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The American Historical Review

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In This Issue

This issue contains the American Historical Association Presidential Address and four articles. The presidential address confronts the issue of statelessness, offering a historical and far-seeing perspective on this timely topic. Like many of the articles in recent issues, the four that follow all deal with comparative or transnational themes. One looks at Indians in the context of the U.S.-Mexican War; another compares the writings on nationalism of two twentieth-century literary figures in colonial contexts; a third examines the “opening of Japan” from a Russian angle; and the final article reexamines “bourgeois feminism” as a contentious topic among modern feminists in the West. As always, a large part of the issue is devoted to our extensive book review section.

Presidential Address

Linda K. Kerber's presidential address, “The Stateless as the Citizen's Other: A View from the United States,” is a wide-ranging and passionate discussion of an issue that has particular meaning in our time, marked as it is by a dramatic increase in the number of refugees, asylum seekers, and other uprooted peoples. She begins—and ends—her address by posing a question drawn from *Madame Butterfly*: What passport would the child of Butterfly and Pinkerton have carried? It is a question relevant to legions of people in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, but especially those, like Cho-Cho-San and her son, whose claim to American citizenship has been legally compromised by their foreign birth. Indeed, Kerber notes that women and children have historically been the most vulnerable when it comes to denying or questioning people's claims to U.S. citizenship. She also shows that the laws that denied citizenship to illegitimate children of American citizens abroad were largely conceived as measures to protect U.S. soldiers in foreign theaters of war from the burden of unwanted dependents. Her address goes on to consider the historical evolution in our understanding of citizenship, leading to the widespread acceptance today of dual citizenship as well as somewhat elastic notions of citizenship as embodied, for example, in the political culture of the European Union. Still, the specter of statelessness is one that haunts many. It is a worldwide problem, aggravated by the vicissitudes of war and the global traffic in labor, among other dislocating forces. The rest of her address provides a survey of how statelessness has figured in American history—from slaves and Indians to others made vulnerable to this condition by marrying people who were ineligible for citizenship because of their race or nationality. In the early part of the twentieth century, she notes, this included immigrant women whose native countries expatriated them upon their marriage to an

American national: they remained stateless until they were legally naturalized. It also was a condition that could result from the deportation of legal residents guilty of crimes or other misdeeds; and in recent times it threatens those caught in the penal shadowland fostered by the war on terrorism. Kerber provocatively suggests that the condition of statelessness serves “the state by signaling who will not be entitled to its protection, and throwing fear into the rest of us.” She ends her address with a wistful and passionate meditation on the possibility of an emerging new understanding of citizenship as a global right—a “meaningful cosmopolitanism, in which a robust international law protects human rights in reliable ways, and reliance on the vagaries of the single nation state is less essential.”

Articles

In “Independent Indians and the U.S.-Mexican War,” **Brian DeLay** offers a new interpretation of the conflict that won the United States half of Mexico’s national territory. During the 1830s and 1840s, northern Mexico experienced a terrifying increase in interethnic violence as Comanches, Kiowas, Apaches, and other Indians attacked Mexican settlements across nine states. Raids claimed thousands of lives, shattered critical sectors of northern Mexico’s economy, and depopulated much of its vast countryside. Just as importantly, the violence shaped how Americans and Mexicans came to view each other in advance of the war. U.S. observers saw Indians driving Mexicans backward, and used this observation to form ambitions and tactics for continental expansion. For their part, Mexicans came to believe that the United States was fomenting raids in order to acquire territory. Most consequentially, Indian raids shaped the course and outcome of the war itself. Exhausted, impoverished, and facing ongoing attacks, northern Mexicans were woefully unprepared to confront the U.S. Army in 1846. American commanders exploited the violence to manage the occupation; and politicians in Washington invoked Indian raiding to justify the seizure of more than half a million square miles of land. In this article, DeLay seeks to make Indians central to our understanding of the U.S.-Mexican War. More broadly, he argues for the relevance of native polities to the international history of the nineteenth-century Americas.

In “Overcoming the ‘Contagion of Mimicry’: The Cosmopolitan Nationalism and Modernist History of Rabindranath Tagore and W. B. Yeats,” **Louise Blakeney Williams** explores the unique view of nationalism of two Nobel Prize-winning poets of the first part of the twentieth century: Rabindranath Tagore and W. B. Yeats. Both authors were lauded as the greatest poets of their countries, but they were also criticized by anticolonial activists at the time, and some scholars in the past few decades, for being pro-British elitists rather than true nationalists. Williams argues, on the contrary, that Tagore’s and Yeats’s ideas were misunderstood at the time and since. Far from being antinationalist, Tagore and Yeats attempted to define an alternative version of nationalism that resembles the “new” cosmopolitanism, a concept that has been considered so promising by many academics in the past twenty years. Both authors hoped for a nationalism that could combine the universal and particular, and the best of the metropolis and periphery, rather than exclude one or the other. Williams shows that they were able to develop these theories because of their nonpro-

gressive views of history. Their resulting version of nationalism avoided many of the problems with anticolonial theories that have been criticized by postcolonial scholars. Above all, the nationalism of Tagore and Yeats was far less imitative of modern Western discourse than other nationalisms because it avoided Orientalist dichotomizing, imperial historical metanarratives, and a valorization of modernization and statism. Thus, the cosmopolitanism of these two great poets had the potential to be more subversive to imperialism than were other forms of nationalism at the time.

Western modernity has long provided a governing logic for our understanding of the history of modern Japan. This logic has often interlinked our use of sources of historical evidence, the method of investigation, theory, and historical narratives. “Reopening the ‘Opening of Japan’: A Russian-Japanese Revolutionary Encounter and the Vision of Anarchist Progress” by **Sho Konishi** attempts to construct an alternative logic of history writing that connects sources, method, theory, and narrative in new ways. The article traces the transnational encounter in mid-nineteenth-century Japan between the Russian revolutionary Lev Mechnikov and Japanese who participated in the “Meiji Ishin,” what Mechnikov called a “complete and radical revolution.” Their revolutionary encounter took place on the non-state and non-organizational level beyond the imagined divide between East and West, a spatial order that itself has been a product of the temporal order of Western modernity. From his encounters with Ishin Japan, Mechnikov constructed a novel theory of human evolutionary progress based on cooperatist principles of anarchism that would both transform modern anarchist thought and form the basis for a major current in Japanese intellectual and cultural life: “cooperatist anarchist modernity.” Those who identified with this movement saw themselves transcending national, racial, gender, and other identities of a specific nature. By tracing intellectual developments transnationally, through cross-border networks, this article offers a fresh approach to Japanese intellectual history. In unsettling, or “reopening,” the historical meaning and value of Japan’s opening to the wider world, Konishi argues for the importance of viewing modern international history outside the epistemological limits of East and West, colonized and colonizer.

“Rethinking the Socialist Construction and International Career of the Concept ‘Bourgeois Feminism’” by **Marilyn J. Boxer** addresses a major theme in women’s history and historiography: the widespread and persistent categorization of women’s movements that distinguishes the thought and action of feminists on the basis of their alleged class interests. Focusing on the origins and usages of the concept “bourgeois feminism,” her article shows how it was deployed by leftists, ranging from socialist women of the Second International to activists of “second wave” feminism, in order to trivialize and dismiss nonsocialist feminist claims. And she also demonstrates the role played by historians and feminist theorists in passing along the rhetoric and politics of the earlier era to a new generation of students and activists. While questioning the class basis on which the distinction between socialist women and non-socialist feminists rests and the extent to which it affected the potential for collaboration among women’s groups, Boxer suggests the need for new histories of feminism and the left no longer encumbered by problematic assumptions about women’s class interests or by socialist politics of the past.



Photo by Tom Langdon, University of Iowa

LINDA K. KERBER

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Presidential Address
The Stateless as the Citizen's Other:
A View from the United States

LINDA K. KERBER

I BEGIN BY ASKING an anachronistic and playful but nevertheless deeply tragic question: What passport would the ill-fated child of *Madame Butterfly* and Captain Pinkerton carry? Normally historians do not turn to an opera libretto for inspiration. Yet this story carries with it hints that help us map the landscape of statelessness in U.S. history, from the founding generation to the present.

It is a subterranean tale that haunts the imperial imagination. The roles have been dramatized over and over again—the man whom the American military has deployed in a strange landscape in a foreign part of the globe; the exotic woman whom he impregnates and abandons. Giacomo Puccini relied on American sources when he wrote the opera *Madame Butterfly*, which had its premiere at La Scala a century ago, in 1904. Puccini was inspired by a play of the same title, written by David Belasco, which he saw in London in 1900 in the Duke of York's Theatre (where Tom Stoppard's *Rock and Roll* is now playing). Belasco based his play on a novella by the Philadelphia writer John Luther Long, who, in his turn, was revising a fictionalized memoir by the French writer Pierre Loti.¹

Whether in novella, play, or opera, the lover is Benjamin Franklin Pinkerton, a U.S. naval officer whose name signals the self-made, cynical American. He beds a trusting Japanese girl, tricking her into breaking with her family. She is pregnant when Pinkerton leaves with his fleet, promising to return. Slowly it dawns on Cho-Cho-San that this respectable military man cannot be counted on; nor will the laws of his nation enforce his promises to her. In Long's story, Cho-Cho-San speaks in

A somewhat different version of this address was offered as the Harold Vyvyan Harmsworth Memorial Lecture at Oxford University, November 16, 2006. I have many people to thank for their good counsel as this project developed over an extended period of time. My recent debts in the UK include invigorating conversations with Tony Badger, Nicholas Bamforth, Jane Caplan, Desmond King, Simon Newman, Matthew Nicholls, Peter Thompson, and the Cambridge University American History Seminar. I am grateful to the Citizenship Study Group at the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study in 2003 and to my colleagues in the University of Iowa Department of History and College of Law. Over the years, I have depended on the wise counsel of many scholars: Thomas Bender, Jacqueline Bhabha, G. Daniel Cohen, Nancy Falgout, Paula Fass, Drew Faust, Michael Grossberg, Charles Hawley, Elizabeth Hillman, Frederick Hoxie, Stephen Legomsky, Gerda Lerner, Barbara Schwartz, Mark Sidel, Avi Soifer, Christopher Tomlins, Barbara Welke, Marilyn Young, all of whom must be absolved from responsibility for any misinterpretations of mine. My greatest debt is to Mary Dudziak, who understood this project when it was just a gleam in my eye, and has offered wise counsel from the beginning.

¹ Kaori O'Connor, "Introduction," in Pierre Loti, *Madam Chrysanthemum* (1901; repr., London, 1985), viii, 335.



PHOTO HALL

THE DEATH OF BUTTERFLY

FIGURE 1: Butterfly has blindfolded her son, whose name is Trouble, so that he cannot see her suicide. Puccini's stage directions specify that she give the child a doll and an American flag to distract him. The photo is probably of the famous American soprano Geraldine Farrar, in a production before 1913. From *The Victor Book of the Opera: Stories of One Hundred Operas with Five-Hundred Illustrations & Descriptions of One-Thousand Victor Opera Records* (Camden, N.J., 1913), 224.

broken English; but as the reader adapts to the way she talks, she becomes a figure whom we respect and with whom we sympathize. Cho-Cho-San clings to the dream of Pinkerton's return—with the robins, as he has promised—and she resolves not to beg:

He don' naever egspeg we got this nize bebbby, account I don' tell him. I don' kin tell him. I don' know where he is. But—me? I don' tell if I know, account he rush right over here, an' desert his country, an' henceforth git in a large trouble—mebbby with that President United States America, an' that large Goddess Liberty Independence!²

A year later, the fleet returns, and she sees him on the deck of a ship in the harbor, arm in arm with a blonde woman; the woman introduces herself to the American consul as Mrs. Benjamin Pinkerton when Cho-Cho-San happens to be in the room. Devastated, Cho-Cho-San attempts suicide with her own father's sword, inscribed "To die with Honor / When one can no longer live with Honor."

² John Luther Long, *Madame Butterfly*, chap. 10, originally published in *Century Illustrated Magazine*, January 1898; reprinted in Maureen Honey and Jean Lee Cole, eds., *Madame Butterfly and A Japanese Nightingale: Two Orientalist Texts* (New Brunswick, N.J., 2002).

Cho-Cho-San—"San" is an honorific; we're speaking of "Miss Cho-Cho"—has been reinvented in our own time as Miss Saigon. Now the composers are French—Claude-Michel Schönberg and Alain Boublil—and the setting is the American war in Vietnam. Boublil has been explicit about how Pierre Loti's fiction resonated with what he learned while growing up in Tunisia: "Vietnam was a French colony and a French mistake before it became an American one." The authors were also inspired by a 1985 photograph of an airlift of "bui-doi"—the mixed-race children of American soldiers and Vietnamese women.

Schönberg and Boublil have transformed Pinkerton into Chris, an appealingly naive American soldier, authentically in love with Kim, a young woman from a respectable family who has been driven to work as a bar girl. When they are separated by the hurricane of war, Kim is brave and resilient, even prepared to kill to protect the child whom Chris does not know he has fathered. Some years later, when Chris finds out about the child, he is back in the U.S. and married. He is ravaged by guilt and the desire to be a true father to his child. His American wife can suggest no solution except to adopt the child themselves. Even in the context of decent people trying to do the right thing, the only way for Miss Saigon to make a respectable future for her child is to disappear. The music stops with her suicide. *Miss Saigon* has had its own stunning success; the London and New York productions ran for ten years each. Duplicate productions have been staged in dozens of other cities around the world.

So now to our anachronistic question: What passport would the child of Madame Butterfly and Captain Pinkerton carry? In the Meiji period in Japan, as in the West until roughly World War I, practices of documenting individual identity were underdeveloped, and the strict system of passport controls with which we have come to be familiar had yet to be invented. Long after Admiral Perry "opened" Japan to foreign intrusion in 1853, it remained rare for Japanese subjects to leave the island. Still, trying to answer the question is a useful exercise.

Was the child a Japanese subject? In the Meiji period, where the story is set, the concept of national civic identity was weak. What counted for legitimacy was inclusion in the father's family registry. Not until 1985 was Nationality Law in Japan revised to permit Japanese women to transmit Japanese citizenship to their children.³ In Butterfly's time, an illegitimate birth was frequently disguised by being registered as the child of the woman's parents, born late in their lives; but in the story, Butterfly has broken from her family, so this registration is unlikely.⁴

Was the child an American citizen? If Butterfly had stowed away on Pinkerton's ship, and given birth to their baby on American soil, the child would have been a citizen at birth, even if Butterfly had never married Pinkerton. The Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, ratified in 1868, guarantees that "all persons, born or naturalized in the United States, are citizens of the United States and of the

³ Vera Mackie, "Feminist Critiques of Modern Japanese Politics," in Bonnie Smith, ed., *Global Feminism since 1945* (London, 2000), 182–183, 190. See also Chikako Kashiwazaki, "Citizenship in Japan: Legal Practice and Contemporary Development," in T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Douglas Klusmeyer, eds., *From Migrants to Citizens: Membership in a Changing World* (Washington, D.C., 2000), 434–471.

⁴ On this point I am grateful for the good counsel of Patricia Steinhoff and Robert Straton of the University of Hawaii. Straton, "Patriarchy in Meiji Japan" (Ph.D. diss., University of Hawaii, 2006).

state in which they reside.” If Pinkerton had married Butterfly, he would have transmitted his citizenship to their child wherever that child was born. But Butterfly does not stow away, nor does Pinkerton marry her, nor does he claim or legitimize the child, who therefore has no claim on the United States. In the U.S., nonmarital children born overseas to American citizen fathers are not citizens until the father legitimizes them. Unrecognized by either nation, Butterfly’s baby is effectively stateless.

A century stretches between our time and Pinkerton’s. His story has been relived countless times, and the American answer to the passport question has not substantially changed. The practices that define which children born abroad are to be considered citizens from birth and which must be naturalized still take into account the status of the mother and the status of the father asymmetrically. Indeed, a case involving these issues came before the U.S. Supreme Court as recently as 2001, and in dealing with it, the Court found itself contemplating our assumptions about belonging and protection, about birthright citizenship and its absence.

Tuan Ahn Nguyen was born in 1969. His father, Joseph Boulais, was an American army veteran who, after his discharge from service in Germany, went to Vietnam in 1963 as a civilian employee of a construction company. Boulais had a son with a Vietnamese woman. In a reversal of the *Madame Butterfly* trope, the Vietnamese mother abandoned her son at birth. In this true story, the father is the nurturer: Boulais remained in Vietnam, married another Vietnamese woman, and cared for his son. In the chaos of the collapse of the Saigon regime in 1975, Nguyen was brought to the U.S. along with other refugees and was reunited with his father and stepmother; from the age of six, he grew up in Houston in his father’s home.

Various statutes provide that children born abroad whose parents are married to each other, and at least one of whom is a citizen, are citizens at birth, so long as one parent has lived in the United States for five years, at least two of which were after age fourteen. But should the parents *not* be married to each other, and if only one is a U.S. citizen, then the sex of the citizen parent has major consequences. In a practice that reaches back to medieval England—when the older rule that the bastard was the child of no one was revised to make the bastard the child of the mother (continuing to free the father from any obligation to that child), extended when the American colonies reified the practice in the form of statutes that provided that children fathered by slave masters “followed the condition of the mother”—birthright citizenship for children born overseas to unmarried couples is transmitted effortlessly only through the mother. But the law requires that a child born overseas to an unmarried citizen father and a foreign woman is not a citizen until the father acknowledges paternity legally and provides financial support until the child reaches the age of eighteen.

So Nguyen was not a citizen. Although Joseph Boulais provided financial support, he neglected to register the birth officially or to demonstrate a blood relationship with the child. So long as life moved along quietly, what did formal paperwork matter? But in the early 1990s, Nguyen was found guilty of two counts of sexual assault on a minor and was given an eight-year prison sentence. While he was serving his term, Congress, responding to a rising tide of anti-immigrant sentiment, tightened the rules for lawful permanent residents such as Nguyen. Conviction for an aggra-

vated felony now meant deportation. And in 2001, a five-to-four U.S. Supreme Court majority denied Nguyen's father's claim that he should have been able to transmit birthright citizenship to his child on the same terms that an American citizen woman can.⁵

In reaching this decision, the Supreme Court wrestled with the meaning of gender equity, scrutinizing Section 1409 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 and its subsequent revisions (the statute that makes distinctions between how men and women confer citizenship on nonmarital children born abroad). The members of the Court considered whether the statute met the high level of scrutiny that has been required since 1996. To meet that standard, those who defend discrimination on the basis of sex must show an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for that discrimination. It must serve "important governmental objectives," and the discriminatory means employed must be "substantially related" to the achievement of those objectives. Writing for the majority, Justice Anthony Kennedy defended the additional requirements placed on men to legitimize a nonmarital child on the grounds that these rules ensure that an authentic parent-child bond exists; that bond, in turn, could be counted on to transmit the values of citizenship (the important governmental objective). Boulais was not being burdened more severely than nonmarital fathers of children born within the United States who are required to exhibit their relationship to the child. Moreover, requiring men to legitimize their nonmarital children guarded against error or trickery: "Given the 9-month interval between conception and birth, it is not always certain," Justice Kennedy observed, "that a father will know that a child was conceived, nor is it always clear that even the mother will be sure of the father's identity. This fact takes on particular significance in the case of a child born overseas and out of wedlock." As for the birthright citizenship transmitted by the nonmarital birth mother, that, Kennedy thought, merely equalized her situation with that of the married mother or of the nonmarital mother who was in a position to return to the United States to bear her child.⁶

Lurking behind the reasoning of the majority opinion lay a fear that was not spoken in the opinion, but that was spelled out at length in the brief filed by the Department of Justice in support of making distinctions between mothers and fathers: "Congress minimized the burdens on unwed mothers who seek citizenship for their children . . . in order to advance its important interest in avoiding statelessness." In the United States, citizenship accompanies birth on American soil, whatever the citizenship or marital status of the parents. But in most nations, citizenship is traced through bloodline and only secondarily through place of birth. By the law of many nations, including nations in which the U.S. has had a substantial military presence, a child born out of wedlock inherits the citizenship of the mother.⁷ There

⁵ *Tuan Ahn Nguyen v. INS*, 533 U.S. 53 (2001). I have written about this case in "Top Court Took a Step Backward on Gender Bias," *Boston Globe*, June 23, 2001, and "Toward a History of Statelessness in America," *American Quarterly* 57 (September 2005): 727-749. See also Kristin Collins, "When Fathers' Rights Are Mothers' Duties: The Failure of Equal Protection in *Miller v. Albright*," *Yale Law Journal* 109 (2000): 101-142.

⁶ *Nguyen*, 53, 60, 65-66, and *Tuan Ahn Nguyen v. INS*, Brief for Respondent, December 13, 2000, 10. This is a development that many feminists had supported, in an effort to strengthen the rights of unmarried birth mothers within the United States. See *Lehr v. Robertson*, 463 U.S. 248 (1983).

⁷ *Nguyen*, Brief for Respondent, 34. On the transmission of citizenship, good places to start are Sarah A. Adams, "The Basic Right of Citizenship: A Comparative Study," Center for Immigration Stud-

was, the Department of Justice argued, a real danger: “that the foreign-born children of unwed citizen mothers might become stateless if they were not eligible for United States citizenship, because the children would not be eligible for citizenship in the country of birth or in the country of the unwed father.”⁸

Congress had recognized this danger in 1940 and again in 1952, framing the law to “insure that the child shall have a nationality at birth.” In Germany, South Korea, and Japan (and to a lesser degree in Thailand), “the danger of statelessness in the event that the [nonmarital] father does not acknowledge the child remains a concern.”⁹ Men and women were differently situated in exposing their nonmarital child to the risk of statelessness: “The foreign-born child of an unwed American mother is at much greater risk of losing his or her ‘status in organized society’ than the foreign-born child of an unwed American father.”¹⁰ Congress left nonmarital children of U.S. citizen fathers exposed to the vagaries of the individual men’s variable sense of personal responsibility and the rules of the countries in which they happened to be born.

“One concern in this context,” Justice Kennedy observed, “has always been with young people, men for the most part, who are on duty with the Armed Forces in foreign countries.” Over one million military personnel were stationed in foreign countries in the year Nguyen was born.¹¹ In a dissenting opinion in one of the cases that formed a backdrop to *Nguyen*, Judge Andrew Kleinfeld of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals had emphasized that Congress understood full well what they were doing:

This statute was passed during the Korean War. Members of Congress knew that American soldiers who went abroad to fight wars, and caused children to be conceived while they were abroad, were overwhelmingly male, because only males were drafted, so that the number of children born illegitimately of male citizens might be large enough to affect immigration policy, while the number of illegitimate children of female citizens would be negligible. They may also have sought to minimize the administrative burden on the Department of Defense for paternity and citizenship claims respectively by the women the soldiers left behind and their children. This may not be pretty, but it is a rational basis for the sex distinction . . . Some noncustodial fathers of children born out of wedlock do not care to pay child support if it can be avoided.¹²

In other words, even those men representing the United States abroad have the Court’s permission to father children out of wedlock and abandon them. “I expect very few of these are the children of female service personnel,” Ruth Bader Ginsburg wryly observed to uncomfortable laughter in the courtroom during the oral argument in *Nguyen*. “There are these men out there who are being Johnny Appleseed.”¹³ In

ies, Washington, D.C., Summer 1994, <http://www.cis.org/articles/1993/back793.html> (accessed January 11, 2007). An important survey is Patrick Weil, “Access to Citizenship: A Comparison of Twenty-Five Nationality Laws,” in T. Alexander Aleinikoff and Douglas Klusmeyer, eds., *Citizenship Today: Global Perspectives and Practices* (New York, 2001), 17–35.

⁸ *Nguyen*, Brief for Respondent, 8.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 19, 36.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 42.

¹¹ *Nguyen*, 65.

¹² *United States v. Ahumada-Aguilar*, 189 F.3d.1121 (9th Cir. 1999).

¹³ Oral Argument in *Nguyen*. It should be emphasized that the minority was unpersuaded. In dissent,

arriving at its judgment about gender equity, the Supreme Court responded to the fear of statelessness.



STATELESSNESS IS A SUBJECT that most historians of the United States have treated as belonging to other national histories—Jews, Gypsies, Palestinians. That U.S. history is taken to be innocent of engagement with the subject is yet another example of the habits of American exceptionalism. Since the *meanings* of statelessness have changed over time, the subject is one that should command the attention of historians as well as humanitarians.

In recent years, when some boundaries between states have become more plastic, “statelessness” has sometimes been given a positive valence. Statelessness can be made to sustain a cosmopolitan dream. The dreamers include many citizens of the member states of the European Union, whose passports carry them over the borders of twenty-five nations, and hundreds of thousands of people who hold more than one passport, often wealthy people with property on two continents. For these people, a destabilized citizenship is an enriched citizenship. Such people may speak cheerfully of multiplied citizenships, a comfortable cosmopolitanism, being a citizen of the world. If citizenship is about what might be called *statefullness*, then some people are rich in it.¹⁴

Somewhat less expansively, but with more stability, simple dual nationality is increasingly common. One result of the technological and economic changes we call globalization is that more and more people now live outside their natal countries—the UN’s 2000 estimate was some 185 million, and the number is clearly growing. Sometimes parents share the same nationality; international marriages are also becoming more frequent. Increasing numbers of children hold citizenship of one country through descent and of another by *jus solis*—birth on the soil.¹⁵

Sandra Day O’Connor stressed the principle—well established, she argued, in a long train of decisions stretching back to the 1970s—that “sex based statutes deny individuals opportunity.” The dissenters did not agree that the statute ensured “that children who are born abroad out of wedlock have, during their minority, attained a sufficiently recognized or formal relationship to their United States citizen parent—and thus to the United States—to justify the conferral of citizenship upon them,” since biological mothers could also be neglectful of their relations with their children. *Nguyen*, 79. That administrative convenience may not be used as justification for discrimination on the basis of sex had been established in *Reed v. Reed*, 404 U.S. 71 (1971), the first decision in which the Court found discrimination on the basis of sex to be a denial of equal protection of the laws. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, then thirty-eight years old, and ACLU director Mel Wulf wrote the brief for Sally Reed, who challenged the Idaho rule that when separated parents competed to serve as administrator of their dead son’s estate, the father must be preferred.

¹⁴ Arjun Appadurai, “Patriotism and Its Futures,” *Public Cultures* 5, no. 3 (1993): 423–424; Aihwa Ong, *Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality* (Durham, N.C., 1999); Linda Bosniak, “Denationalizing Citizenship,” in Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer, *Citizenship Today*, 237–252. A contradictory trend has been the effort of some wealthy individuals to relinquish their citizenship, and of the manipulations of corporate nationality to avoid paying taxes. A place to begin to consider this is G. Warren Whitaker and B. Dane Dudley, “Departing Is Such Sweet Sorrow: Giving Up U.S. Citizenship or Residence,” *Probate and Property* 19 (September/October 2005): 10–12. I am grateful to Stanford Ross for this point.

¹⁵ Among the many discussions of this subject are David A Martin and Kay Hailbronner, eds., *Rights and Duties of Dual Nationals: Evolution and Prospects* (The Hague, 2003), especially Martin, “Intro-

The old tradition that required the renunciation of all other nationalities at the time of naturalization has substantially—but not completely—eroded. Canada dropped its renunciation requirement in 1947. The 1997 European Convention on Nationality accepts dual nationality, although some countries, including Germany, require adults who gained dual citizenship at birth to make a choice of nationality when they reach adulthood. In an effort to enable expatriates to protect themselves against increasingly harsh U.S. deportation laws and heightened discrimination, and responding to the hesitation, on sentimental and practical grounds, of expatriates to take oaths of naturalization, Mexico and some other Latin American countries changed their laws in the late 1990s to embrace dual citizenship (generally with provision to eliminate dual voting). And although the first item in the United States of America's oath of naturalization is the renunciation of allegiance to "any foreign prince, potentate, state or sovereignty of whom or of which I have heretofore been a subject or citizen," the Department of State puts virtually no energy into enforcing this provision. In 1967, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that voluntary denationalization must be explicit—that even voting in a foreign election did not imply expatriation. In a powerful opinion, Justice Hugo Black wrote that the intention of Congress in the era of the Fourteenth Amendment had been "to put citizenship beyond the power of any governmental unit to destroy." Without a specific and voluntary renunciation, the Court held, "Congress has no power to divest a person of citizenship." Consular officials now abide by that rule; even the holding of dual nationality in the face of the naturalization oath is not construed by the Executive Branch as voluntary relinquishment.¹⁶

Yet even the enriched state is still defined by borders. Inside those borders are citizens and subjects, legal permanent residents, refugees, undocumented aliens. It has become essential to a state's identity that it be able to distinguish between those who belong—and are vulnerable to taxation and conscription—and those who do not. Citizens' identities are secured by passports, which they must have in order to leave the nation and in order to reenter it. International law limits the power of a nation to exclude or deport its own nationals; U.S. citizens have a virtually absolute right to enter the United States.¹⁷ Legal permanent residents leave with nonbinding assurances that they can reenter; they are vulnerable if the rules or policies change while they are away. In times of danger—as last summer in Lebanon—the U.S. will seek to evacuate its citizens; but lawful permanent residents (green card holders) generally are not entitled to emergency and protective services provided by the U.S. government and must turn to the nearest diplomatic representative of the country of which they are nationals.¹⁸ Undocumented aliens had better leave by the invisible

duction: *The Trend toward Dual Nationality*, 3–18; and Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer, *From Migrants to Citizens*, especially Miriam Feldblum, "Managing Membership: New Trends in Citizenship and Nationality Policy," 475–499.

¹⁶ *Afroyim v. Rusk*, 387 U.S. 253 (1967); *Vance v. Terrazas*, 444 U.S. 252 (1980).

¹⁷ Stephen Legomsky, "Why Citizenship?" *Virginia Journal of International Law* 35 (1994–1995): 289. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 12.4, adopted by the United Nations 1966, entered into force 1976; adopted by the United States and entered into force 1992.

¹⁸ Consular officials are guided in this matter by the *Foreign Affairs Manual*, vol. 7, 012—Eligibility: Section c. The manual does provide, however, that "When an L[egal] P[ermanent] R[esident] applicant has exceptionally close and strong ties to the United States, and overriding humanitarian and com-

modes by which they came. Most nations require a visa of foreigners who enter, and thus control admission at their borders. The ultimate "other" to the citizen is not the citizen of a different country, not the multiply passported, but rather those who lack passports of any sort; the stateless are defined by what they *lack*.

When Hannah Arendt—who herself was stateless for more than a decade—wrote memorably about statelessness a half-century ago, it was technically a legal term of art, describing "a person who is not considered as a national by any State by the operation of its law."¹⁹ The stateless person may be a refugee, but not necessarily, for in times of peace a state may not have much interest in emphasizing vulnerability. A refugee may—but not necessarily—be a stateless person. If a refugee has a state, it is a state to which he or she is unable or unwilling to turn for protection; a stateless refugee is presumed not to have access to state protection at all.²⁰ (The German constitution explicitly provides that people cannot be denationalized if that would expose them to statelessness.)²¹ The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights asserts that "Every person has a right to a nationality." The 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons prohibits expulsion of stateless persons "save on grounds of national security or public order," but provides no oversight or enforcement mechanism. Neither the U.S. nor Canada ratified the 1954 Convention, apparently because both were concentrating on the overwhelming problem of refugees and displaced persons after the war and feared that the convention's recognition of *de facto* (as well as *de jure*) stateless persons might encourage them to seek "a new nationality for the sake of convenience."²²

In our own historical moment, the contours of statelessness are somewhat different than they were in the immediate aftermath of World War II. It is true that statelessness is the formal description of lack. But statelessness is also a condition that changes over time, dynamically created and re-created by sovereignties in their own interests, defining the vulnerable in ways that affirm the invulnerable, and in the process revealing changing domestic values and changing power relations across international boundaries.

The nightmare of statelessness—of the man, woman, or child without a country—exists everywhere in our own time. As the meanings of work, racial identity, and gender identity have shifted over time under the stress of war, political struggles, global economic relations, and developing ideologies, vulnerability to statelessness

passionate grounds exist, request guidance from CA/OCS/ACS about the propriety of providing the service, with the understanding that the host government may not, and is not obligated to, honor a request from the U.S. Government on behalf of such an individual." I am grateful to Charles Hawley, Vice Consul, U.S. Consulate General, Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, for this reference.

¹⁹ The 1954 Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons entered into force June 6, 1960, but as of September 2006, only sixty states had signed and ratified it. The U.S. is not among them. The text is conveniently found on the UNHCR website: <http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3bbb0abc7.pdf> (accessed January 11, 2007).

²⁰ Andrew Brouwer for UNHCR, "Statelessness in Canadian Context: A Discussion Paper," July 2003, 23; <http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/40629ffc7.pdf> (accessed January 11, 2007).

²¹ Basic Law, Section I, Basic Rights; Article 16: (1) "German citizenship may not be taken away. Citizenship may be lost only pursuant to a law, and against the will of the concerned person only if they do not become stateless as a result." Gisbert H. Flanz, ed., *Constitutions of the Countries of the World* (Dobbs Ferry, N.Y., 2003), n.p.

²² Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948, Article 15; Convention Relating to Stateless Persons, Article 32; UNHCR, "Statelessness in Canadian Context," 8.

AFFIDAVIT OF IDENTITY IN LIEU OF PASSPORT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA)
 STATE OF New York) S.S.
 COUNTY OF New York)
 I

I, JOHANNA BLUCHER, nee Arendt, also known as HANNAH ARENDT
 residing at 130 Morningside Drive New York 27, N.Y.
 being duly sworn, depose and state:

1. I was born on Oct. 14, 1906 at Hannover in Germany
2. My occupation is Writer; Executive Secretary of Jewish Cultural Reconstruction, Inc.
3. I am married; the name of my husband is Heinrich Blucher born on Jan. 29, 1899 at Berlin/Germany, residing at 130 Morningside Drive, New York 27, N.Y.
4. I am a former citizen of Germany and at present stateless
5. I was lawfully admitted as a permanent resident of the United States of America at Rouses Pt., N.Y. on April 14, 1946
6. I declared my intention to become a citizen of the United States of America on June 20, 1946 before the US District Court for the Southern District of New York
7. I resided since birth at the following places:
 From 1906-1928: Koenigsberg - Germany
 1929-1931: Frankfurt - Germany
 1931-1933: Berlin - Germany
 1933-1940: Paris - France
 1940-1941: Montauban - France
 1941-1949: New York - United States of America
8. I wish to use this document in lieu of passport which I, a stateless person, cannot obtain at present.
9. I am desirous of travelling to Europe for the following reasons: representative of Jewish Cultural Reconstruction, Inc. 1341 Broadway New York, N.Y.
10. I am attaching hereto my photograph and I am giving my personal description as evidence of my identity.
11. I intend to return to the United States after a stay abroad of about 6 months.

Hannah Blucher - Arendt

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a
 Notary Public this 7th day of July 1949.
 CARL A. NOLTE, JR.
 Notary Public, State of New York
 No. 41-2902150
 Qual. in Queens Co., Cert. Filed
 With N.Y. Co. Clerk and Register
 Commission Expires March 30, 1951

Personal description of applicant: Height: 5 feet 6 1/2 inches. Weight: 135
 Color of eyes: brown Color of hair: dark
 Complexion: fair Distinctive marks: none

I hereby certify that the above is the true and proper photograph
 and description of *Hannah Blucher*, the deponent of the
 affidavit hereto attached.
 CARL A. NOLTE, JR.
 Notary Public
 No. 41-2902150
 Qual. in Queens Co., Cert. Filed
 With N.Y. Co. Clerk and Register
 Commission Expires March 30, 1951

RECEIVED
 JUL 14 1949
 NEW YORK

FIGURE 2: Hannah Arendt's "Affidavit of Identity in Lieu of a Passport, 1949." Note answers to questions 4 and 8. Box 4, Hannah Arendt Papers, Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.

has been reconfigured. The definition of statelessness itself has expanded. In the United States now, perhaps the most chilling signal that reconceptualization is possible is the presence of a vigorous political attack on the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of birthright citizenship, an attack that destabilizes one of the strongest founding principles of American identity and makes highly likely the increase of statelessness. Although a parent receives no immigration benefits from having a U.S. citizen child until that child turns twenty-one, this attack has been soaked with the complaint that pregnant women enter the United States illegally in order that their children may claim citizenship by birthright, in effect tricking the generous provision of the Fourteenth Amendment.²³

The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees now speaks of *effective nationality* and *ineffective nationality*, and of *de facto* statelessness.²⁴ It has broadened the definition to include "the unprotected."²⁵ "Statelessness spells vulnerability," writes the immigration lawyer Stephen Legomsky. "In a world built on nationality, one simply cannot leave home without it . . . Every individual needs one sovereign state to play the role of guardian angel."²⁶

The pace of attention paid to the issue of statelessness can be traced in the lineage of fiction and nonfiction writings, tracking with chilling accuracy the rise and fall of the threat of statelessness throughout the world. There is Edward Everett Hale's classic novella *The Man without a Country*, written during the Civil War and re-

²³ On the inability of noncitizen parents to benefit from the citizenship of their child, see 8 U.S.C. section 1151(b)(2)(A)(I). An argument for reinterpreting the Fourteenth Amendment was made by Peter H. Schuck and Rogers H. Smith in *Citizenship without Consent: Illegal Aliens in American Polity* (New Haven, Conn., 1985). More recently it was made in the Brief of Amicus Curiae Eagle Forum Education and Legal Defense Fund in Support of Respondents in *Yaser Esam Hamdi et al. v. Rumsfeld*, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). An effort to undermine birthright citizenship by statute was defeated in the immigration reform bill of December 2005. For an international overview, see Andrew Grossman, "Birthright Citizenship as Nationality of Convenience," Proceedings of the Third Conference on Nationality, Council of Europe, October 2004, <http://uniset.ca/naty/maternity/> (accessed January 11, 2007). In 1993, Representative Elton Gallegly of California sponsored a constitutional amendment that would have changed the language of the Fourteenth Amendment to read "All persons born in the United States . . . of mothers who are citizens or legal residents of the United States . . . are citizens of the United States." See "The Birthright Citizenship Amendment: A Threat to Equality," *Harvard Law Review* 107 (1994): 1026–1043. For a defense against the constitutional attack, see Walter Dellinger, "Statement before the Subcommittees on Immigration and Claims and on the Constitution of the House Committee on the Judiciary," December 13, 1995, <http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/deny.tes.31.htm> (accessed January 11, 2007).

²⁴ International conventions on statelessness were established in 1954 (Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons) and 1961 (Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness). They can conveniently be found at <http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/stateless.htm> and <http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/statelessness.htm> (both accessed January 11, 2007). The UNHCR web page <http://www.unhcr.org/protect/3b8265c7a.html> (accessed January 11, 2007), framed as an answer to the question "Who is stateless?" is very helpful. It has the current definition: "A stateless person is someone who is not recognized by any country as a citizen. Several million people globally are effectively trapped in this legal limbo, enjoying only minimal access to national or international legal protection or to such basic rights as health and education." The UNHCR site also has convenient links to texts of conventions, case law, and UN reports. Among the most useful are UNHCR, "2005 Global Refugee Trends: Statistical Overview of Populations of Refugees, Asylum-Seekers, Internally Displaced Persons, Stateless Persons, and Other Persons of Concern to UNHCR," Geneva, June 9, 2006, <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/events/opendoc.pdf?tbl=STATISTICS&id=4486ceb12> (accessed January 11, 2007). A very good resource is UNHCR, "Statelessness in Canadian Context."

²⁵ Carol Batchelor, "Stateless Persons: Some Gaps in International Protection," *International Journal of Refugee Law* 7, no. 2 (1995): 232–259.

²⁶ Legomsky, "Why Citizenship?" 299–300.

published dozens of times since, especially during World War I and World War II, most recently shortly after 9/11.²⁷ There are films—*Casablanca* (1942), *I Was a Male War Bride* (1949), *Lady without a Passport* (1950), and most recently Steven Spielberg's *Terminal* (2004). The only monograph in the field was published seventy years ago: Catheryn Seckler-Hudson's 1934 *Statelessness: With Special Reference to the United States (A Study in Nationality and Conflict of Laws)*.²⁸ In the aftermath of World War II, when the Atlantic world was swarming with displaced people, Hannah Arendt wrote what remains the most powerful set of reflections on statelessness—the stunning ninth chapter of *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, written between 1945 and 1951, when she herself was stateless.²⁹ Attention to statelessness receded again in the 1960s, reemerged modestly when attention was claimed by refugees from Vietnam and by the contested condition of Palestinians, and then exploded in our own time.³⁰ The UNHCR has recognized that distinctions between stateless people and refugees are somewhat less sharp than they once were. It now describes stateless people as one of several categories among the 20.8 million who represent a “pop-

²⁷ Edward Everett Hale, *The Man without a Country* (Boston, 1865), first appeared in the *Atlantic Monthly* in 1863. It was reprinted steadily throughout the nineteenth century; several editions were timed to coincide with the Spanish-American War. For Hale's own reflections on the origins of the story, see E. E. Hale, “The Man without a Country,” *Outlook* 59 (May 5, 1898): 116. There was another flurry of printings the year after Hale died in 1909. Prompted by World War I, Harvard Classics published its edition in 1917. On the edge of World War II, with the world filled with stateless people who had not denounced their country but who were desperate for sanctuary, the circulation was energized again by cheap copies distributed to schoolchildren. (That may be the form in which I first read it.) It was most recently reprinted by the Naval Institute Press in 2002.

²⁸ Catheryn Seckler-Hudson, *Statelessness: With Special Reference to the United States (A Study in Nationality and Conflict of Laws)* (Washington, D.C., 1934), published under the auspices of the Department of International Law and Relations of the American University Graduate School, with a preface by Ellery C. Stowell, who described statelessness as “an inexcusable anomaly” and an “intolerable condition.”

²⁹ Hannah Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (New York, 1951).

³⁰ For a judicious assessment, see Lex Takkenberg, *The Status of Palestinian Refugees in International Law* (Oxford, 1998), especially chap. V: “Laws Relating to Stateless Persons.” “Palestinians who were displaced as a result of the 1948 war are at the same time both refugees and stateless persons,” Takkenberg observes. Their situation is made more unusual because they were not displaced from a state; the citizenship they once held in the British mandate was erased in 1948. “Gradually, the legal and political impairment of being stateless, not belonging to a state, not having a national passport, became more significant . . . Although the host states have generally provided permanent residency status to those refugees who took direct refuge . . . during and in the aftermath of the 1948 war . . . with the exception of Jordan, citizenship has generally not been available, not even for second or third generation refugees”; 347–350. Takkenberg concludes that “the entity ‘Palestine’ currently does not fully satisfy the international legal criteria of statehood . . . Palestinians who have not acquired the nationality of a third state therefore continue to be stateless for the purpose of international law”; 181. In *The Iron Cage: The Story of the Palestinian Struggle for Statehood* (Boston, 2006), his judicious history of the impact of the absence of nationality, Rashid Khalidi observes that without a Palestinian state to maintain a central archive of documents, the historical record is greatly and permanently impoverished; xxxv. The UNHCR has been cautious about how it describes Palestinians, generally treating them as stateless but making rhetorical room for those who do not agree; thus the wording of the *UNHCR Global Appeal 2005 Middle East Regional Overview*, 189: “although Palestinians may not be considered as stateless since a Palestinian state has technically existed since the approval of UN General Assembly Resolution 181 (1947), some three million have been unable to return to their homes and their legal status has constantly been disputed by the Israeli government.” For a careful analysis of the ambivalent citizenship offered—and denied—to Palestinian Arabs resident in Israel between 1948 and 1952, see Shira Nomi Robinson, “Occupied Citizens in a Liberal State: Palestinians under Military Rule and the Colonial Formation of Israeli Society, 1948–1966” (Ph.D. diss., Stanford University, 2005), chaps. 1 and 2.

ulation of concern.”³¹ Refugees are the largest category, accounting for roughly 40 percent of the total. Other categories are asylum seekers and “internally displaced persons” who, once uprooted, fall through the cracks of current human rights law. Although international conventions have long provided protections against *refoulement*—the expulsion of persons who have the right to be recognized as refugees—its practice is increasing as asylum seekers are increasingly sent back to their nations of origin or to third countries, many of which will not provide them safety.³² Some 2.4 million people are conservatively estimated by the UNHCR to be stateless, living “in a Kafkaesque legal vacuum,” their numbers uncertain, hard to document, “non-persons, legal ghosts.”³³

These “persons of concern” introduce a new dimension into our understanding. Stateless persons have been commonly understood to be a population made vulnerable by movement; Philip Nolan, the “Man without a Country” in the nineteenth-century novella, is forced out of the state he calls home. But citizenship ties can be fractured in stasis as well as in movement; liminal people who have not moved physically can find that state boundaries have shifted, and the protections that citizenship was thought to provide can suddenly evaporate. A good example is the now stateless citizens of the former Soviet Union who have not obtained nationality in any of the new countries that succeeded the USSR.³⁴

Imprisonment heightens vulnerability. In the normal course of events, the citizen can claim some measure of state protection when abroad. If arrested, a U.S. citizen who is charged with a crime while in another country can expect a personal visit and assistance from a U.S. consular officer. (The consul staff may not be able to resolve the problem, but they can be counted upon to make a good faith effort to try.) The stateless person has no consul to whom to turn.

Extreme economic vulnerability also can propel people into something that looks like statelessness; they dare not ask for asylum, and often have no one whom they can ask for it. In this situation, most notably, are the millions of desperate laborers,

³¹ A good place to begin is the UNHCR home page, especially “2005 Global Refugee Trends,” <http://www.unhcr.org/statistics/STATISTICS/4486ceb12.pdf> (accessed January 11, 2007).

³² For the definition of *refoulement*, see http://portal.unesco.org/shs/en/ev.php-URL_ID=4145&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html (accessed January 11, 2007). The definition is included in the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1954, Article 33(1): “No Contracting State shall expel or return (‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.” But not all countries are parties to the UN Convention. See the important essay by Stephen H. Legomsky, “Secondary Refugee Movements and the Return of Asylum Seekers to Third Countries: The Meaning of Effective Protection,” *International Journal of Refugee Law* 15 (2003): 567–677.

³³ UNHCR, “The World’s Stateless People: Questions and Answers,” September 1, 2006, <http://www.unhcr.org/basics/BASICS/452611862.pdf> (accessed January 11, 2007). For the estimate of nearly 2.4 million stateless, see UNHCR, “Refugees by Numbers 2006 Edition,” <http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/basics/opendoc.htm?tbl=BASICS&id=3b028097c#Stateless> (accessed January 11, 2007). This report includes the observation “The Universal Declaration of Human Rights underlines that ‘Everyone has the right to a nationality.’ Unfortunately, circumstances have conspired to deny many of that right, often leaving them in a Kafkaesque legal vacuum . . . As a result of a concerted effort to improve the data provided by states, the number of stateless people identified as being of concern to UNHCR rose sharply from 1,455,900 in 2005 to 2,381,900 at the beginning of 2006. Although precise numbers are still difficult to estimate, UNHCR believes the actual total of people without a country to call their own may be at least 11 million.”

³⁴ See UNHCR, “Statelessness in Canadian Context,” 16.

many of whom are women, who can escape the dire circumstances of their home countries only by accepting airfare from traffickers who transport them to labor situations close to slavery, in which they have no recourse against the exploitation and anger of their employers.³⁵ Indeed, the term “slavery” is once again in use as a descriptor of current conditions, and among the conservative estimates of the number of slaves in the world today is Kevin Bales’s of 27 million.³⁶ Last February, the UNHCR called on states “to cooperate in the establishment of identity and national status of victims of trafficking, many of whom, especially women and children, are rendered effectively stateless.”³⁷

Gender has, in fact, been a key factor in the history of statelessness. Only recently have gender-specific asylum claims such as rape, dowry-related violence, and coerced female circumcision been recognized, and that recognition has been sporadic. Among refugees, in settings in which gender and age demographics are provided by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, adults divide evenly between men and women, but women are much more likely to be accompanied by children. Most significant, as Jacqueline Bhabha has recently emphasized, crude numbers do not describe the situation as women experience it: there is a substantial disparity in exposure to statelessness between men and women refugees and asylum seekers in different parts of the world, which emerges only when microclimates are examined. “In every single developing country of asylum neighboring the refugees’ country of origin, women and children refugees substantially outnumber adult males [representing nearly 80 percent of the refugees] . . . [I]n every developed state, male asylum seekers far outnumber females.” Women historically have had less access than men have to “the formal and informal structures that facilitate migration (state agencies, travel agents, smugglers, family funding), together with dependent family status, resource inadequacy, personal history and social positioning, which militate against a self-perception as an autonomous asylum seeker, [and] are likely to be powerful impediments to individual flight,” Bhabha observes.³⁸

In short, statelessness did not disappear with World War II, nor is the United States innocent of its terrors. How are we to understand its resilience—the continued reconstruction of an absence? Is it possible that the state *needs* its negation in order to know itself?

To historicize statelessness is to write a history of the practices of race, gender, labor, and ideology, a history of extreme otherness and extreme danger. It is time,

³⁵ For a recent example, see Amy Waldman, “Sri Lankan Maids Pay Dearly for Perilous Jobs Overseas,” *New York Times*, May 8, 2005, A1, detailing “exploitation so extreme that it sometimes approaches ‘slaverylike’ conditions, according to a recent Human Rights Watch report on foreign workers in Saudi Arabia.”

³⁶ Kevin Bales, *Disposable People: New Slavery in the Global Economy* (Berkeley, Calif., 2004), 9; stunning photographs are included in Andrew Cockburn, “21st Century Slaves,” *National Geographic* 204 (September 2003): 2–25.

³⁷ UNHCR, “Statelessness: Prevention and Reduction of Statelessness and Protection of Stateless Persons,” February 14, 2006, <http://www.unhcr.org/excom/EXCOM/43f1f6682.pdf> (accessed January 11, 2007).

³⁸ Jacqueline Bhabha, “Demography and Rights: Women, Children, and Access to Asylum,” *International Journal of Refugee Law* 16 (2004): 232, 235; see also Bhabha, “‘More Than Their Share of Sorrow’: International Migration Law and the Rights of Children,” *Saint Louis University Public Law Review* 22 (2003): 253 n. 1.

I think, to examine the phenomenon in the long course of American history, and also as it now presents itself—in the context of new turn-of-the-century wars, in the context of American fears of terrorism, and when, as likely as not, it is the woman who lacks the country.



THE WORK OF HANNAH ARENDT is a crucial starting point for any examination of statelessness. I begin where she—with her perfect pitch for irony—begins, in the era of state building that marks the opening of the modern era. She calls our attention to the paradoxes of the age of the democratic revolutions of the eighteenth century. Americans spoke of *inalienable rights*, the French of *the rights of man*, both “*inalienable*” because they were supposed to be independent of all governments; but,” writes Arendt, “it turned out that the moment human beings lacked their own government and had to fall back on their minimum rights, no authority was left to protect them and no institution was willing to guarantee them . . . [What was] supposedly inalienable, proved to be unenforceable.”³⁹

The democratic transformations of the late eighteenth century paradoxically gathered an increasingly mobile population, one no longer tied to the soil, into populations fictively tied to a nation. As Robert Wiebe brilliantly discerned, systematized citizenship has great advantages for the state: it simplified taxation, and it provided an identifiable pool of male citizens vulnerable to military conscription. And in these redefinitions, it might be added, distinctions between those who belonged to a state and those who lacked one were invented, elaborated, and expanded.⁴⁰

In the United States, where the foundations were weaker, nation-state building did not go as far as it did in France, which in 1792 began to construct a new civil order in which citizenship required a stabilized personal identity; criteria of residence, parentage, age, and status were regularized, even extending to reshaping naming practices, such as those of Jews, that were regarded as exotic.⁴¹ Even in the more relaxed United States, however, state building and its centralization was key—that is the struggle, after all, between the Articles of Confederation and the federalist coup that makes the Constitution. Were you inside the new polity? Outside? By 1856, Congress had asserted the exclusive right to issue passports.⁴²

The process of constructing the nationally integrated state—the state that defined the rights of citizens and simultaneously defined who was to be excluded—stretched out across the long nineteenth century, from the confederation of colonies

³⁹ Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 291–293.

⁴⁰ Robert Wiebe, “Framing U.S. History: Democracy, Nationalism, and Socialism,” in Thomas Bender, ed., *Rethinking American History in a Global Age* (Berkeley, Calif., 2002), 239. For a similar perspective based on European examples, see John Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport: Surveillance, Citizenship and the State* (Cambridge, 2000), chap. 1.

⁴¹ For the process in France, see Gérard Noiriel, “The Identification of the Citizen: The Birth of Republican Civil Status in France,” in Jane Caplan and John Torpey, eds., *Documenting Individual Identity: The Development of State Practices in the Modern World* (Princeton, N.J., 2002), 29–47.

⁴² James H. Kettner, *The Development of American Citizenship, 1608–1870* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1978), chap. 7; Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport*, 95.

that made a revolution against Britain at the end of the eighteenth century to the state that was Britain's defender in 1917.

By the middle of the eighteenth century, the Swiss scholar Emmerich de Vattel's *Law of Nations* had made explicit some two centuries of political development since the state system established by the Treaty of Westphalia that ended the Thirty Years' War in 1648. States were to be understood as moral entities, creating a moral international law of their own devising. In that context, Eliga Gould has brilliantly argued, those who are outside the state system can easily be understood as being outside the law; the stateless float in an immoral world. The Empire for Liberty protected its citizens against statelessness in part by strengthening distinctions between those of European descent inside the borders and placing Indians, slaves, and pirates outside the protective boundary, in a stateless realm of problematic morality and ethics.⁴³ Giorgio Agamben's long meditation on the indispensability of absences to the definition of the state is helpful here; the state requires the "state of exception" to define what it is not.⁴⁴ The new concept of citizenship required its opposite, its state of exception. Nation building has its ironies; the stateless becomes the citizen's other.

NOWHERE IS ABSENCE—and the dependence of the state on its own construction of the stateless—more sharply limned than in the contradictory centrality of slavery to the new republic. Slaves' presence was central to the economy of the new republic, yet their absence from its protections was central to the agreement—the three-fifths compromise—that made the Federal Constitution possible. Slaves were the exception to "We the People," frozen in Agamben's state of exception; they were, as Christopher Tomlins brilliantly puts it, "the living dead of the United States Constitution," violently, shockingly disfigured by the clause that counted slaves as three-fifths of a person for the purposes of representation.⁴⁵

In 1773, as Massachusetts patriots were challenging the Tea Act, enslaved inhabitants petitioned the legislature: "We have no Property. We have no Wives. No Children. We have no City. No Country." Three years before Thomas Jefferson was to articulate a fundamental right to the "pursuit of happiness," they described themselves repeatedly as "unhappy," described their "greatest unhappiness," and signed themselves, wistfully, "FELIX."⁴⁶ Like Arendt's stateless people, slaves were deprived "of a place in the world which makes opinions significant and actions effective

⁴³ Eliga H. Gould, "Zones of Law, Zones of Violence: The Legal Geography of the British Atlantic, circa 1772," *William and Mary Quarterly* 60 (2003): 471–510; and Gould, "States, Statelessness and the Law of Nations in the British Atlantic, circa 1756" (unpublished paper, American Society of Legal History, 2005).

⁴⁴ I am grateful to Christopher Tomlins for prompting my thinking on these matters. Giorgio Agamben, *Homo Sacer: Sovereign Power and Bare Life*, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford, Calif., 1998), 18.

⁴⁵ See Christopher Tomlins, "The Threepenny Constitution (and the Question of Justice)," forthcoming in *Alabama Law Review*.

⁴⁶ "Petition of the Africans, Living in Boston, 1773," in James Oliver Horton and Lois E. Horton, *Slavery and the Making of America* (New York, 2005), 51. In a 1792 debate in the French Assembly, a deputy would say, "slaves have no civil status. Only the free man has a city, a fatherland; only he is born, lives and dies a citizen." Quoted in Noiriël, "The Identification of the Citizen," 29.

... belonging to the community into which one is born is no longer a matter of course and not belonging no longer a matter of choice . . . They are deprived, not of the right to freedom, but of the right to action; not of the right to think whatever they please, but of the right to opinion."⁴⁷

On the eve of the Civil War, voting with the majority in *Dred Scott v. Sanford*—a decision that arguably helped to bring the war into being—Associate Justice Peter V. Daniel of Virginia stated what he took to be truth: that among Africans, “there never has been known or recognized by the inhabitants of other countries anything partaking of the character of nationality, or civil or political polity; that this race has been by all the nations of Europe regarded as subjects of capture or purchase; as subjects of commerce or traffic.” His is a blunt definition of permanent statelessness.⁴⁸ The state of exception continued to define the boundaries of the nation, and it would take the explosion of civil war, and millions of deaths, to destabilize it.

INDIANS WERE ALSO STATELESS against the Constitution, neither foreign nor domestic, existing in the interstices of the landscape and the law. Like the British before them, Americans chose definitions where it suited their interests. Sometimes the Indians were foreign, organized in force, led by chiefs, resembling a state. The new United States conducted treaties with Indians—some twelve between 1785 and 1819 with the Cherokee alone. “No one has ever supposed,” Chief Justice John Marshall mused in 1830, “that the Indians could commit treason against the United States.”⁴⁹

But Americans could just as readily define Indians as savages, people who had no state formation to which recognition was due. In the Declaration of Independence, they figure only as “the merciless Indian Savages whose known rule of warfare, is an undistinguished destruction of all ages, sexes and conditions.” Indians have no state; they are vaguely the “inhabitants of our frontiers.” Thus no tribe was included as a party to the peace treaties between the United States, Britain, and France, even though the Indians of the Old Northwest had successfully defended their claim to lands north of the Ohio River. (What would it have meant to include the Indians directly in the peace settlement, already multinational, of 1783?) In 1847, Justice Roger Taney observed that “the native tribes . . . have never been acknowledged or treated as independent nations . . . On the contrary, the whole continent was divided and parcelled out, and granted by the governments of Europe as if it had been vacant and unoccupied land.”⁵⁰ By the late nineteenth century, even though treaties reserved vast expanses of land for Indians, maps in general circulation showed only the states of the United States, with no acknowledgment of Indian lands.

In 1830, in *Worcester v. Georgia*, Marshall admitted (his word) that the Cherokee, although not a foreign state, “yet, having the right of self government, they, in some sense, form a state . . . [but] they may not be admitted to possess the right of soil.”

⁴⁷ Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 296.

⁴⁸ *Dred Scott v. Sanford*, 60 U.S. 393 (1856). See also Mark Janis, “Dred Scott and International Law,” *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law* 43 (2005): 763.

⁴⁹ *Worcester v. Georgia*, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).

⁵⁰ *U.S. v. Rogers*, 45 U.S. 567 (1846).

They had, he thought, “a peculiar relation” to the United States.⁵¹ It was indeed peculiar: forced into removal, their lands a state without soil, truly a “state of exception.” For this exception, Marshall offered the convoluted concept of a “domestic dependent nation.”⁵² In that dependent nation, individuals had no reliable claims against the United States; locked into the landscape, they could not declare their autonomy. The authorization of removal, one Cherokee leader would try to persuade Congress, was a “scheme . . . to denationalize us.”⁵³ And indeed it did. The Trail of Tears did not lead to vacant land; it led to lands already inhabited by other peoples, who had no reason to welcome the newcomers. The Fourteenth Amendment assigned citizenship to “all persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof.” In 1884, the Supreme Court ruled that an Indian born in the United States but within the geographic boundaries of tribal authority (already so undermined that it could offer little protection against the state) was not born “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States and therefore was not a citizen at birth.⁵⁴ By 1903 it was established that Congress had plenary power to abrogate any Indian treaty. Native Americans lacked, in Arendt’s words, “a place in the world which makes opinions significant and actions effective.”

In a willful refusal to respect the relationship that Indians had with each other and with their lands, U.S. policymakers failed to acknowledge that while citizenship for Americans meant strengthening their civil and property rights, citizenship for Native Americans meant dispossession. Not until 1924 did all Indians get the right to vote; not until the New Deal was tribal authority grudgingly recognized within narrow limits.⁵⁵ Finally the stacked deck was reshuffled; the state mattered, and Indians’ opinions mattered. Issues could be addressed, challenges could be seriously made. Indians did not always get their way, and still do not. But the challenges are carried on within the boundaries of the state. Sometime in the 1930s, it ceased to be reasonable to construe Indians as stateless.

THE LEGAL BAGGAGE CARRIED from the colonial era into the republic included the concept of *coverture*, a set of rules and practices that linked married women to the state through their husbands, defining them as “covered” by their husbands’ legal identity. The culture of coverture had no room for the concept that there might be limits to a husband’s sexual access to his wife’s body. It embedded the husband’s control of the wife’s body, property, and earnings in the heart of the marriage contract. Married women were thus extremely vulnerable under the law: as one judge in the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts observed in 1805, “a married woman

⁵¹ *Worcester v. Georgia*.

⁵² *Cherokee Nation v. the State of Georgia* 30 U.S. 1 (1831).

⁵³ John Ross in 1840, quoted in William McLoughlin, *After the Trail of Tears: The Cherokees’ Struggle for Sovereignty, 1839–1880* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1993), 28. I am grateful to Frederick Hoxie for this reference, and for an extended conversation that helped me develop these ideas.

⁵⁴ *Elk v. Wilkins*, 112 U.S. 94 (1884).

⁵⁵ The best overview of these matters is to be found in R. David Edmunds, Frederick E. Hoxie, and Neal Salisbury, *The People: A History of Native America* (Boston, 2007).

has no more political rights than an alien.”⁵⁶ In this culture—and Americans were not peculiar; these practices persist in other nations into our own time—the common sense of the matter was that when a male citizen married a foreign woman, his citizenship stretched to embrace her. She did not even have to go through the process of naturalization. But when a woman citizen married a foreign man, she lost her citizenship, and, depending on the laws of the other country, statelessness loomed. Even President Ulysses S. Grant’s daughter was denationalized when she married an Englishman in 1874, and it took a special act of Congress to reinstate her citizenship when she was widowed. “Are we aliens because we are women?” demanded abolitionist Angelina Grimke.⁵⁷

No one definitively answered Grimke’s question until 1907, when Congress passed a statute, and 1915, when the U.S. Supreme Court upheld it, that provided that the marriage of a woman citizen to a foreigner produced her denaturalization, even if she had been born in the United States. The Expatriation Act confirmed that hundreds of American-born women were no longer citizens. When World War I began, many hundreds of American-born women who had married men from countries with which the United States was at war were required to register as alien enemies.⁵⁸ Yet not all of their husbands’ homelands embraced them as citizens. Once American women seized the vote, one of the first things for which they used it was to press for the integrity of married women’s citizenship.

AT THE TURN OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, in the aftermath of the Spanish-American War of 1898 (which stretched, in the Philippines, at least to 1902), the United States invented the ambiguous and unstable category of “noncitizen national” to describe a new status of people who lived under the U.S. flag without the full range of constitutional protections that flag normally carries. When the United States acquired the Philippines, Guam, Cuba, and Puerto Rico, Congress and the Supreme Court devised a series of related statutes, decisions, and conceptualizations that defined the status of these places in ways that simultaneously, as Christina Duffy Burnett eloquently puts it, took “control over territory while avoiding many of the responsibilities that sovereignty implies.” Like other imperial powers—the British in India, Africa, and elsewhere; the Germans in Africa; the French in North Africa and Asia—the United States, through the Supreme Court, simultaneously asserted sovereignty while holding that these territories were “*neither foreign nor part of the United States*.”⁵⁹ Despite the extension of numerous federal statutes to these territories, they could not look forward to developing into states. The U.S. Supreme Court drew a distinction between “incorporated territories,” such as those that had been covered

⁵⁶ *Martin v. Commonwealth*, 1 Mass. 347 (1805). I have discussed this case at some length in *No Constitutional Right to Be Ladies: Women and the Obligations of Citizenship* (New York, 1998), chap. 1.

⁵⁷ House Joint Resolution no. 238, 55th Cong., 2nd sess. (May 18, 1898), 30 Stat. 1496; Angelina Grimke, *Appeal to the Women of the Nominally Free States* (Boston, 1838), 19.

⁵⁸ See *Mackenzie v. Hare*, 239 U.S. 299 (1915), upholding the denationalization of American women who married aliens. John L. Cable, *Decisive Decisions of United States Citizenship* (Charlottesville, Va., 1967), 41–42; *New York Times*, May 4, 1918.

⁵⁹ Christina Duffy Burnett, “The Edges of Empire and the Limits of Sovereignty: American Guano Islands,” *American Quarterly* 57, no. 3 (September 2005): 798, 795; my italics.

by the Northwest Ordinance of 1787, and “unincorporated territories,” such as Guam and the Philippines. When Congress provided a Bill of Rights for the Republic of the Philippines after quashing an insurgency in 1902, it omitted the right to bear arms and the right to a jury trial. The Constitution did not follow the flag. At the borders, Congress exercised plenary power, largely excused from constitutional oversight by the courts.⁶⁰ In the aftermath of 1898, as the United States developed an empire, some geographical configurations—states—were defined by the United States as fully peopled by citizens; other geographical configurations were colonies, inhabited by subjects who were not, and could not be, citizens. The nation experimented with the creation of ambiguous spaces between the domestic and the foreign, between the national and the international, between sovereignty and subjugation. And in those spaces lay great potential for statelessness.



THE MATURE MODERN STATE, John Torpey has written, can be said to have accomplished three defining seizures: the first, described by Marx, is the appropriation of the means of production from workers by capitalists; the second, described by Max Weber, is the appropriation of the means of violence from individuals by the state; and the third is the expropriation by the modern state of the legitimate means of movement across national boundaries. This last is a characteristic of state formation in the twentieth century, a century in which documentation of a relation to the state or its lack became a defining aspect of statelessness.⁶¹

In the early years of the twentieth century, before visas were required for entry into the United States, and when the United States understood itself to be in great need of new labor, most of the people who entered at Ellis Island lacked documents of any sort.⁶² By contrast, the words “undocumented alien” now describe a condition of danger in relation to statelessness.

Throughout the century, grassroots movements for opening borders—to refugees, displaced persons, and the stateless after World War II; to a wider range of ethnicities in the remarkable immigration reforms of 1965—were in tension with skepticism and caution, embodied most obviously in the continued enforcement of the Chinese Exclusion Acts (not repealed until 1943), the Immigration Restriction statutes of the 1920s, the political restrictions of the McCarren-Walter Act of 1952, and the refusal of the United States to be party to a number of international conventions that included the stabilization of nationality, notably the 1954 Convention on Statelessness and the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, which the U.S. signed but has not ratified.

⁶⁰ *Downes v. Bidwell*, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); note Justice John Marshall Harlan’s eloquent dissent.

⁶¹ Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport*, 4.

⁶² Most of those who entered at Angel Island in San Francisco did have to meet the registration requirements of the Chinese Exclusion Acts.

STATELESSNESS CONTINUED TO FIGURE in American life in the twentieth century. The disruption of national boundaries devised by the Treaty of Versailles in the aftermath of World War I gave already well-established federal claims of plenary power at the borders considerably more frequent occasions on which to be deployed. The fascists' rise to power intensified the pressures. In this context, Fridtjof Nansen, the League of Nations' High Commissioner for Refugees, devised a passport that granted departure without the right of return and was widely used as an identification and travel document by the USSR and Eastern European countries. The Nansen Passport was a devil's bargain.⁶³ In its wake, Britain, France, and the United States hastened to stabilize and seal their borders against the millions of refugees and stateless whom the post-Versailles remapping of the European landscape created.⁶⁴ But what contemporaries called "nationality problems" entered anyway. It was the fault of the airplane, one political scientist dourly reflected in 1930, for exacerbating population movements and heightening the visibility of the vulnerable.⁶⁵

The United States Immigration Act of 1924 reduced entry into the United States by some 85 percent of what it had been on the eve of World War I. Once the statute was backed by enforcement mechanisms, Mae Ngai writes, deportation "amounted to permanent banishment under threat of felony prosecution." The clash between the new statute and the explosive aftermath of the war meant that the difference between the immigrant and the refugee began to blur; even more blurred became the difference between the refugee and the stateless. Fleeing the Nazis, thousands of stateless Jews begged for sanctuary and were turned back at the U.S. borders.⁶⁶

The forced displacements of the 1940s from World War II and the Cold War that followed it—in Europe, in India/Pakistan, in the Middle East—turned uncountable numbers of people into refugees (between 7 and 11 million, it is estimated, for Europe alone). Most of these "displaced persons" were not technically stateless, since they were entitled to the passports of their home countries, but few could safely return there. Nearly a quarter-million Jewish DPs were in zones occupied by the Allies in Germany, Austria, and Italy in early 1946. Those from Germany or Austria had been denationalized by the Nazis and were technically stateless; those from Poland, where a pogrom killed forty Jews in 1946, had good reason to refuse to return. The response of the United States ranged from hostile to guarded; it was understood to be a generous gesture when President Harry Truman reserved to DPs half the quotas already in place for immigrants from Europe and allowed NGOs (as

⁶³ For the Nansen Passport, see Arendt, *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, especially 281 n. 30; and Torpey, *The Invention of the Passport*, 127–129. When the Germans occupied France, they used the Nansen Passport for their own purposes, detaining all the Russians who had one.

⁶⁴ Despite the severity of U.S. immigration restriction policies in the 1920s and thereafter, Catheryn Seckler-Hudson estimated that some 18.5 million immigrants entered the United States in the first third of the twentieth century. Seckler-Hudson, *Statelessness*, 1.

⁶⁵ Richard W. Flournoy Jr., "Nationality Convention Protocols and Recommendations Adopted by the First Conference on the Codification of International Law," *American Journal of International Law* 24 (1930): 467, quoted in Seckler-Hudson, *Statelessness*, 2.

⁶⁶ I am indebted to Mae Ngai's remarkable essay "The Strange Career of the Illegal Alien: Immigration Restriction and Deportation Policy in the United States, 1921–1965," *Law and History Review* 21 (2003): 69–107, especially nn. 11 and 14. In her analysis, immigration restriction makes the illegal alien; she gives relatively little attention to statelessness, although it is implicit in the situation. On the results of Nazi denationalization, see the moving testimony by a man himself stateless, Marc Vishniac, *The Legal Status of Stateless Persons* (New York, 1945), 34; and David S. Wyman, *Paper Walls: America and the Refugee Crisis, 1938–1941* (Amherst, Mass., 1968).

well as individuals) to certify that they would not become a public charge. Even so, barely 5,000 DPs, less than 10 percent of total European immigrants, entered the U.S. that year. Only in 1948, after intensive lobbying and much legislative struggle, did Congress authorize a capacious statute that authorized the admission of 200,000 over and above immigration quotas in two years (extended for another two years and another 200,000 visas in 1950). Even then, the State Department and Immigration and Naturalization Service dragged their collective feet, understanding themselves, as historian Roger Daniels puts it, to be “gatekeepers whose function was to ‘protect’ America from foreign contagion.” Among those admitted, only about 15 percent were Jewish, many of whom were stateless.⁶⁷

IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY, until well after World War II, it was common practice for married women to travel on their husbands’ passports. The implications—that husband and wife would always be together, that she would not leave the country without him—are harmless only in times of peace and quiet. Suspicion of foreigners soaked the political atmosphere during World War I and in the years that followed; restrictive immigration legislation in the 1920s and its even more restrictive interpretation in the 1930s was supplemented by major decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court that made people of various non-white and non-African ethnicities ineligible for naturalization and enforced these rulings retroactively.

The Cable Act, passed in 1922 in the midst of a movement for immigration restriction, secured married women’s nationality—up to a point. If an American woman married a foreign man who was himself eligible for citizenship, but went overseas with him to live, she lost her citizenship; if she wished to return (perhaps as a widow), she would need to naturalize (that is, she could not reclaim her original birthright citizenship), and she would first have to enter under the immigrant quota of her husband’s nation. She could not pass her own American citizenship to her children.⁶⁸

Despite the Cable Act’s promise to stabilize the nationality of native-born women, should such a woman marry a man who was *ineligible* for citizenship (as were people from China; Japanese were added in 1922, “Hindus” in 1923, and Filipinos in 1925), she was considered to have renounced her citizenship and could not easily reclaim it if the marriage ended in death or divorce.⁶⁹ When the Supreme Court declared in 1923 that Hindus could not be naturalized, Mary Das’s naturalized husband lost his citizenship, and she was retroactively denied a passport even though she had been born in the United States. The only advice the State Department (still thinking in the old concepts that linked married women’s identity with their husbands) had to offer was that she might consider divorcing her husband or remaining stateless while she searched for some other country to be naturalized in. She was,

⁶⁷ Roger Daniels, *Guarding the Golden Door: American Immigration Policy and Immigrants since 1882* (New York, 2004), 108. For a full history of these developments, see Leonard Dinnerstein, *America and the Survivors of the Holocaust* (New York, 1982), especially chap. 8.

⁶⁸ Candice Lewis Bredbenner, *A Nationality of Her Own: Women, Marriage and the Law of Citizenship* (Berkeley, Calif., 1998), is indispensable on these matters. See chap. 4, especially 134–136.

⁶⁹ *Takao Ozawa v. U.S.*, 260 U.S. 178 (1922); *U.S. v. Thind*, 261 U.S. 204 (1923); and *Toyota v. U.S.*, 268 U.S. 402 (1925).

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A Woman Without a Country

By MARY K. DAS

I AM an American-born woman. My ancestors came from England to America in the year 1700. By the existing double standard of the American Government, I am not only rendered alien, but a stateless alien. My husband, a Hindu, was a naturalized American citizen when I married him. He had secured his certificate of naturalization from a United States District Court in 1914, having previously resided in the United States for eight years. The United States State Department three times gave him passports with which he traveled all over the world. He still holds his American naturalization certificate, but today he is told by the State Department that he was never an American citizen, because "the judges, who during the last quarter of a century or more naturalized Hindus to American citizenship, by due process of law, did not know the meaning of the United States naturalization laws, and so these judges from all parts of the United States acted illegally." This interpretation is based upon a recent decision rendered by a United States Supreme Court judge who is himself a naturalized citizen, who held that "high-caste Hindus are not white persons according to the commonly accepted meaning of the term, and thus are ineligible to American citizenship." Before we were married my husband went to several lawyers and asked if I stood the least chance of losing my citizenship in marrying him. These legal experts, one a former adviser to the State Department, told him that this could never happen, because the United States could not and would never apply a Supreme Court decision retroactively.

Last year when I asked the State Department for a passport to go to Europe my request was refused on the ground that I was "no longer an American citizen, having lost my American citizenship by [my] marriage with an alien ineligible to citizenship." This I disclaimed, and still disclaim, for at the time of my marriage and up to the present day my husband is in possession of his naturalization papers. But by fiat of the State Department my husband and I are stateless.

The amazing stand taken by the United States authorities is "that Hindus who are deprived of their American citizenship revert to their former British status." Is this stand due to total ignorance of the British law? The British law says that any British subject who renounces British nationality willingly, by naturalization into any other country, cannot revert to British citizenship automatically, in case the said subject wishes to do so; but must be naturalized according to British law, after living at least five years in some British territory. Now, it is apparent that without a passport an alien cannot enter British territory for the purpose of taking up residence; and there is no record of British authorities offering safe conduct to an Indian who has become an American citizen and then been deprived of American citizenship, to go to British territory, under promise of renaturalization in the course of time. Requests to the British Government to enter British territory, made by Indians who have lost their American citizenship, have either been refused or no notice has been taken

of them. So when the American Government arbitrarily takes from us (American women and Hindus naturalized as American citizens) our American citizenship and protection, violating the scraps of paper given us in the form of naturalization certificates, it takes from us our safety and our standing in any community no matter where we may take refuge.

According to the Cable Act, an American woman marrying an alien ineligible to citizenship loses her American citizenship. An American man may marry a Japanese, Chinese, Hindu—any woman he pleases. To do so does not lose him his citizenship. But an American woman is penalized when she exercises this right granted the American man. She may marry a Negro from Africa and not lose her American citizenship, but if she marries a Hindu, Chinese, or Japanese, however high his reputation as a scholar, she loses her American citizenship. I feel that an American woman should not be penalized for marrying the person she loves. Marriage is not a matter of convenience; it has a spiritual bearing and none has the right to dictate the inner life of an individual.

The National Woman's Party has sought to remedy the situation by amending the Cable Act, but the House Immigration Committee refused to report out the bill. Some Representatives and Senators, members of the Immigration Committees of the two houses of Congress, hold that the ideal of Americanism should keep any American woman from marrying any foreigner, particularly an Asiatic. One Senator said that he would do all he could to defeat any amendment to the Cable Act which would give the right of American citizenship to any American woman marrying any foreigner. The American patriots who think that such provincialism is Americanism would do well to remember what Theodore Roosevelt said on an allied topic:

Our nation fronts on the Pacific, just as it fronts on the Atlantic. We hope to play a constantly growing part in the great ocean of the Orient. We wish, as we ought to wish, for a great commercial development in our dealings with Asia; and it is out of the question that we should permanently have such development unless we freely and gladly extend to other nations the same measure of justice and good treatment as we expect to receive in return. . . . I ask fair treatment for the Japanese, as I would ask fair treatment for Germans, Englishmen, Frenchmen, Russians, or Italians.

I am not pleading today for the right of Asiatics to become American citizens. But I hold that the attitude of the United States Government toward Hindus who were naturalized before the adverse Supreme Court decision is worse than the alleged attitude of Soviet Russia or the Mexican Government, against which the United States State Department so bitterly complains, in enacting retroactive laws depriving Americans of their vested rights. The State Department, declaring that Hindus who were naturalized by United States judges according to due process of law, to whom naturalization certificates were given upon the authority of the United States Government, are no longer American citizens, is violating a solemn contract. Has the American Government fallen to such a state of degradation that to it the civil rights of its citizens have less value than property rights?

FIGURE 3: In this essay, Mary K. Das emphasized her family's American lineage and her own fury: "An American man may marry a Japanese, Chinese, Hindu—any woman he pleases. To do so does not lose him his citizenship . . . I feel that an American woman should not be penalized for marrying the person she loves. Marriage is not a matter of convenience; it has a spiritual bearing and none has the right to dictate the inner life of an individual." *The Nation* 123 (August 4, 1926): 105.

she wrote in an angry essay published in *The Nation*, “A Woman without a Country.”⁷⁰

Women from nations that expatriated them when they married an alien—countries that then included Britain and Canada, and still include some states that impose an automatic change in nationality status on women who marry foreigners⁷¹—could become temporarily stateless when they married American men after the passage of the Cable Act. “Women Without a Country Are in Straits from the New American Nationality Law” was the headline of an article in the *New York Times* in 1922. And, writes Candice Bredbenner, “most resident immigrant women who married Americans after the passage of the Cable Act became stateless on their wedding days and remained so until they earned a naturalization certificate.”⁷² In the United States in the interwar years, “woman” was a category of instability and potential statelessness; most individual cases of statelessness involved women and arose from marriage.⁷³

As fascists moved from harassing Jews to murdering them, naturalized women, many of them Jewish, desperately tried to bring husbands and fiancés into the United States during the 1930s. They organized themselves as the Citizen Wives Organization, established in an office by the Hebrew Immigrant Aid and Sheltering Society in New York. In the context of fascist expansion, the inability of American women, whether citizens by birth or by naturalization, to transmit their citizenship to their stateless children or husbands spelled danger. Even when the Naturalization Law was revised in 1930, its changes were not made retroactive; a citizenship that married women could take with them wherever they went was not fully achieved until the 1960s.⁷⁴

The problematic national identity of married women, and their exposure to statelessness, was a key item on the League of Nations’ human rights agenda. But the League’s work was aborted by the onset of war. The American member of the League’s Committee of Experts on the Legal Status of Women, Dorothy Kenyon, was deeply disappointed to lose the chance to pursue these questions, and after the war she worked hard, and successfully, to be appointed to its successor, the UN Commission on the Status of Women. Although red-baiting derailed Kenyon’s UN career, she and her allies doggedly kept the issue alive. In 1957, the UN created a “Convention on the Nationality of Married Women,” forbidding compulsory expatriation.⁷⁵ The issue was not solved. Signatories to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), adopted in 1979, undertake to ensure that “neither marriage to an alien nor change of nationality by the

⁷⁰ *The Nation* 123 (August 4, 1926), cited in Bredbenner, *A Nationality of Her Own*, 135–136.

⁷¹ Department of International Protection, UNHCR, “Final Report Concerning the Questionnaire on Statelessness Pursuant to the Agenda for Protection,” March 2004, <http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/4047002e4.pdf> (accessed January 11, 2007).

⁷² For an American-born woman of Chinese descent who irretrievably lost her citizenship when she married a Chinese man, see *Ex parte (Ng) Fung Sing*, 6 F.2d 670 (1925), and the discussion in Bredbenner, *A Nationality of Her Own*, 136. For the exposure to statelessness of foreign women who married U.S. men, see *ibid.*, 157.

⁷³ Seckler-Hudson, *Statelessness*, 23–99.

⁷⁴ Bredbenner, *A Nationality of Her Own*, 174–183, 216.

⁷⁵ The original agenda of the UN Commission on the Status of Women expressed a grave concern for the risks of statelessness, and a fear for the fragility of married women’s nationality. I have written about this aspect of Kenyon’s career in “‘I Was Appalled’: The Invisible Antecedents of Second Wave Feminism,” *Journal of Women’s History* 14 (2002): 86–97.

husband during marriage” shall automatically change the nationality of the wife, force upon her the nationality of the husband, or render her stateless. But although the U.S. signed the treaty, Congress never ratified it. In any event, there is virtually no enforcement mechanism for any provision of CEDAW; in some nations today, women who marry foreign men lose their citizenship, exposing themselves and the children of that marriage to statelessness.⁷⁶

CHILDREN—OFTEN SUBSUMED in the category “women and children”—have had and continue to have their own specific vulnerabilities to statelessness. In the United States, where “all persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside,” children are citizens at birth. But the meanings of citizenship are different for children and adults, not least because children are spared or excused from the key rights and obligations of citizenship: to vote, to serve on a jury, to perform military service. The 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child provides that every child (including children born to noncitizen parents in the territory of a state party to the convention) “shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have the right from birth to a name, [and] the right to acquire a nationality.” It provides that “States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights . . . in particular where the child would otherwise be stateless.” But the Convention, which the U.S. has signed but has not ratified, does not stipulate obligation to confer nationality, and there is no enforcement mechanism. Among the states that today grant nationality only through the father are Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypt, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia.⁷⁷

A crudely drafted American statute of 1802 excluded foreign-born marital children of American fathers from citizenship. Had they the misfortune to be born in a nation in which citizenship followed blood rather than birth—a category that grew as the Code Napoleon spread—these children could find themselves without any citizenship at all. In 1855, it was American fathers (not mothers) who transmitted citizenship to their children, and that continued to be the case well into the 1930s.

When adults are deported or interned, their citizen children go with them. The most notorious example of this is the U.S. internment camps of World War II, where the birthright citizen children of Japanese-American parents (some of whom were

⁷⁶ Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, Article 9. Full text is found at <http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw.htm> (accessed January 11, 2007). For an overview, see Weil, “Access to Citizenship,” and on transmission of citizenship only through the father’s bloodline, see Anita Fabos, “Transnational Practices of Citizenship and Gender Making for Sudanese Nationals in Egypt,” *Northeast African Studies* 8 (2001): 47–68.

⁷⁷ Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989, Article 7. Full text is found at <http://www.unhcr.ch/html/menu2/6/crc/treaties/crc.htm> (accessed January 11, 2007). This is more elaborate than the provision in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1996, Article 24.3: “Every child has a right to a nationality”; <http://www.ohchr.org/english/law/ccpr.htm> (accessed January 11, 2007). For a convenient digest of the rules of transmission of birthright citizenship, see Sarah Adams, 263–264. Algeria will provide birthright citizenship if the father is stateless. For a detailed account of an unsuccessful legal challenge to the rule in Bangladesh, see Kif Augustine-Adams, “Gendered States: A Comparative Construction of Citizenship and Nation,” *Virginia Journal of International Law* 41 (2000): 93–139. For an international summary (which does not, however, list individual states), see UNHCR, “Final Report Concerning the Questionnaire on Statelessness Pursuant to the Agenda for Protection.”

themselves birthright citizens) were confined without recourse.⁷⁸ The Bracero Program of 1948–1964 involved several million Mexican men as temporary contract laborers; by the time it ended, many had built families in America. Their citizen children could not force a pause for reconsideration; they left with their parents. In the aftermath of 9/11, an uncounted number of citizen children have risked or actually faced the deportation of noncitizen parents.⁷⁹

A CIVIL WAR STATUTE provided that a deserter would lose his “rights of citizenship”; by the time it was embedded in the Nationality Act of 1940, the wording had been made so capacious that the deserter would simply lose his “citizenship.” Over the course of World War II, some 21,000 men were convicted of desertion from the army, and some 7,000 of them were separated from the service and rendered stateless. These figures do not include the navy and marines. The scope of the problem was not recognized until 1958, when a deserter applied for a passport. Deeply dismayed that the law conceded to “the military authorities complete discretion to decide who among convicted deserters shall continue to be Americans and who shall be stateless,” Chief Justice Earl Warren wrote the ringing opinion in *Trop v. Dulles*.⁸⁰ “Citizenship is not a license that expires upon misbehavior . . . We believe . . . that use of denationalization as a punishment is barred by the Eighth Amendment [against cruel and unusual punishment] . . . The punishment strips the citizen of his status in the national and international political community . . . While any one country may accord him some rights . . . no country need do so because he is stateless . . . In short, the expatriate has lost the right to have rights.”⁸¹ Although he did not cite her, Warren had clearly read Arendt.

After the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 required deportation for what immigration law referred to as aggravated felony convictions and defined as such felonies an expansive range of crimes, minor as well as serious, thousands of permanent legal residents were subject to deportation. If they were stateless, or came from nations with which the United States had no treaty of reciprocity (including Vietnam and, at the time, Cambodia), there was no obvious

⁷⁸ Hannah Arendt misunderstood the status of the interned, many of whom were technically enemy aliens, nationals of Japan. But she did articulate a delicious irony that I cannot help but quote here: the test of statelessness is when one would have more rights as a criminal. “A West Coast Japanese-American, who was in jail when the army ordered internment . . . would not have been forced to liquidate his property at too low a price; he would have remained right where he was, armed with a lawyer to look after his interests.” *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, 287 n. 42.

⁷⁹ On Mexican migrant farm workers, and braceros in particular, see Mae M. Ngai, *Impossible Subjects: Illegal Aliens and the Making of Modern America* (Princeton, N.J., 2004), chap. 4, and Kitty Calavita, *Inside the State: The Bracero Program, Immigration, and the INS* (New York, 1999). Holly Brewer opens the large question of “What ‘inalienable rights’ do children have?” in *By Birth or Consent: Children, Law, and the Anglo-American Revolution in Authority* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2005).

⁸⁰ *Trop v. Dulles*, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). Mr. Trop, an army private, had escaped from the stockade in Casablanca in 1944. A day later, he was found making his way back to the base, cold, hungry, and penniless. He served three years at hard labor and received a dishonorable discharge. Some years later, he applied for a passport.

⁸¹ The principle was strengthened in 1967, when the U.S. Supreme Court held, in *Afroyim v. Rusk*, that “every citizen in the United States has a constitutional right to remain a citizen . . . unless he voluntarily relinquishes that citizenship.” The rules about what counts as voluntary relinquishment are very strict. See nn. 15 and 16 about dual citizenship above.

place to send them. In Seattle, Assistant Federal Public Defender Jay Stansell found an entire floor of the Federal Detention Center devoted to nearly two hundred prisoners who had prospect of neither freedom nor deportation. In the spring of 2001, a hundred such cases were brought together for appeal for habeas corpus proceedings and a limit to the indefinite detention to which they were subject. Among them was the stateless Kestutis Zadvydas, who had been born to Lithuanian parents in a refugee camp in Germany. He was not a citizen of Germany (which does not recognize *jus solis*) and not a citizen of Lithuania (or of Russia, which succeeded the former Soviet Union, of which Lithuania had been a part when he was born); nor had he ever naturalized in the United States, although his family had moved there when he was eight years old. The crime for which he was convicted made him deportable after 1996, but no country would accept him. The 1954 Convention on Statelessness promises that all persons—it does not say all persons not convicted of crime—have a right to a nationality; but there is no practical provision for enforcing that promise.⁸²

During the Supreme Court argument, while defending indefinite detention in response to a series of questions from Justice Ginsburg, Deputy Solicitor General Edwin Kneedler found himself saying, in an eerie reprise of Edward Everett Hale's Civil War novella *The Man without a Country*, that "one way to remove the alien [who has no country to go to] would be to put him on a boat." And when Stansell emphasized the vulnerability of one of the youthful prisoners—his inability to speak the language, his lack of contacts if he were to be sent back to Cambodia—Justice Antonin Scalia was skeptical: "It is up to you to find a country to get sent back to. The burden is not on us."⁸³

But the Supreme Court ruled (although Scalia dissented) that although the attorney general "may" continue to detain aliens who present risks to the community, he does not have unlimited discretion.⁸⁴ "[O]nce an alien enters the country . . . the Due Process Clause applies to all 'persons' within the United States, including aliens, whether their presence here is lawful, unlawful, temporary or permanent." Stansell's clients were spared indefinite detention—a limbo not unlike statelessness—only until the administration found a place to which to deport them. Once a repatriation agreement was negotiated with Cambodia, some were deported to that country, where they knew no one, and whose languages they did not speak.⁸⁵

⁸² *Zadvydas v. Davis*, 533 U.S. 678 (2001), argued February 21, 2001. After the German government refused to admit Zadvydas, he filed this writ of habeas corpus. The district court granted the writ, finding that his detention was unconstitutional because Zadvydas was "stateless" and would be detained forever. The Fifth Circuit reversed, finding that despite five years in detention and numerous failed efforts by the INS to establish citizenship for Zadvydas somewhere, there was not yet a definitive showing that deportation would be impossible, so his detention could continue without violating the Constitution. For reflections on *Zadvydas* as an example of the erosion of plenary power, see Hiroshi Motomura, *Americans in Waiting: The Lost Story of Immigration and Citizenship in the United States* (New York, 2006), 111–113.

⁸³ Oral Argument, *Zadvydas v. Davis*; Kneedler, 47; Stansell, 7.

⁸⁴ This time the Court drew on Justice Robert H. Jackson's legendary dissent in *Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei*, in 1953 at the height of the Cold War, when a legal permanent resident who, after twenty-five years of quiet living in the U.S., had visited family behind the Iron Curtain found himself barred from returning, and was imprisoned indefinitely on Ellis Island. Mezei was released only after four years by a presidential "act of grace."

⁸⁵ Deborah Sontag, "In a Homeland Far from Home," *New York Times Magazine*, November 16, 2003, 48ff.

Indefinite detention has long been the norm at the U.S. Naval Station at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, which identifies itself as the United States' "oldest U.S. base outside the continental United States," and host to the "War on Terrorism Detainee Mission."⁸⁶ Guantánamo is now the prison for men captured in Afghanistan and elsewhere who are thought to have fought for al-Qaeda. In three separate decisions in 2004, justices of the U.S. Supreme Court expressed their suspicion of unlimited detention and simultaneously limited severely the ability of the detainees to test it. But these decisions were narrowly framed, and the general thrust of the Patriot Act of 2001, the proposals to strengthen it in 2003 (the most severe, which came to light only in a leaked draft, were never passed), and the Military Commissions Act of 2006, all make indefinite detention a familiar strategy. Some men have been held in indefinite detention for five years; some were in their teens when they were first imprisoned.⁸⁷ Indefinite detention may be our contemporary opposite of expulsion. Guantánamo, the island prison where the American flag flies, inhabited by men whose own nations cannot ensure them decent prisoner-of-war treatment, is today's floating prison of men without a country.

IF CITIZENSHIP IS LINKED to work—as it is in Judith Shklar's understanding of citizenship as the "right to earn," T. H. Marshall's understanding of social citizenship as the right to basic material well-being, and Alice Kessler-Harris's understanding of economic citizenship—then what citizenship can be claimed by those trapped jobless in the underworld of the globalized marketplace?⁸⁸ It is estimated that 14,500 to 17,500 people are illegally trafficked in or through the United States each year against their will, despite the Thirteenth Amendment's strictures against involuntary servitude. The Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000, and its steady reauthorization and expansion, most recently in 2005, recognizes something of the scope of the problem in the United States. At least twenty-three states now have laws making trafficking a state felony offense.⁸⁹ Anthropologist Aihwa Ong has argued that in the last generation, "the norms of good citizenship in advanced liberal

⁸⁶ <http://www.nsgtmo.navy.mil/htmpgs/gtmohistory.htm> (accessed January 11, 2007).

⁸⁷ The Patriot Act gave the attorney general expanded power to detain noncitizens who are suspected of terrorist activity; he is not required to notify them of the reason for detention or to share with them the evidence on which detention is based. The draft of Patriot II contemplated stripping even native-born Americans of their citizenship if they provide support for organizations marked as terrorist. For a detailed report on the leaked document, see "ACLU Fact Sheet on Patriot Act II," March 28, 2003, <http://www.aclu.org/safefree/general/17383leg20030328.html> (accessed January 11, 2007). In December 2004, the Law Lords, Britain's highest court, ruled that the indefinite detention of foreign terrorism suspects is incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. See <http://hrw.org/english/docs/2004/12/16/uk9890.htm> (accessed January 11, 2007). See also Mark Denbeaux, "Report on Guantanamo Detainees: A Profile of 517 Detainees through Analysis of Department of Defense Data," Seton Hall Public Law Research Paper no. 46, available at Social Science Research Network, <http://ssrn.com/abstract=885659> (accessed January 11, 2007). I am grateful to Elizabeth Hillman for this reference.

⁸⁸ Judith N. Shklar, *American Citizenship: The Quest for Inclusion* (Cambridge, Mass., 1991); T. H. Marshall, *Citizenship and Social Class* (Cambridge, 1950); Alice Kessler-Harris, *In Pursuit of Equity: Women, Men, and the Quest for Economic Citizenship in Twentieth-Century America* (New York, 2001).

⁸⁹ See also U.S. Department of State, "Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000: Trafficking in Persons Report," June 5, 2002, <http://www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/2002> (accessed January 11, 2007), and Center for Women Policy Studies, *State Laws/Map of the United States*, http://www.centerwomenpolicy.org/programs/trafficking/map/default_flash.asp (accessed January 11, 2007). Also

democracies have shifted from an emphasis on duties and obligations to the nation to a stress on becoming autonomous, responsible choice-making subjects who can serve the nation best by becoming 'entrepreneurs of the self.'⁹⁰ Those who lack resources—and 70 percent of the world's poor are women—are almost bound to fail that entrepreneurial challenge.⁹¹

Labor trafficking is the third-largest international criminal enterprise, behind only drug and arms smuggling, producing billions of dollars in profit. (The United Nations Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children is the internationally agreed-upon definition.)⁹² Although this traffic involves both men and women, the largest categories by far are in the kinds of work in which women are most likely to be found: domestic service; marginally skilled labor in hotels, restaurants, and nursing homes; and sex work. So long as labor contracts are taken at face value, the realities of trafficking remain masked. Ambiguous borders cloud the margins between Ong's "mobile homo economicus" and the trafficked, between the trafficked and the refugee, between the refugee, the "essentially stateless," and the stateless.

Contemporary vulnerabilities to "essential statelessness" were recently made transparent by the largest successfully prosecuted human trafficking case in U.S. history, involving over two hundred Vietnamese and Chinese women and some men imported to work in near-slavery conditions at the Daewoosa garment factory in American Samoa. Opened in 1999, Daewoosa held contracts with several important American retailers of clothes, including JC Penney and Sears, which could import from Samoa at lower tariffs with products labeled "Made in American Samoa." In April 2002, the High Court of American Samoa awarded \$3.5 million (approximately \$13,000, or two years' salary, each—far less than minimum wage) to more than two hundred workers; in 2003, the U.S. Federal District Court in Hawaii sentenced Kil Soo Lee, the proprietor of the by then defunct factory, to forty years in prison for extortion, money laundering, and—in a rare invocation of the Thirteenth Amendment—"involuntary servitude." The workers who were imported into American Samoa were technically citizens of Vietnam and of China, but they had little hope of protection from either country. The government of Vietnam acknowledged its own general mandate to assist Vietnamese nationals residing overseas, but as in many countries where it is national policy to encourage labor migration, government ministries and offices have multiple responsibilities, and overseeing or protecting the interests of workers usually falls below expanding labor exports and serving the interests of labor exporters. No Vietnamese consul visited the Daewoosa factory.⁹³ In

see Judith Resnik, "Law's Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and Federalism's Multiple Ports of Entry," *Yale Law Journal* 115 (2006): 1564–1670, especially n. 485.

⁹⁰ Aihwa Ong, *Buddha Is Hiding: Refugees, Citizenship, the New America* (Berkeley, Calif., 2003), 9.

⁹¹ See UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, *The World's Women 2005*, and other resources in Resnik, "Law's Migration," especially 1667 n. 510.

⁹² Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, Supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime, UN GAOR, 55th Sess., Annex 2, Agenda Item 105, at 31, UN Doc. A/RES/55/25 (2000); "Jobs and Borders: The Trafficking Victims Protection Act," *Harvard Law Review* 118 (2005): 2180–2202, and U.S. Department of Justice, "Report on Activities to Combat Human Trafficking: Fiscal Years 2001–2005" (2006), 75 pp., <http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/crim/introduction.pdf> (accessed January 11, 2007).

⁹³ http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2003/February/03_crt_108.htm (accessed January 11, 2007); and see

this context, and when home states decline to protect them effectively, the UNHCR's conclusion of February 2006 is especially apt: trafficked women and children are "essentially stateless."⁹⁴



THE DREAM OF A COSMOPOLITAN CITIZENSHIP—and the nightmare of its absence in statelessness—in American history is a complicated one, whose presence we are only just beginning to acknowledge. In trying to understand the expansive meanings embedded in the status of statelessness, we come to consider not only questions of who can be a citizen and on what terms, but also some of the instabilities of public/private distinctions, of the way the personal and the political merge, of the way in which the state regularly relies on the microclimates of the workplace, the bedroom, and the birthing room to sustain national citizenship.

Behind the public story is a backstory of distrust: a distrust of the future complexities of sorting out the claims of thousands of people who might well conclude that they could now claim citizenship retroactively, and a distrust of women as tricksters, accompanied by a belief that men should be able to pick and choose for which of their children they will be responsible. These issues have such resilience not only because they are stereotypes based on actual trends, but also because these issues are rooted in concepts that reach back to the founding era, when the property regime of coverture ensured that married women's relation to the state was filtered through their husbands.

The categories that define who is vulnerable to statelessness have been refigured since the 1930s, when Catheryn Seckler-Hudson sought to provide it with a syntax. Statelessness is not a static conceptual matter; it now breaks along the fault lines of perceptions of state security, race and ethnicity, ideal workers, and gender. Indeed, the fault lines are not themselves always clear. Hannah Arendt has reminded us of the difficulty of distinguishing between stateless refugees and "normal" resident aliens. "Who," she asked, "will guarantee human rights to those who have lost their nationally guaranteed rights?" Statelessness is now made in the daily decisions of captors in prisons such as Abu Ghraib and Guantánamo, deciding who is entitled to the protections of international law and who is not. Today's transnational market in domestic labor is filled with people who are not technically refugees, but who are homeless in having left their home country, who are citizens of one country but undocumented aliens where they work. By far most of these people are women, many of whom, like Miss Saigon, slide all too easily into the international traffic in women and into the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees' understanding of "ineffective nationality" and "de facto statelessness." In this volatile political context, statelessness is no longer so easily measured only by the presence or absence

New York Times, April 20, 2002; and *Jiang Shunzhe v. Daewoosa Samoa LTD and Kil-Soo Lee*, High Court of American Samoa, Trial Division, CA 68-99. Mark Sidel, "Legal Reform in Whose Interests: Illuminations from Vietnamese Labor Export and Its Regulation" (unpublished paper delivered at Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris, October 2003).

⁹⁴ UNHCR, "Statelessness: Prevention and Reduction." EC/57/SC/CRP6, 4.

of a passport; it is a state of being, continually produced by new and increasingly extreme forms of restriction and of the creation of new categories of stateless human beings.

And so it may be that—from the days of the founding to our own time—the state has needed the stateless: needed them at some deep level, to construct what it is not; needed them for its own definition, to stabilize its own borders and boundaries. It is widely understood—thanks not least to Nansen and to Arendt—that statelessness haunted twentieth-century Europe. Statelessness has also haunted the United States throughout its history, from its oxymoronic founding as a republic of slavery to our own time. “Once they had left their homeland they remained homeless; once they had left their state they became stateless; once they had been deprived of their human rights they were rightless.” Arendt’s heartbreaking words conspicuously begin not with a crime but with an apparently neutral behavior: “once they had left.” It is the leaving that makes the individual or community vulnerable, whether or not the leaving was itself voluntary. But if, for Arendt, twentieth-century statelessness was triggered by a single act, statelessness today, in particular in relation to the borders and borderlands of the United States, is most usefully understood not only as a status but as a practice, made and remade in daily decisions of presidents and judges, border guards and prison guards, managers and pimps. The stateless are the citizen’s other. The stateless serve the state by embodying its absence, by providing frightening models of the vulnerability of those who lack sufficient awe of the state. The stateless serve the state by signaling who will not be entitled to its protection, and throwing fear into the rest of us.

And yet.

Is it possible to end not with the nightmare, but with the dream? Is it possible, still, to imagine a citizenship of the world?

Herman Melville imagined it—Melville, who had been a seaman on an immigrant ship, fleeing the Ireland of the Great Hunger. “Let us waive that agitated national topic,” he wrote in *Redburn*, “as to whether such multitudes of foreign poor should be landed on our American shores; let us waive it, with the one only thought, that if they can get here, they have God’s right to come; though they bring all Ireland and her miseries with them. For the whole world is the patrimony of the whole world; there is no telling who does not own a stone in the Great Wall of China.”⁹⁵

Melville’s dream has recently been invoked by Aristide R. Zolberg, professor of political science emeritus at the New School in New York, whose connection with the subject was forged when he himself was a child hidden from the Nazis. Zolberg calls on us to address the central asymmetry in international human rights law: if indeed “everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own,” we need the concomitant principle: “Everyone has the right to enter any country.” The world was made better in 1990 “when Hungary opened up its border to Austria, providing to masses of East German vacationers the possibility of driving their sputtering Trabants to freedom, and the processes unleashed by this turn of events amounted to a major turning point in world history.” Zolberg muses, “the strict confinement of

⁹⁵ Herman Melville, *Redburn, His First Voyage* (1849; repr., Evanston, Ill., 1969), 293; cited in Aristide R. Zolberg, *A Nation by Design: Immigration Policy in the Fashioning of America* (Cambridge, Mass., 2006), 455.

individuals to membership in the states under whose jurisdiction they happened to be born negates their being as members of a common species.”⁹⁶

Now, Zolberg is no fool, and he recognizes that “under present world conditions, in the absence of border controls, the world’s affluent countries would be quickly overwhelmed by truly massive flows of international migrants in search of work, social benefits and safety . . . The prospect imposes a major constraint on the application of the Melville principle.” But at the very least, we can shift our starting point, searching for an ethical immigration policy that places the burden of proof on those who would restrict.

The end of the Cold War and the successes of the European Union have turned much critical attention toward inherited understandings of citizenship; whatever “globalization” is understood to be, it is having an impact on how people understand their relationship to the jurisdictions in which, as Zolberg says, “they happened to be born.” Identities shift and fracture; the relation of national identity to religious, gender, class, and ethnic identities blurs and re-forms. Millions of people right now are experiencing what it is like to be members of a nation and the European Union simultaneously. It may be possible to feel our way into a meaningful cosmopolitanism, in which a robust international law protects human rights in reliable ways, and reliance on the vagaries of the single nation-state is less essential. We are in the early days, but we can watch the dream expand in the European Union, which every day offers fresh examples of federalism in practice and of the framing of a robust and expansive international law of equity and human rights, practiced in courts of relatively recent invention: the International Court of Justice, the European Court of Human Rights, the International Criminal Court. As the European Union prepares to embrace new members, including Bulgaria and Romania, it may well be that we are living in the early years of a new and vibrant cosmopolitanism. We may not be able to assess this for fifty years; even a century is not long as these things go—we are in a time frame in which we repeatedly invoke the Treaty of Westphalia, after all. The United States itself has deep ambivalence toward these developments—“often at the forefront of efforts to redress human rights abuses and to bring the world under the power of international law,” as Harlan Cohen has observed, while at the same time being “equally careful to remain outside such legal schemes.”⁹⁷ That the United States hesitates to play a leading role in this enterprise is to be regretted, but already we see a telling rhetorical shift, from talk of “civil rights”—rights that rely on the nation for maintenance—to “human rights,” with the claim that the validity stretches throughout humanity. “The time may have come once again,” writes Ralph W. Mathisen, thinking of the expansive imperial citizenship of Rome, “for a form of citizenship unburdened by the baggage of nationalism or political allegiances.”⁹⁸

While we are engaged in constructing an authentically capacious citizenship, we can be strengthened by the example of efforts by individuals to forge such a citizenship out of their own desperation. So let me end as I began, now with a third version of *Madame Butterfly*, this one by the novelist Pearl Buck; this one written

⁹⁶ Zolberg, *A Nation by Design*, 454–455.

⁹⁷ Harlan Grant Cohen, “The American Challenge to International Law: A Framework for Debate,” *Yale Journal of International Law* 28 (2003): 552.

⁹⁸ Ralph W. Mathisen, “Peregrini, *Barbari*, and *Cives Romani*: Concepts of Citizenship and the Legal Identity of Barbarians in the Later Roman Empire,” *AHR* 111, no. 4 (October 2006): 1040.



FIGURE 4: King Gustavus V of Sweden presents the Nobel Prize for Literature to Pearl Buck, December 1938. Courtesy of Pearl S. Buck International, www.pearl-s-buck.org.

in 1952; this one stretching across the globe, engaging the Atlantic as well as the Pacific; this one with a wistfully optimistic ending (which is the more believable for its imperfection and the deep sadness at its core).

Josui is a modernized Cho-Cho-San, who navigates between the United States and Japan in the context of the postwar occupation in Pearl Buck's mesmerizing

novel *The Hidden Flower*.⁹⁹ Married by Japanese rite in Japan, despite her skeptical family, Josui actually goes to the U.S. to marry her American soldier under American law, but discovers that he is from Virginia, where interracial marriage is illegal, as it would be until 1967. His wealthy family pressures him—threatening the loss of his inheritance—should he move with Josui to New York, and he capitulates to them, abandoning her (as Pinkerton and Chris, in their different ways, abandoned their commitments to their Asian lovers). The scion of the First Families of Virginia is humiliated in the readers' eyes as spineless, unreliable, and without ethics. While Josui is pregnant with the child of her faithless American "husband," she is wooed by her Japanese former suitor—himself a fine young man, eager to enter the modern world, who has remained loyal and loving during her absence. But he cannot find the strength to bear the shame that in his society would accompany not only marrying a divorced woman but also raising the biracial child of her first husband. He will marry her, but not if she brings the child back to Japan. And so Josui returns to America, to Los Angeles, as far away from Virginia as she can get. She gives birth to her son in a charity clinic. In a marvelous twist of fate, she is saved from giving him up for anonymous adoption by the intervention of a refugee Jewish woman physician, who has lost all that made her life worthwhile in the Holocaust, but whose heart is stirred by Josui's infant. The doctor adopts the infant, who is key to her new life; Josui can return to Japan a respectable woman to make a new life of her own. The exemplars of the ethics of a cosmopolitan world are these two women—the Butterfly who finds a way to ensure her child's future without having to kill herself; the survivor of the Holocaust who stretches her hands across the Pacific, across boundaries of language, race, and nation. Together they will make a world in which state boundaries are less important than ethics and love.

⁹⁹ New York, 1952.

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Independent Indians and the U.S.-Mexican War

BRIAN DELAY

IN THE SUMMER OF 1845, amid mounting concern that the United States and Mexico would go to war over Texas, the New Orleans *Commercial Bulletin* reported that a Comanche Indian force of “extraordinary magnitude” was preparing to descend upon the “weakened population” of northern Mexico. According to the editors, the whole of the Mexican north would soon be “engulfed in a terrible Indian war.” This fact would “powerfully influence political relations” and “would have to be considered as a new element in diplomatic calculations.” The translated article soon appeared in Mexican newspapers, including Durango’s *Registro Oficial*. The paper’s editors admitted that Comanches posed a tremendous threat, but blamed their “philanthropic” American neighbors for that. From Durango’s perspective, Americans were “impelling” and “inviting” Indians across the frontier, encouraging “the evils that always attend the depredations of the savage,” all with an eye to acquiring lands that excited the “insatiable greed” of the United States.¹

This cross-border conversation had a broad and tragic context. In the early 1830s, following what for most had been nearly two generations of imperfect peace, Comanches, Kiowas, Navajos, and several different tribes of Apaches dramatically increased their attacks upon northern Mexican settlements. While contexts and motivations varied widely, most of the escalating violence reflected Mexico’s declining military and diplomatic capabilities, as well as burgeoning markets for stolen livestock and captives. Indian men raided Mexican ranches, haciendas, and towns, killing or capturing the people they found there, and stealing or destroying animals and other property. When able, Mexicans responded by attacking their enemies with comparable cruelty and avarice. Raids expanded, breeding reprisals and deepening enmities, until the searing violence touched all or parts of nine states.

These events had powerful but virtually forgotten consequences for the course and outcome of the U.S.-Mexican War. In pursuing their own material, strategic, and cultural goals, indigenous polities in the Mexican north remade the ground upon which Mexico and the United States would compete in the mid-1840s. Raids and counter-raids claimed thousands of lives, ruined critical sectors of northern Mexico’s

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¹ *El Registro Oficial del Gobierno del departamento de Durango*, August 17, 1845. The editors reprinted translated portions of the *Bulletin*’s editorial from *El Diario de Veracruz*.

economy, stalled the north's demographic growth, depopulated much of its vast countryside, and fueled divisive conflicts between Mexicans at nearly every level of political integration. Exhausted, impoverished, and divided by fifteen years of war, and facing ongoing and even intensifying Indian raids, northern Mexicans were singularly unprepared to resist the U.S. Army in 1846 or to sustain a significant insurgency against occupation forces.

At the same time, as the editorials from New Orleans and Durango suggest, Indian raiders shaped how Americans and Mexicans viewed each other in advance of the war. From Texas to Washington, Anglo-American observers began looking at Mexico *through* the autonomous native peoples of the borderlands, as if these Indians were lenses calibrated to reveal essential information about Mexicans, their lands, and their futures in North America.² Schooled in Indian removal—that supreme exhibition of state power over native peoples—Americans watched Indians driving Mexicans backward, and this observation inspired ambitions and tactics for continental expansion. Mexicans living through the conflicts could not afford the same creative detachment, but they too came to gaze through Indians rather than at them. Mexicans saw Americans standing behind *los indios bárbaros*, employing them as proxies in a plan to seize Mexico's territory. In other words, Americans and Mexicans both used Indians to conceive of and talk about each other, synthesizing the actions of Comanches, Apaches, Navajos, and others into narratives of the nation-state. Conversations about Indian raiders conditioned Mexican responses to the U.S. invasion, informed American expectations, war plans, and occupation strategy, and figured prominently in the debate over how much land Mexico should have to surrender in defeat.

Thus U.S. expansion into Mexican territory should be viewed not as the culmination of one story, but rather as the collision of two. The more familiar tale about competition between a thriving and a faltering republic intersected in neglected but decisive ways with a story—or, more precisely, multiple stories—about independent Indian peoples pursuing their own interests at the margins of state power. Such a reinterpretation is long overdue, because Indians remain all but invisible in the narrative of the U.S.-Mexican War and its economic, military, and ideological context. This is not for lack of sources. Reports and commentaries on Indian raiders are common in American sources from the time, widespread in Mexico City's publications, and ubiquitous in northern Mexico's newspapers and official correspondence.³ Ralph Adam Smith and Isidro Vizcaya Canales long ago tapped into this material to give scholars on both sides of the border glimpses into the devastation suffered

² I use the terms "autonomous" and "independent" to distinguish Comanches, Kiowas, Apaches, and Navajos from the large majority of indigenous peoples in North America, those in Mexico who by the nineteenth century had long since come under some kind of subordination by nonnative political authorities. Following independence, Mexican officials also came into conflict with semi-autonomous peoples such as the Yaquis and Mayos of northwestern Mexico, but such "rebellions" stood outside of the discourses that are central to my analysis. See Evelyn Hu-DeHart, *Yaqui Resistance and Survival: The Struggle for Land and Autonomy, 1821–1910* (Madison, Wis., 1984), 18–65; Cynthia Radding, *Wandering Peoples: Colonialism, Ethnic Spaces, and Ecological Frontiers in Northwestern Mexico, 1700–1850* (Durham, N.C., 1997), 288–301.

³ Newspapers are especially valuable sources from this period of northern Mexico's history, because when military and civilian officials corresponded about Indians, editors usually published the letters in their entirety rather than summarize their contents. For this reason, it is possible to recover in some detail Mexican interactions with Indians in any given state by working with the state's official newspaper.

by parts of northern Mexico prior to the U.S. invasion.⁴ And yet, so tightly have historians framed the story of the war as a contest between nation-states that the narrative has no conceptual space for the actions of stateless Indian peoples. Hence the U.S. literature on manifest destiny and on the war itself says precious little about raids and otherwise includes the region's Indians only on those rare occasions when they traded, talked, or fought with U.S. soldiers.⁵ Josefina Zoraida Vázquez has championed Mexico's renewed scholarly interest in *la intervención norteamericana*, and a few Mexican scholars have begun integrating Indian conflicts into the war's history at the state level.⁶ But still we lack an appreciation of the broader international consequences of Mexico's far-flung conflict with independent Indians.

In part this can be attributed to a lack of communication between the literatures concerning U.S. expansion into northern Mexico and the growing scholarship on Indian-Mexican relationships in that region.⁷ In recent decades, scholars on both sides of the border have significantly advanced our understanding of these relation-

⁴ Smith's most expansive article is Ralph A. Smith, "Indians in American-Mexican Relations before the War of 1846," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 43, no. 1 (1963): 34–64. See also his "The Comanche Invasion of Mexico in the Fall of 1845," *West Texas Historical Association Year Book* 35, no. 1 (1959): 3–28; "The Comanche Bridge between Oklahoma and Mexico, 1843–1844," *Chronicles of Oklahoma* 39, no. 1 (1961): 54–69; "Apache Plunder Trails Southward, 1831–1840," *New Mexico Historical Review* 37, no. 1 (1962): 20–42; and "Apache 'Ranching' below the Gila, 1841–1845," *Arizoniana* 3, no. 1 (1962): 1–17. Isidro Vizcaya Canales, ed., *La invasión de los indios bárbaros al noreste de México en los años de 1840 y 1841* (Monterrey, 1968).

⁵ See, for example, Farnham Bishop, *Our First War in Mexico* (New York, 1916), 142; Justin H. Smith, *The War with Mexico*, 2 vols. (New York, 1919), 1: 298, 479, 521; Bernard Augustine De Voto, *The Year of Decision, 1846* (Boston, 1943), 156, 249–250, 388–392, 417; Alfred Hoyt Bill, *Rehearsal for Conflict: The War with Mexico, 1846–1848* (New York, 1947), 126, 130; Robert Selph Henry, *The Story of the Mexican War* (Indianapolis, 1950), 131; Seymour V. Connor and Odie B. Faulk, *North America Divided: The Mexican War, 1846–1848* (New York, 1971), 95; David M. Pletcher, *The Diplomacy of Annexation: Texas, Oregon, and the Mexican War* (Columbia, Mo., 1973), 76; K. Jack Bauer, *The Mexican War, 1846–1848* (New York, 1974), 19, 136–137; John Edward Weems, *To Conquer a Peace: The War between the United States and Mexico* (Garden City, N.Y., 1974), 315; Thomas R. Hietala, *Manifest Design: Anxious Aggrandizement in Late Jacksonian America* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1985), 145–146; Robert Walter Johannsen, *To the Halls of the Montezumas: The Mexican War in the American Imagination* (New York, 1985), 33; John S. D. Eisenhower, *So Far from God: The U.S. War with Mexico, 1846–1848* (New York, 1989), 220–221, 234, 249; Carol Christensen and Thomas Christensen, *The U.S.-Mexican War* (San Francisco, 1998), 113; Douglas W. Richmond, "A View of the Periphery: Regional Factors and Collaboration during the U.S.-Mexican Conflict, 1845–1848," in Richard V. Frangaviglia and Douglas W. Richmond, eds., *Dueling Eagles: Reinterpreting the U.S.-Mexican War, 1846–1848* (Fort Worth, Tex., 2000), 127–154, 136, 140–141; Paul Foos, *A Short, Offhand, Killing Affair: Soldiers and Social Conflict during the U.S. Mexican War* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2002), 140; Douglas V. Meed, *The Mexican War, 1846–1848* (New York, 2003), 41, 89.

⁶ See José de la Cruz Pacheco Rojas, "Durango entre dos guerras, 1846–1847," in Josefina Zoraida Vázquez, ed., *México al tiempo de su guerra con Estados Unidos (1846–1848)* (Mexico, 1997), 189–212; Ignacio Almada Bay, José Marcos Medina Bustos, and José René Córdova Rascón, "Medidas de gobierno en Sonora para hacer frente a la guerra con los Estados Unidos, 1846–1849," in *XXI Simposio de historia y antropología de Sonora: Sonora y la región* (Hermosillo, 1997), 229–263; César Navarro Gallegos, "Una 'Santa Alianza': El gobierno duranguense y la jerarquía eclesiástica durante la intervención norteamericana," in Laura Herrera Serna, *México en guerra (1846–1848): Perspectivas regionales* (Mexico, 1997), 233–251. For older Mexican literature that briefly mentions Indian raids in the context of the U.S.-Mexican War, see, for example, Carlos María Bustamante, *El nuevo Bernal Díaz del Castillo o sea historia de la invasión de los anglo-americanos en México* (1847; repr., Mexico, 1949), 57–58; Gastón García Cantú, *Las invasiones norteamericanas en México* (Mexico, 1971), 163–179; Fernando Jordán, *Crónica de un país bárbaro* (Chihuahua, 1978), 221–230, esp. 227; Leopoldo Martínez Caraza, *El norte bárbaro de México* (Mexico, 1983), 130–131.

⁷ While it says little about Mexican-Indian violence, the important book by Andrés Reséndez is an exception to this observation. See *Changing National Identities at the Frontier: Texas and New Mexico, 1800–1850* (Cambridge, 2005).

ships during the 1830s and 1840s, albeit usually in the context of much longer chronological studies. We now have careful examinations of interactions between Mexicans and independent Indians in individual states, biographies of key figures, and rich studies of particular Indian groups and their stances toward outsiders.⁸ A few works take a more comprehensive view. David Weber's classic *The Mexican Frontier* situates worsening violence within a larger matrix of challenges facing Mexico's far north, including the often disruptive effects of U.S. commercial expansion. James Brooks's justly celebrated *Captives and Cousins* interrogates the dynamic social and economic networks that bound together diverse peoples across a wide arc of Mexico's far north in ways both creative and destructive.⁹ But even these comparatively expansive treatments restrict their core analyses to the present-day American Southwest, whereas the worst of the violence occurred south of the Rio Grande. Because it has been focused on specific locales, states, or tribes, or on one side or another of a border that did not exist before 1848, the borderlands scholarship has obscured

⁸ For Chihuahua, see William B. Griffen, *Utmost Good Faith: Patterns of Apache-Mexican Hostilities in Northern Chihuahua Border Warfare, 1821–1848* (Albuquerque, N.Mex., 1988); Luis Aboites, "Poder político y 'bárbaros' en Chihuahua hacia 1845," *Secuencia* 19, no. 1 (1991): 17–32; Víctor Orozco Orozco, *Las guerras indias en la historia de Chihuahua: Primeras fases* (Mexico, 1992); Orozco, *Las guerras indias en la historia de Chihuahua: Antología* (Ciudad Juárez, 1992); Ana María Alonso, *Thread of Blood: Colonialism, Revolution, and Gender on Mexico's Northern Frontier* (Tucson, Ariz., 1995), 21–111; Ricardo León García and Carlos Gonzáles Herrera, *Civilizar o exterminar: Tarahumaras y apaches en Chihuahua, siglo XIX* (Mexico, 2000). For Sonora, see Stuart F. Voss, *On the Periphery of Nineteenth-Century Mexico: Sonora and Sinaloa, 1810–1877* (Tucson, Ariz., 1982), 64–74, 95–106. For Coahuila, see Martha Rodríguez, *Historias de resistencia y exterminio: Los indios de Coahuila durante el siglo XIX* (Mexico, 1995), 55–74; Rodríguez, *La guerra entre bárbaros y civilizados: El exterminio del nómada en Coahuila, 1840–1880* (Saltillo, Coahuila, 1998). For Nuevo León, see Isidro Vizcaya Canales, *Tierra de guerra viva: Incurciones de indios y otros conflictos en el noreste de México durante el siglo XIX, 1821–1885* (Monterrey, 2001). Matthew McLaurine Babcock, "Trans-National Trade Routes and Diplomacy: Comanche Expansion, 1760–1846" (M.A. thesis, University of New Mexico, 2001), 81–123, discusses Comanche activities below the Rio Grande, focusing especially on Coahuila and Chihuahua. For New Mexico, see Ward Alan Minge, "Frontier Problems in New Mexico Preceding the Mexican War, 1840–1846" (Ph.D. diss., University of New Mexico, 1966); Frank D. Reeve, "Navaho Foreign Affairs, 1795–1846," *New Mexico Historical Review* 46, no. 2–3 (1971): 101–132, 223–251; Frank McNitt, *Navajo Wars: Military Campaigns, Slave Raids, and Reprisals* (Albuquerque, N.Mex., 1972), 66–123; Daniel Tyler, "Mexican Indian Policy in New Mexico," *New Mexico Historical Review* 55, no. 2 (1980): 101–120; David M. Brugge, *Navajos in the Catholic Church Records of New Mexico, 1694–1875*, 2nd ed. (Tsile, Ariz., 1985), 57–87; James F. Brooks, *Captives and Cousins: Slavery, Kinship, and Community in the Southwest Borderlands* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 2002), esp. 180–228. For Texas, see F. Todd Smith, *From Dominance to Disappearance: The Indians of Texas and the Near Southwest, 1786–1859* (Lincoln, Neb., 2005), chaps. 5–6; Gary Clayton Anderson, *The Conquest of Texas: Ethnic Cleansing in the Promised Land, 1820–1875* (Norman, Okla., 2005), 81–226. Biographies include Edwin R. Sweeney, *Cochise: Chiricahua Apache Chief* (Norman, Okla., 1991), 3–77; Edwin R. Sweeney, *Mangas Coloradas: Chief of the Chiricahua Apaches* (Norman, Okla., 1998), 27–137; Ralph Adam Smith, *Borderlander: The Life of James Kirker, 1793–1852* (Norman, Okla., 1999). For studies of particular native groups, see, for example, Thomas W. Kavanagh, *Comanche Political History: An Ethnohistorical Perspective, 1706–1875* (Lincoln, Neb., 1996), 193–294; Morris W. Foster, *Being Comanche: A Social History of an American Indian Community* (Tucson, Ariz., 1991); F. Todd Smith, *The Wichita Indians: Traders of Texas and the Southern Plains, 1540–1845* (College Station, Tex., 2000), 111–154.

⁹ David J. Weber, *The Mexican Frontier, 1821–1846: The American Southwest under Mexico* (Albuquerque, N.Mex., 1982); Brooks, *Captives and Cousins*. Thomas D. Hall, *Social Change in the Southwest, 1350–1880* (Lawrence, Kans., 1989), 147–203, takes a broad view and discusses both independent Indians and the U.S.-Mexican War, but does little to combine the two. See Cuauhtémoc José Velasco Avila, "La amenaza comanche en la frontera mexicana, 1800–1841" (Ph.D. diss., Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, 1998), 233–342, for Texas and northeastern Mexico to 1841. While it ends in 1830, the complex analysis in Gary Clayton Anderson, *The Indian Southwest, 1580–1830: Ethnogenesis and Reinvention* (Norman, Okla., 1999), also embraces multiple peoples and represents a major advance in the literature.

the geopolitical significance of the interethnic violence of the 1830s and 1840s. By exploring the connections between regional and international conflict, it is possible to set the rich but fragmented borderland literature in a revealing continental context.

More broadly, recovering the significance of Indians to the U.S.-Mexican War advances the project of integrating native peoples into the international history of the Americas. It is now a basic tenet of North America's colonial narrative that Indians could decisively shape the course of inter-imperial relations. Sometimes native peoples did so directly, by lending military support to particular European powers. But one of the chief virtues of the groundbreaking work done on this subject by Richard White, Daniel K. Richter, Colin G. Calloway, and others has been an insistence that Indian politics could just as often influence imperial designs and colonial realities indirectly, by independently pursuing their own complicated and shifting agendas.¹⁰ With the literature still focused on eastern North America, however, this influence is thought to have peaked with the Seven Years' War, declined through the American Revolution, and vanished after the War of 1812. Scholars are only now beginning to give more serious consideration to the role of Indians in international relations after that date.¹¹ Similarly, historians of Mexico's early national period have been integrating indigenous peasants into the larger narrative, and yet the tens of thousands of autonomous Indians who controlled Mexico's northern territories are still ignored or consigned to regional scholarship.¹² Finally, historical and socio-

¹⁰ The historiography bearing on Indians and inter-imperial conflicts is large. Important works since 1990 include Richard White, *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650–1815* (Cambridge, 1991); David J. Weber, *The Spanish Frontier in North America* (New Haven, Conn., 1992); Daniel K. Richter, *The Ordeal of the Longhouse: The Peoples of the Iroquois League in the Era of European Colonization* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1992); Daniel H. Usner, *Indians, Settlers, and Slaves in a Frontier Exchange Economy: The Lower Mississippi Valley before 1783* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1992); Eric Hinderaker, *Elusive Empires: Constructing Colonialism in the Ohio Valley, 1673–1800* (Cambridge, 1997); Anderson, *Indian Southwest*; Jerry Adelman and Stephen Aron, "From Borderlands to Borders: Empires, Nation-States, and the Peoples in Between in North American History," *AHR* 104, no. 3 (June 1999): 814–841; Fred Anderson, *Crucible of War: The Seven Years' War and the Fate of Empire in British North America, 1754–1766* (New York, 2000); Daniel K. Richter, *Facing East from Indian Country: A Native History of Early America* (Cambridge, Mass., 2001); Gregory Evans Dowd, *War under Heaven: Pontiac, the Indian Nations, and the British Empire* (Baltimore, Md., 2002); Alan Gallay, *The Indian Slave Trade: The Rise of the English Empire in the American South, 1670–1717* (New Haven, Conn., 2002); Colin G. Calloway, *One Vast Winter Count: The Native American West before Lewis and Clark* (Lincoln, Neb., 2004); David J. Weber, *Bárbaros: Spaniards and Their Savages in the Age of Enlightenment* (New Haven, Conn., 2005); Fred Anderson and Andrew Cayton, *The Dominion of War: Empire and Liberty in North America, 1500–2000* (New York, 2005), 1–246; Stephen Aron, *American Confluence: The Missouri Frontier from Borderland to Border State* (Bloomington, Ind., 2006); Alan Taylor, *The Divided Ground: Indians, Settlers and the Northern Borderland of the American Revolution* (New York, 2006); Kathleen DuVal, *The Native Ground: Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent* (Philadelphia, Pa., 2006).

¹¹ See, for example, Sheila McManus, *The Line Which Separates: Race, Gender, and the Making of the Alberta-Montana Borderlands* (Lincoln, Neb., 2005); Anderson, *Conquest of Texas*, which includes consideration of Indians and Texan-Mexican relations; and David G. McCrady, *Living with Strangers: The Nineteenth-Century Sioux and the Canadian-American Borderlands* (Lincoln, Neb., 2006).

¹² See, for example, Florencia E. Mallon, *Peasant and Nation: The Making of Postcolonial Mexico and Peru* (Berkeley, Calif., 1995); Peter F. Guardino, *Peasants, Politics, and the Formation of Mexico's National State: Guerrero, 1800–1857* (Stanford, Calif., 1996); Eric Van Young, *The Other Rebellion: Popular Violence, Ideology, and the Mexican Struggle for Independence, 1810–1821* (Stanford, Calif., 2001); Peter F. Guardino, *The Time of Liberty: Popular Political Culture in Oaxaca, 1750–1850* (Durham, N.C., 2005), 122–291. For thoughts on the place of nomads in Mexican memory, see Aguilar Luis Aboites, "Nómadas y sedentarios en el norte de México: Elementos para una periodización," in Beatriz Braniff C. and

logical literature on the emergence of nation-states in the Western Hemisphere has grown up around explicit and implicit comparisons to Europe. But this literature has made little conceptual use of the striking difference that, unlike Europe, vast portions of the Americas remained under the control of stateless societies well into the second half of the 1800s.¹³

As nineteenth-century North America's defining international conflict and an event with enduring consequences for all of the continent's peoples, the U.S.-Mexican War is an ideal starting place for reconceptualizing indigenous contributions to the hemisphere's international history. By taking seriously both what Indians did and how their deeds informed discourse in the U.S. and Mexico, it is possible to see how native polities could "powerfully influence political relations" between rival states in North America and beyond.

IN 1830, NORTHERN MEXICANS enjoyed relatively peaceful relations with most independent Indians. Despite frequent animal thefts, killings and kidnappings were relatively rare and were met more often with negotiation than with organized violence. Conditions deteriorated rapidly during the next decade, until overlapping theaters of war canvassed the whole of the north. By the early 1830s, Apaches in the northwest were raiding in five states: "Western" Apaches in Sonora and Chihuahua; Chiricahuas in Sonora, Chihuahua, and southern New Mexico; and Mescaleros in Chihuahua, Coahuila, and Durango. As the decade progressed, New Mexicans became embroiled in renewed war with Navajos, and during the early 1840s they provoked narrower quarrels with Utes and Arapahos as well. Lipan Apaches on the Lower Rio Grande broke a wary peace with Mexicans repeatedly in the 1830s and 1840s, raiding ranches and settlements throughout the northeast. Finally, Comanches and Kiowas dramatically escalated their raids on Chihuahua in the early 1830s, turned to Tamaulipas, Nuevo León, and Coahuila by mid-decade, and by 1840 were even campaigning across Durango, northern Zacatecas, and parts of San Luis Potosí.

While all of these conflicts had local and regional proximate causes, a few broad changes help explain why violence metastasized across the north when it did. Following independence in 1821, the Republic of Mexico found itself without the financial and, to a lesser extent, the diplomatic resources that had helped Bourbon New Spain foster a delicate system of alliances, regulated trade, and gift-giving with independent Indians. Presents to Indians became fewer and shabbier, provoking "humiliating" excuses from cash-poor northern Mexican officials and violent outbursts by Indian visitors.¹⁴ The consequences of Mexican parsimony were nowhere

Marie-Areti Hers, eds., *Nómadas y sedentarios en el norte de México: Homenaje a Beatriz Braniff* (Mexico, 2000), 613–621.

¹³ Miguel Angel Centeno and Fernando López-Alves, eds., *The Other Mirror: Grand Theory through the Lens of Latin America* (Princeton, N.J., 2001); James Dunkerley, ed., *Studies in the Formation of the Nation-State in Latin America* (London, 2002); Sara Castro-Klarén and John Charles Chasteen, *Beyond Imagined Communities: Reading and Writing the Nation in Nineteenth-Century Latin America* (Washington, D.C., 2003). For brief thoughts on how independent Indians might fit into the concerns of this literature, see Miguel Angel Centeno, *Blood and Debt: War and the Nation-State in Latin America* (University Park, Pa., 2002), 137–138.

¹⁴ Changes in the conceptualization and implementation of Spanish frontier policy are explored in



FIGURE 1: Approximate zones of conflict between independent Indians and Northern Mexicans, ca. 1844.

more calamitous than in the northwest, where Apaches resorted to widespread raiding only after the cancellation of a decades-old ration program.¹⁵

For most independent Indians, the costs of conflict diminished along with the benefits of peace. The presidios (garrisons) that had anchored Spanish military force on the frontier went into steady decline beginning in the 1810s. By the 1840s, no presidio had even half of the men required by a law passed in 1826—to say nothing of the men they realistically needed following the collapse of security in the 1830s.¹⁶ National leaders seldom employed regular army troops against autonomous Indians, distracted as they were by interminable coups and regional uprisings. State and local officials worked tirelessly to organize civilian defenses, and in Sonora, Chihuahua, and New Mexico they regularly sent offensive campaigns against Indian enemies. But authorities across the north complained bitterly that they lacked the money, the mounts, and, especially, the arms and ammunition to defend their people against horse-borne raiders. Zacatecans had special grounds for protest. Disarmed by the central government following an uprising in 1835, the state's population faced well-armed Comanches, they said, without even "nails to scratch ourselves."¹⁷

By making peace attractive and war dangerous, the regional system established in the late colonial era had put a brake on the contest for animals and, to a lesser extent, captives that fueled nearly all organized conflict between independent Indians and northern Mexicans. Native and nonnative economies alike depended on domestic animals for transportation of goods and people, and for hunting and war. Throughout northern Mexico, horses, mules, and (especially for Mexicans and Navajos) sheep also served as markers of wealth, as resources that bound together

Max L. Moorhead, *The Apache Frontier: Jacobo Ugarte and Spanish-Indian Relations in Northern New Spain, 1769–1791* (Norman, Okla., 1968), and Weber, *Spanish Frontier*, 204–235. For this period, see also the classic account in Elizabeth A. H. John, *Storms Brewed in Other Men's Worlds: The Confrontation of Indians, Spanish, and French in the Southwest, 1540–1795* (Norman, Okla., 1996), 226–697. For gifts, see Ross Frank, *From Settler to Citizen: New Mexican Economic Development and the Creation of Vecino Society, 1750–1820* (Berkeley, Calif., 2000), 132–136. For independent Mexico's fiscal troubles, see Barbara A. Tenenbaum, *The Politics of Penury: Debts and Taxes in Mexico, 1821–1856* (Albuquerque, N.Mex., 1986). For outbursts and "humiliating" explanations, see, for example, Kavanagh, *Comanche Political History*, 201, 205.

¹⁵ On the reduction of rations, see William B. Griffen, *Apaches at War and Peace: The Janos Presidio, 1750–1858* (Albuquerque, N.Mex., 1988), 131–133. For the initial years of the conflict in Chihuahua, see Griffen, *Utmost Good Faith*, 21–41. There were also scattered reports of deaths caused by Apaches in southern New Mexico during the 1830s. See Cayetano Martínez to Governor of New Mexico, March 9, 1836, frame 535, roll 21, Mexican Archives of New Mexico (microfilm). For Mescaleros in Durango, see "Ofensas a la nación por bárbaros que la invaden," folder 10, Uncataloged Imprints, W. B. Stephens Collection, Nettie Lee Benson Latin American Collection, University of Texas, Austin.

¹⁶ For presidios, see Max L. Moorhead, *The Presidio: Bastion of the Spanish Borderlands* (Norman, Okla., 1975); Weber, *Spanish Frontier*, 204–235. For a brief but insightful analysis of the problems facing presidios following independence, see Pedro García Conde, "Memoria del secretario de Estado y del Despacho de Guerra y Marina leída en la cámara de Senadores el día 10 y en el de Diputados el día 11 de Marzo de 1845," document no. 501 in Colección Lafragua, Biblioteca Nacional, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Mexico City [hereafter Lafragua]. Data from presidios is taken from the annual reports of the ministers of war for the years 1841, 1844, 1845, and 1846, available as documents no. 517, 494, 501, and 499, respectively, in Lafragua. There were no reports for the years 1842 and 1843, when Congress was not in session.

¹⁷ Manuel Gonzalez Cosío to Valentín Gómez Farías, Zacatecas, October 17, 1845, Doc. no. 1288, Valentín Gómez Farías Collection, Benson Latin American Collection, University of Texas, Austin. My thanks to Daniel Gutiérrez for sharing this document with me. For disarmament in Durango, see *Gaceta del Supremo Gobierno de Durango*, August 22, 1833.

networks of patrons and clients, and as the gifts most commonly used for bride-price. Without access to animals, then, young men could not participate in basic aspects of economic and social life. Indian and Mexican societies likewise placed a premium on captive women and children, who could be treated as commodities, slaves, or dependent kin. Across northern Mexico, inequalities and unrealized ambitions encouraged men to improve their own fortunes by taking animals and captives from ethnic others.¹⁸

Meanwhile, maturing connections to outside markets made theft all the more lucrative. American commercial activity in the Mexican north increased dramatically after 1821. Mexican officials denounced U.S. merchants whom they labeled “traders of blood” for supplying raiders with arms and ammunition in return for stolen Mexican animals.¹⁹ There is evidence of such activity among Apaches, and especially on the southern plains, where American and Texan merchants established several trading houses on the edges of *la comanchería* in the 1830s and 1840s.²⁰ Other Indians probably provided even more dynamic outlets for Mexican plunder than did Americans or Texans. Osages, Cheyennes, and Arapahos all forged peaceful trading relationships with Comanches and Kiowas in the 1830s and 1840s.²¹ Perhaps most importantly, Cherokees, Choctaws, Creeks, Chickasaws, and other native peoples displaced by the U.S. policy of Indian removal presented a huge market for stolen horses and mules, often working through Shawnee, Delaware, and Caddo intermediaries. These quiet but persistent traders also conducted a lucrative trade in captives, and likely provided the lion’s share of guns and munitions to the southern plains market in the decade before the U.S. invasion.²² Internal inequalities and

¹⁸ The pioneering work emphasizing inequalities on the southern plains was Bernard Mishkin, *Rank and Warfare among the Plains Indians* (New York, 1940). More recently, Jane Fishburne Collier, *Marriage and Inequality in Classless Societies* (Stanford, Calif., 1988), and Brooks, *Captives and Cousins*, have made in-group inequality a still more revealing analytic.

¹⁹ Weber, *Mexican Frontier*, 83–105, esp. 95.

²⁰ For Apaches, see Smith, *Borderlander*, 47–58; “Comunicado de José Agustín de Escudero,” 1839, in Orozco, *Guerras indias: Antología*, 263–273; Josiah Gregg, *Commerce of the Prairies*, ed. Max L. Moorhead (Norman, Okla., 1954), 202. For the southern plains, see, for example, testimony of Dionisio Santos, Lampazos, July 11, 1873, in Cuauhtémoc José Velasco Avila, ed., *En manos de los bárbaros* (Mexico, 1996), 40–43. For Texan traders and Indian agents distributing ammunition to Comanches, often following explicit instructions from Texan officials, see, for example, Thomas G. Western to Benjamin Sloat, Washington, May 12, 1845, and “Report of a Council with the Comanche Indians,” Trading House Post No. 2, November 23, 1845, both in Dorman H. Winfrey and James M. Day, eds., *The Indian Papers of Texas and the Southwest, 1825–1916*, 5 vols. (Austin, Tex., 1966–1995), 2: 238–240, 410–413; *Telegraph and Texas Register*, May 21, 1845.

²¹ For glimpses of Osages trading, see *Telegraph and Texas Register*, October 3, 1841; *The Weekly Despatch* [Matagora, Tex.], March 16, 1844; James Mooney, *Calendar History of the Kiowa Indians* (Washington, D.C., 1979), 274–275. For Cheyennes, see J. C. Eldredge to Sam Houston, Washington on the Brazos, December 8, 1843, in Winfrey and Day, *Texas Indian Papers*, 1: 251–275.

²² For the trade generally, see David La Vere, *Contrary Neighbors: Southern Plains and Removed Indians in Indian Territory* (Norman, Okla., 2000), 115–118; R. A. Irion to Sam Houston, Houston, March 14, 1838, in Winfrey and Day, *Texas Indian Papers*, 1: 43; Testimony of Cornelio Sánchez, Lampazos, June 4, 1873, in Velasco Avila, *En manos de los bárbaros*, 52–54. For other Indians trading for captives taken by Comanches, see, for example, *Weekly Despatch*, March 16, 1844; Grant Foreman, “Journal of Elijah Hicks,” *Chronicles of Oklahoma* 13, no. 1 (1935): 68–99, n. 2; Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, November 25, 1844, in Senate Doc. no. 1, 28th Cong., 2nd sess., 307, 439. For firearms specifically, see Barnard E. Bee to John Forsyth, Washington, D.C., December 15, 1840, in William R. Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States: Inter-American Affairs, 1831–1860*, vol. 12: *Texas and Venezuela* (Washington, D.C., 1939), 208–211; Ralph A. Smith, “Mexican and Anglo-Saxon Traffic in Scalps, Slaves, and Livestock, 1835–1841,” *West Texas Historical Association Year Book* 36, no.

external opportunities, then, encouraged Indian and, to a lesser extent, Mexican men to steal animals, women, and children from outsiders. These economic bases for conflict have received extensive and subtle treatment in borderlands literature.

Less attention has been given to the political processes structuring interethnic conflict in the region.²³ Students of southern plains Indians, for example, have recognized that Comanches and Kiowas sometimes campaigned in large groups but nonetheless have portrayed raiding as an essentially apolitical endeavor governed by individual material ambitions. Consequently, far more stress is placed on raiding as an ongoing economic activity than on raids as historical events. Perhaps partly for this reason, plains scholars have shown little interest in determining what exactly Comanches and Kiowas did south of the Rio Grande.

The copious Mexican source material, some of it already mined by Mexican scholars, makes possible a quantitative reconstruction of Indian raiding activities. Three features of the data suggest that economic explanations for raiding should be situated within a larger political framework. First, changes in Comanche and Kiowa raiding indicate coordination of policy rather than coincidence of ambition. Over the 1830s and 1840s, the geography and intensity of raiding expanded in sharply defined stages, each stage corresponding to geopolitical events on and around the southern plains. Second, large campaigns were the norm rather than the exception. On more than thirty occasions between 1834 and 1846, Comanches and Kiowas sent parties of one hundred men or more below the Rio Grande. More than a third of these groups included at least five hundred warriors, and on four occasions Mexican officials reported expeditions of eight hundred to a thousand men. These largest campaigns involved perhaps half of the total fighting force of the southern plains.²⁴

Third and finally, the tremendous destruction of these campaigns often worked against the very material ambitions that seem to have motivated raiders in the first place. In addition to plundering homes, taking captives, and seizing horses and mules, southern plains men exerted great energy and took great risks to kill Mexicans, slaughter thousands of pigs, cows, goats, and sheep, and set fire to dwellings, barns, and granaries. In October 1844, for example, several hundred raiders attacked settlements in northern Tamaulipas. While they took many horses and captives, they also burned to death more than twenty men, women, and children at Los Moros, killed another forty-six men who came to help, and later killed upward of one hundred residents of Rancho de la Palmita.²⁵ The data suggest that Comanches and their allies killed at least two thousand Mexicans in the twelve years before the U.S.-

1 (1960): 98–115, 99; Testimony of Francisco Treviño, Musquiz, September 21, 1873, in Velasco Avila, *En manos de los bárbaros*, 44–49; Manuel de Mier y Terán, “Noticia de las tribus de salvajes conocidos que habitan en el Departamento de Tejas, y del número de Familias de que consta cada tribu, puntos en que habitan y terrenos en que acampan,” in Mauricio Molina, ed., *Crónica de Tejas: Diario de viaje de la Comisión de Límites* (Mexico, 1988), 129–139, 130.

²³ On the need to take internal politics seriously before we draw conclusions about how a community confronts outside powers, see Sherry B. Ortner, “Resistance and the Problem of Ethnographic Refusal,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 37, no. 1 (1995): 173–193.

²⁴ Quantitative information in this and the next paragraph comes from data in the appendix of Brian DeLay, *The War of a Thousand Deserts* (New Haven, Conn., forthcoming).

²⁵ See Francisco Lofero to judges of sections 6, 12, 15, 16, 17, 18–23, Matamoros, October 12, 1844, 8–9, vol. 51, Matamoros Archives Photostats, Center for American History, University of Texas, Austin [hereafter MAP]. Jorge L. de Lara to Francisco Lofero, Matamoros, October 13, 1844, 11–13, vol. 51,

Mexican War—a figure that amounts to five Mexicans killed for every two the raiders tried to capture. Indeed, southern plains Indians occasionally became so engrossed with the work of killing people, slaughtering animals, and destroying property that Mexican forces had time to converge on the scene and deprive them of their spoils.

Famously fractious and anti-authoritarian, Comanche society consisted of interlocking segments. The smallest family units usually moved in larger gatherings of extended kin, groups of extended families collectively formed a band, and each of the four Comanche tribes existing in the 1830s and 1840s (Kotsotekas, Yamparikas, Tenewas, and Hois) consisted of several bands. Any explanation for how individuals cooperated so effectively within and across these diffuse organizational units to forge consensus and act on public goals would have to consider a host of mechanisms, all supported by networks of blood, affine, and fictive kinship. Some of the more important included emerging military societies, public dances, the traditional roles of women in policing male honor, and the integrative functions of tribal and pan-tribal meetings.²⁶

But one feature in particular of the Comanche and Kiowa political traditions helps to explain the coordination, size, and extreme violence of the campaigns into Mexico: vengeance. Like most non-state peoples, individual Comanches and Kiowas could call upon kin to help them avenge loved ones killed by outsiders. Among southern plains Indians, however, grieving families could enlist prominent, ambitious men to recruit on their behalf. The injured party came humbly before such influential men, weeping and asking for pity, for help in killing enemies and assuaging grief. Then the seekers would widen the circle. Once the grieving relative had convinced a *paraibo* (leader) in his own community to sponsor his quest, according to a shrewd observer, the pair then journeyed to other neighboring bands, “weeping and calling for help in defeating the enemy.” This more distant *paraibo* received the two “afflicted ones” graciously, gathering warriors and old men to hear their guests explain “why they have come and the reasons which impel them to summon the tribes of their people.” Although supplicants were occasionally refused, more often they convinced their host to help, to raise volunteers, and perhaps to send runners to other bands. The soliciting pair would set a time and a place for a general rendezvous, and then move on to visit still another *paraibo*. This process could continue for weeks or even months, sometimes intersecting with tribal or pan-tribal meetings.²⁷

MAP; *Gaceta del Gobierno de Tamaulipas*, October 19, 1844, and editorial and list of dead, *ibid.*, October 26, 1844.

²⁶ Non-Indian observers occasionally glimpsed connections between pan-tribal meetings and emerging raiding campaigns. In December 1847 and January 1848, for example, a Texan Indian agent reported a meeting of between five and six thousand members of “upper” Comanche tribes, Kiowas, and a few Mescalero Apaches. “The avowed intention of the present assembling is to make preparation for a descent upon the northern provinces of Mexico, Chihuahua, and others, early in the spring.” See Robert S. Neighbors to W. Medill, U.S. Special Indian Agency, December 13, 1847, in Senate Report Com. no. 171, 30th Cong., 1st sess.; and same to same, January 20, 1848, House Executive Doc. no. 1, 30th Cong., 2nd sess., 573–575. For more on the political mechanisms mentioned above, see DeLay, *War of a Thousand Deserts*, chap. 4.

²⁷ Jean Louis Berlandier, *The Indians of Texas in 1830*, ed. John C. Ewers, trans. Patricia R. Leclercq (Washington, D.C., 1969), 69–75; José María Sánchez, “A Trip to Texas in 1828,” *Southwestern Historical Quarterly* 29, no. 3 (1926): 249–288, 262. See also Mooney, *Calendar*, 282. It seems that Kiowa notions of justice did not demand that the death be revenged upon the killer per se, but simply upon one of his people. See Mishkin, *Rank and Warfare*, 29. For parallels, see White, *Middle Ground*, 75–82; Walter

In the abstract, the huge campaigns organized in this way were supposed to be brief, to culminate with an enemy's death, and to remain conceptually distinct from the much smaller and informal "raids" targeting animals and captives.²⁸ But these distinct endeavors seem to have collapsed into one in the years before the U.S. invasion, thanks to the peculiar manner in which profits intersected with dangers in northern Mexico. While many Comanches and Kiowas made reputations and fortunes raiding Mexicans between 1834 and 1846, at least five hundred southern plains men lost their lives in the attempt.²⁹ Kiowas often chose the deaths of prominent men killed while raiding in Mexico as the touchstone events of the year, memorializing them in their painted calendars. The winter of 1834–1835, for example, was marked in the calendar as the winter that Pa-ton was killed; 1835–1836 was the winter that To'edalte was killed; and 1836–1837 was the winter that K'inahiate was killed.³⁰ These kinds of deaths produced mourners and calls for revenge, activating the complicated machinery on the southern plains for provoking pity, enlisting patrons, and organizing retaliatory campaigns. The sources provide glimpses of this process. Twice in 1845, for example, large parties of Hois Comanches preparing descents into Mexico told Texan envoys that vengeance was their goal. The Kiowa calendar reveals that the brutal attacks mentioned above upon Los Moros and Rancho de la Palmita were organized by a man named Zepkoeete in response to the death of his brother, who had been killed while raiding in Tamaulipas the year before. Mexicans slew one of Zepkoeete's companions, and Kiowas thereafter memorialized the season as the winter that Atahaik'i was killed.³¹

Rather than simply promote the individualistic, economic benefits of raiding

Goldschmidt, "Inducement to Military Participation in Tribal Societies," in Paul R. Turner and David C. Pitt, eds., *The Anthropology of War and Peace: Perspectives on the Nuclear Age* (Granby, Mass., 1989), 15–31; John Phillip Reid, *A Law of Blood: The Primitive Law of the Cherokee Nation* (New York, 1970), 153–162. More generally, see Reid, *Patterns of Vengeance: Crosscultural Homicide in the North American Fur Trade* (Pasadena, Calif., 1999). As important as vengeance was for the prosecution of the Comanches' war with Mexico, their conflict fits poorly with the notion of a "mourning war" as described by Daniel K. Richter for the Iroquois, waged not just to avenge but to formally replace deceased community members. See Richter, "War and Culture: The Iroquois Experience," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd ser., 40, no. 4 (1983): 528–559.

²⁸ For the distinction between a raid executed simply to obtain horses, captives, and plunder and a raid motivated by revenge, see Mishkin, *Rank and Warfare*, 28–34; Berlandier, *Indians of Texas*, 71–72; Anderson, *Indian Southwest*, 238–239; William C. Meadows, *Kiowa, Apache, and Comanche Military Societies: Enduring Veterans, 1800 to the Present* (Austin, Tex., 1999), 313.

²⁹ Five hundred is almost certainly an underestimate. Comanches took tremendous risks to recover the bodies of dead comrades—a cultural imperative reinforced by the Mexican practice of taking as trophies the hands and heads of fallen raiders. See, for example, José María de Ortega to Governor of Nuevo León, Monterrey, March 1, 1841, in *El Seminario político del gobierno de Nuevo León*, March 4, 1841; Sánchez, "A Trip to Texas in 1828," 262. Ethnographers working with Comanches in the early twentieth century reported that if a warrior's corpse was scalped, he was forever barred from heaven. See Ernest Wallace and E. Adamson Hoebel, *The Comanches: Lords of the South Plains* (Norman, Okla., 1952), 188. Because Comanches absconded with fallen comrades, Mexican authorities often had to refer to the number of enemy dead in adjectives rather than numbers, or by gesturing to the amount of blood they left behind; see, for example, Miguel Guerra to D. Francisco Casteñeda, Santa Rosa, December 10, 1843, in *El Voto de Coahuila*, December 16, 1843.

³⁰ Mooney, *Calendar*, 269–271.

³¹ The vast majority of Comanche casualties in Mexico were men, but occasionally women who accompanied raiding campaigns were killed as well. See, for example, Orozco, *Guerras indias: Primeras fases*, 160–161. For Hois, see Thomas G. Western to A. Coleman, Washington on the Brazos, May 11, 1845, in Winfrey and Day, *Texas Indian Papers*, 2: 236–237; and *Telegraph and Texas Register*, September 3, 1845. For the Kiowa version of the attack on Los Moros, see Mooney, *Calendar*, 282.




FIGURE 2: Prominent Kiowas killed in Mexico. From James Mooney, *Calendar History of the Kiowa Indians* (Washington, D.C., 1898).

Mexican settlements, then, Comanches and Kiowas united their broader communities in the enterprise in part by submerging economics in a discourse about honor, pity, and, especially, revenge. Doing so enabled them to assemble enough men to penetrate deep into Mexican territory for weeks at a time, to take hundreds of captives and steal tens of thousands of horses and mules. But because vengeance provided the political gravity necessary to organize these armies of raiders, Comanches and Kiowas crossed the river to hurt Mexicans as well as take from them. Hence the vast destruction during the 1830s and 1840s, destruction that often undermined the economic objectives that fueled raiding in the first place. Thus it was not simply what Indians wanted from Mexicans but how they took it, how they structured their conflicts politically, that did such damage to Mexico before and during the U.S. invasion. More than a land of unbridled economic predation, northern Mexico in the 1830s and 1840s must also be seen as a zone of intense competition between distinct polities, some state-organized and others not, all struggling imperfectly to secure unity of purpose in pursuit of shared goals.

Most observers from the time reduced the complex reactions and counterreactions of this competition to simplistic national stories. Americans and Mexicans saw little in the brutal reports out of northern Mexico to suggest that coherent native policies were behind the region's security crisis. And in any case, that was not how the world was supposed to work. Observers in both nations tacitly agreed that while tribes could certainly trouble nation-states, they were not entities of international significance. And yet, as the editors in New Orleans and Durango noted, northern Mexico's worsening situation was indeed a matter of international interest. Americans and Mexicans overcame this interpretive problem by adjusting their gaze, looking less *at* Indians than *through* them in search of compelling explanations for Mexico's security crisis. Americans and Mexicans in this way subsumed the complex, organized, and deeply consequential activities of northern Mexico's indigenous communities into affirming, nationalistic dialogues about rival states.

We can begin exploring this process in the United States, where observers took to the notion of native transparency instinctually. What American politicians saw as they gazed through Indians encouraged most to despise Mexico's historic claim to its northern territories. Glimpses of what they came to see as a race war between mongrel degenerates and Indian savages left many Americans feeling entitled—even manifestly destined—to possess and redeem the region themselves. This supreme self-confidence began, appropriately, with Texas.

THE SCALE AND INTENSITY of interethnic violence increased at a sickening pace across all of northern Mexico after 1830, but subregions endured significant episodic conflict before then. Texas was one such place. Soon after Mexico's War for Independence began in 1810, Spanish authority went into sharp decline in Texas, Indian diplomacy faltered, and native peoples began raiding *tejano* settlements. Spanish officials saw Indian violence as one important factor retarding the development of Texas, and in 1820 began allowing limited Anglo-American colonization in the troubled province. Following independence in 1821, Mexican authorities expanded the

pace of colonization. This decision they soon came to regret, as colonists quickly outnumbered *tejanos*, conflicts mounted, and, finally, Texans declared independence from Mexico in 1836.³²

The rebels dispatched their most illustrious citizen, Stephen F. Austin, to tour the United States and capitalize on sympathy for the movement.³³ Austin delivered a stump speech in several states, laying out the Texan case. "In doing this," he stated, "the first step is to show, as I trust I shall be able to do by a succinct statement of facts, that our cause is just." Indeed, the Texan cause was better than just—it was American: "the same holy cause for which our forefathers fought and bled." Preamble finished, Austin invoked Indians:

But a few years back Texas was a wilderness, the home of the uncivilized and wandering Comanche and other tribes of Indians, who waged a constant warfare against the Spanish settlements . . . The incursions of the Indians also extended beyond the [Rio Grande], and desolated that part of the country. In order to restrain the savages and bring them into subjection, the government opened Texas for settlement . . . American enterprise accepted the invitation and promptly responded to the call.³⁴

This story, which we can call the Texas Creation Myth, was retold and refined in books, articles, and pamphlets published in cities across the U.S. Texan ambassadors to the United States chanted the Creation Myth like a mantra, and sympathetic U.S. politicians soon knew it by heart.³⁵ The myth contained three basic components: First, Texas had been a wasteland before Anglo-American colonists arrived,

³² On Indians and colonization, see Dieter George Berninger, *La inmigración en México* (Mexico, 1974), 28–29. On the decision to open Texas to foreign colonists, see also Mattie Austin Hatcher, *The Opening of Texas to Foreign Settlement, 1801–1821* (Austin, Tex., 1927); Edith Louise Kelly and Mattie Austin Hatcher, trans. and eds., "Tadeo Ortiz and the Colonization of Texas, 1822–1833," *Southwestern Historical Quarterly* 32, no. 1–4 (1929): 74–86, 152–164, 222–251, 311–343, 153; and Weber, *Mexican Frontier*, 158–178. For a fresh interpretation of the Texas Rebellion, see Reséndez, *Changing National Identities*, 146–170.

³³ As soon as news spread about the war in Texas, there were public meetings in support of the rebels in New Orleans, Mobile, Montgomery, Boston, New York, and other cities. The earliest debates in Congress over the recognition of Texan independence were taken up in response to petitions received from several different states. See Ethel Zivley Rather, "Recognition of the Republic of Texas by the United States," *Quarterly of the Texas State Historical Association* 13, no. 2 (1910): 155–256, 171, 213.

³⁴ "An Address Delivered by S. F. Austin of Texas, to a very large Audience of Ladies and Gentlemen in the Second Presbyterian Church, Louisville, Kentucky, on the 7th of March, 1836," in Mary Austin Holley and William Hooker, *Texas* (Lexington, Ky., 1836), 254, 269. The address was quickly reprinted. See Rebecca Smith Lee, "The Publication of Austin's Louisville Address," *Southwestern Historical Quarterly* 70, no. 4 (1967): 424–442. For Austin's tour, see Gregg Cantrell, *Stephen F. Austin, Empresario of Texas* (New Haven, Conn., 1999), 329–347.

³⁵ In defining this collective story as a "creation myth," I have been influenced by the discussion of mythogenesis in Richard Slotkin, *Regeneration through Violence: The Mythology of the American Frontier, 1600–1860* (Middletown, Conn., 1973), 6–24. For the descriptive and historical literature that elaborated upon the Texas Creation Myth, see, for example, Chester Newell, *History of the Revolution in Texas, particularly of the War of 1835 & '36: Together with the latest geographical, topographical, and statistical accounts of the country, from the most authentic sources, also, an appendix* (New York, 1838), 14–15; L. T. Pease, *A Geographical and Historical View of Texas, With a Detailed Account of the Texian Revolution and War* (Hartford, Conn., 1837), 252–254; Joseph Emerson Field, *Three Years in Texas: Including a View of the Texan Revolution, and an Account of the Principal Battles, Together With Descriptions of the Soil, Commercial and Agricultural Advantages, &c* (Boston, 1836), 6–7; William Kennedy, *Texas: The Rise, Progress, and Prospects of the Republic of Texas* (1841; repr., Fort Worth, Tex., 1925), 297–298, 329–338; William H. Wharton, *Texas: A Brief Account of the Origin, Progress, and Present State of the Colonial Settlements of Texas, Together with an Exposition of the Causes Which Have Induced the Existing War with Mexico* (Nashville, Tenn., 1836), 3–5. Written under the pen name "Curtius," most of Wharton's Texas pamphlets were sent directly to Washington. See Lee, "The Publication of Austin's Louisville Address."

because the Mexicans, “either through a want of personal prowess or military skill . . . were unable to repel the frequent incursions of their savage neighbors.” Second, officials in Mexico invited American colonists into Texas both to redeem the wilderness from the Indians and to protect northeastern Mexico from Indian attack. Third, the Americans quickly accomplished these twin tasks. As one author put it, “the untiring perseverance of the colonists triumphed over all natural obstacles, expelled the savages by whom the country was infested, reduced the forest to cultivation, and made the desert smile.”³⁶

The political utility of the Texas Creation Myth may be gauged in part by how often it was invoked in Washington. Arguing for immediate U.S. recognition of Texan independence in 1836, for example, Senator Robert Walker informed his colleagues that Americans had been “invited to settle the wilderness, and defend the Mexicans against the then frequent incursions of a savage foe.”³⁷ Representative E.W. Ripley echoed these sentiments in the House. Mexicans had used the colonists as “a barrier against the Camanches and the Indians of Red River, to protect the inhabitants of the interior States.” Once the Anglo-Americans responded to Mexico’s invitation, another representative insisted, Texas changed overnight: “The savage roamed no longer in hostile array over the plains of Texas.”³⁸

Beleaguered northern Mexicans would have found much to criticize in these characterizations of Texan history, especially in the notion that the colonists had actually formed “a barrier against the Comanches.” But the Texas Creation Myth had of course been crafted for Americans, and with this constituency it helped solidify the moral foundation of Texan independence. More importantly, the myth introduced a set of ideas about Indians and Mexicans into American political discourse at a moment when the nation was taking notice of the whole of northern Mexico for the first time. More and more U.S. politicians could read about Mexico in newspapers and journals such as *Niles’ Weekly Register*, consular reports, travel literature on and descriptions of Texas and northern Mexico, and, of course, executive and congressional reports and debates. Through these kinds of sources, U.S. observers increasingly came to perceive the whole of the Mexican north in the same way that they saw the pre-American history of Texas, complete with savage Indians, suffering Mexicans, and desolate wastes.

Americans quickly learned that Indians had been frustrating Mexico across the north. An 1839 memorial from the Missouri Assembly, for instance, informed representatives in Washington that New Mexico had been devastated by Indian raiders: “The plains and pastures of that province have now become waste and deserted, and her people impoverished.” Josiah Gregg, chief chronicler of the Santa Fe trade, marveled at the “temerity” of Apaches and the inability of the Mexicans to resist

For diplomatic use of the Creation Myth, see Memucan Hunt to John Forsyth, Washington, August 4, 1837, in Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence*, 12: 129–140.

³⁶ For “either through want,” see Field, *Three Years in Texas*, 6. For “the untiring perseverance,” see Wharton, *Texas, a Brief Account*, 5. For a later rendition of the Texas Creation Myth, complete with quotes from Austin, see Charles Hunter Owen, *The Justice of the Mexican War* (New York, 1908), 92–96.

³⁷ Speech of Sen. Robert Walker, April 26, 1836, *Congressional Globe*, 24th Cong., 1st sess., 401.

³⁸ Speech of Rep. E.W. Ripley, May 7, 1836, *Congressional Globe*, 24th Cong., 1st sess. Appendix, 369–370; Speech of Rep. Adam Huntsman, March 2, 1837, *Congressional Globe*, 24th Cong., 2nd sess., Appendix, 226–228.

them: "Small bands of three or four warriors have been known to make their appearance within a mile of the city of Chihuahua in open day, killing the laborers and driving off whole herds of mules and horses without the slightest opposition."³⁹ The U.S. consul in Matamoros frequently reported on Indian depredations in other northern states. Tamaulipas, Nuevo León, Coahuila, Chihuahua, and Sonora all seemed under siege, and Indian raiders went even farther. William Kennedy, widely accepted as an authority on Texas, informed his readers that Comanches and Apaches had for many years "penetrated into the interior of Durango . . . plundering and destroying the villages, and driving off horses and cattle." In 1840, *Niles'* reported that a raiding party of several hundred Indians had pushed as far south as Real de Catorce, in San Luis Potosí. Geographically minded readers would have marveled at the distances involved. Had Comanches ridden east instead of south, they would have been in striking range of Nashville or Atlanta.⁴⁰

For Americans, nothing so viscerally epitomized Mexico's prostration before the Indians as Mexican women and children in bondage. The same sources reporting Comanche raids often included notice that the Indians had "carried off several women," "made their escape with several captives," or "carried off a large number of women and children," whom they "invariably convert into servants."⁴¹ In 1846, Waddy Thompson, former U.S. ambassador to Mexico, insisted that there were "not less than five thousand Mexicans at this moment slaves of Comanches." And Mexican ranchers, militia, even regular military personnel could seemingly do nothing about it. In 1844, for example, *Niles'* reported that Comanches had killed one-fourth of General Mariano Arista's entire northern army in a single engagement.⁴²

But while Comanches overwhelmed Mexicans, informants assured their readers, the Indians became craven wretches in the presence of armed Anglo-American men. The popular *New Orleans Picayune* explained that Comanches "care little for the Spaniards, but they dread the Americans." Gregg agreed, insisting that Comanches appeared "timid and cowardly" when they encountered Americans. Another author added that Comanches "recede as fast as encroachments are made upon their territory."⁴³ A historian of Texas observed that as they were "incapable of united and

³⁹ *Memorial of the Assembly of Missouri*, Senate Doc. no. 225, 25th Cong., 3rd sess., 1-4; Gregg, *Commerce*, 203.

⁴⁰ For the consular reports, see, for example, D. W. Smith to U.S. Secretary of State, Matamoros, October 24, 1836, frames 613-614, reel 1, *Despatches from United States Consuls in Matamoros, 1826-1906* (microfilm, 12 reels, National Archives Microfilm Publications) [hereafter *Despatches*]; same to same, November 30, 1837, frame 744, reel 1, *Despatches*; Kennedy, *Texas*, 330. Kennedy was an English writer and diplomat. See Laura Lyons McLemore, *Inventing Texas: Early Historians of the Lone Star State* (College Station, Tex., 2004), 41-42. For references to his work in congressional debates, see, for example, *Congressional Globe*, 28th Cong., 1st sess., Appendix, 696-701; *ibid.*, 760-775. For reports of Indian raids into San Luis Potosí and Durango, see *Niles'*, April 4, 1840, 66.

⁴¹ Richard Belt to John C. Calhoun, Matamoros, July 5, 1844, frame 369, reel 2, *Despatches*; D. W. Smith to U.S. Secretary of State, Matamoros, May 26, 1840, frame 166, reel 2, *Despatches*; *Niles'*, November 23, 1844, 178; Henry S. Foote, *Texas and the Texans; or, Advance of the Anglo-Americans to the South-West; including a history of leading events in Mexico, from the conquest by Fernando Cortes to the termination of the Texan revolution*, 2 vols. (Philadelphia, Pa., 1841), 1: 298.

⁴² Waddy Thompson, *Recollections of Mexico* (New York, 1846), 172. For the reported slaughter of Arista's soldiers, see *Niles'*, April 4, 1840, 66.

⁴³ For the *Picayune's* reports, see Matthew C. Field, *Matt Field on the Santa Fe Trail*, ed. John E. Sunder (Norman, Okla., 1960), 269; Gregg, *Commerce*, 436; Orceneth Fisher, *Sketches of Texas in 1840; designed to answer, in a brief way, the numerous enquiries respecting the new republic, as to situation, extent, climate, soil, productions, water, government, society, religion, etc* (Springfield, Ill., 1841), 47.

skillful action in self-defense or otherwise,” Comanches must “melt away before their [Anglo-American] enemies by inches.” Kennedy, the great authority, dismissed these Indians as “a nation of robbers.” “Even a single American armed with the rifle has been known to keep large parties of them at bay,” he explained; “their depredations are always committed upon the defenseless.” So it was, still another author insisted, that Comanches chose to attack Mexicans, “an enemy more cowardly than themselves, and who has been long accustomed to permit them to ravage the country with impunity.”⁴⁴

In other words, the same Indians who had in American minds so efficiently dismantled northern Mexico supposedly dissolved into hapless cowards in the presence of Anglo-Americans. This idea was as essential as it was self-serving. By denigrating Comanches, critics excoriated the Mexican men who allowed themselves to be bested by such contemptible enemies. As in the Texas Creation Myth, American discourse about northern Mexico made Indians into the great signifiers of, rather than the reason for, Mexico’s failures. Like Texas prior to colonization, northern Mexico was in tatters not because Indians were strong, but because Mexicans were weak.

And why were Mexicans weak? Many commentators emphasized deficiencies of courage or intelligence. Writing about Apache depredations in Chihuahua, for example, Gregg insisted that occasional efforts at pursuing Indian attackers did nothing but “illustrate the imbecility” of the Mexicans, who were “always sure to make a precipitate retreat, generally without even obtaining a glimpse of the enemy.”⁴⁵ American observers also tried to explain Mexico’s Indian problem as a consequence of Mexican sloth, physical weakness, and stupidity. More holistic thinkers gathered all of these condemnations together under the roof of what during the Jacksonian period had become increasingly sophisticated pseudo-scientific theories about racial difference.⁴⁶

So in a fundamental, physical sense, Mexican blood was to blame for the Indian raids that had wrecked northern Mexico. The Texas Creation Myth featured mixed-

⁴⁴ For “incapable of united and skillful action,” see A. B. Lawrence, *A History of Texas; or, The emigrant’s guide to the new Republic, by a resident emigrant, late from the United States* (New York, 1844), 255. Kennedy, *Texas*, 332–333. For “an enemy more cowardly,” see Francis Moore, *Map and description of Texas, containing sketches of its history, geology, geography and statistics: With concise statements, relative to the soil, climate, productions, facilities of transportation, population of the country; and some brief remarks upon the character and customs of its inhabitants* (Philadelphia, Pa., 1840), 31–33.

⁴⁵ Gregg, *Commerce*, 203–204. For the compelling argument that anti-Mexican prejudice in the nineteenth-century U.S. should be understood as a legacy of the “Black Legend” of earlier centuries that had long demonized Spaniards in Anglo eyes, see David J. Weber, “Scarce More than Apes: The Historical Roots of Anglo-American Stereotypes of Mexicans in the Border Region,” in Weber, *Myth and the History of the Hispanic Southwest* (Albuquerque, N.Mex., 1988), 153–168, and Raymund A. Paredes, “The Origins of Anti-Mexican Sentiment in the United States,” in Weber, ed., *The Idea of Spanish Borderlands* (New York, 1991), 145–174.

⁴⁶ For the pseudo-scientific foundations of racism in this period, see Andrew Delinton Ferrand, “Cultural Dissonance in Mexican-American Relations: Ethnic, Racial and Cultural Images of the Coming of the War, 1846” (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Santa Barbara, 1979), 98–138. The standard work on the intersection of racism and territorial expansion is Reginald Horsman, *Race and Manifest Destiny: The Origins of American Racial Anglo-Saxonism* (Cambridge, 1981). For an early articulation of similar ideas, see Frederick Merk, *Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History: A Reinterpretation* (New York, 1963), 237–247. See also Hietala, *Manifest Design*, 132–172; Thomas R. Hietala, “‘This Splendid Juggernaut’: Westward a Nation and Its People,” in Sam W. Haynes and Christopher Morris, eds., *Manifest Destiny and Empire: American Antebellum Expansionism* (College Station, Tex., 1997), 48–67; John M. Belohlavek, “Race, Progress, and Destiny: Caleb Cushing and the Quest for American Empire,” *ibid.*, 21–47.

blood Mexican “Zamboes” who, from either “their dread of Indians” or their “want of personal prowess or military skill,” had been “too lazy to cultivate the soil, and too cowardly to resist the aggressions of the northern Indians.”⁴⁷ Stories about Indian raids from elsewhere in northern Mexico had the similar effect of rhetorically invalidating Mexico’s claim to the land, only on a much larger scale. Waddy Thompson, who had nothing but contempt for Comanches, thought that Mexico’s unending ordeal with Indian raids presented the best evidence against that nation’s future in North America. “That the Indian race of Mexico must recede before us, is quite as certain as that that is the destiny of our own Indians, who in a military point of view, if in no other, are superior to them.”⁴⁸ By the mid-1840s, such amateurish ethnographic comparisons had become commonplace in American thinking about Mexicans and their enticing northern territories.

MEXICANS ALSO ARRIVED at a rough consensus on why Indians had done such damage to the northern third of their nation, but it took them more than a decade to get there. Everyone acknowledged that the once-formidable Spanish defenses had declined and that Indians found it easier to raid than before. But that opportunity spoke more to how Indians accomplished their raids than to why they launched them in the first place. In reaching for ultimate causes, northern Mexicans tended initially to attribute the violence to what they saw as the base, animalistic, evil nature of *los salvajes*, whereas prominent authorities in Mexico City pointed to the Indians’ disadvantaged, pitiable condition.

Undoubtedly northerners held a range of shifting views about raiders.⁴⁹ Still, by the early 1830s, most northern policymakers and writers began framing the “war against the barbarians” as one pitting civilization, religion, and political organization against savagery, faithlessness, and chaotic individualism. A commentator from Chihuahua, for example, asked whether the same people who had cast off Spanish rule would now consent to become “slaves to some wandering barbarian tribes, who have no more policy than robbery and assassination.” Another observer demanded to know “what is a miserable handful of fearful cannibals that they should keep an organized society in constant anxiety?” Some in the north argued for negotiation and insisted on a shared humanity, but they were in the minority. “I could never agree that they are like us who live in society, profess a religion, and recognize all the rights established in it,” a lieutenant governor of Sonora informed an advocate for ne-

⁴⁷ Wharton, *Texas, a Brief Account*, 3; Kennedy, *Texas*, 338; Field, *Three Years in Texas*, 6.

⁴⁸ Thompson, *Recollections of Mexico*, 239.

⁴⁹ The influential New Mexican priest Antonio José Martínez, for example, insisted that *los bárbaros* were fully human, lacking only education. He attributed raiding to desperation (shrinking bison populations, for instance), and found evidence of Indian capacity for conversion and reduction to civilized life in the many *convertidos* (referring to baptized Indian captives, especially—in the 1840s—Navajos) who lived alongside the New Mexicans. See Antonio José Martínez, *Exposición que el prebitero Antonio José Martínez, cura de Taos de Nuevo México, dirige al Gobierno del Exmo. Sor. General Antonio López de Santa Anna: Proponiendo la civilización de las naciones bárbaras que son al contorno del Departamento de Nuevo México* (Taos, N.Mex., 1843), n.p., reproduced in David J. Weber, ed., *Northern Mexico on the Eve of the United States Invasion: Rare Imprints Concerning California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas, 1821–1846* (New York, 1976), n.p.

gotiation. "The Apaches are not similar to us, except in their human shape."⁵⁰ *Los bárbaros* were animal, elemental, something, in the words of political geographer José Agustín Escudero, that "the ground seems to vomit forth in its pain." Editors wrote that the enemy strikes without reason or warning, "kills the poor shepherd . . . wretched woodcutter . . . washer women . . . little children." Hence the only rational, indeed the only possible, response, according to Sonora's legislature, was "destruction and eternal war against these barbarians."⁵¹

Presidents and prominent ministers in the nation's capital thought the northern rhetoric excessive, and insisted not just that Apaches, Comanches, Navajos, and other raiders were human, but that they were Mexican. This was consistent with the sweeping claim of the Constitution of 1824 that everyone born inside Mexico's territorial limits was *mexicano*, but it was also important because Mexican political elites contrasted their own enlightened, inclusive benevolence with the aggressive exclusionism of the United States, and especially with remembered Spanish cruelties.⁵² When northerners dehumanized Indians in deed as well as word—by promoting state-funded scalp bounties, for example—national officials intervened. Northern Indians needed to be helped, not hunted. In 1835, after four years of intense violence, President Antonio López de Santa Anna optimistically affirmed this notion that Apaches and Comanches were Mexicans. He admonished his northern subordinates that these wandering "groups of forest men . . . demand the attention of all friends of humanity," and should be reduced to a state of civilization. Regrettably, individual raiders might need to be destroyed for their misdeeds. But ultimately those misdeeds followed from ignorance and misfortune, not from some essential and irredeemable corruption.⁵³

The conceptual chasm between these two positions aggravated the security crisis. Northerners viewed their fight against *los bárbaros* as an "eminently national" war, albeit one waged against an incomprehensible enemy. National officials saw raiders as something closer to Mexican "banditti," and hence as domestic agents of local or

⁵⁰ For "slaves to some wandering barbarian tribes," see letter from Chihuahua signed "a contributor," in Orozco, *Guerras indias: Antología*, 247–248. For "what is a miserable handful," see Carlos Pacheco to the permanent diputation of the congress of Chihuahua, Chihuahua, December 13, 1833, *ibid.*, 227–229. For the lieutenant governor, see Ignacio de Bustamante to Ignacio Mora, Arizpe, May 13, 1835, Doc. no. 373, Pinart Prints microfilm set, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley [hereafter Pinart Prints].

⁵¹ For "the ground seems to vomit," see "Comunicado de José Agustín de Escudero, 1839," in Orozco, *Guerras indias: Antología*, 265. For "kills the poor shepherd," see *La Luna de Chihuahua*, March 2, 1841, quoted in Smith, *Borderlander*, 123. For "destruction and eternal war," see J. Joaquín G. Hereros, circular, Arizpe, June 30, 1835 (copy of notice from June 2), Doc. no. 405, Pinart Prints. For consideration of savagery rhetoric in the centuries-long contest between Spaniards/Mexicans and northern Indians, with a focus on nineteenth-century Chihuahua, see Jorge Chávez Chávez, "Retrato del Indio Bárbaro: Proceso de Justificación de la Barbarie de los Indios del Septentrion Mexicano y Formación de la Cultura Norteña," *New Mexico Historical Review* 73, no. 3 (1998): 389–425.

⁵² For *los indios bárbaros* as Mexicans, see Weber, *Mexican Frontier*, 103–104. For the conceptual position of Indians in post-independence Mexico, see Charles A. Hale, *Mexican Liberalism in the Age of Mora, 1821–1853* (New Haven, Conn., 1968), 215–247. For an insightful discussion of how Indian identities complicated the national project in Latin America, see Héctor Díaz Polanco, *Indigenous Peoples in Latin America: The Quest for Self-Determination*, trans. Lucia Rayas (Boulder, Colo., 1997), 3–22, 65–82.

⁵³ For the cancellation of Chihuahua's scalp-hunting program, see Smith, *Borderlander*, 71. For the president's quote, see law of January 8, 1835, in Manuel Dublán and José María Lozano, eds., *Legislación Mexicana; ó Colección completa de las disposiciones legislativas expedidas desde la independencia de la República*, 22 vols. (Mexico, 1876–93), 3: 9–12.



Comanches.

Comanches du Texas Occidental. vêtus lorsqu'ils vont à la guerre.

FIGURE 3: *Western Comanches in War-Dress*. Watercolor by Lino Sánchez y Tapia. Reproduced by permission of the Gilcrease Museum of the Americas.

regional crime waves—not as alien threats to national security. Without a single interpretive framework that situated Indian raiders in an unambiguously national context, frontier defense remained disorganized, ineffective, and hobbled by bitter competition for inadequate resources.⁵⁴

⁵⁴ For “the war against the barbarians is eminently national,” see *El Republicano: Periodico Oficial del Gobierno de Coahuila*, November 1, 1845. The “banditti” characterization was an attempt by the U.S. ambassador to Mexico to explain Mexico’s perspective to the U.S. secretary of state. See Joel R. Poinsett to Henry Clay, Mexico City, April 13, 1827 [private], in *Despatches from United States Ministers to Mexico, 1826–1906* (microfilm, 179 reels, National Archives Microfilm Publications), M97.

After a decade of disagreement, Mexicans finally began to construct a unified discourse about Indian raiders. As was the case in the United States, the nationalization of Mexico's conversation started with Texas, and emerged from a combination of deliberate political calculation, ideological reasoning, and honest observation. In the early 1840s, as the Republic of Texas adopted more belligerent rhetoric toward Mexico, northern officials observed that the word "Texan" commanded Mexico City's attention in a way that "Apache" or "Comanche" never had. Editors of northern newspapers began discerning heretofore underappreciated links between Texans and *los salvajes*. Northern governors started doing the same, informing their constituents and superiors that the Indian invasions were "directed by the Texans," and successfully linking the two threats in appeals for resources.⁵⁵

Mexico City felt comfortable with such notions. Observers in the capital had long believed that Texans and Americans provided Indians with their firearms, and pronouncements and policies from the early 1840s suggest that national officials were coming to see connections more sinister still.⁵⁶ In 1841, for example, when Texan officials started boasting of plans to make the Sierra Madre their southern boundary, the editors of Mexico's official newspaper insisted that Texans were inciting Indian raiders to prepare the way for a planned invasion. In 1842, the central government rewarded the northern town of Reynosa, Tamaulipas, for repelling a Comanche attack. The militiamen and their leaders received a coat of arms, and a title that had nothing to do with Indians: "Valiant defender of Texas, of the integrity of the Mexican territory." In 1844, the Mexican congress urged the president to send resources to frontier populations because "their loyal breasts are the walls that contain the barbarians beyond San Luis [Potosí], Zacatecas, and other departments," and because "the national honor and dignity wants not to submit to the disloyal Texan."⁵⁷

Once the purported Texan-Indian connection started coming into focus at the frontier and in the capital, two things happened to turn this rhetorical convergence into something resembling a national consensus. First, U.S. president John Tyler presented Congress with a plan for the annexation of Texas in the spring of 1844. Tyler's scheme failed, but Mexico's leaders took it to mean that annexation was only a matter of time. While officials in Mexico considered the implications of this, the second change took place: Indians dramatically escalated their raiding activities across the whole of northern Mexico. In Chihuahua, a series of agreements that had secured peace with Apaches in 1842 and 1843 started to unravel in 1844 and came entirely undone the year after. In New Mexico, the Navajo conflict seemed worse

⁵⁵ For editorials, see, for example, *Gaceta del Gobierno del Tamaulipas*, October 26, 1844. For "directed by the Texans," see Smith, "Comanche Bridge," 69. For an example of the successful use of this connection in an appeal for resources, see Juan N. de la Garza y Evia to Minister of War, Monterrey, July 25, 1845, and Pedro García Conde to Juan N. de la Garza y Evia, Mexico, August 4, 1845, E4 and E5, C18, *Correspondencia con la secretaría de Guerra y Marina*, Archivo General del Estado de Nuevo León, Monterrey, Nuevo León [hereafter AGENL-MGM].

⁵⁶ Mexico's foreign ministry complained repeatedly about arms sales to its U.S. counterpart during the 1830s. See, for example, the documents in Expediente H/610 "837"/2, Legajo 16-3-31, Archivo Histórico de la Secretaría de Relaciones Exteriores, Mexico City.

⁵⁷ *Diario del Gobierno de la Republica Mexicana* [Mexico City], February 24, 1841, as described in Antonio Escobar Ohmstede and Teresa Rojas Rabiela, eds., *La presencia del indigena en la prensa capitalina del siglo XIX* (Mexico, 1992), 168. For the coat of arms, see Dublán and Lozano, *Legislación Mexicana*, 4: 198–199. For congressional appeal, see "Contestación del presidente de la cámara de diputados," July 4, 1844, no. 1519, Lafragua.

every month, and the Mexican governor foolishly provoked Utes, who began threatening exposed northern towns and villages.⁵⁸

Most importantly, after a relatively uneventful 1843, Comanches and Kiowas launched several destructive campaigns into Tamaulipas, Coahuila, Chihuahua, Durango, and Zacatecas in 1844 and 1845. This surge in raiding coincided with the consummation of a formal peace between the Republic of Texas and the Hois, the southernmost Comanche tribe. The treaty indirectly encouraged raiding by establishing vigorous new trade relationships and by improving security for the families and fortunes that Indian men would have to leave behind while campaigning in Mexico. But the timing of the attacks convinced Mexicans of a direct relationship between raiders and *norteamericanos*, and small but significant details only deepened the suspicions. In autumn 1844, for example, Mexican forces drove several hundred raiders from northern Tamaulipas and found Indian dead on the field wearing U.S. peace medals featuring a bust of President Martin Van Buren.⁵⁹ During the same season, victorious Mexican militia in Chihuahua found non-Indians among fallen “Comanche” warriors, a discovery that for them confirmed “the idea that the Texans foment them to make war upon us.” Later, authorities in Durango discovered that four “men of reason”—Christians—were guiding Comanche raiders. “[T]hey are from distant lands and are the foulest murderers.” It now appeared that *norteamericanos* had provided Indian raiders with “more advanced objectives than killing and robbing.” Durango’s *Registro Oficial* urged its readers to see things whole, insisting that “the war against the barbarians cannot be considered isolated and like the one our fathers suffered through, but rather intimately linked to the Texas war [that is, the looming war with the U.S. over Texas], to which it is auxiliary and cooperative.”⁶⁰

As international tension increased, more and more Mexicans started seeing in the security crisis evidence of Indian-*norteamericano* collusion. James Polk won the U.S. presidential election in November 1844 thanks to his strong support for annexing Texas, and the U.S. Congress responded by approving annexation days before his inauguration. Soon after Polk took office, Mexico’s minister of war, Pedro García Conde, confidently explained to Mexico’s house and senate that the “hordes of barbarians” were “sent out every time by the usurpers of our territory, in order to desolate the terrain they desire to occupy without risk and with perfidy.” García Conde described an agreement whereby the U.S. provided Indians not only with arms and

⁵⁸ For diplomacy between Mexico and the United States in these years, see Pletcher, *Diplomacy of Annexation*, 113–311. For Apaches, see Griffen, *Utmost Good Faith*, 91–114. For Utes and Navajos, see Ward Alan Minge, “Mexican Independence Day and a Ute Tragedy in Santa Fe, 1844,” in Albert Schroeder, ed., *The Changing Ways of Southwestern Indians: A Historic Perspective* (Glorieta, N.Mex., 1973), 107–122. For Arapahos, see Frank D. Reeve, “The Charles Bent Papers [Letters from Charles Bent to U.S. Consul in Santa Fe Manuel Alvarez, from the Benjamin J. Read Collection, Historical Society of New Mexico, Santa Fe],” *New Mexico Historical Review* 30, no. 2 (1955): 155–159.

⁵⁹ Texas-Comanche relationships during this period are best discussed in Anderson, *Conquest of Texas*, 195–211. For the medals, see *Gaceta del Gobierno de Tamaulipas*, October 26, 1844.

⁶⁰ For Chihuahua, see Smith, “Comanche Bridge,” 67–68. For the “men of reason,” see José Francisco Terán to Marcelino Castañeda, Labor del Rodeo, October 15, 1845, in *Registro Oficial*, October 19, 1845. For “more advanced,” see *Gaceta del Gobierno de Tamaulipas*, October 26, 1844. Final quote is from *Registro Oficial*, September 25, 1845. For the U.S.-Indian connection reported elsewhere in Mexico, see, for example, the article from *La Prudencia*, the official paper of Guanajuato, reprinted in *Registro Oficial*, October 9, 1845.

ammunition, but also with a political education, with “the necessary instruction they need to understand the power they can wield when united in great masses.”⁶¹

The emerging national consensus on why Indians did what they did—because unscrupulous *norteamericanos* and possibly even agents of the U.S. government encouraged and instructed them to—was as much a fiction as the Texas Creation Myth. Apaches and Comanches doubtlessly obtained some arms and ammunition from Americans, and there is evidence that a few merchants tried to increase business by fomenting raids.⁶² But *norteamericano* traders had little or no influence over native policy—Indians in Mexico’s far north were much more likely to trade with and seek council from other Indians. And as for the U.S. government, it had little contact with Comanches and Kiowas in the 1830s and early 1840s, and none with Apaches and Navajos.

Nonetheless, the consensus had its uses. It provided a conceptual framework that finally seemed to promise unanimity of national purpose in coping with Indian raiders. By putting an American stamp on the long lists of dead and the numbingly familiar news stories of empty corrals, burned-out ranches, and childless parents, the new consensus also fueled anti-Americanism in advance of an increasingly likely war. And, finally, the imagined conspiracy between *norteamericanos* and Indians helped northerners and national leaders alike escape a conceptual problem of their own making. It had been emotionally and ideologically satisfying to speak of “a miserable handful of fearful cannibals” or of “children of the desert” yearning to be civilized and embraced as compatriots. But such talk had required Herculean self-deception in the presence of several hundred Indian raiders campaigning together with methodical precision across multiple states, year after year. So when, in their hour of crisis, Mexicans started looking through Indians and saw *norteamericanos* on the other side, dispensing weapons, supplies, and “the necessary instruction,” the world made more sense than it had in a long time.⁶³

BUT CONSENSUS CAME TOO LATE. The U.S. Army invaded northern Mexico in the spring of 1846, and Americans won striking victories over Mexican troops due in large part to advantages in light artillery. As Polk’s army moved through the north, it found a land already scoured by war. From New Mexico to Tamaulipas, the invaders saw abandoned homes, overgrown fields, and hastily finished graves. These artifacts of desperation had their complement in the occasional town or village crammed full of refugees, or, as one American called the displaced that he glimpsed

⁶¹ Pedro García Conde, “Memoria del secretario de Estado y del Despacho de Guerra y Marina,” Doc. no. 501 in Lafragua. This sort of argument can be found even in recent literature. See, for example, Jesús Vargas Valdez, “La resistencia del pueblo de Chihuahua ante la invasión norteamericana,” in Serna, *México en guerra*, 157–184.

⁶² Holland Coffee and James Kirker were the two American traders most credibly accused of arming and encouraging raiders. For Coffee, see Angel Navarro to Domingo de Ugartechea, Bexar, June 1, 1835; James Bowie to Henry Rueg, Natches [Neches], August 3, 1835; and Peter Ellis Bean to Domingo de Ugartechea, Nacogdoches, August 11, 1835, all found in Malcolm Dallas McLean, ed., *Papers Concerning Robertson’s Colony in Texas*, 18 vols. (Fort Worth, Tex., 1974–1995), 10: 347, 11: 250, 280. For Kirker, see Smith, *Borderlander*, 47–58.

⁶³ For “hijos del desierto” [a quote from General Mariano Arista], see *Gaceta del Gobierno de Tamaulipas*, February 16, 1843.

in a northern village, “an over portion of inhabitants. Every house and hut was crowded with men, boys, women, and children.”⁶⁴ Sometimes northern Mexicans confided in the *norteamericanos*, telling tales of perpetual insecurity, lamenting dead or stolen kin, and promising cooperation in return for protection from Indians.⁶⁵

Polk and his war planners had counted on this. While the war would eventually end when U.S. troops took Mexico City and the “Halls of the Montezumas,” initially the president intended to wage the war entirely in the north, in those same regions that had been devastated by Indian raids. Polk and his advisors were anxious to obtain the friendship, or at least neutrality, of the northern Mexicans who would fall under U.S. occupation. American generals had to worry about tens of thousands of civilians swelling the ranks of the Mexican army, about coordinated efforts to deny Americans necessary supplies, and, perhaps most importantly, about the possibility of a broad-based guerrilla insurgency against the occupation. Anxiety over such scenarios prompted Polk and his subordinates to craft detailed instructions for commanders on the ground, ordering them to exploit Mexicans’ fears and dissatisfaction with their government. Indians would be central to this task. “It is our wish to see you liberated from despots,” General Zachary Taylor was to announce at each town conquered or surrendered, “to drive back the savage Cumanches, to prevent the renewal of their assaults, and to compel them to restore to you from captivity your long lost wives and children.” General Stephen W. Kearny delivered a New Mexican variant. “From the Mexican government you have never received protection,” he proclaimed. “The Apaches and the Navajoes come down from the mountains and carry off your sheep, and even your women, whenever they please. My government will correct all this.”⁶⁶

⁶⁴ Observations of deserted homes and tales of raiding, etc., are common in eyewitness accounts of the war. See, for example, James William Abert, *Abert's New Mexico Report, 1846-'47* (Albuquerque, N.Mex., 1962), 49, 62, 66, 125, 135–136; Ross Calvin, ed., *Lieutenant Emory Reports: A Reprint of Lieutenant W. H. Emory's Notes of a Military Reconnaissance* (1848; repr., Albuquerque, N.Mex., 1951), 80, 82–84, 88; Maurice G. Fulton and Paul Horgan, eds., *Diary and Letters of Josiah Gregg* (Norman, Okla., 1941), 90, 91, 98, 99, 108, 109, 111, 112, 119, 123–125; D. H. Hill, *A Fighter from Way Back: The Mexican War Diary of Lt. Daniel Harvey Hill, 4th Artillery, USA*, ed. Nathaniel Cheairs Hughes, Jr., and Timothy D. Johnson (Kent, Ohio, 2002), 59–60, 145; Napoleon Jackson Tecumseh Dana, *Monterrey Is Ours! The Mexican War Letters of Lieutenant Dana, 1845–1847*, ed. Robert H. Ferrell (Lexington, Ky., 1990), 103, 115; John T. Hughes, *Doniphan's Expedition: Containing an Account of the Conquest of New Mexico; General Kearny's Overland Expedition to California; Doniphan's Campaign Against the Navajos; His Unparalleled March upon Chihuahua and Durango; and the Operations of General Price at Santa Fe* (Cincinnati, 1848), 143–144, 151, 162, 202–203, 285, 326, 358, 363; Frederick Adolph Wislizenus, *Memoir of a Tour to Northern Mexico* (1848; repr., Fairfield, Wash., 1992), 24, 27, 46, 56, 58, 59, 63, 66, 67, 71. For “over portion,” see Hughes, *Doniphan's Expedition*, 362.

⁶⁵ See, for example, Dana, *Monterrey Is Ours*, 115; Smith, *War with Mexico*, 1: 204, 479; Joseph B. Ridout, “An Anti-National Disorder: Antonio Canales and Northeastern Mexico, 1836–1852” (M.A. thesis, University of Texas, 1994), 136; Samuel E. Chamberlain, *My Confession: Recollections of a Rogue*, ed. William H. Goetzmann (Austin, Tex., 1996), 259.

⁶⁶ For Polk's concern with occupation strategy, see James K. Polk, *The Diary of James K. Polk during His Presidency, 1845 to 1849*, ed. Milo Milton Quaife, 4 vols. (Chicago, 1910), 2: 5. See also Elbert W. Smith, *Magnificent Missourian: The Life of Thomas Hart Benton* (Philadelphia, Pa., 1958), 214–215; Marcy to Taylor, Washington, June 3, 1846, in House Executive Doc. no. 60, 30th Cong., 1st sess., 153–155. For fears about Mexicans depriving the U.S. Army of provisions, see Taylor to the Adjutant General of the Army, Matamoros, July 2, 1846, in House Executive Doc. no. 60, 30th Cong., 1st sess., 329–332. These were realistic anxieties. In August and September 1846, for example, military authorities in Nuevo León ordered residents of Cerralvo and Marín to abandon their homes and carry their belongings with them, to hide their animals, to deprive the enemy of all resources, and to attack them when possible. See Miguel A. González Quiroga, “Nuevo León ante la invasión norteamericana, 1846–1848,”

Given Mexican assumptions about the causes of Indian raiding, we can imagine people in the crowds shaking their heads and exchanging knowing looks. But help from hypocrites surely seemed better than no help at all, because conflicts with Indians would only intensify during the U.S.-Mexican War. In New Mexico, Navajo headmen protested when American officers insisted that they stop raiding Mexicans. "You have lately commenced a war against the same people," the leader Zacarillos Largos observed. "You now turn upon us for attempting to do what you have done yourselves." By 1847, American periodicals were reporting that raids in New Mexico were worse than they had been in twenty years.⁶⁷ In Chihuahua and Sonora, the war likewise coincided with an amplification of interethnic violence. Just months after the start of the U.S. invasion, scalp hunters funded by Chihuahua's government assisted Mexican townspeople in massacring at least 130 Apache men, women, and children who had come unarmed and at peace into the town of Galeana. An observer in Chihuahua City recalled "howling jollification," copious amounts of tequila and mescal, and hats thrown into the air in "wild exultation" as the withered black scalps were paraded through town. Mangas Coloradas and other Apache leaders responded with waves of retributive violence that would crash down upon northwestern Mexico throughout the war.⁶⁸

Most consequentially, Comanches and Kiowas continued sending huge raiding campaigns into Mexico during the U.S.-Mexican War. Doubtlessly they sought to profit from Mexico's distractions, but their campaigns also drew impetus from events above the Rio Grande. In 1846, southern Comanche negotiators forged an alliance with Mescalero Apaches, former enemies who frequented critical crossing points into Mexico and who had previously hindered Comanche raiding campaigns. The peace likely put the Mescaleros' extensive knowledge about northern Mexico at Comanche disposal, and may have led to joint raids.⁶⁹ Moreover, 1846 marked the end

in Serna, *México en guerra*, 425–472, 431. Instructions to Taylor and Kearny are in Senate Doc. no. 19, 29th Cong., 2nd sess., 17–18. Kearny's proclamation can be found in Calvin, *Emory Reports*, 50. For similar attempts to convince Mexicans of the failure of their government to protect them from Indians, see *Matamoros Reveille*, June 27, 1846; Manuel Alvarez to James Buchanan, Santa Fe, September 4, 1846, *Despatches from U.S. Consuls at Santa Fe, 1830–1846* (microfilm, 1 reel, National Archives Microfilm Publications, 1951), reel 1.

⁶⁷ For continued violence in New Mexico, see J. Lee Correll, *Through White Men's Eyes: A Contribution to Navajo History—A Chronological Record of the Navaho People from Earliest Times to the Treaty of June 1, 1868* (Window Rock, Ariz., 1976), 214–230; McNitt, *Navajo Wars*, 122–131. Quote is from Hughes, *Doniphan's Expedition*, 187. For periodicals, see *Niles' National Register*, November 6, 1847, 155, which took the story from the *St. Louis Republican*. For another, similar lament, see *Niles' National Register*, June 19, 1847, 252.

⁶⁸ For the massacre and quotes, see Smith, *Borderlander*, 161–168. See also the graphic second-hand description of the event in George F. Ruxton, *Adventures in Mexico and the Rocky Mountains* (1848; repr., Glorieta, N.Mex., 1973), 151–154. For the effect on Apache policies, see Sweeney, *Mangas Coloradas*, 135–158.

⁶⁹ In August 1846, P. M. Butler and M. G. Lewis reported that 500 Mescaleros and 3,500 "Esreequetees" had "formed an alliance and acquisition to" a Comanche tribe they called the "Nocoonees," referring to the Nokonis, an ethnonym that only begins to appear in the documents around this time. When they used the term "Esreequetees," Butler and Lewis were referring either to the Comanche word for Mescaleros, "esikwita," or to the Kiowa term from which it was derived, "ésèkwità-g," both of which mean "gray feces" or "brown feces," a condition thought to be the consequence of eating mescal. (See Morris Edward Opler, "Mescalero Apache," in *Handbook of North American Indians*, vol. 10: *Southwest*, ed. Alfonso Ortiz [Washington, D.C., 1983], 419–439, 438.) Thus the 4,000 people to whom Butler and Lewis referred were all Mescaleros. The authors added that the Mescaleros "have heretofore been at

of a long, stable period of greater than average rainfall in most of northern Mexico and the southern plains. The effects of the drought were exacerbated by long-term over-hunting for the hide trade and habitat destruction along critical watercourses. Combined, these developments would do great damage to the southern bison herd. By 1847, the U.S. Indian agent for Texas reported widespread consumption of horses and mules in Comanche camps, and the Kiowa calendar memorialized the winter of 1847–1848 for its elaborate antelope drive—something resorted to only in times of great scarcity. Disappointing hunts seem to have contributed to a series of tremendously destructive raiding campaigns into Coahuila, Chihuahua, Durango, Zacatecas, and San Luis Potosí during the U.S.-Mexican War.⁷⁰

Northern Mexicans suffered grievously. “And to think that we owe all this,” raged the editors of the *Registro Oficial*, “to those infamous North American enemies who push the bloody hordes of savages upon us and direct their operations with unparalleled astuteness and ferocity! Such are the methods through which a nation that styles itself enlightened and just wages war.” A British traveler passing through north-central Mexico in late 1846 glimpsed the effects of Indian raids everywhere he went. As far south as Zacatecas City, he found that “‘Los Indios! Los Indios!’ was the theme of every conversation.” As he made his cautious way north, he constantly heard tales of terror and “dread expectation,” and saw the raiders’ work in settlement after settlement: “a perfect forest of crosses, many of them thrown down or mutilated by Indians”; a well belonging to Chihuahua’s governor choked with slaughtered animals; vultures feasting on a roadside corpse with an arrow buried in its face.⁷¹

Therefore, when northern Mexicans spoke of the “enemy” in 1846 and 1847, they as often meant *indios* as *norteamericanos*. The ruinous legacy of fifteen years of raiding and the ongoing threat of Indian violence left large segments of northern Mexico’s population unable and probably unwilling to resist the U.S. Army. In the northeast, for example, state officials were ordered to muster all males between the ages of sixteen and fifty against the Americans. While the orders exempted those places most exposed to raids, many local authorities still demurred, insisting that their communities needed the men to patrol against Indians.⁷² Occasionally this scenario un-

war with the Camanches, but recently become their allies, and are now at war with Mexico.” See P. M. Butler and M. G. Lewis to W. Medill, Washington, D.C., August 8, 1846, in Senate Report Com. no. 171, 30th Cong., 1st sess. For similar observations, see Robert S. Neighbors to W. Medill, Austin, Tex., January 6, 1847, House Executive Doc. no. 100, 29th Cong., 2nd sess. For previous Mescalero-Mexican cooperation against Comanches, see, for example, Mauricio Ugarte to commander general of Chihuahua, El Norte, May 18, 1841, in *Diario del Gobierno*, June 14, 1841. For Mescalero-Comanche conflict, see also *Diario del Gobierno*, October 19, 1841.

⁷⁰ For the drought and the decline in the herd, see Dan Flores, “Bison Ecology and Bison Diplomacy: The Southern Plains from 1800 to 1850,” *Journal of American History* 78, no. 2 (1991): 465–485, 482. See also Pekka Hämäläinen, “The First Phase of Destruction: Killing the Southern Plains Buffalo, 1790–1840,” *Great Plains Quarterly* 21, no. 1 (2001): 101–114. For the loss of habitat along the Arkansas (and for shrinking herds), see Elliott West, *The Way West: Essays on the Central Plains* (Albuquerque, N.Mex., 1995), 13–83. For the consumption of horses and mules, see Robert S. Neighbors to W. Medill, Torrey’s Trading House, June 22, 1847, in Senate Doc. no. 734, 30th Cong., 1st sess. For the antelope drive, see Mooney, *Calendar*, 287–289.

⁷¹ *Registro Oficial*, October 22, 1846. For the traveler, see Ruxton, *Adventures in Mexico*, 113–129, 161.

⁷² For the draft order, see Juan N. Almonte to Juan N. de la Garza y Evia, Mexico City, August 28, 1846, E10, C18, AGENL-MGM. For failures to supply requested men, see Miguel A. González Quiroga, “Nuevo León ocupado: El gobierno de Nuevo León durante la guerra entre México y los Estados Uni-

folded on a grand scale. In late 1846, Santa Anna labored to amass a huge army and defeat Taylor near Monterrey. Mexico City called upon the states to raise men, but, recognizing the troubles that the north faced from both Indians and Americans, insisted on contributions from only three northern states: Chihuahua, Durango, and Zacatecas. Suspicious of Santa Anna and, more importantly, facing acute threats from Apaches and Comanches, none of the three sent any men. In February 1847, the Mexican army lost the battle of Buena Vista by the narrowest of margins. Had Chihuahua, Durango, and Zacatecas met their quotas, Santa Anna's force would have been increased by one-fifth, perhaps enough to win the battle and shift the entire dynamic of the war.⁷³ Finally, the legacy and ongoing reality of Indian raiding inhibited the emergence of a popular insurgency against the U.S. occupation in the north. While northerners did organize against the invaders, most notably in New Mexico and California, guerrilla activity in the north never seriously threatened Taylor's position. U.S. commanders denounced insurgent attacks on stragglers and the occasional mule train, and even responded to such acts by inflicting severe collective punishments upon Mexican settlements. But cooler heads recognized that the insurgency was but a shadow of what it could be. Traveling with the U.S. Army, Josiah Gregg observed that the key northern insurgent had fewer than a thousand or even a hundred men, although northeastern Mexico should have been able to produce a hundred thousand volunteers to wage irregular warfare against American troops. Had it materialized, such an insurgency would likely have made it militarily and politically impossible for Polk to open up the decisive campaign into central Mexico.⁷⁴

But Taylor's occupation did not come under serious guerrilla threat, Polk did send General Winfield Scott to central Mexico in early 1847, and the Americans did conquer the capital that autumn. In defeat, certain Mexican leaders denounced what they saw as northern indifference, even complicity with the invader. Durango's editors assailed those who accused the state's population of treason. "Why? Because we have not fielded armies that have been impossible to raise, because they need be composed of men paid in cash, and our brothers have been assassinated by the barbarians, or else fled far away from their fury?" Chihuahua's representatives likewise

dos," in Vázquez, *México al tiempo*, 333–359, 341–342; González Quiroga, "Nuevo León ante la invasión," 429. An official in Chihuahua blamed his inability to field men against U.S. soldiers on the fact that Indians had stolen all of the horses; "this land is plagued with savages." See *Registro Oficial*, December 31, 1847.

⁷³ For Santa Anna's efforts at raising men, see William A. DePalo, *The Mexican National Army, 1822–1852* (College Station, Tex., 1997), 108–109. The government's order called for 1,600 men from Zacatecas, 600 men from Durango, and 560 men from Chihuahua. See Tomás Calvillo Unna and María Isabel Monroy Castillo, "Entre regionalismo y federalismo: San Luis Potosí, 1846–1848," in Vázquez, *México al tiempo*, 417–454, 423. For the states' refusal, see Albert C. Ramsey, ed., *The Other Side; or, Notes for the History of the War between Mexico and the United States* (New York, 1850), 85–86; Smith, *War with Mexico*, 1: 376. For explanations why, see, for example, Isidro Reyes to Governor of Durango, San Miguel del Mesquital, November 1, 1846, *Registro Oficial*, November 8, 1846.

⁷⁴ For Gregg, see Fulton and Horgan, *Diary and Letters of Josiah Gregg*, 2: 141. There was intense debate in Mexico about whether to formally support a system of guerrilla war. See Ramsey, *The Other Side*, 439–442, for the argument that sustained guerrilla activity would have driven the U.S. Army out of Mexico. See also Irving W. Levinson, *Wars within War: Mexican Guerrillas, Domestic Elites, and the United States of America, 1846–1848* (Fort Worth, Tex., 2005), 66. For U.S. attacks upon villages as reprisals for guerrilla activity, see Foos, *Short, Offhand, Killing Affair*, 113–148.

tried to defend their honor. They reminded their compatriots that Chihuahua had been “afflicted and desolated for fifteen years by the savages, drowned in the blood of the men and in the lamentations of the widows and the orphans, an ideal theatre in which to showcase the power of the United States.”⁷⁵

Subtract the irony, and expansionists in Washington would have agreed. To their way of thinking, Chihuahua and the rest of northern Mexico was not only an ideal showcase for U.S. power, but a land in desperate need of it. By the time senators began openly debating how much territory to demand from Mexico, expansionists could draw on more than a decade of observations to describe a Mexican north empty of meaningful Mexican history, and, by all appearances, increasingly empty of Mexicans themselves. So it was that Senator Edward Hannegan could defend taking half of Mexico’s territory simply by characterizing it as empty, “essential to us, useless to her,” a “wilderness uninhabited, save by bands of roving savages.” Senator Robert Hunter said that he did not “believe it practicable to prevent our people from over-spreading that country. The Mexican people [are] now receding before the Indian; and this affords a new argument in favor of our occupation of the territory, which would otherwise fall into the occupation of the savage.”⁷⁶

These perceptions should be taken seriously. U.S. leaders turned to tales of Indians attacking Mexicans for more than just rhetorical cover. Congressmen, editors, and administration officials pointed to Mexico’s ruinous war with frontier Indians as compelling and, to their minds, honest evidence that Mexicans were incapable of developing their northern lands. This is not to say that everyone subscribing to this view also wanted to acquire Mexican territory. Politicians ambivalent about or even opposed to the war also talked about raiding, but they incorporated Indians into arguments against a cession—for example, invoking the “well-known fact” that raiders had “encroached upon and broken up many of the settlements of the Spaniards” in the north, leaving behind mainly indigenous Mexicans unfit for American political life.⁷⁷ In other words, rhetoric about Mexico’s Indian war was not so much part of a calculated expansionist argument as it was indicative of assumptions that by 1846 had become common across the political spectrum.

Indeed, one of the men who spoke most earnestly about Indians was often at odds with the expansionist program. John C. Calhoun abstained from the initial vote on the war, disliked the president’s machinations, and thought that acquiring significant territory below the Rio Grande, which is what Polk and some of his cabinet privately

⁷⁵ For Durango, see *Registro Oficial*, April 8, 1847. For charges against Chihuahua, see, for example, Bustamante, *El nuevo Bernal Díaz*, 226. For Chihuahua’s response, see “La Diputación de Chihuahua a la Nación, March 25, 1847,” in José María Ponce de León, ed., *Reseñas históricas del estado de Chihuahua* (Chihuahua, 1913), 350–357; and Luis Jáuregui, “Chihuahua en la tormenta, su situación política durante la Guerra con los Estados Unidos: Septiembre de 1846–Julio de 1848,” in Vázquez, *México al tiempo*, 134–156, 145–147. Final quote is from “La Diputación Permanente de la Honorable Legislatura de Chihuahua a sus comitentes, Villa de Allende, April 6, 1848,” in Ponce de León, ed., *Reseñas históricas*, 344–346.

⁷⁶ For “essential to us,” see speech of Sen. Edward Hannegan, February 26, 1847, *Globe*, 29th Cong., 2nd sess., 516. For “believe it practicable,” see speech of Sen. Robert Hunter, February 7, 1848, *Globe*, 30th Cong., 1st sess., 310.

⁷⁷ For “well-known fact,” see [Sen.] S. W. Downs, *Speech on the Mexican War, delivered before the Senate on January 31, 1848* (Washington, D.C., 1848). Similarly, see Rep. Truman Smith, March 1, 1848, *Globe*, 30th Cong., 1st sess., 416–417.



Indian Atrocities in New Mexico.

FIGURE 4: "Indian Atrocities in New Mexico." From John Frost, *Pictorial History of Mexico and the Mexican War* (Philadelphia, Pa., 1848).

advocated, would hurt the slave states.⁷⁸ So at two different moments when he feared that events might shift in favor of a larger cession, Calhoun made speeches in support of having U.S. forces unilaterally withdraw to the Rio Grande and keeping everything above. First, he justified taking New Mexico and California in part by pointing to Mexico's singular failure with the Indians. "It was a remarkable fact in the history of this continent," he said, "that, for the first time, the aborigines had been pressing

⁷⁸ For the desire on the part of Polk, Secretary of Treasury Robert J. Walker, and Secretary of State James Buchanan to make the Sierra Madre the new boundary rather than the Rio Grande, see Merk, *Manifest Destiny and Mission*, 186–187. Others championed the wildly unrealistic notion of annexing all of Mexico. See John Douglas Pitts Fuller, *The Movement for the Acquisition of All Mexico, 1846–1848* (Baltimore, Md., 1936); John H. Schroeder, *Mr. Polk's War: American Opposition and Dissent, 1846–1848* (Madison, Wis., 1973), 120–141.

upon the population of European extraction." A year later, Calhoun added an argument about defense: "Well, the whole of the country covered by that line is inhabited by Indian tribes, so powerful that there is no fear of Mexico invading. They invade Mexico! They are too powerful for her; and it will not require a single soldier to be stationed on its whole extent to protect us against Mexico."⁷⁹

No one rose to dispute Calhoun's characterizations. Many disagreed with his position, certainly, but no one challenged the notion that Indians were dismantling Mexico's accomplishments in the north. This is surely a basic reason why, except in narrow debates about the Texas-Mexico border, opponents of the war and of the cession spoke of Mexico's territorial rights only rarely and in generalities. Many in and out of Congress thought the war unjust and dangerous to the Union, and these dissenters often attacked Polk's rationalizations of the conflict.⁸⁰ But when they spoke of Mexico's territorial rights, they almost never ventured beyond the undisputed though sterile fact that Mexico retained legal title. It is striking that anti-expansionists, groping for ammunition against Polk's designs, did not invoke more resonant and compelling arguments in defense of Mexico's claims. Were northern Mexicans not pioneers, warrior-farmers who for generations had worked and bled for family, faith, monarch, and nation, just as the pioneers of U.S. history had? Did not their recent sufferings underscore these sacrifices all the more? Was it not a perversion of basic American ideals to despoil Mexico of lands that its people and their ancestors had been fighting Indians for since the sixteenth century? These were arguments that the war's many opponents avoided. While anti-expansionists may not have held Mexico's territorial claims in contempt, they said little about the historical specifics of Mexico's case, because at bottom they accepted the expansionists' observation that Mexico's northern endeavors had been stalled or reversed by Indians.

Northern Mexico's security crisis had therefore become foundational to how U.S. politicians thought about the proposed cession, irrespective of their position on the war. But that was only half of the story. The other half, fully realized in the Texas Creation Myth but as yet only potential in the ongoing conflict with Mexico, concerned the Anglo-American capacity and even destiny to do what Mexico could not: defeat the Indians and provide security to the long-suffering residents of northern Mexico.

Polk had instructed his generals to promise precisely this to Mexicans in the field, and he took pains to assure Congress that this was his intention when he finally made explicit his territorial ambitions in late 1847. The Mexican government should desire to place New Mexico "under the protection" of the U.S., the president explained, because Mexico was too feeble to stop bands of "warlike savages" from committing depredations not only above the Rio Grande, but also upon more populous states below. Thus the cession would improve life for Mexicans north of the line, but more

⁷⁹ Speech of John C. Calhoun, February 9, 1847, *Globe*, 29th Cong., 2nd sess., 357; Calhoun, March 17, 1848, *Globe*, 30th Cong., 1st sess., 496–497. The U.S. Senate approved the treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo on March 10. Calhoun's speech seven days later was part of a larger discussion of how the U.S. might respond if Mexico failed to ratify the treaty. Calhoun's dilemma is discussed at length in Ernest McPherson Lander, Jr., *Reluctant Imperialists: Calhoun, the South Carolinians, and the Mexican War* (Baton Rouge, La., 1980).

⁸⁰ For generalities, see, for example, the language cited in Lyon Rathbun, "Champions of Mexico in Ante-Bellum America," *Journal of Popular Culture* 35, no. 2 (2001): 17–23. For congressional opposition during the war, see Schroeder, *Mr. Polk's War*, 3–88, 160–167.

importantly “it would be a blessing to all the northern states to have their citizens protected against [the Indians] by the power of the United States. At this moment many Mexicans, principally females and children, are in captivity among them,” Polk continued. “If New Mexico were held and governed by the United States, we could effectually prevent these tribes from committing such outrages, and compel them to release these captives, and restore them to their families and friends.”⁸¹

Confident talk, but did anyone believe it? Every senator had to decide for himself, because Article Eleven of the proposed Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo bound U.S. authorities both to restrain Indians residing north of the new border from raiding into Mexico, and to rescue Mexican captives held by Indians. Treaty negotiator Nicolas Trist told Secretary of State James Buchanan that Mexico’s northern states would never have approved the treaty without Article Eleven, and Mexicans took Trist’s support as proof that he saw their cause “as the cause of all cultured nations, that of civilization versus barbarism.”⁸² The article echoed Polk’s self-assured rhetoric, but more importantly it called such confidence to task. All the talk about incompetent and cowardly Mexicans, contemptible Comanches, Anglo-Americans easily defeating the Indians and turning deserts into gardens—was this bravado or conviction?

It is telling that the opposition to Article Eleven was led by those who understood Mexico’s security problem best. Unlike nearly everyone else in Washington, representatives of the new state of Texas had an appreciation for how difficult it would be to prevent Indian raids into Mexico. In the abstract they spoke glibly about saving Mexicans from savages, but when it came time to vote, they assailed Article Eleven. Senator Sam Houston predicted that it would leave the U.S. “encumbered by conditions relative to the Indians which would be worth more, in a pecuniary point of view, than all the vacant land acquired.” Houston and his state counterpart Thomas Jefferson Rusk enlisted Missouri’s Thomas Hart Benton (long the capitol’s expert on New Mexico and the Mexican north), Jefferson Davis (commander of a regiment in northeastern Mexico during the war), and a dozen others to gut Article Eleven before the final vote.⁸³

They failed. The majority of senators, men better versed in the rhetoric than the reality of Mexico’s conflicts with Indians, voted to ratify a treaty that enshrined U.S. obligations for preventing Indian raids into Mexico. They apparently did so because they had persuaded themselves that the United States would indeed save northern Mexico, simply by letting Anglo-Americans and their superior energies flow into the new territories. They would quickly defeat the wandering savages, redeem the helpless Mexican captives, and rescue the vast, derelict garden of western North America from Mexican neglect.

⁸¹ Polk’s address is in Senate Doc. no. 1, 30th Cong., 1st sess. See pp. 7–11 for Mexico material. Quote is from p. 11.

⁸² For northern insistence on Article Eleven, see Nicholas P. Trist to James Buchanan, Mexico, January 25, 1848, in Senate Doc. no. 52, 30th Cong., 1st sess., 280–294. For “civilization vs. barbarism,” see Bernardo Couto Miguel Atristain and Luis G. Cuevas, “Exposición dirigida al supremo gobierno por los comisionados que firmaron el tratado de paz con los Estados-Unidos,” Mexico, March 1, 1848, reprinted in *Registro Oficial*, May 25 and May 28, 1848.

⁸³ For “encumbered by conditions,” see speech of Sam Houston, February 28, 1848, Senate Doc. no. 52, 30th Cong., 1st sess., 5. For the votes, see Senate Doc. no. 52, 30th Cong., 1st sess., 12–13.

THAT REPRESENTATIVES FROM BOTH NATIONS felt confident about and pleased with Article Eleven testifies to an essential congruity between American and Mexican conceptions of Indian raiders. Americans believed that Apaches, Navajos, Kiowas, Comanches, and the like were undisciplined, craven opportunists. Above all, Americans considered these Indians reactive. Mexican weakness, racial impurity, cowardice, and stupidity induced, even compelled, Indians to raid. Most U.S. politicians believed that American strength would quickly reverse the trend. For their part, Mexico's negotiators assumed that *los salvajes* drew much of their strength, most of their weapons, and perhaps even their tactics and political coherence from *norte-americanos*. So it was that Mexican representatives championed Article Eleven as the "only advantage" that could compensate Mexico for all it had sacrificed in the war.⁸⁴

These were vain hopes, born out of a shared nineteenth-century worldview that held only nation-states and empires to be entities of hemispheric significance. Despite an abundance of evidence, national leaders in both Mexico and the United States had been incapable of seeing non-state Indian peoples as consequential political communities pursuing their own collective goals—goals that, however indirectly, might alter the course of nation-states. So it was confusing and infuriating for leaders in both capitals to see raiding surge in the aftermath of the war, and grow progressively worse through the early 1850s. There was evidently more behind raiding campaigns than Mexican incompetence or American provocation. Mexicans responded with outrage and threatened lawsuits into the tens of millions of dollars, based on the violation of Article Eleven. U.S. administrators grumbled about Mexican passivity and asked for patience. Cross-border raids by native peoples would continue in diminished form through the 1880s, but Washington was not prepared to wait nearly that long. Despairing of its ability to honor Article Eleven, the United States bought its way out of it in 1854, with the Gadsden Purchase.⁸⁵

It is unsurprising that nineteenth-century Americans weathered this embarrassment without reevaluating assumptions that had helped them appropriate half of Mexico's national territory. What *is* surprising is that historians on both sides of the modern border retain many of the same assumptions about the capacity of America's indigenous peoples to influence geopolitics in the postcolonial era. But the evidence above suggests that the transformations we associate with the U.S.-Mexican War emerged from a nexus of American, Mexican, and *Indian* politics. U.S. expansion into Mexican territory appears considerably more contingent in its outcome once

⁸⁴ Luis de la Rosa to John M. Clayton, Washington, March 20, 1850, in William R. Manning, ed., *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States: Inter-American Affairs, 1831–1860*, vol. 9: *Mexico, 1848 (Mid-Year)–1860* (Washington, D.C., 1937), 350–352.

⁸⁵ The U.S.-Mexican controversy over Indian raiding following the war is explored in detail in J. Fred Rippy, "The Indians of the Southwest in the Diplomacy of the United States and Mexico, 1848–1853," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 2, no. 3 (1919): 363–396; Rippy, *The United States and Mexico* (New York, 1926), 68–84, 126–147; Luis G. Zorrilla, *Historia de las relaciones entre México y los Estados Unidos de América, 1800–1958* (Mexico, 1965), 275–292. For ongoing violence in U.S.-controlled New Mexico, see Sister Mary Loyola, *The American Occupation of New Mexico, 1821–1852* (Albuquerque, N.Mex., 1939), 74–99. For initial discussion of lawsuits, see R. P. Letcher to John M. Clayton, Mexico City, April 8, 1850, *Despatches from United States Ministers to Mexico*. On continued raiding below the Rio Grande after 1848, see the detailed report made by the Mexican government, based on interviews and on archival and periodical sources from northern states, *Informe de la comisión pesquisidora de la frontera del norte al ejecutivo de la union, en cumplimiento del artículo 3 de la ley de 30 de septiembre de 1872* (Mexico, 1874), 15–108. The Gadsden Treaty was signed in late 1853 and ratified in 1854. See Odie B. Faulk, *Too Far North, Too Far South* (Los Angeles, 1967).

Indian actors are included in the story. This can only be for the good, given that a perception of inevitability has contributed to collective disinterest in the U.S.-Mexican War, despite its immense and enduring continental consequences.

More broadly, we need to rethink the significance of autonomous native peoples to the interlocked histories of American states. By the early 1820s, more than a dozen generations after Columbus, indigenous polities still controlled between half and three-quarters of the continental landmass claimed by the hemisphere's remaining colonies and newly independent states.⁸⁶ The fact that the scope of Indian power is rarely cast this way, in hemispheric terms, speaks to the grip that national teleologies have upon our historical imaginations. Historians have tended to consider the endurance of native power into the early postcolonial period as a fact relevant to national rather than international histories. Historians of South America, especially, have lately worked to correct the picture, although in this regard the Americas' early national period is still poorly understood in comparison to the colonial era.⁸⁷ The ethnohistorical literature is reaching a point of maturity where it may be fruitfully integrated with more traditional historiographies on topics such as nationalism, diplomacy, military history, and economic development, in order to better understand not only native peoples, but also the broader transnational world in which they moved. Once it is more advanced, this endeavor will likely leave American nation-states and their citizens looking less exclusively determinative of the hemisphere's contours than we now believe them to have been.

⁸⁶ See Claudio Esteva Fabregat, *Mestizaje in Ibero-America*, trans. John Wheat (Tucson, Ariz., 1995), 232, as cited in David J. Weber, "Bourbons and Bárbaros: Center and Periphery in the Reshaping of Spanish Indian Policy," in Christine Daniels and Michael V. Kennedy, eds., *Negotiated Empires: Centers and Peripheries in the Americas, 1500–1820* (New York, 2002), 79–103, 79 n. 1. Philip D. Curtin estimates that Europeans actually governed less than one-quarter of the Americas in 1800. See *The World and the West: The European Challenge and the Overseas Response in the Age of Empire* (Cambridge, 2000), 12.

⁸⁷ See, for example, the essays by Kristine L. Jones, James Schofield Saeger, Neil Whitehead, and Jonathan D. Hill in Frank Salomon and Stuart B. Schwartz, eds., *The Cambridge History of the Native Peoples of the Americas*, vol. 3: *South America* (Cambridge, 1999); Brooke Larson, *Trials of Nation Making: Liberalism, Race, and Ethnicity in the Andes, 1810–1910* (Cambridge, 2004); and Erick D. Langer, "The Eastern Andean Frontier (Bolivia and Argentina) and Latin American Frontiers: Comparative Contexts (19th and 20th Centuries)," *The Americas* 59, no. 1 (2002): 33–63.

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Overcoming the “Contagion of Mimicry”: The Cosmopolitan Nationalism and Modernist History of Rabindranath Tagore and W. B. Yeats

LOUISE BLAKENEY WILLIAMS

RABINDRANATH TAGORE AND WILLIAM BUTLER YEATS first met in 1912. The Indian poet, who was awarded the Nobel Prize for literature the next year, was very impressed by the Irish poet who would win the same prize ten years later. Tagore compared Yeats's work to that of the greatest ancient Indian poets and claimed that Yeats was “someone capable of comprehending the world through the un-trammelled power of his soul.”¹ Equally as enthusiastic, Yeats described Tagore as “a great poet—if not the greatest poet at the present time in the world.”² The poets admired one another not just for their creative writing, but also for their contributions to the nationalist movements of their respective countries. Tagore credited Yeats's return to “the ancient poetic tradition of Ireland” for the “national awakening” of Ireland, while Yeats claimed that Tagore's poetry was crucial for a “new Renaissance” that had “been born in” India.³ Many of their countrymen agreed that the two authors were important representatives of their nations' genius. Tagore's poems about India, for example, were considered so moving that one of them was chosen for India's national anthem in 1947, while Yeats was so distinguished that he was appointed one of independent Ireland's first senators.⁴

Yet, although Yeats and Tagore were lauded as the greatest poets of their countries, they were not particularly well liked by anticolonial nationalists. Both authors were criticized harshly, and were accused periodically of being pro-British elitists rather than true nationalists. Some commentators are still suspicious of them today. Ashis Nandy, for example, argues that Tagore “rejected the idea of nationalism,” while Stephen Regan writes that “the nationalist sentiments Yeats espouses are es-

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¹ Rabindranath Tagore, “Poet Yeats” (1912), in Tagore, *Rabindranath Tagore: An Anthology*, ed. Krishna Dutta and Andrew Robinson (New York, 1997), 217.

² W. B. Yeats, “Preface to *Gitanjali*” (1912), in Yeats, *Essays and Introductions* (New York, 1968), 387.

³ Tagore, “Poet Yeats,” 218; Yeats, quoted in Bikash Chakravarty, ed., *Poets to a Poet, 1912–1940: Letters from Robert Bridges, Ernest Rhys, W. B. Yeats, Thomas Sturge Moore, R. C. Trevelyan, and Ezra Pound* (Calcutta, 1998), 165.

⁴ See Krishna Dutta and Andrew Robinson, *Rabindranath Tagore: The Myriad-Minded Man* (London, 1995), 161; Richard Ellman, *Yeats: The Man and the Masks* (New York, 1979), 240.

entially those of *déclassé* Irish Protestantism.”⁵ That the greatest national poets of two widely separated British colonies could find themselves accused of betraying their own nations is an interesting paradox.⁶ It also is a problem connected directly to academic debates in the fields of nationalism and imperialism. Tagore and Yeats were nationalists, but they have been misunderstood because their particular forms of nationalism, which were remarkably similar, were different from those of more well known nationalists. Rather, the nationalism they espoused resembles the “new” cosmopolitanism that many scholars in the past decade have attempted to define, the study of which has been called “a revolution in the social sciences.”⁷

This new cosmopolitanism is contrasted to most nineteenth- and twentieth-century forms of nationalist thought because it questions the value of nation-states with unique, unitary cultures opposed to all others. At the same time, it also differs from the “old” cosmopolitanism or universalism of the eighteenth century, which proposed that national differences be minimized in favor of one uniform enlightened culture. Rather, “new” cosmopolitans, who also have been called “rooted” or “realistic” cosmopolitans, respect the variety of traditions and nationalities, but also believe in universal values that all people in all countries should accept.⁸ They think that individuals can be nationalists by retaining their national identities and primary loyalty to one nation, while at the same time being “respectful of cultural diversity, interested in dialogue across cultures, and committed to forms of cultural hybridization.”⁹ Some scholars argue that if this theory were adopted today, it might help combat disturbing trends in nationalism, because, as Pratap Bhanu Mehta puts it, cosmopolitanism avoids “both the logic of assimilation that eroded difference” and “an enclavism that made dialogue impossible.”¹⁰ Critics, however, question the practicality of the new cosmopolitanism; it succumbs to “the fallacy of the possible mid-

⁵ Ashis Nandy, *The Illegitimacy of Nationalism: Rabindranath Tagore and the Politics of Self* (New Delhi, 1994), 80; Stephen Regan, “Poetry and Nation: W. B. Yeats,” in Richard Allen and Harish Trivedi, eds., *Literature and Nation: Britain and India, 1800–1990* (London, 2000), 92.

⁶ Whether Ireland actually was a colony or instead “an outlying territory gradually absorbed into an expanding European monarchy,” and whether Ireland today should be considered a postcolonial nation or a modern Western European state, is the subject of a debate that it is not necessary to discuss here, because Yeats and Tagore believed Ireland to be a colony. David Lloyd, “Irish New Histories and the ‘Subalternity Effect,’” in *Subaltern Studies IX* (Oxford, 1996), 262. For examples of arguments on both sides, see Stephen Howe, *Ireland and Empire: Colonial Legacies in Irish History and Culture* (Oxford, 2000); Luke Gibbons, *Transformations in Irish Culture* (Notre Dame, Ind., 1996).

⁷ Ulrich Beck, “The Cosmopolitan Society and Its Enemies,” *Theory, Culture & Society* 19, no. 1–2 (2002): 17. Studies of cosmopolitanism are most popular in the fields of political science, sociology, anthropology, geography, philosophy, and cultural studies. See David A. Hollinger, “Not Universalists, Not Pluralists: The New Cosmopolitans Find Their Own Way,” in Steven Vertovec and Robin Cohen, eds., *Conceiving Cosmopolitanism: Theory, Context, Practice* (Oxford, 2002), 228–239.

⁸ David Hollinger expands on this list of adjectives used to describe cosmopolitanism and argues convincingly that they “do not denote different schools, but different attempts to say pretty much the same thing.” Hollinger, “Not Universalists,” 228. For more definitions of this “new” cosmopolitanism, see, for example, Pheng Cheah and Bruce Robbins, eds., *Cosmopolitics: Thinking and Feeling beyond the Nation* (Minneapolis, 1998); Ulrich Beck, “The Truth of Others: A Cosmopolitan Approach,” *Common Knowledge* 10, no. 3 (2004): 430–449; Sheldon Pollock, “Cosmopolitan and Vernacular in History,” *Public Culture* 12, no. 3 (2000): 591–625; Kwame Anthony Appiah, “Cosmopolitan Patriots,” *Critical Inquiry* 23, no. 3 (Spring 1997): 617–639; Ulf Hannerz, “Cosmopolitans and Locals in World Culture,” *Theory, Culture & Society* 7 (1990): 237–251.

⁹ Pratap Bhanu Mehta, “Cosmopolitanism and the Circle of Reason,” *Political Theory* 28, no. 5 (October 2000): 620.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 623.

dle" by attempting to combine the particular and universal, and is "too abstract to motivate individuals to engage in moral action."¹¹

Tagore and Yeats were not such skeptics. This may be because they lived at a time when nationalist thinking was more fluid than it is today. After years of scholarly analysis, it often seems that the only choice is between dichotomies, first between nationalism and universalism, and then, if nationalism is adopted, between religious and secular, traditional and modernizing, conservative and liberal varieties.¹² Yeats and Tagore did not see the need to make such choices and instead hoped for a balance of opposites that, as Tagore put it, accepted "neither the colourless vagueness of [universalist] cosmopolitanism, nor the fierce self-idolatry of nation-worship."¹³ They did this in all areas of their lives, becoming cosmopolitan individuals as well as thinkers. Both authors read widely in the works of many different nations, and combined features of diverse cultures in their own creative writing. Like most cosmopolitans, they traveled to, and resided in, many places; Yeats alternated between living in Ireland, England, and France, while Tagore was constantly on the move throughout the entire world. Both also participated in social and professional communities that provided places for artists and scholars from many nations to interact as equals. In London, Yeats's circle included natives not only of Ireland, England, America, and Europe, but also of India and Japan. In Calcutta, Tagore socialized with citizens of all those places, as well as with individuals who had a more hybrid sense of national identity, such as half-British, half-Sri Lankan Ananda K. Coomaraswamy and Irishwoman-turned-Hindu nun Sister Nivedita.¹⁴

It was on one of his many overseas travels that Tagore met Yeats, and was drawn

¹¹ Ibid., 624; Nicholas Buttle, "Critical Nationalism: A Liberal Prescription?" *Nations and Nationalism* 6, no. 1 (2000): 123. See also Bryan S. Turner, "Cosmopolitan Virtue, Globalization and Patriotism," *Theory, Culture & Society* 19, nos. 1–2 (2002): 56; Simon Gikandi, "Globalization and the Claims of Postcoloniality," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 100, no. 3 (Summer 2001): 644; Bruce Robbins, "Comparative Cosmopolitanism," *Social Text* 31/32 (1992): 171.

¹² Lloyd Kramer discusses "the dichotomizing structure" of the twentieth-century historiography of nationalism. Kramer, "Historical Narratives and the Meaning of Nationalism," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 58, no. 3 (1997): 525–545. For discussions of the various types of nationalism, see, for example, Eric Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality* (Cambridge, 1990); Anthony D. Smith, *The Nation in History: Historiographical Debates about Ethnicity and Nationalism* (Cambridge, 2000); Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in a Global Era* (Cambridge, 1995); David Brown, "Are There Good and Bad Nationalisms?" *Nations and Nationalism* 5, no. 2 (1999): 281–302.

¹³ Rabindranath Tagore, *Nationalism* (London, 1918), 5.

¹⁴ Tagore claimed that "Vaishnava literature and the *Upanishads* have mingled to form my mental climate," but he also greatly admired British Romantic poets such as Shelley, Keats, and Wordsworth. Yeats was primarily influenced by Shelley and Blake, but also loved traditional Irish folk stories and beliefs, and his interest in alternative religions, especially theosophy, led him to study and appreciate the "Vedas and the Upanishads." Tagore, letter to (Sir) Brajendranath Seal [October 31, 1921], in Rabindranath Tagore, *Selected Letters of Rabindranath Tagore*, ed. Krishna Dutta and Andrew Robinson (Cambridge, 1997), 283; Yeats, "The Poetry of A. E." (1898), in Yeats, *Uncollected Prose by W. B. Yeats*, vol. 1: *First Reviews and Articles, 1886–1896*, ed. John P. Frayne (New York, 1970), 121. Like most literary modernists, Yeats integrated themes and literary forms from many different cultures and time periods into his own work. For example, beginning in 1914, he wrote plays on Irish subjects in the form of the Japanese Noh. On the influence of other cultures on Yeats and the modernists in his circle, see, for example, Louise Blakeney Williams, *Modernism and the Ideology of History: Literature, Politics, and the Past* (Cambridge, 2002), 114–205. The adjective "modernist" used in this essay refers to the early-twentieth-century literary movement. For definitions of literary modernism, see Malcolm Bradbury and James McFarlane, eds., *Modernism, 1890–1930* (Harmondsworth, 1983); Alistair Davies, *An Annotated Critical Bibliography of Modernism* (Totowa, N.J., 1982); Michael H. Levenson, *A Genealogy of Modernism: A Study of English Literary Doctrine, 1908–1922* (Cambridge, 1984). On Yeats's artistic circle, see Williams, *Modernism*. On Tagore's circle, see Tapati Guha-Thakurta, *The Making of New "Indian"*

into his cosmopolitan circle of friends in London. A grand public banquet was organized in Tagore's honor, at which Yeats was supposed to take the chair. Plans had to be changed at the last minute because, according to one account of the event, Yeats "was unable, as a loyal Irish nationalist, to propose the King's health."¹⁵ Yeats's cosmopolitan mixing of cultures, therefore, did not preclude an anticolonial nationalism. In fact, Yeats and Tagore are much better comprehended not by denying their nationalism, but through the concept of new cosmopolitanism. In this way, both authors can be seen as significant nationalist thinkers as well as great artists.

This approach also contributes to a deeper understanding of the history of nationalism. That history cannot be characterized as merely the story of unitary, oppositional ideologies competing with universalism. It must acknowledge a cosmopolitanism that "surfaced from time to time" as well.¹⁶ Tagore and Yeats were the best exponents of a nationalism that was shared by the larger group of artists and art critics with whom they worked and associated. Tagore's and Yeats's ideas, thus, give us some insight into one fairly widespread cosmopolitan moment that has yet to be explored in detail. This particular moment is especially interesting because it illustrates the complex, multidirectional, and hybrid nature of imperialism.¹⁷ It also highlights an ironic feature of imperialism. A new type of cosmopolitanism would not have been possible without the increased interaction between metropolis and periphery facilitated by the expansion of the British Empire. But this cosmopolitanism, in turn, was a way of thinking that challenged imperialism more fundamentally than any other nationalist ideology.

As a number of critics have made clear, most anticolonial nationalists did not really counter imperialism effectively, but instead copied its underlying ideology. This is one of the key features of what Partha Chatterjee has called "the post-colonial predicament."¹⁸ For example, most nationalists adopted the Orientalism so famously defined by Edward Said, but merely reversed or inverted it. They agreed with Westerners that the people of the East had a spiritual "essence," which was fundamentally different from the rationality and materialism of the West. They denied, however, that this made them inferior and unchanging, but argued instead that it gave them the potential to exceed the achievements of their conquerors.¹⁹ Underlying this the-

Art: Arts, Aesthetics, and Nationalism in Bengal, c. 1850–1920 (Cambridge, 1992); Partha Mitter, *Art and Nationalism in Colonial India, 1850–1922* (Cambridge, 1994).

¹⁵ Robert Speaight, *William Rothenstein: The Portrait of an Artist in His Time* (London, 1962), 249.

¹⁶ Robert Fine and Robin Cohen, "Four Cosmopolitan Moments," in Vertovec and Cohen, *Conceiving Cosmopolitanism*, 137. The term "cosmopolitan moment" had been adopted from this article. See also Pollock, "Cosmopolitan and Vernacular."

¹⁷ While this essay focuses only on Tagore and Yeats, it is part of a larger work that explores in detail the cosmopolitan moment of early-twentieth-century artists and art critics in England, Ireland, and India. For other studies emphasizing the mutual impact and hybridity of the British Empire, see, for example, Peter van der Veer, *Imperial Encounters: Religion and Modernity in India and Britain* (Princeton, N.J., 2001); Elleke Boehmer, *Empire: The National and the Postcolonial, 1890–1920* (Oxford, 2002); Andrew Thompson, *The Empire Strikes Back? The Impact of Imperialism on Britain from the Mid-Nineteenth Century* (Harlow, 2005).

¹⁸ Carol Breckenridge and Peter van der Veer, eds., *Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament* (Philadelphia, Pa., 1993).

¹⁹ On Orientalism, see Edward Said, *Orientalism* (New York, 1978). On nationalism as an "inversion of orientalist epistemology," see Thomas Blom Hansen, *The Saffron Wave: Democracy and Hindu Na-*

ory, according to scholars such as Gyan Prakash, Ranajit Guha, and Prasenjit Duara, was a view of history that replicated the progressive assumptions about the past that were used to justify the imperialist "civilizing mission." The ultimate result of this imitation of Western Orientalist and historical discourse was that the postcolonial states, which nationalists helped create, were not fundamentally different from the states of their colonial masters, and thus were equally as Eurocentric and oppressive.²⁰

Yeats's and Tagore's cosmopolitan nationalism was formulated as a response to their awareness of potential problems such as these, and in direct opposition to them. Tagore explicitly warned his countrymen in 1931 about the "contagion of mimicry" he noticed among many nationalists who copied Western actions and ideology.²¹ Both Tagore and Yeats consciously tried to avoid this imitation and, as a result, formulated a very different type of nationalism. They were able to do this in part because they escaped "the hegemony of linear time" and Western historical assumptions through nonprogressive theories of the past.²² Yeats, like most early-twentieth-century literary modernists, formulated a complex cyclic theory of history. Tagore had similar historical assumptions, probably inspired by traditional Indian writings about the past. These nonprogressive views of history helped both authors become cosmopolitan nationalists by enabling them to transcend Western antithetical thinking and anticolonial nationalism. Rather than assume that a dichotomy existed between hemispheres, races, or nations and advocate the triumph of a superior one, Tagore and Yeats insisted on the balance or harmony of opposites in all areas of thought and life.

Far from being traitors to the causes of India and Ireland, Tagore and Yeats were sincere nationalists who tried to formulate an alternative version of nationalism that avoided the problems to which so many of their contemporaries succumbed. Ranajit Guha noticed this about Tagore, and claimed to be deeply saddened that Tagore's "is a loser's voice."²³ There is, therefore, a need to consider again the cosmopolitan

tionalism in Modern India (Princeton, N.J., 1999), 60; Ronald Inden, *Imagining India* (Oxford, 1990); David Ludden, "Orientalist Empiricism," in Breckenridge and van der Veer, *Orientalism*, 250–278; Nandy, *The Intimate Enemy: Loss and Recovery of Self under Colonialism* (Oxford, 1983), 72–74; Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought in the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse?* (London, 1986); Declan Kiberd, *Inventing Ireland* (Cambridge, Mass., 1996), 32. This retention of Western Orientalist discourse is why nationalism has been called "the avatar of orientalism." Carol Breckenridge and Peter van der Veer, "Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament," in Breckenridge and van der Veer, *Orientalism*, 12.

²⁰ See, for example, Gyan Prakash, "Postcolonial Criticism and Indian Historiography," *Social Text* 31/32 (1992): 8–19; Prakash, "Writing Post-Orientalist Histories in the Third World: Perspectives from Indian Historiography," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 32, no. 2 (April 1990): 383–408; Ranajit Guha, *Dominance without Hegemony: History and Power in Colonial India* (Cambridge, Mass., 1997); Guha, *History at the Limit of World-History* (New York, 2002); Prasenjit Duara, "Postcolonial History," in Lloyd Kramer and Sarah C. Maza, *A Companion to Western Historical Thought* (Oxford, 2002), 417–431; Ashis Nandy, "History's Forgotten Doubles," *History and Theory* 34, no. 2 (May 1995): 44–66; Partha Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories* (Princeton, N.J., 1993), 76–112.

²¹ Tagore, letter to Nitindranath Gangulee, July 31, 1931, in Tagore, *Selected Letters*, 403.

²² Prasenjit Duara, "The Regime of Authenticity: Timelessness, Gender, and National History in Modern China," *History and Theory* 37, no. 3 (October 1998): 301.

²³ Guha, *History at the Limit*, 72, 73. Guha claims that Tagore's ideas about history are "an original vision" very different from "the colonialist historiography propagated by the Raj and the ideologues of imperialism." *Ibid.*, 75.

losers of the early-twentieth-century nationalist debates, not just to gain a better understanding of Yeats and Tagore and the cosmopolitan moment to which they contributed, but also for suggestions about different forms of nationalism and modes of historical thinking that may be truly free of Eurocentric and imperialist discourse.

AS POETS AND LITERARY CRITICS, Yeats and Tagore had many common interests and ideas, but they did not agree on everything.²⁴ On the subject of nationalism, however, their opinions were so similar as to be almost uncanny, especially given the fact that they formed those views independently of one another. Yeats did not know of Tagore before they were introduced in 1912. It is possible that Tagore read Yeats's poetry before their meeting, but it is unlikely that he was familiar with Yeats's theories of nationalism. The authors had the opportunity to exchange ideas in 1912 and 1913 when they worked together in London on translations of Tagore's poetry.²⁵ They immediately noticed the similarities in the nationalist situations in their countries, and in their own responses to them, and they shared these with the public in articles and lectures.²⁶ After 1913, Yeats and Tagore continued to correspond, but very sporadically. They did, however, openly express admiration for one another to the end of their lives.²⁷

In spite of their limited communication, the two authors were in remarkable agreement from the very start on issues relating to nationalism. This is not a coincidence. Many of the artists and art critics in their cosmopolitan circles of friends also had similar ideas. Tagore and Yeats, in fact, were the earliest and most eloquent exponents of a common artistic response to developments in nationalism in the early

²⁴ For more on their interactions see, R. F. Foster, *W. B. Yeats: A Life* (Oxford, 1997), 469–473; Harold M. Hurwitz, "Yeats and Tagore," *Comparative Literature* 16, no. 1 (Winter 1964): 55–64; Ganesh N. Devy, "The Indian Yeats," in Toshi Furomoto et al., eds., *International Aspects of Irish Literature* (Gerrards Cross, 1996), 93–106. As these sources note, Yeats was not entirely uncritical of Tagore, but this was largely about his creative writing. Yeats disliked the fact that Tagore was so concerned with his positive reception in England that he did not challenge his reputation as a religious thinker rather than a poet, or the poor quality of some of the English translations of his writing. Yeats also thought that Tagore's work sometimes could be overly sentimental. Nevertheless, Yeats continued to admire and praise Tagore throughout his life.

²⁵ Yeats's writings on nationalism appeared mostly in Irish newspapers, which Tagore is unlikely to have had access to before their meeting. In 1912 and 1913, Tagore and Yeats worked together on English translations of Tagore's poems, which were published under the title *Gitanjali*, and for which Yeats wrote an introduction. It was largely because of this translation that Tagore won the Nobel Prize. In the years before 1915, Yeats also hosted readings of Tagore's poetry, lectured on him, and arranged for his Irish National Theatre to stage Tagore's play *The Post Office* in both Dublin and London. Tagore, in turn, wrote an article about Yeats and arranged for a report of one of Yeats's lectures to be published in India by the *Modern Review*. See especially Chakravarty, *Poets to a Poet*, 145–178, 190, 191.

²⁶ For example, in 1912, Tagore wrote that the nationalist situation in Ireland was "reminiscent of our own country," and in a 1913 lecture in Dublin, Yeats noted "a curious resemblance between the condition of India today and the condition of Ireland," and he suggested that the Irish could learn from the Indian movement of which Tagore was a part. Tagore, "Poet Yeats," 219; Yeats, quoted in Chakravarty, *Poets to a Poet*, 165.

²⁷ In 1914, Yeats planned to travel to India to gain a better understanding of Tagore's poetry "and to study the world out of which" it was made, but the two authors never met again face to face. Yeats, letter to Tagore, September 12 [1914], in Chakravarty, *Poets to a Poet*, 152. Nevertheless, in 1931, Yeats still admired Tagore enough to tell him he was his "most loyal student and admirer." Yeats, letter to Tagore, September 7, 1931, *ibid.*, 155. On Yeats's death in 1939, Tagore declared, "I shall cherish the fact to the end of my days that my life has been linked with the memory of one of the greatest poets of modern Europe." *Ibid.*, 178.

twentieth century. For example, there were writers in Ireland, such as J. M. Synge and Lady Gregory, whom Yeats admired and considered allies in his debates with other nationalists. In India, Tagore had the support of his nephew Abanindranath Tagore and his associates in the "Modern Bengal School," who put a cosmopolitan theory of national identity into practice in their visual art. There also were a number of art critics and artists who straddled both worlds, including E. B. Havell, Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, and James Cousins. They all expressed views of nationalism similar to Tagore's after meeting him and his circle in India, but they probably were influenced by an earlier awareness of Yeats's movement in Ireland.²⁸ The fact that Tagore's and Yeats's theories of nationalism were so alike, therefore, must be attributed to parallel developments taking place in Ireland and India to which they, and other artists, responded, and to their similar backgrounds, which made the two great poets especially aware of them.

Tagore and Yeats were born in 1861 and 1865, respectively. They grew up at a time of important changes in both their countries resulting from the increasing English presence that accompanied the expanding British Empire. Although the English had been involved in Ireland for centuries, it was only after the Great Famine of 1848 that the majority of Irish people were drawn fully into English culture. The same was true in India, which was directly controlled by the British Parliament only after the 1857 Mutiny/War of Independence. The growth of state-supported education (in English) and an expansion of government administration and services in both countries brought more Irish and Indians into closer contact with England than ever. These developments, plus improvements in communications and transportation, helped to more fully integrate India and Ireland into the wider world. While many citizens welcomed this opening up of horizons, others were concerned that traditional cultures were being lost to Anglicization.²⁹

Tagore and Yeats were well placed to feel these changes. Both were brought up among the elites of their countries: Yeats was from a well-off Protestant family, while Tagore was born to a family of Brahman Hindu landlords in Bengal. However, they had somewhat unconventional upbringings because of relatives with strong artistic tendencies and unorthodox religious beliefs. Yeats's father was a painter who was at odds with mainstream society because of his bohemian lifestyle and his religious agnosticism. Many of Tagore's relatives also were artists. Members of his immediate family, moreover, had founded a reformed branch of Hinduism that combined Western Christian and rationalist theories with traditional Indian religious doctrines.

²⁸ On Irish writers with opinions similar to Yeats's, see Kiberd, *Inventing Ireland*, 155–188, 268–304. On Abanindranath Tagore and his school of art, see Guha-Thakurta, *The Making of New "Indian" Art*, 143–212. On James Cousins, see Gauri Viswanathan, "Ireland, India, and the Poetics of Internationalism," *Journal of World History* 15, no. 1 (March 2004): 7–30. On returning to England from India, Havell and Coomaraswamy also helped found the India Society of London, which introduced Yeats and Tagore in 1912. Their key works include E. B. Havell, *Indian Sculpture and Painting* (London, 1908); Havell, *The Basis for Artistic and Industrial Revival in India* (Adyar, 1912); Havell, "The New Indian School of Painting," *Studio* 44 (July 1908): 107–117; Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, *The Deeper Meaning of the Struggle* (Broad Campden, 1907); Coomaraswamy, *Essays in National Idealism* (Madras, 1911); Coomaraswamy, *Art and Swadeshi* (Madras, 1912).

²⁹ See, for example, Judith M. Brown, *Modern India: The Origins of an Asian Democracy* (Oxford, 1994), 95–167; R. V. Comerford, "Ireland, 1850–1870: Post-Famine and Mid-Victorian," in W. E. Vaughan, ed., *A New History of Ireland*, vol. 5: *Ireland under the Union, 1: 1801–1870* (Oxford, 1990), 372–395.

Tagore's and Yeats's childhoods also were quite cosmopolitan. They spent time in urban and rural environments. Yeats lived in London and Dublin, but spent holidays in the countryside of western Ireland. Tagore lived in Calcutta and in rural Bengal, but also visited England twice as a young man. Both authors consequently were introduced to high art as well as folk culture, to the ideas of the metropolis and periphery, and to people who were Anglicized as well as those who were not. They serve as good examples of the way in which the British Empire at its height facilitated an interaction between cultures that made cosmopolitanism possible.³⁰

That empire also engendered nationalist movements, and in the early 1880s, Tagore and Yeats became involved in them. While the movements developed separately, they had similarities that historians have not failed to note.³¹ Tagore was drawn into the "Bengal Renaissance," which was largely a movement of cultural nationalism in response to Anglicization. It began in the mid-1860s, partially through the efforts of Tagore's relatives who worked to protect traditional culture through yearly festivals featuring Indian songs and poems, wrestling matches, and exhibitions of local industry. Tagore joined the movement by writing poems inspired by ancient Indian forms, and by arguing for the use of modern Bengal as the subject matter of a classic art.³² In Ireland, Yeats took part in a similar "Irish Renaissance" that was initiated by the activities of the Gaelic Athletic Association and the Gaelic League in 1884 and 1893. It also attempted to revive traditional Irish sports, language, folklore, entertainment, and dress, often through cultural festivals. Yeats joined in by writing poems and plays inspired by ancient myths and legend cycles, and by founding the Irish National Theatre Society.³³

Coinciding with these cultural movements was a new political nationalism in both countries. In the late 1870s and 1880s, Charles Stuart Parnell and his Irish Party in

³⁰ For more on Tagore's and Yeats's backgrounds, see Dutta and Robinson, *Tagore: The Myriad-Minded Man*; Ellmann, *Yeats*; Foster, *W. B. Yeats*; David Kopf, *The Brahmo Samaj and the Shaping of the Modern Indian Mind* (Princeton, N.J., 1979).

³¹ On the similarities between Indian and Irish nationalism, see T. G. Fraser, "Ireland and India," in Keith Jeffrey, ed., *An Irish Empire? Aspects of Ireland and the British Empire* (Manchester, 1996), 84–90; Howard Brasted, "Indian Nationalist Development and the Influence of Irish Home Rule, 1870–1880," *Modern Asian Studies* 14, no. 1 (1980): 37–63; Richard P. Davis, "India in Irish Revolutionary Propaganda, 1905–1922," *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bangladesh* 22, no. 1 (April 1977): 66–68; Boehmer, *Empire*, 25–124.

³² On the Bengal Renaissance and the Tagores, see Kopf, *The Brahmo Samaj*, 184–186; David Kopf and Safiuddin Joarder, eds., *Reflections on the Bengal Renaissance* (Rajshahi, Bangladesh, 1977). On Tagore's contributions to it, see Tagore, *Tagore: An Anthology*, 177; Guha-Thakurta, *The Making of New "Indian" Art*, 128–145, 188, 259. Later in his life, Tagore was very proud that he was "the first to introduce the land of Bengal to Bengalis as a subject fit for literature." Tagore, letter to Prashanta Chandra Mahalanobis, September(?) 1921, in Tagore, *Tagore: An Anthology*, 177. For a concise definition of cultural nationalism that includes examples from both India and Ireland, see John Hutchinson, *The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism: The Gaelic Revival and the Creation of the Irish Nation State* (London, 1987), 1–45.

³³ On the Irish Renaissance, see Hutchinson, *The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism*, 114–195; Robert Kee, *The Bold Fenian Men* (London, 1972), 130–141. On Yeats's contributions to it, see Elizabeth Cullingford, *Yeats, Ireland and Fascism* (New York, 1981), 61; Foster, *W. B. Yeats*, 98, 114–134. For Yeats's and Tagore's theories about why culture was important for nationalism, see, for example, Yeats, *Uncollected Prose*, 1: 82, 84, 104, 213, 223, 250, 273; W. B. Yeats, *Uncollected Prose by W. B. Yeats*, vol. 2: *Reviews, Articles and Other Miscellaneous Prose, 1897–1939*, ed. John P. Frayne and Colton Johnson (New York, 1976), 70, 73, 326; Yeats, *Essays and Introductions*, 206; Tagore, "India's Epic," *The Modern Review* 9, no. 3 (March 1912): 237; Tagore, "Literary Criticism" (1907), in Rabindranath Tagore, *Selected Writings on Literature and Language*, ed. Sisir Kumar Das and Sukanta Chaudhuri (New Delhi, 2001), 157.

the British Parliament organized a campaign to pressure the government to grant Home Rule. In 1885 the Indian National Congress was founded to convince the British to increase native participation in the government. Initially, most cultural nationalists supported these political movements as a complement to their efforts. Beginning in the 1890s, however, many nationalists, including Tagore and Yeats, began to question the ability of politicians to make any significant changes. In Ireland this was largely because of the fall of Parnell in 1891. The subsequent split in the Irish Party, and the victory of the Conservatives in the British parliamentary election of 1895 made the possibility of achieving Home Rule by political means very remote. In India, Congress did have some success with the Indian Councils Act of 1892, but the limited nature of the act, and British insistence that nothing further would follow, indicated the weakness of this approach. Journalists and politicians, including B. G. Tilak, Bipin Chandra Pal, and Aurobindo Ghose, formed the so-called "Extremist" Party in Congress, and became increasingly radical in their criticism of the passivity of Congress politicians.³⁴

Frustration with political nationalism grew even more intense in the years around 1905 in both India and Ireland. More extreme forms of nationalism, advocating complete political and cultural independence rather than just a share in the government, were proposed. In Ireland, for example, the secret Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB), which had been inactive since the rise of Parnell, began to plan again for a violent revolution to overthrow the British government. In addition, Arthur Griffith developed the idea of Sinn Féin ("Ourselves"), which suggested a boycott of all English goods, services, and offices in favor of Irish ones, as a means both to paralyze English rule and to display Irish independence. This idea was not put into practice widely in Ireland until after World War I, but a similar theory did have a great impact in India. In 1905, the proposed partition of the province of Bengal by the British government, aimed at reducing nationalist activity, led to the Swadeshi ("Our Country") movement, which has been called "a Bengali Sinn Féin."³⁵ It organized boycotts of British goods, education, and jobs, and their replacement by Indian ones. The Swadeshi movement, in turn, inspired the formation of a number of new revolutionary and even terrorist groups, such as the one led by Aurobindo Ghose and Sister Nivedita.³⁶

Both Yeats and Tagore initially were drawn to these new forms of nationalism. In the 1890s, Yeats wrote articles advocating the purchase of Irish goods, the wearing

³⁴ On Irish political nationalism, see Kee, *The Bold Fenian Men*; Hutchinson, *The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism*; F. S. L. Lyons, *Culture and Anarchy in Ireland, 1890–1939* (Oxford, 1979), 38–47. On Indian political nationalism, see Sumit Sarkar, *Modern India, 1885–1947* (Madras, 1983), 65–100; Jim Masselos, *Indian Nationalism: A History* (New Delhi, 1991), 78–92; Rajat Kanta Ray, *Social Conflict and Political Unrest in Bengal, 1875–1927* (Delhi, 1984); Sanjay Seth, "Rewriting Histories of Nationalism: The Politics of 'Moderate Nationalism' in India, 1870–1905," *AHR* 104, no. 1 (February 1999): 95–116.

³⁵ Dutta and Robinson, *Tagore: The Myriad-Minded Man*, 141. Dutta and Robinson translate Swadeshi as "Our Country," but there are other translations, for example, the use of things "of one's country." Masselos, *Indian Nationalism*, 112. Davis claims that "it was agreed on both sides that the words Sinn Féin [sic] and Swadeshi were interchangeable." Davis, "India in Irish Revolutionary Propaganda," 70. For example, in September 1905, Arthur Griffith called Swadeshi "the Sinn Féin policy in India." Griffith, quoted in Boehmer, *Empire*, 31. However, Boehmer argues that "Bengal evolved its concept of swadeshi in the awareness of Sinn Féin's emphasis on self-help and self-reliance, yet not in direct emulation of it," drawing also on indigenous ideas. *Ibid.*, 10.

³⁶ On violent nationalism in India in the early twentieth century, see Peter Heehs, *The Bomb in Bengal: The Rise of Revolutionary Terrorism in India, 1900–1910* (Oxford, 1993).

of Irish clothing, and the development of Irish industry, and he may have joined the IRB. Tagore was even more active as a leading figure in the Swadeshi movement; he participated in protests, wrote patriotic songs, supported the creation of Indian stores and industries, and started his own school entirely independent of the British system. There is even some suggestion that he was involved with revolutionary groups, because he described them so well in his novels.³⁷

Gradually, however, Yeats and Tagore grew uneasy with these new nationalist movements and criticized them openly. Both authors condemned the "blood-stained nationalism," as Tagore put it, or what Yeats described as "the violence of the mob" that often accompanied extreme nationalism in the form of riots in Ireland, or sectarian attacks, Swadeshi coercion, and even bombings and assassinations of British officials in India.³⁸ They also objected to the unsophisticated and religiously bigoted view of culture espoused by these nationalists, who were more interested in propaganda than great art. Lack of an appreciation of high culture and violence seemed to go hand in hand for Yeats when in 1907, riots accompanied his theater's production of J. M. Synge's *The Playboy of the Western World*.³⁹ Tagore also associated nationalists who believed that "ideas make for weakness" with bloodshed in his novel *The Home and the World*.⁴⁰ This unsophisticated attitude toward culture made many nationalists argue that all English influence should be avoided. Both Yeats and Tagore not only criticized this position, but went so far as to compliment the English. According to Yeats, in opposition to the Irish, who have the "most utter indifference to art," the English artistic elite make "beautiful things and . . . [add] a little to the world's store of memorable experiences," and the Irish would do well to learn from

³⁷ On Irish nationalism at this time, see Kee, *The Bold Fenian Men*, 142–162; Hutchinson, *The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism*, 43–47, 168–180; Lyons, *Culture and Anarchy*, 57–62; R. V. Comerford, "Nation, Nationalism and the Irish Language," in Thomas E. Hachey and Lawrence J. McCaffrey, eds., *Perspectives on Irish Nationalism* (Lexington, Ky., 1989), 20–41; Patrick Maume, *The Long Gestation: Irish Nationalist Life, 1891–1918* (New York, 1999). On Indian nationalism at this time, see Sarkar, *Modern India*, 96–123; Masselos, *Indian Nationalism*, 92–118; Ray, *Social Conflict*, 136–185; Peter Heehs, *Nationalism, Terrorism, Communalism: Essays in Modern Indian History* (Delhi, 1998). Yeats also helped organize protests against Queen Victoria's Diamond Jubilee and the Boer War, as well as a celebration of the Wolfe Tone Centenary between 1897 and 1899. See Yeats, "Emmet" (1904), in Yeats, *Uncollected Prose*, 2: 321, 324, 325; Foster, *W. B. Yeats*, 93, 112, 179, 189–193, 195, 196, 221–229; Cullingford, *Yeats, Ireland and Fascism*, 34–44, 53, 54. One contemporary asked Yeats in 1933 if he had ever joined the IRB. Yeats replied that "he never took any oath, but regarded himself as one of the party." Patrick McCartan, "Yeats the Fenian," in W. B. Yeats, *Yeats and Patrick McCartan: A Fenian Friendship*, Letters with a Commentary by John Unterecker and an Address on Yeats, the Fenian, by Patrick McCartan (Dublin, 1967), 428, 429. On Tagore's involvements at this time, see Dutta and Robinson, *Tagore: The Myriad-Minded Man*, 120, 143–162; Mary M. Lago, ed., *Imperfect Encounter: Letters of William Rothenstein and Rabindranath Tagore, 1911–1941* (Cambridge, Mass., 1972), 2–8. Ray argues that Tagore's novels *Ghare Baire* and *Char Adhyaya* depict very accurately the "darker aspects" of revolutionary nationalist movements, evidence of which can be found only in the "files of the Intelligence Branch." Ray, *Social Conflict*, 184, 185.

³⁸ Rabindranath Tagore, "What Then?" (1906), in Tagore, *Towards Universal Man* (Bombay, 1961), 99; Yeats, "A Postscript to a Forthcoming Book of Essays by Various Writers" (1900), in Yeats, *Uncollected Prose*, 2: 246. See also Foster, *W. B. Yeats*, 180, 181; Dutta and Robinson, *Tagore: The Myriad-Minded Man*, 149; Sarkar, *Modern India*, 123–137; Masselos, *Indian Nationalism*, 102–118.

³⁹ See Yeats, "The Controversy over the Playboy" (1907), in Yeats, *Uncollected Prose*, 2: 348–352; Yeats, "Poetry and Tradition" (1907), in Yeats, *Essays and Introductions*, 246–260; Yeats, "Journal" (1909), in W. B. Yeats, *Memoirs*, ed. Denis Donoghue (London, 1973), 142. For disagreements between Yeats and other nationalists over the theater at this time, see Ben Levitas, *The Theatre of Nation: Irish Drama and Cultural Nationalism, 1890–1916* (Oxford, 2002); Kiberd, *Inventing Ireland*, 166–188.

⁴⁰ Rabindranath Tagore, *The Home and the World* (1918; repr., London, 1985), 62.

them.⁴¹ Tagore also publicly praised the "great poets born in England" and claimed that he knew "among the English many great-souled men."⁴²

It was because of attitudes such as these that Yeats and Tagore earned a reputation as pro-English elitists and cowards, as opposed to true nationalists. Sinn Féin founder Arthur Griffith, for example, described Yeats as "an 'imperialist' who had gone over to the enemy: 'a poseur in patriotism.'"⁴³ Tagore also was attacked for writing works that were "overly influenced by Western models," and "not springing from the national heart."⁴⁴ It is not surprising that both authors withdrew entirely from an active involvement in nationalism by 1907. Tagore's reputation fell even further when he published *The Home and the World* in 1915, which sharply criticized nationalists in the Swadeshi movement, and *Nationalism* in 1918, in which he argued that "the organized selfishness of Nationalism" is the "path of suicide."⁴⁵

Despite the fact that Tagore and Yeats openly objected to injustices of British rule during World War I and into the 1920s and 1930s, they both continued to be attacked for their betrayal of nationalism.⁴⁶ For example, after the violent Easter Rising of 1916, led by militant nationalist Patrick Pearse, and during the even more bloody War of Independence that began in 1919 and ultimately resulted in the creation of the Irish Free State in 1922, Yeats openly condemned the excessive response of the English government in punishing suspected rebels.⁴⁷ Tagore was so disgusted with the British government after the killing of 379 innocent people in the Amritsar Massacre of 1919 that he renounced the knighthood he had received four years earlier.⁴⁸ But instead of appreciating these indications of anti-English sentiments, nationalists focused on the disagreements that Yeats had with the governments of the new Irish Free State under the leadership of W. T. Cosgrave and Éamon de Valera,

⁴¹ Yeats, "Hopes and Fears for Irish Literature" (1892), in Yeats, *Uncollected Prose*, 1: 249, 250.

⁴² Tagore, "Silent Poet, Untaught Poet" (1880), in Tagore, *Selected Writings*, 27; Tagore, "The Master's Will Be Done," (1917), in Tagore, *Towards Universal Man*, 199.

⁴³ Arthur Griffith, quoted in R. F. Foster, *The Irish Story: Telling Tales and Making It Up in Ireland* (London, 2001), 62.

⁴⁴ Rabindranath Tagore, "The Religion of an Artist" (1936), in Tagore, *Angel of Surplus: Some Essays and Addresses on Aesthetics* (Calcutta, 1978), 3, 4. See also Dutta and Robinson, *Tagore: The Myriad-Minded Man*, 149–151, 161; Stephen N. Hay, *Asian Ideas of East and West: Tagore and His Critics in Japan, China, and India* (Cambridge, Mass., 1970), 253 fn. 6; Anita Desai, "Introduction," in Tagore, *The Home and the World*, 7, 8; Desai, "The First and Last Renaissance Man from Bengal," in Chris Morash, ed., *Creativity and Its Contexts* (Dublin, 1995), 63–83.

⁴⁵ Tagore, *Nationalism*, 39, 77.

⁴⁶ For more on criticisms of Yeats and Tagore, see Foster, *The Irish Story*, 80–93; Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton, N.J., 2000), 155–163; Hay, *Asian Ideas*, 253–303; Sabyasachi Bhattacharya, *The Mahatma and the Poet: Letters and Debates between Gandhi and Tagore, 1915–1941* (New Delhi, 1997), 23, 24, 29; Davis, "India in Irish Revolutionary Propaganda," 73–75. Because Yeats had experienced the same thing, he understood that Tagore found himself "in a very difficult position in India between the two extremes of politics, both extremes denying him his merits." Yeats, letter to William Rothenstein, September 22, 1931, in Chakrabarty, *Poets to a Poet*, 175, 176. See also Yeats, letter to Robert Bridges, October 18 [1915], in Bridges and Yeats, *The Correspondence of Robert Bridges and W. B. Yeats*, ed. Richard J. Finneran (London, 1977), 45, 46.

⁴⁷ See Foster, *The Irish Story*, 70–77; W. B. Yeats, *The Letters of W. B. Yeats*, ed. Allan Wade (New York, 1955), 612–614. For more on Yeats's political views in the 1920s and 1930s, see Paul Scott Stanfield, *Yeats and Politics in the 1930s* (Basingstoke, 1988). Yeats explicitly told an American newspaper reporter in 1920 that he was "an Irish Nationalist" who thought the only hope for the nation was "self-government." Yeats, quoted in Karin Margaret Strand, "W. B. Yeats's American Lecture Tours" (Ph.D. diss., Northwestern University, 1978), 314.

⁴⁸ See Bhattacharya, *The Mahatma and the Poet*, 5.

and those that Tagore had with Mohandas K. Gandhi, even though Tagore was the first person to call Gandhi “Mahatma,” or “great soul.”⁴⁹ In fact, according to one historian, some nationalists of the 1920s “went so far as to say that Tagore’s statements would have been, had India been independent, tantamount to treason.”⁵⁰ But Tagore and Yeats had not given up on nationalism. A closer look at their criticisms of other nationalists, and their own ideas of cosmopolitan nationalism, tells a different story.

SKEPTICS ABOUT TAGORE’S NATIONALISM have been remarkably consistent. As early as 1917, he was condemned for his “anti-nation” idea and his “nebulous conception of universal humanity.”⁵¹ In other words, he was not considered a nationalist because, supposedly, he did not believe that a group of people who are united by a common geography, history, institutions, and traditions should maintain a unique culture and be granted political autonomy. Today this is still the most widely accepted definition of nationalism, and it may be why sympathetic scholars such as Ashis Nandy, Gauri Viswanathan, and Martha Nussbaum also do not consider Tagore a nationalist. They claim that he was a patriot and anti-imperialist because he loved his country and did not want the British to rule it, but he was a universalist rather than a nationalist because he advocated the creation of a culture common to all people, instead of separate national cultures, and because he did not want independence if that also meant adopting the form of a nation-state.⁵² Commentators on Yeats make similar arguments. They point to his condoning of the use of English in Irish creative writing, and to his admiration for eighteenth-century Ireland when Protestants dominated the country, as indications that he too did not support a unique culture independent of England.⁵³

⁴⁹ Although Tagore criticized a number of Gandhi’s positions, he also admired many of his ideas and actions. For more on their relationship and the similarities between the two, see V. S. Naravane, *The Saint and the Singer: Reflections on Gandhi and Tagore* (Allahabad, 1995); David W. Atkinson, “Tagore and Gandhi: The Poet and the Pragmatist,” *South Asia* 6, no. 2 (1983): 1–14; B. K. Ahluwalia and Shashi Ahluwalia, *Tagore and Gandhi* (New Delhi, 1981); Jag Parresh Changer, ed., *Tagore and Gandhi Argue* (Lahore, 1945); Tapan Raychaudhuri, “Gandhi and Tagore: Where the Twain Met,” in Raychaudhuri, *Perceptions, Emotions, Sensibilities: Essays on India’s Colonial and Post-Colonial Experiences* (New Delhi, 1999), 141–151. For more on Yeats’s disagreements with de Valera, see Stanfield, *Yeats and Politics*, 8–39.

⁵⁰ Bhattacharya, *The Mahatma and the Poet*, 24.

⁵¹ Chittaranjan Das, quoted in Hay, *Asian Ideas*, 253.

⁵² For definitions of nationalism, see, for example, Smith, *Nations and Nationalism*, 149, 150; Alan Patten, “The Autonomy Argument for Liberal Nationalism,” *Nations and Nationalism* 5, no. 1 (1999): 1, 2; Buttle, “Critical Nationalism,” 111–127; Anthony D. Smith, “The Poverty of Anti-Nationalist Modernism,” *Nations and Nationalism* 9, no. 3 (2003): 359, 366. For arguments that Tagore was not a nationalist, see Nandy, *The Illegitimacy of Nationalism*; Viswanathan, “Ireland, India”; Martha Nussbaum, “Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism,” in Joshua Cohen, ed., *For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism* (Boston, Mass., 1996). See also Mohammad A. Quayum, “Tagore and Nationalism,” *Journal of Commonwealth Literature* 39, no. 2 (2004): 1–6; Hitendra Mitra, *Tagore without Illusions* (Calcutta, 1983).

⁵³ See Jonathan Allison, “Introduction,” in Allison, *Yeats’s Political Identities: Selected Essays* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 1996), 1–4. See also Joseph Chadwick, “Yeats: Colonialism and Responsibility,” in Furumoto, *International Aspects of Irish Literature*, 107–114. For arguments that both authors were nationalists, see Jahan Ramazani, *The Hybrid Muse: Postcolonial Poetry in English* (Chicago, 2001); Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe*; Rosinka Chaudhuri, “The Flute, *Gerontion*, and Subalternist Misreadings of Tagore,” *Social Text* 78 22, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 103–122; Amit Chaudhuri, “The Flute of

These descriptions, however, ignore a great deal of the writings of Tagore and Yeats that make very different points.⁵⁴ Both authors were quite clear that they wanted their countries to be different and unique culturally, and independent and autonomous politically. As Tagore put it in 1919, "providence has fashioned each race on a different pattern, and to put one into the coat of another results in a misfit."⁵⁵ Moreover, it was their desire for real political, economic, and cultural independence from England that was at the heart of their criticisms of other nationalists. Like scholars, such as Partha Chatterjee, who describe the "derivative discourse" of many nationalists, Yeats and Tagore continually condemned nationalists for taking their ideas from English sources or copying English institutions or behaviors.⁵⁶

The first group Tagore and Yeats criticized was the politicians of the late nineteenth century. Not only was their begging "scraps of things" ineffective, to use Tagore's words, it also was English.⁵⁷ As Tagore put it, "politics in the West have dominated Western ideals, and we in India are trying to imitate you."⁵⁸ According to Yeats, Irish nationalists "borrowed mature English methods of utterance and used them to sing of Irish wrongs or preach of Irish purposes," and "had not a native style."⁵⁹ This was hardly a unique argument even for the time in which Yeats and Tagore were writing. Where they were more original was in pointing out the imitation of English imperialism in the ideas of most other nationalists as well.

While today scholars easily recognize that the "modernizing" nationalism of the

Modernity," *New Republic*, October 19, 1998, 38–46; Kiberd, *Inventing Ireland*; David Lloyd, *Anomalous States: Irish Writing and the Postcolonial Moment* (Dublin, 1993); Edward Said, *Culture and Imperialism* (New York, 1993); Timothy Webb, "Yeats and the English," in Joseph McMin, ed., *The Internationalism of Irish Literature and Drama* (Gerrards Cross, 1992), 232–251.

⁵⁴ If Yeats's and Tagore's ideas on nationalism are not very well understood, it may be because they appeared in many different places. While Tagore devoted an entire book and a novel to the subject, he also wrote articles, which were published in a variety of books and journals, as well as many letters about nationalism. Yeats spent less sustained time writing on the topic. Early and late in his career, he published a number of articles specifically on nationalism, but during more difficult times he tended to remain silent. The views of both authors, therefore, have to be pieced together from a variety of sources and writings. Nevertheless, it is clear that Tagore and Yeats had consistent theories of nationalism that did not change significantly after the first decade of the twentieth century.

⁵⁵ Rabindranath Tagore, "The Centre of Indian Culture" (1919), in Tagore, *Towards Universal Man*, 211. Yeats also believed strongly in maintaining an Irish culture distinct from that of England. For example, he very much disliked any artist who "tried to be Englishman and to write as an Englishman." Yeats, "Some New Irish Books" (1892), in Yeats, *Uncollected Prose*, 1: 229. See also Yeats, *Uncollected Prose*, 2: 56, 141. In 1904 he even argued that "the extinction of . . . nationality" was part of the English plan to destroy the Irish nation, and that it was "the greatest crime that can be committed against the welfare of mankind." Yeats, speech of February 28, 1904, quoted in Yeats, *Yeats and Patrick McCartan*, 432.

⁵⁶ Chatterjee, *Nationalist Thought*. Kiberd makes the point that Yeats warned the Irish people against a nationalism that did no more than imitate the English, but he does not elaborate on it. Kiberd, *Inventing Ireland*, 165. See also Ludden, "Orientalist Empiricism," 250–278; Lawrence J. McCaffrey, "Components of Irish Nationalism," in Hachey and McCaffrey, *Perspectives on Irish Nationalism*, 37, 38. C. A. Bayly refines Chatterjee's theories to argue that nationalists also retained traditional forms of discourse, especially of "old patriotisms," in addition to adopting modern Western models. Bayly, *Origins of Nationality in South Asia: Patriotism and Ethical Government in the Making of Modern India* (Oxford, 2001).

⁵⁷ Tagore, *Nationalism*, 112, 113.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, 97.

⁵⁹ Yeats, "Irish National Literature I: From Callanan to Carleton" (1895), in Yeats, *Uncollected Prose*, 1: 361.

late-nineteenth-century Japanese directly copied Western industrialism and militarism, at the time most Indian nationalists were not bothered by it. Rather, they were enthusiastic that modernizing had led to the Japanese victory in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905. Tagore, on the other hand, very much disliked the fact that Japan had become “a mere reproduction of the West.”⁶⁰ He warned his countrymen that “to imitate the British and try to save ourselves by adopting a disguise is mere self-deception”; it would not work in the long term because “it is nothing but mimicry.”⁶¹

Tagore also objected to the Japanese use of violence. In fact, he and Yeats disliked violence in all types of nationalism, not only in its modernizing form. Some more “traditionalist” nationalists, including Aurobindo Ghose and Patrick Pearse, who advocated the elimination of English culture and a return to “authentic” values, also condoned violence.⁶² Tagore objected to this, not just because he found violence morally unacceptable, but because it copied the worst feature of English imperialism—the use of brutality to achieve dominance over others. As Tagore put it in 1917, to “return contempt for contempt and evil for evil” was to “imitate Europe in one of her worst features.”⁶³

Yeats also argued that nationalists who “fought for causes worthy in themselves with the unworthy instruments of tyranny and violence” were no different from their oppressors.⁶⁴ In fact, any expression of anger at the English was rejected by both authors as an imitation of imperialist injustice.⁶⁵ Even nonviolent alternatives to

⁶⁰ Tagore, *Nationalism*, 55. See also *ibid.*, 75–78; Tagore, letter to Yone Noguchi, September 1, 1938, in Tagore, *Selected Letters*, 499, 500. On Indian reactions to the Japanese victory, see Heehs, *The Bomb in Bengal*, 62, 63; Ray, *Social Conflict*, 141.

⁶¹ Tagore, “Society and State” (1904), in Tagore, *Towards Universal Man*, 65; Tagore, *Nationalism*, 75.

⁶² On Ghose, see Peter Heehs, *Sri Aurobindo: A Brief Biography* (Delhi, 1989); Heehs, *The Bomb in Bengal*. On Pearse, see Séan Farrell Moran, *Patrick Pearse and the Politics of Redemption: The Mind of the Easter Rising, 1916* (Washington, D.C., 1994). On other extreme nationalists and Tagore, see Kopf, *The Brahmo Samaj*, 210–214. Tagore also thought that these more violent nationalists were little different from earlier nationalists who were “begging political rights”; they merely “hit upon a [new] device . . . —begging, not with folded hands, but in a tone that carried a threat.” Tagore, “The Call of Truth” (1921), in Tagore, *Towards Universal Man*, 261, 254, 257. Yeats was equally unimpressed by nationalists who try “now to bully England by loud words and now to wheedle England by soft words.” Yeats, “Emmet,” 320.

⁶³ Tagore, *Nationalism*, 87. In *The Home and the World*, the nationalist whom Tagore presents in the most unflattering light recommends the use of cruelty and injustice in imitation of “all world-conquerors.” Tagore, *The Home and the World*, 79, 80. See also Tagore, *Nationalism*, 79.

⁶⁴ Yeats, “The Controversy over the Playboy,” 351. See also Yeats, letter to H. J. C. Grierson, October 21 [1922], in Yeats, *The Letters*, 690, 691. According to Jahan Ramazani, “Yeats worries that anti-English prejudices invert but ultimately preserve the colonizer’s terms.” Ramazani, *The Hybrid Muse*, 27. The violent nationalist whom Yeats objected to most was Patrick Pearse. According to Yeats’s friend Ezra Pound, Yeats criticized Pearse for being “half-cracked,” not being “happy until he was hanged,” and having “Emmet mania, same as other lunatics think they are Napoleon or God.” Pound to John Quinn, May 1, 1916, quoted in James Longenbach, *Stone Cottage: Pound, Yeats, and Modernism* (New York, 1988), 256. Both authors also objected to nationalists who emphasized the development of bodily strength as a way to regain a supposedly lost masculinity, as was popular in India with a “new cult of physical prowess,” and in Ireland with the physical training of the Gaelic Athletic Association. Ray, *Social Conflict*, 141. On Tagore’s opinions on this matter, see letter to Aurobindo Mohan Bose, November 19, 1908, in Tagore, *Selected Letters*, 72; Tagore, “India’s Epic,” 238; Tagore, *Towards Universal Man*, 44, 63, 85, 178, 182. For Yeats on “manhood,” see Yeats, *Uncollected Prose*, 2: 352. The fact that this type of nationalism imitates British discourse had been pointed out by Kiberd and van der Veer, who connect religious nationalist “hypermasculinity” in Ireland and India, respectively, with British “muscular Christianity.” Kiberd, *Inventing Ireland*, 31; van der Veer, *Imperial Encounters*, 83–105.

⁶⁵ According to Tagore, “anger against foreigner” took attention away from a more useful program of love of one’s own people. Tagore, “The Call of Truth,” 254. Moreover, according to Tagore, by

political nationalism were criticized, because they often were motivated by hatred of foreigners. For example, the boycotts used by Swadeshists and later by Gandhi were flawed, in Tagore's opinion, because their emphasis on the English, on getting rid of their goods or creating native versions of them, was a form of flattery. Concentrating only on expelling the English also was too easy; it allowed nationalists to avoid finding indigenous solutions to serious internal problems. Finally, boycotts were counterproductive, according to both Tagore and Yeats, because they injured the native poor by denying them goods and ideas that could benefit them economically and intellectually.⁶⁶

Yeats and Tagore also found more subtle examples of mimicry. They realized that nationalist leaders needed to create unity among their followers, be they a small group of terrorists or a mass movement, in order to gain support and inspire enthusiasm. Nationalists often achieved this unity by relying on simplistic dichotomies, similar to those of the English, which have since been defined as Orientalist. Tagore, for example, objected to the English "habit of sharply dividing the human world into the good and the bad according to the hemispheres to which they belong" and of assigning inferiority to those they wished to dominate.⁶⁷ He warned Indians not to copy this. Yeats similarly rejected this type of dichotomous essentializing, because it was a "habit of mind" that "would compress a complex incalculable, indecipherable nation into the mould of theory invented by political journalists and forensic historians," and it, plus an equally one-dimensional view of England, was "twofold slander."⁶⁸

Yeats also disliked the simplistic notion of national identity resulting from the nationalist inversion of Orientalism. He especially objected to the vision of an "authentic" Ireland espoused by Éamon de Valera, who was named first president of the Irish Republic during the War of Independence, and elected prime minister of the Irish Free State in 1932. The Ireland that de Valera hoped to re-create was a "puritan and provincial" country inspired by Catholic values and a healthy peasant lifestyle.⁶⁹ It was, in de Valera's words,

focusing all their attention on the enemy, nationalists were, in fact, "secretly . . . offering the British our admiration"; Tagore, letter to Sarat Chandra Chatterji [Chattopadhyay] [February 10, 1927], in Tagore, *Selected Letters*, 347. Yeats also objected to nationalists who made "the cultivation of hatred as the one energy of their movement" because it was not constructive, and because "when loathing remains but loathing," nationalists turn to their "mechanical opposite." Yeats, *The Autobiography of William Butler Yeats: Consisting of Reveries over Childhood and Youth, The Trembling of the Veil, and Dramatis Personae* (New York, 1965), 329, 157.

⁶⁶ Boycotts when directed against minor things such as "the English Sunday newspapers," according to Yeats, promised that "the small Irish country town will be plunged a little deeper in ignorance even than it is." Yeats, letter to Edmund Gosse, February 25, 1912, in Yeats, *The Letters*, 566. See also Yeats, letter to George Russell (A. E.) [April 1919], *ibid.*, 656. According to Tagore, boycotts made the poorest of natives suffer by destroying their livelihoods. Tagore, *The Home and the World*, 99–115; Tagore, letter to Suniti Kumar Chatterji [Chattopadhyay] [February 2, 1928], in Tagore, *Selected Letters*, 359.

⁶⁷ Tagore, "The Religion of an Artist," 1, 2.

⁶⁸ Yeats, "Irish National Literature II: Contemporary Prose Writers" (1895), in Yeats, *Uncollected Prose*, 1: 369, 370. Yeats was particularly disturbed by "the commonplace conception of the Irish character as a something charming, irresponsible, poetic, dreamy, untrustworthy, voluble, and rather despicable, and the commonplace conception of English character as a something prosaic, hard, trustworthy, silent, and altogether worshipful." *Ibid.*, 369.

⁶⁹ McCaffery, "Components of Irish Nationalism," 17. See also 18 and 19.

a land whose countryside would be bright with cosy homesteads, whose fields and villages would be joyous with the sounds of industry, with the romping of sturdy children, the contests of athletic youths, the laughter of comely maidens; whose firesides would be forums of the wisdom of old age. It would, in a word, be the home of a people living the life that God desires men should live.⁷⁰

Tagore objected to a similar definition of national identity for India, especially as expressed by Gandhi. In Gandhi's ideal India, all people lived in the countryside and farmed the land with "the same kind of plough as existed thousands of years ago," inhabited "small villages" in "the same kind of cottages" as they had for centuries, and had no modern technology or medicine, no cities or industries, and no higher education. He practiced what he preached in his own simple lifestyle and in his suggestion that Indians take up spinning cloth on the traditional *charka* on a daily basis. Although Gandhi claimed that Indians of all religions would be included equally in his nation, people at the time and commentators since have noted his Hindu bias.⁷¹

Yeats and Tagore disliked these ideas of national identity for a number of reasons. First, they felt that such notions ignored the real complexity and diversity of their nations. Yeats claimed that the idea that Irish national culture "'must come from the Celtic people of the country . . . and must not and cannot be divorced from the philosophy and influences of the Catholic religion'" was wrong because "Ireland is not wholly Celtic any more than England is wholly Saxon, or wholly Catholic any more than England is wholly Protestant."⁷² Tagore similarly argued that India had always been varied in religion and lifestyle because she accepted "alien races as factors in her civilization."⁷³ Because it denied diversity, both authors feared that such a unitary sense of national identity would lead to cultural homogenization, or

⁷⁰ De Valera radio broadcast, St. Patrick's Day 1943, quoted in Stanfield, *Yeats and Politics*, 12. See also Tim Pat Coogan, *Eamon de Valera: The Man Who Was Ireland* (New York, 1995), 486–506; Hutchinson, *The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism*, 316–324; Lyons, *Culture and Anarchy*, 165, 175. Kiberd calls this vision "a pastoral figment of the late-Victorian imagination" and concludes that it is basically English: "thus a people who in the nineteenth century, had thought in Irish while speaking English came in the twentieth to 'think English' even while they were speaking Irish." Kiberd, *Inventing Ireland*, 182, 183. Judith M. Brown similarly describes the deep debt Gandhi owed to Victorian thinking in "Gandhi—A Victorian Gentleman: An Essay in Imperial Encounter," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 27, no. 2 (May 1999): 68–85.

⁷¹ Mahatma Gandhi, "Hind Swaraj" (1909), in Raghavan Iyer, ed., *The Moral and Political Writings of Mahatma Gandhi*, vol. 1: *Civilization, Politics, and Religion* (Oxford, 1986), 212–214, 232, 251–259. For more on Gandhi's peasant vision of India, see David Arnold, *Gandhi* (London, 2001), 64–103. For Gandhi's Hindu discourse, see *ibid.*, 163–194; Peter van der Veer, *Religious Nationalism: Hindus and Muslims in Asia* (Berkeley, Calif., 1994), 94–99; Hansen, *The Saffron Wave*, 45. Critics also argue that the "ideas that Gandhi used to conjure the essential India . . . came from the treasure chest of orientalism." Ludden, "Orientalist Empiricism," 271. For one description of Gandhi's inversion of Orientalism, see Richard G. Fox, "Gandhian Socialism and Hindu Nationalism: Cultural Domination in the World System," *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 25, no. 3 (November 1987): 236.

⁷² Yeats, "Professor Dowden and Irish Literature—II" (1895), in Yeats, *Uncollected Prose*, 1: 352. It may have been for this reason that Yeats was particularly pleased with his work as chairman of the committee that chose the new coinage of the Irish Free State in 1928. The coins were selected for their artistic merit, regardless of the fact that they were designed by an English, rather than an Irish, artist. They also featured animals of the country rather than modern political figures or religious symbols. Not surprisingly, they were fiercely criticized for their lack of religious symbolism when they were issued. See Brian Cleve, ed., *W. B. Yeats and the Designing of Ireland's Coinage* (Dublin, 1972).

⁷³ Tagore, "The Problem of India" (1909), in Tagore, *Tagore: An Anthology*, 236. See also Tagore, letter to Charles Freer Andrews, January 17, 1921, in Tagore, *Selected Letters*, 251.

as Tagore put it, to the "notion that the culmination of national unity is reached by pounding all differences into an undifferentiated mass."⁷⁴ This attempt to suppress differences was an imitation of Anglicization, and was "as wrong as murder."⁷⁵

National homogenization, in turn, would have devastating consequences. It would alienate minorities and encourage violence. Yeats particularly was upset by the Free State's attempt to enforce a Gaelic identity by making use of the language compulsory, and by insisting that "the Catholic conscience alone must dominate the public life of Ireland" with laws banning divorce, and censorship for religious content.⁷⁶ These were, in Yeats's opinion, impermissible "attempts upon the liberty of minorities."⁷⁷ Yeats also correctly predicted that this would prevent the country from being united; the Protestants in the north would never agree to become part of the Catholic south because they would "not suffer [the] injustice" of Catholic "fanaticism."⁷⁸ Tagore had a similar fear about Hindu revivalism, even in Gandhi's mild form, because it would ensure that Muslims were never fully accepted in the nation. He predicted that Hindu nationalists would make Muslims know their place as inferiors or even "suppress . . . them altogether," and this eventually would contribute to sectarian violence.⁷⁹

Both authors were worried that the need to eradicate difference would require the suppression of freedom of speech, and artistic and intellectual creativity. This, in turn, would lead to a nation of stupid people with no initiative, capable only of obeying authorities. Tagore accused Gandhi of encouraging this by his minimization of the importance of art and intellectual endeavor. Gandhi's emphasis on spinning cloth was especially objectionable to Tagore, because it "does not require anyone to think: one simply turns the wheel of the antiquated invention endlessly, using the minimum of judgment and stamina."⁸⁰ Tagore and Yeats also believed that a lack of initiative and creativity would prevent their nations from joining the international community as respected equals. According to Tagore, nationalists who flaunted "parochialism as nationalism" were erecting "caste restrictions in human cultures" that would force nations to be "walled up into impassable compartments" and make India

⁷⁴ Tagore, "Hindu University" (1911), in Tagore, *Towards Universal Man*, 144. Yeats also abhorred any movement that "makes all places and persons alike." Yeats, "Pages from a Diary in 1930," in W. B. Yeats, *Explorations* (New York, 1962), 316. See also Tagore, *Towards Universal Man*, 246, 317. Thomas Blom Hansen argues that the nationalist tendency toward homogeneity is Orientalist and British. Hansen, *The Saffron Wave*, 11, 29, 30, 33–37.

⁷⁵ Tagore, "Hindu University," 143.

⁷⁶ Yeats, "An Undelivered Speech" (1925), in Yeats, *Uncollected Prose*, 2: 450. For Yeats's criticisms of the actions of the Free State, see Yeats, *Uncollected Prose*, 2: 439–452, 461–480, 477–485; Foster, *The Irish Story*, 95–112.

⁷⁷ Yeats, "An Undelivered Speech," 452.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 450.

⁷⁹ Tagore, *The Home and the World*, 120–123, 158–163.

⁸⁰ Tagore, letter to Rani Mahalanobis (Maitra) [October 16, 1929], in Tagore, *Selected Letters*, 365. For more on their criticisms of nationalist suppression of intellect and creativity, see, for example, Yeats, *Uncollected Prose*, 2: 306, 307; Yeats, letter to John Quinn, October 4, 1907, in Yeats, *The Letters*, 495; Tagore, *Towards Universal Man*, 186, 187, 194, 263, 268, 274–285; Tagore, *Nationalism*, 113–126; Tagore, letter to William Rothenstein, in Lago, *Imperfect Encounter*, 147; Tagore, *Mahatma Gandhi* (Calcutta, 1963), 15, 16. Tagore was especially upset when Gandhi dismissed his criticisms by declaring that artists should be silent during the national struggle, and that "the poet will sing the true note after the war is over." Bhattacharya, *The Mahatma and the Poet*, 88; see also 66, 87–91; Naravane, *The Saint and the Singer*, 125–127.

"segregated in our independence."⁸¹ Yeats also feared that an exclusively Gaelic national culture would "build a wall" to "keep out the European mind" solely out of fear that the Irish would think for themselves, rather than obey religious leaders.⁸²

In stressing obedience to a unitary national culture, nationalists such as de Valera and Gandhi, once again, were copying the dictatorial policies of the English government. According to Tagore, "alien government in India is a veritable chameleon. Today it comes in the guise of the Englishman; tomorrow perhaps as some other foreigner; the next day, without abating a jot of its virulence, it may take the shape of our own countrymen."⁸³ Or as Yeats put it more succinctly, "all those who have pulled down a tyrant . . . put another in his place," and one who was a native instead of a foreigner.⁸⁴ Both authors noted this trend in the 1920s and 1930s. Yeats commented on the "threatenings and compellings" and "tyranny" among Irish nationalists.⁸⁵ He thought that the Irish "prefer to make men servile, rather than permit their opinions to differ from our own."⁸⁶ Tagore also wrote of the "compulsions," "despotism," and "a tyranny in the air" in Indian nationalism in the 1920s.⁸⁷ Nationalists were attempting to make "everyone talk in the same voice and make the same gestures" and insisted "that all questioning must stop; there should be nothing but blind obedience."⁸⁸

Once this obedience and uniformity had been achieved, Tagore and Yeats feared that Indian and Irish nationalists would copy English imperialism in fact. They would mimic English assertions of superiority, justifications of a civilizing mission, and willingness to go to war to conquer other nations. Because no dissent would be permitted, nationalists would have an inflated sense of the value of their nation. According to Tagore, "arrogance accompanies the awakening of a sense of power," and this, in turn, inclines a nation "to self-delusion rather than self-appraisal" and "causes us to forget that only by clearly defining what we lack, may we truly un-

⁸¹ Tagore, "Hindu University," 156; Tagore, "Art and Tradition" (1926), in Tagore, *Angel of Surplus*, 46, 47; Tagore, *Nationalism*, 109. See also Tagore, *Angel of Surplus*, 20–27; Tagore, *Selected Writings*, 164–178; Yeats, *Essays and Introductions*, 65–95, 153–164, 261–292.

⁸² Yeats, "Compulsory Gaelic" (August 2, 1924), in Yeats, *Uncollected Prose*, 2: 445. Lawrence McCaffery suggests that this is exactly what occurred in independent Ireland when it created "the Shamrock Curtain." McCaffery, "Components of Irish Nationalism," 18.

⁸³ Tagore, "The Call of Truth," 255.

⁸⁴ Yeats, "Compulsory Gaelic," 444. See also Yeats, *Autobiography*, 337. Both Yeats and Tagore also argued that this tendency to tyranny was a side effect of imperialism because years of being enslaved made colonial people more inclined to enslave others when given the opportunity. According to Yeats, the long "servitude" under the English had "bred into Irish bones a stronger sub-conscious desire than England ever knew to enslave and to be enslaved," while Tagore claimed that "slavery . . . has entered into our very bones" because of submission to British "domination," and this, in turn, had made Indians "believe that to make others submit is a kind of religion." Yeats, "Compulsory Gaelic," 443; Tagore, *The Home and the World*, 131.

⁸⁵ Yeats, "Compulsory Gaelic," 443; Yeats, "The Irish Censorship" (1928), in Yeats, *Uncollected Prose*, 2: 482.

⁸⁶ Yeats, "Compulsory Gaelic," 443, 444. As early as 1905, Yeats predicted that "we will have a hard fight in Ireland before we get the right for every man to see the world in his own way admitted." Yeats, letter to John Quinn, February 15, 1905, in Yeats, *The Letters*, 447. See also Yeats, *Uncollected Prose*, 2: 306, 307, 461–465; Yeats, *Autobiography*, 155; Yeats, *The Letters*, 808, 885; Foster, *The Irish Story*, 95–112.

⁸⁷ Tagore, "The Call of Truth," 265, 268, 263. See also Tagore, *The Home and the World*, 43, 129, 131.

⁸⁸ Tagore, "The Call of Truth," 263. See also *ibid.*, 269, 270; Tagore, "Gandhi the Man" (1938), in Tagore, *Mahatma Gandhi*, 11–12; Tagore, "Art and Tradition," 47.

derstand what we have."⁸⁹ Yeats also believed that "'Know thyself' is a true advice for nations as well as for individuals. We must know and feel our national faults and limitations no less than our national virtues."⁹⁰

Those nationalists unwilling to admit the faults of their nation might follow the path of Aurobindo Ghose in India, who justified terrorism with the claim that he was doing "God's work" because India was "His chosen nation," destined to conquer all other nations and "become the master of the world."⁹¹ Tagore and Yeats found this type of thinking very disturbing. Tagore warned Indians that they "must firmly remember that our country is not a god and therefore we cannot substitute it for God,"⁹² while Yeats concluded that the Irish must "care for things Gaelic and Irish, not because we hold them better than things Saxon and English, but because they belong to us, and because our lives are to be spent among them, whether they be good or evil."⁹³

By 1918, Tagore was truly alarmed by nationalist movements throughout Asia. He realized that Western civilization "is based upon exclusiveness. It is always watchful to keep the aliens at bay or to exterminate them."⁹⁴ Former colonials seemed to be doing the same thing. They were perpetuating the situation of the recent past, "when each race or nation was confined to itself and went on intensifying its individuality to an unconscionable extent till it grew into a menace for mankind," and as a result, "the whole world" would be overrun "with narrow patches of national preserves surrounded by thorny hedges of slavery, giving rise to mutual hatred, suspicion and lying diplomacy."⁹⁵

Yeats's concern about the direction in which Irish nationalism was heading was such that in 1933 he even told a friend that she was "right in comparing De Valera to Mussolini or Hitler" because "all three have exactly the same aim" of tyranny.⁹⁶ Rather, Yeats insisted, "we must become a modern, tolerant, liberal nation."⁹⁷ But how this would be done was not obvious. According to some scholars, liberalism is contrary to nationalism because "the universalism of liberalism and the particularism of nationalism" pull in "opposing directions."⁹⁸ Neither Tagore nor Yeats thought

⁸⁹ Tagore, "Poet Yeats," 219. According to Tagore, "modern Indians . . . always sound like European brass bands, irrespective of whether they are bragging about their own ancient civilizations or condemning and repudiating the West." Tagore, "The Unity of Education" (1921), in Tagore, *Towards Universal Man*, 251. See also Tagore, *Selected Writings*, 207, 208; Tagore, *Nationalism*, 39. See also Tagore, *Towards Universal Man*, 200; Tagore, "Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi" (1931), in Tagore, *Mahatma Gandhi*, 35.

⁹⁰ Yeats, "Hopes and Fears," 250.

⁹¹ Aurobindo Ghose, *Bande Mataram: Early Political Writings* (Pondicherry, 1973), 872, 469; Ghose, *The Ideal of Karmayogin* (Calcutta, 1945), 17. These books reprint articles first published by Ghose between 1906 and 1910. Patrick Pearse in Ireland also thought of nationalism as "a religious faith," the dedication to which will enable the Irish to "come into a great joy" and replace the "Pax Britannica" with "the Peace of the Gael." Moran, *Patrick Pearse*, 152.

⁹² Tagore, letter to Aurobindo Mohan Bose, November 19, 1908, in Tagore, *Selected Letters*, 72. Yeats claimed that the most dangerous thing to a modern state was when "politics take the place of theology." Yeats, letter to Olivia Shakespear, [October 9] 1922, in Yeats, *The Letters*, 690.

⁹³ Yeats, "Hopes and Fears," 250.

⁹⁴ Tagore, *Nationalism*, 59.

⁹⁵ Tagore, "Presidential Address" (1908), in Tagore, *Towards Universal Man*, 147; Tagore, letter to Mayce Seymour, May 14, 1918, in Tagore, *Selected Letters*, 205.

⁹⁶ Yeats, letter to Olivia Shakespear, February 21 [1933], in Yeats, *The Letters*, 806.

⁹⁷ Yeats, "An Undelivered Speech," 452.

⁹⁸ Buttler, "Critical Nationalism," 124.

that was the case. And it was just such a balance between the universal and the particular that they hoped to achieve in their cosmopolitan nationalism.

TAGORE AND YEATS BOTH BELIEVED that their countries would gain real independence as soon as they successfully adopted a national identity that transcended the limits of space and time by combining features of the modern and traditional world, and of the metropolis and periphery. One reason they thought such a hybrid identity was possible was their views of history. Like most nationalists, Tagore and Yeats initially turned to history to discover what was truly authentic about their nations, to return a sense of pride to a dominated people, and to help define their national identity.⁹⁹ But Yeats and Tagore came to very different conclusions about the past than did others.

As scholars have pointed out, anticolonial nationalists had assumptions about history not much different from those of Western imperialists. They adopted Western discourses of the Enlightenment period, especially “metanarratives or teleologies” of progress or evolution.¹⁰⁰ Imperialists used these theories to argue that the improvements Westerners had made in the material world of science, technology, politics, and economics proved that they had reached a higher stage of evolution, and gave them the right to rule and civilize inferior peoples. Anticolonial nationalists, on the other hand, took pains to deny the superiority of Westerners. They argued that while Western accomplishments in the material world were impressive, the spirituality and deeper sensitivity of non-Western people made them potentially better than crudely materialistic Westerners. If their spirituality could be added to the new material advances, an even higher stage of evolution might be reached, and Asian civilizations could surpass those of Europe.

Anticolonial nationalists, therefore, did not deny the reality of Western ideas of progress. But in order to explain how the West had conquered their nations, they had to modify linear theories of progress to propose a spiral pattern for history. They usually adopted a “triadic structure” that posited an initial “Golden Age” in the past of their nation, and a subsequent period of decline due to foreign interference. A return to the values of the past, especially of spiritualism, would ensure progress in the future to a third phase of unsurpassed greatness if the knowledge of the intervening period, of Western material achievements, were retained. According to Partha Chatterjee, in order to effect this synthesis of Western and non-Western essences, most nationalists assumed that Western materialism could be adopted in

⁹⁹ As Tagore put it, history could break “the worst form of bondage . . . the bondage of dejection, which keeps men hopelessly chained in loss of faith in themselves,” by reminding Asians that in the past “great kingdoms were founded, philosophy, science, arts and literatures flourished, and all the great religions of the world had their cradles,” and that “for centuries we did hold torches of civilization in the East when the West slumbered in darkness.” Tagore, *Nationalism*, 50. See also Tagore, “Society and State,” 63. Yeats also thought that history could prove that the Irish once were famous throughout the world for their intellect and culture, and that they once had conquered other peoples all over Europe with their Christianity. See Yeats, “Bardic Ireland” (1890), in Yeats, *Uncollected Prose*, 1: 163.

¹⁰⁰ For a concise discussion of the progressive nature of nationalist history and how it replicates imperialist history, see Duara, “The Regime of Authenticity,” 287–308. See also Dipesh Chakrabarty, “Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History: Who Speaks for ‘Indian’ Pasts?” *Representations* 37 (Winter 1992): 1–26.

the public sphere of politics, economics, and technology, as long as traditional spiritualism still informed the private sphere of culture and the home. This, in turn, was one of the key causes of the "postcolonial predicament." Because nationalists accepted the idea of progress in the material realm, they copied Western political, economic, and scientific structures almost entirely upon gaining independence.¹⁰¹

At first glance, Tagore's and Yeats's theories of history seem similar to those of other nationalists. But there were some important divergences. Yeats developed a theory similar to those of the modernist literary figures he knew at the time in England, such as Ezra Pound, Ford Madox Ford, D. H. Lawrence, and T. E. Hulme. Modernists' views of history marked a fundamental break with Enlightenment thinking in a way similar to their innovations in aesthetic practices. Just as modernist literature abandoned a linear narrative with a beginning, middle, and end, and instead used techniques juxtaposing apparently unrelated images and ideas, time shifts, and cyclic structures, modernist historical thought rejected the idea of progress, and instead focused on timelessness and analogies between widely separated ages, or posited a universal pattern of cycles. While Tagore is not considered one of the literary modernists, and there is no indication that he was influenced by them, his ideas of history were very similar to theirs. This may be because his views were inspired by traditional Indian philosophies, which also contributed to most literary modernists' cyclic theories, especially those of Yeats. In fact, modernist history shares much with non-Western senses of the past. According to scholars, traditional Asian and Indian writings on the past either use "a cyclic structure whereby time will reproduce, return to, or approximate a 'known certainty,'" or make "myth, history, and the contemporary . . . part of the same chronological sequence; one is not distinguished from another; the passage from one to another, consequently, is entirely unproblematic."¹⁰² Both of these descriptions could serve just as well for modernist literature or history.

Yeats and Tagore initially rejected linear theories of historical progress because they disliked most features of modern Western culture and life, and did not view them as superior to the past. Yeats went on to claim that progress was a myth, and for much of his adult life he worked to outline a cyclic theory of history. This culminated in his 1937 book *A Vision*, in which he described in detail how the "Great Wheel" of history moved in cycles of approximately two thousand years, each of

¹⁰¹ See Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments*. For nationalist triadic and progressive history, see Duara, "The Regime of Authenticity," 288–290; Matthew Levinger and Paula Franklin Lytle, "Myth and Mobilisation: The Triadic Structure of Nationalist Rhetoric," *Nations and Nationalism* 7, no. 4 (2001): 175–194; Margarita Díaz-Andreu, "Guest Editor's Introduction: Nationalism and Archaeology," *Nations and Nationalism* 7, no. 4 (2001): 420–440; Anthony D. Smith, "Authenticity, Antiquity, and Archaeology," *Nations and Nationalism* 7, no. 4 (2001): 441–449; John Hutchinson, "Archaeology and the Irish Rediscovery of the Celtic Past," *Nations and Nationalism* 7, no. 4 (2001): 505–519; Anthony Smith, "The 'Golden Age' and National Renewal," in Geoffrey Hosking and George Schöpfung, eds., *Myths and Nationhood* (London, 1997), 36–59; Partha Chatterjee, "A Modern Science of Politics for the Colonized," in Chatterjee, *Texts of Power: Emerging Disciplines in Colonial Bengal* (Minneapolis, 1995), 93–117; Lloyd, "Irish New Histories," 265. Nationalists' spiral views of history, while not the linear progress of most Western imperialists, were still very similar to European theories, especially to those of many early-nineteenth-century Romantic writers. See M. H. Abrams, *Natural Supernaturalism: Tradition and Revolution in Romantic Literature* (New York, 1971), 183–195.

¹⁰² Duara, "The Regime of Authenticity," 291; Chatterjee, *The Nation and Its Fragments*, 80. For more on modernist views of history, see Williams, *Modernism*.

which had within it twenty-eight smaller cycles.¹⁰³ Tagore also believed that life revolves around “the great wheel of the world,” because “everything in the universe is enclosed in a cycle of death and rebirth,” and that “the unending procession of the world has gone on, through ups and downs, from the beginning of creation till today.”¹⁰⁴ But because of the extent of poverty in India, Tagore was more ambivalent about the idea of progress in general than was Yeats; while he did not believe that progress had occurred in the modern West, he hoped that the lives of Indians could be improved in the future.¹⁰⁵

Yeats's and Tagore's theories of history were different from the views of other nationalists in a number of ways. Most important was the underlying structure they posited. Most nationalists assumed that history followed a pattern that historians of history have defined as “cycloid,” while Tagore's and Yeats's theories were “sinusoidal.” In cycloid theories, some civilizations traverse a simple cycle of rise into greatness, followed by decline and decay. This cycle may be repeated more than once, but it also can be overcome, and end in ultimate progress, if a civilization gains knowledge from previous periods of decline. In this case history becomes the spiral that most nationalists anticipated.¹⁰⁶

Sinusoidal theories of history are more complex and more strictly cyclic. They posit an endless series of cycles for all cultures, because they assume that rises and declines are caused by the continual alternation of two opposed traditions or sets of values, one superior and the other inferior. Modernist literary figures often used the terms “classic” and “romantic” to describe these different traditions. In sinusoidal histories, ages ascend to greatness when the superior tradition gains in popularity among the majority of the people and informs politics, society, art, and religion. Cultures decay when the inferior tradition is more widely preferred. Thus, one

¹⁰³ W. B. Yeats, *A Vision* (1937; repr., New York, 1966), 80–89, 266–300. See also Yeats, *Explorations*, 350–355, 392–399, 403, 404. As Yeats put it, he did not believe in “progress as we understand it . . . the straight line,” because “it is one of our illusions . . . that life moves slowly and evenly towards some perfection.” In fact, Yeats even claimed that progress is “the sole religious myth of modern man” and, as a relatively new concept, cannot be trusted. Yeats, *Wheels and Butterflies* (New York, 1935), 125; Yeats, “The Theatre” (1900), in Yeats, *Essays and Introductions*, 171, 172; Yeats, “Introduction to ‘Words upon the Windowpane’” (1931), in Yeats, *Explorations*, 355. Yeats also was happy that Indians avoided this progressive view because of their closeness to the cyclic patterns of nature. Yeats, “The Holy Mountain” (1934), in Yeats, *Essays and Introductions*, 468, 469, 471.

¹⁰⁴ Tagore, “Literature” (1889), in Tagore, *Selected Writings*, 49; Tagore, “On the Eve of Departure” (1912), in Tagore, *Towards Universal Man*, 161; Tagore, “What Then?” 91. For more on Tagore's cyclic view of history, see Tagore, *Towards Universal Man*, 158, 359; Tagore, *Nationalism*, 51, 66, 67, 92; Tagore, *Angel of Surplus*, 101, 102.

¹⁰⁵ Tagore also argued that while “civilization is said to progress,” he did not see it in the “triumphal march of the god of acquisitive wealth” that made the West claim superiority to the East, and he clearly disliked the Darwinian idea of “the struggle for existence.” Tagore, “The Unity of Education,” 242; Tagore, “The Centre of Indian Culture,” 218. See also Tagore, *Nationalism*, 57, 78. For statements indicating Tagore's belief in progress, see his *Selected Writings*, 35, 39, 40, 51, 62, 71, 169, 170; Tagore, *Towards Universal Man*, 63, 148, 150, 151; Tagore, *Mahatma Gandhi*, 38. Even though he did accept some concept of progress, Tagore's approach to history is different from modern Western approaches. Ranajit Guha makes a strong argument for this in *History at the Limit*, 76–94. This argument would be even stronger had Guha discussed more writings of Tagore, especially those in which Tagore criticizes Western academic history writing. See Tagore, “The Nature of Krishna” (1895), in Tagore, *Selected Writings*, 214; Tagore, “The Historical Novel” (1898), *ibid.*, 194–198.

¹⁰⁶ For definitions of “cycloid” and “sinusoidal” cyclic theories of history, see Frank E. Manuel, *Shapes of Philosophical History* (Stanford, Calif., 1965), 125. For more on cyclic views of history, see Mircea Eliade, *The Myth of the Eternal Return* (Princeton, N.J., 1965); Romila Thapar, *Time as a Metaphor of History: Early India* (New Delhi, 1996).

tradition is predominant for a number of centuries or years, and then it is replaced by the other tradition, and this alternation continues forever.¹⁰⁷

It is quite difficult to incorporate progress into an alternation view of history. Proponents of sinusoidal history believe that the fundamental values of each tradition remain constant throughout time and space, even if their expressions vary slightly in different places and historical periods. Thus, cycles in which one tradition is predominant are always essentially the same; they differ only from the cycles of the alternate tradition. And traditions always will return. As a result, changes in the condition of life are never permanent or cumulative, and thus there can be no real progress. History also cannot be teleological; there is no possibility that one tradition (or race or nation, for that matter) will triumph over the other and that history will end in an earthly paradise or utter decay. Finally, the place of something in time is not important in sinusoidal theories; those features or values that are more recent are not better than older ones, because there is no progress. Rather, all ages in the same tradition, regardless of when they occur chronologically, are analogous in value and meaning. Thus they are interchangeable, and there is no anachronism in comparing features of ages from the same tradition even if they are widely separated in time.¹⁰⁸ Sinusoidal theories of history, therefore, are far removed from the progressive and teleological civilizing mission of British imperialism. Rather, they are very much like the non-Western concepts of the past described by Ashis Nandy, in which time is reversible and there is "no real disjunction between the past and the present."¹⁰⁹

Both Tagore and Yeats had remarkably similar ideas about the characteristics of the two traditions. The best ages of the past embodied a superior tradition of thought and life that achieved a balance of opposing values. For example, Yeats's "Great Wheel" of history is propelled by the cyclic alternation of two contrary principles, which are the basis of all of life and thought, called Discord and Concord, the tearing apart and conflict of Subjectivity and the bringing together and unity of Objectivity. The best ages had a perfect balance or unity of values, and in the worst the principles were divided and carried to their extremes.¹¹⁰ Tagore had a similar view that "the world in its essence is a reconciliation of pairs of opposing forces," and when that reconciliation does not take place, decline ensues.¹¹¹ Both authors also plotted the

¹⁰⁷ In cycloid theories, "history goes through . . . [a] sequence of beginning, middle, and end only to start over with a repetition." Charles Trinkhaus, Review of G. W. Trompf, *The Idea of Historical Recurrence in Western Thought, History and Theory* 20, no. 2 (1982): 218. In contrast, in an "alternation (or fluctuation) view" of the past, "one set of general conditions is regularly succeeded by another, which then in turn gives way to the first." Trompf, *The Idea of Historical Recurrence in Western Thought: From Antiquity to the Reformation* (Berkeley, Calif., 1979), 2.

¹⁰⁸ On these features of sinusoidal cyclic theories, see Trompf, *The Idea of Historical Recurrence*, 2; Manuel, *Shapes of Philosophical History*, 125.

¹⁰⁹ Nandy, *Intimate Enemy*, 58. See also Thapar, *Time as a Metaphor*; Eliade, *The Myth of the Eternal Return*.

¹¹⁰ According to Yeats, history is the endless alternation of a "falling . . . into division" when unity of mind "began to break into fragments," and a "resurrection into unity" or into "Unity of Being" that was "perfectly proportioned." Yeats, *A Vision*, 80; Yeats, "Nationality and Literature" (1893), in Yeats, *Uncollected Prose*, 1: 273; Yeats, *Autobiography*, 128, 129.

¹¹¹ Tagore, *Sadhana* (1913; repr., Madras, 1979), 79. Tagore argued that perfection results when "the finite and the infinite are not in conflict" but are "in harmony," when "a union of two opposed elements" is created, because "in the mind of the Creator, male and female principles are both present—how otherwise could creation arise from uniformity?" But when "the harmony which gives to the component

cyclic alternation of periods of unity and discord throughout the history of the world. Their assessments were very much alike, especially in the assumption that archaic and medieval civilizations in most nations were more unified than those inspired by the Hellenism of the classical Greeks, for example in the period of the Renaissance in Europe and after, and the age of the Gandharan sculptures in India.¹¹²

It was because the unity of culture was broken that both Tagore and Yeats believed the present age to be one of decline. The West had destroyed that unity by taking materialism and rationality to an extreme.¹¹³ In fact, most of Tagore's book *Nationalism* was directed not against Asian nationalism, but against Western "greed of material prosperity," which caused "the upset of man's moral balance" and led to the mass destruction of the First World War.¹¹⁴ But Tagore was equally critical of Asians, such as Gandhi, who went too far to the other extreme and were removed from material concerns. Tagore summed up the problem of modern disunity and imbalance: "The East in the modern time has been beaten in the race of life, because it has neglected to cultivate the science of the finite, and the West is being driven into conflict of passions and unmeasuring multiplication of things because it has lost its respect for the cult of the infinite. The salvation of humanity lies in the meeting of the East and West in a perfect harmony of truth."¹¹⁵

Tagore's distinction between the scientific West and spiritual East was similar to Yeats's assumption of the difference between material England and spiritual Ireland.¹¹⁶ While this appears to be a form of Orientalist essentializing, something very different is going on here. First, this dichotomy describes only the present. Because of their cyclic views of history, both Tagore and Yeats believed that this modern imbalance was not an essential feature of either Asian or Western life. In fact, there had been a past in the West, especially in the Middle Ages, and in the East and Ireland for most of their histories, when the superior tradition was at its height and

parts of a thing the equilibrium of the whole" is broken, the result is "nomadic atoms fighting against one another" and decline. Tagore, letter to Seal, 283; Tagore, *Nationalism*, 34. See also Tagore, *Selected Letters*, 279; Tagore, *Angel of Surplus*, 10, 85. Because the world is a harmony of opposites, Tagore claimed that "waves rise, each to its individual height . . . but only up to a certain point"; then they "return" to their starting point "in a rhythm which is marvellously beautiful." Tagore, *Sadhana*, 80.

¹¹² In Indian history, for example, Tagore thought that new cycles began with the Aryan invasion of India, during the Buddhist age, under the Mughals, and with the arrival of the British, while in Europe he posited a cyclic fall after the classical period in Greece, a rise during the Middle Ages, and a subsequent decline. See, for example, Tagore, *Towards Universal Man*, 61–63, 185, 186, 202–230; Tagore, *Nationalism*, 28, 33, 34; Tagore, *Angel of Surplus*, 45, 91, 92. Yeats's cycles were similar; historical heights were reached in ancient Egypt, archaic Greece, ancient Ireland, Europe of the medieval and Renaissance periods, and ancient India, China, and Japan, while troughs occurred in the classical Greek and Roman periods, and in Europe during and after the Reformation. See, for example, Yeats, *A Vision*, 202–206, 243–300; Yeats, *Essays and Introductions*, 221–237, 252, 356–383, 387–395, 396–411, 426–437, 448–473.

¹¹³ According to Tagore, "the age of intellect, of science" in Europe marked a fall from balance because "mental and material power" outgrew "moral strength," and the heart was detached from the mind and the result was "commercial and political cannibalism." Tagore, *Nationalism*, 34, 35; Tagore, "East and West" (1922), in Tagore, *Tagore: An Anthology*, 210, 211. Yeats was equally as disturbed by the "political and moral materialism" of modern Europe. Yeats, "Mr. Lionel Johnson's Poem" (1898), in Yeats, *Uncollected Prose*, 2: 91.

¹¹⁴ Tagore, *Nationalism*, 9, 16.

¹¹⁵ Tagore, letter to Mahadev Desai, September 29, 1921, in Tagore, *Selected Letters*, 279.

¹¹⁶ Yeats assumed that traditional Irish culture was entirely different from the culture of the modern English. The English were materialistic, while the Irish were a spiritual race. He also thought they resembled Indians in this. See, for example, Yeats, *Uncollected Prose*, 1: 108, 130–137, 268, 274, 350.

materialism was properly balanced by spiritualism.¹¹⁷ These periods of balance alternated in both places with periods of division. Thus, in the past, both West and East, England and Ireland, were varied, diverse, changing and changeable, good and bad. In other words, they were similar in being a collection of opposites. And during those periods when a better unified tradition predominated, people of the periphery and the metropolis were essentially the same.¹¹⁸ In addition, neither Tagore nor Yeats wanted to maintain the dichotomy between West and East, even in an inverted form; each hoped to harmonize them in order to make them similar in their diversity again, rather than widely different as they were in the present day because one was uniformly materialistic and the other uniformly spiritual.

Because of their interest in diversity, and their assumption that all ages expressing the values of a superior tradition were equivalent and interchangeable, Yeats and Tagore found much more in the pasts of their countries to admire than other nationalists who merely inverted Western Orientalism and continued to assume the essential and unchanging disparity between West and East. Those nationalists felt it necessary to privilege only the features of their nations' past that were different from the West.¹¹⁹ Tagore and Yeats, on the other hand, were free to describe a complex and diverse past for their nations because they appreciated ages that had similarities to some periods in English history as well as those that were different. For example, in opposition to Gandhi, who emphasized a vague golden age of pre-industrial Hindu peasants, Tagore wrote about all ages of the Indian past—Dravidian, Aryan, medieval, and Moghul. He featured kings, sages, saints, and artists; Muslims, Buddhists, Sikhs, Jains, and Christians; and people who lived and worked in forest retreats, universities, royal courts, and cities, as well as rural Hindu peasants.¹²⁰ Yeats similarly wrote of chiefs of tribes, kings, aristocrats, scholars, warrior monks, bards and poets, pagans and Protestants, in Dublin as well as the countryside, from mythic times, through the Middle Ages, to the eighteenth century, in addition to the Catholic peasants so loved by de Valera.¹²¹

Thus, Yeats's and Tagore's modernist and traditional cyclic theories of history incorporated national diversity more effectively than Enlightenment progressive the-

¹¹⁷ In fact, according to Tagore, in an earlier cycle there had been a "great" Europe, with the "spiritual strength" of "Christian culture . . . deep in her life's core," which balanced materialism with "the purest stream of human love, of love of justice, of spirit of self-sacrifice for higher ideals." Tagore, *Nationalism*, 65, 66. See also Tagore, *Nationalism*, 18, 23–26, 56, 57, 65; Tagore, *Towards Universal Man*, 226, 245, 272, 273; Tagore, *Selected Letters*, 349, 334.

¹¹⁸ It was because Yeats thought that the culture of medieval Europe and Ireland was the same as that of traditional India that he could write of Tagore's poems: "a whole people, a whole civilisation, immeasurably strange to us, seems to have been taken up into this imagination; and yet we are not moved because of its strangeness, but because we have met our own image, . . . or heard, perhaps for the first time in literature, our voice as in a dream." Yeats, "Preface to *Gitanjali*," 392. In fact, Yeats thought that Tagore's poetry was "exquisite in style," and that this "style was familiar to Europe several hundred years ago." Yeats, speech delivered at India Society dinner for Tagore, July 10, 1912, in *India Society: Minute Book*, MSS Eur F 147/65A, Oriental and India Office Collection, British Library.

¹¹⁹ For ways in which various nationalists exclude possible pasts, see, for example, Hutchinson, "Archaeology and the Irish Rediscovery," 512–517; Smith, "The 'Golden Age'"; Amartya Sen, "On Interpreting India's Past," in Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal, eds., *Nationalism, Democracy and Development: State and Politics in India* (Delhi, 1998), 17, 18.

¹²⁰ See, for example, Tagore, *Selected Writings*, 129–137, 156, 158–160, 162, 174, 175, 179, 258–264, 266, 272; Tagore, *Towards Universal Man*, 49–66, 202–230, 285–301, 303–322.

¹²¹ See, for example, Yeats, *Uncollected Prose*, 1: 103, 147, 163, 165, 198–202; 2: 95–107, 118–121, 454–461, 486–490.

ories. They also helped both authors define their cosmopolitan nationalism. In their views of history, the key distinction was between superior and inferior traditions of values, rather than that which occurred earlier or later in time, or that which was from the West or the East. Because of this, and because history would not witness the triumph of one dichotomy over another, a nation did not have to exclude any part of its past, any group of people, or any features of other nations from its identity. Tagore and Yeats, therefore, did not need to follow other nationalists in choosing between traditionalism or modernity, peripheral or metropolitan culture, as the direction their nations should follow. In fact, they did not need to define their national identity in opposition to an "other" group of people at all. They did, however, have to find another principle to solve what Peter van der Veer describes as "the very subject of nationalist debate," which is "the decision about what is 'within' and what is 'outside' the nation."¹²² Both authors found this in their theories of the harmony of opposites.

Tagore's definition of God was "the One in all diversities of creation."¹²³ This also is how he hoped that an independent India could be defined. Rather than force all citizens to conform to a single national ideal, Tagore wished that the people could be unified into one but be allowed to maintain their differences. As Tagore claimed in 1908, "the world-wide problem today is not how to unite by wiping out all differences, but how to unite with all differences intact."¹²⁴ He thought that this had been achieved at certain great times in India's past when people did "not admit difference to be conflict, nor . . . espy an enemy in every stranger," but instead tried "to find a place for all in a vast social order" and acknowledged "every path and recognize[d] greatness" wherever it could be found.¹²⁵ Yeats advocated something similar when he argued that it was essential to "cherish the thoughts which separate men from one another, and that are creators of distinguished life, instead of those thoughts that had made one man like another."¹²⁶ Tagore and Yeats were confident that this diversity would encourage harmony among the various people of the nation, rather than promote division or conflict, because the differences would neutralize one another.¹²⁷

An acceptance of diversity did not mean that either Tagore or Yeats was a cultural relativist. Neither author thought that all differences were acceptable, and they did suggest that there was a principle to guide the selection of what features should be part of a national culture. In other words, like most "new" cosmopolitans, they

¹²² Van der Veer, *Religious Nationalism*, xv. For the classic discussion of nationalism defined in opposition to an "other," see Linda Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707–1837* (New Haven, Conn., 1992).

¹²³ Tagore, "The Centre of Indian Culture," 230. See also Tagore, *Towards Universal Man*, 64, 65; Yeats, *Explorations*, 280, 309.

¹²⁴ Tagore, "Presidential Address," 146.

¹²⁵ Tagore, "Society and State," 65, 66.

¹²⁶ Yeats, "Notes" (1907), in Yeats, *Uncollected Prose*, 2: 353. Yeats also thought that a nation should combine many different streams around a "Unity of Image" or culture. See Yeats, *Autobiography*, 176.

¹²⁷ According to Tagore, diversity would not result in chaos, or "the discord of the unique," because "the juxtaposition of diversities neutralizes their excesses and helps to bring out what they have of essential value." Tagore concluded that "when natural differences find their harmony, then it is true unity." Tagore, "What Is Art?" (1917), in Tagore, *Angel of Surplus*, 38; Tagore, "Presidential Address," 150; Tagore, "The Centre of Indian Culture," 215. Yeats also believed that a "concord of many" can produce "a harmony of beings." Yeats, "Pages from a Diary in 1930," 312; Yeats, *Autobiography*, 335, 336.

believed in minimum universal values.¹²⁸ As Tagore put it, sounding much like Matthew Arnold, nations should "accept the best teaching, whenever and wherever [*sic*] it may be found."¹²⁹ A cyclic view of history in which all ages were fundamentally equal when they were informed by the superior of the two traditions of life made this quite possible. Nationalists could choose any features of the past or present, in their own culture or that of any other nation, as long as they were informed by the ideals of the superior tradition.¹³⁰ While neither Tagore nor Yeats made it entirely clear what those ideals were, in general, once again, they balanced opposites.

This is apparent in their ideas about their own art and the best type of culture for their nations. Both authors believed it was possible to include foreign elements in a native culture. As Tagore put it, a culture could reflect "universal ideas," "without a loss of national identity."¹³¹ They also had similar opinions on how this could be done by creative artists. Yeats claimed that by using the natural settings, or "native scenery," the historical memories, myths, and images, as well as the unique rhythm of a nation, a national art also could incorporate foreign styles or symbols.¹³² Similarly, Tagore thought that if the "tradition and temperament" of the people were retained, artists also could depict what universal to all people and borrow what was best from other cultures.¹³³ This type of culture, in Tagore's opinion, could "ex-

¹²⁸ See, for example, Beck, "The Truth of Others," 430–449; Turner, "Cosmopolitan Virtue," 45–63.

¹²⁹ Tagore, "Mahatma Gandhi" (1937), in Tagore, *Mahatma Gandhi*, 27. Bruce Robbins argues that contemporary cosmopolitans also follow this Arnoldian injunction. Robbins, "Comparative Cosmopolitanism," 184. For similar arguments made by Yeats that the Irish must study other cultures to learn what is best in them, see, for example, Yeats, *Uncollected Prose*, 1: 269, 273, 274.

¹³⁰ As Yeats put it, "all civilisations [are] equal at their best." Yeats, *A Vision*, 206. This is why he wanted to "take up . . . old things and make them subtle and modern," and create "a new yet ancient perfection." Yeats, letter to Florence Farr, April [1908], in Yeats, *The Letters*, 508; Yeats, letter to Frank Fay, August 28 [1904], *ibid.*, 440. Similarly, Tagore hoped to establish "deeply intimate ties . . . between past and present, between far and near," in order to create for India "a wonderful consistency between her ancient traditions and the modern times." Tagore, "Bengal National Literature" (1895), in Tagore, *Selected Writings*, 179; Tagore, "Society and State," 61. See also Tagore, *Nationalism*, 57; Tagore, *Selected Writings*, 47, 48, 103, 179–193; Yeats, *Uncollected Prose*, 1: 255, 284.

¹³¹ Tagore, "Poet Yeats," 217. This was precisely what Tagore admired in Yeats; he was "a universal poet," but he also belonged "to his native land and his ideas are coloured by the special passions of his native land." Tagore also thought that Vaishnava poetry did the same thing, because it is "world poetry" but it also "adds a particular flavour, it renders the universal in a particular form." Tagore, "Poet Yeats," 217. See also Tagore, "Literary Creation" (1907), in Tagore, *Selected Writings*, 162. This also was Yeats's intention as early as 1893, when he suggested that Irish writers could "learn from English and other literatures without loss of national individuality," and as late as 1930, when he was confident that a new world could "include all nations in the European stream in one harmony where each drew its nourishment from all though each drew different nourishment." Yeats, "Nationality and Literature," 269; Yeats, "Pages from a Diary in 1930," 311.

¹³² See, for example, Yeats, *Uncollected Prose*, 1: 90, 151, 208, 212, 218, 255, 272, 274, 285, 384; 2: 127, 142, 143, 154, 161, 167, 185–196, 219, 245, 146, 300–303; Yeats, *Essays and Introductions*, 206; Yeats, *Autobiography*, 100–102, 128, 131. Yeats even argued that a national literature could be written in English rather than in a native language, as had been done by other former colonists, the Americans, who created a literature distinct from that of the English, even though it used the same language. Yeats, "The De-Anglicising of Ireland" (1892), in Yeats, *Uncollected Prose*, 1: 255, 256. Tagore, on the other hand, insisted on national literature written in the native tongue. See Tagore, *Towards Universal Man*, 39–48, 202–230; Tagore, *Selected Writings*, 300–319, 346–357. Jahan Ramazani describes in detail how Yeats, and many other postcolonial writers, used the techniques described above to achieve such a "creolization" of English, and a hybridity between native and foreign elements. Ramazani, *The Hybrid Muse*, 36–48.

¹³³ See, for example, Tagore, *Angel of Surplus*, 46, 48; Tagore, *Towards Universal Man*, 61, 226; Tagore, *Nationalism*, 15, 16. Tagore claimed that this had been done in ancient India.

press both our national and our cosmopolitan consciousness," because "however cosmopolitan the several limbs may be, the heart will still be the heart of India."¹³⁴

The type of national art that Tagore and Yeats preferred also would balance other dichotomies. Like most modernist artists, both authors rejected European aesthetic naturalism because of its one-sided emphasis on the material world. They preferred an art that balanced realism and symbolism, matter and spirit, the natural world and the divine, emotion and reason, the inner and the outer.¹³⁵ They also wished to find a balance between high and popular art, rather than maintain the separation between them assumed in the modern West. Yeats especially liked the art of the European Middle Ages because it had achieved such an equilibrium. This also was why he was enthusiastic about Tagore's work. Yeats thought that Tagore's popularity among all types of Indians was proof that a similar art still was in existence; a great artist was able to produce a "work of a supreme culture" that also was "as much the growth of the common soil as the grass and the rushes."¹³⁶ Tagore also admired artworks such as the ancient epics *Ramayana* and *Mahabharata*, which were appreciated by both the elite and peasants, and were an intimate part of everyday existence for all Indians.¹³⁷

Both Tagore and Yeats had plans to effect a return to this type of art and connect it to a new nationalism through the revival of traditional fairs or festivals, as had existed in ancient Ireland, India, and the Middle Ages in Europe. These fairs, according to Tagore, would have the added advantage of bringing Hindus and Muslims together in India. Not surprisingly, Tagore and Yeats hoped that their new national culture could be shared by all the religions of their nations. Given that both authors' personal spiritual beliefs balanced ideas from a wide variety of religions from different countries and time periods, they saw no reason why this would not work.¹³⁸

¹³⁴ Tagore, "Presidential Address," 156; Tagore, "Society and State," 66. Tagore hoped to create such a cosmopolitan culture in India by founding a new "seat of . . . Indian learning" that would provide for the coordinated study of the best of many cultures, including "the Vedic, the Puranic, the Buddhist, the Jain, the Islamic, the Sikh, and the Zoroastrian," and also "side by side with them the European." Tagore, "The Centre of Indian Culture," 216, 224. See also Tagore, *Selected Writings*, 156, 157. He did found such a center at Santiniketan in 1921. See Dutta and Robinson, *Tagore: The Myriad-Minded Man*, 219–236. Yeats wanted to create a cosmopolitan art that could compete with the best culture of all times. He himself hoped to write a great Irish drama that "the Englishmen at the time of Shakespeare and the Greek of the time of Sophocles and the Spaniard of the time of Calderon and the Indian at the time of Kaladasa would have recognised as akin to their own great art." Yeats, "The Acting at St. Theresa's Hall" (1902), in Yeats, *Uncollected Prose*, 2: 293. See also Yeats, *Essays and Introductions*, 341.

¹³⁵ See, for example, Tagore, *Angel of Surplus*, 20–27, 45, 76, 77; Tagore, *Selected Writings*, 95–99; Yeats, *Essays and Introductions*, 146–170, 266; Yeats, *Uncollected Prose*, 1: 284, 288, 322, 327, 328, 367, 412, 420; 2: 121–137, 291–293, 382, 367, 393.

¹³⁶ Yeats, "Preface to *Gitanjali*," 390. See also Yeats, *Uncollected Prose*, 1: 108, 147; Yeats, *Explorations*, 249; Tagore, *Angel of Surplus*, 8, 30.

¹³⁷ As Tagore put it, "they are read daily in every village, in every house,—as welcome in the grocer's shop as in the royal palace." Tagore, "India's Epic," 238. Tagore also boasted about how his "songs have found their place in the heart of my land, and that the folk of the future, in days of joy or sorrow or festival, will have to sing them." Tagore, "The Religion of an Artist," 5. Yeats was impressed that Tagore's songs were sung by the common people in India, and he very much liked this feature of Indian poetry. It also reminded him of a similar practice in Ireland; around 1900, he had heard Irish haymakers singing a poem written by his colleague Douglas Hyde. Yeats had always hoped that something similar could be revived in the modern world. Yeats, *Explorations*, 337; Yeats, *Autobiography*, 145, 146; Yeats, *Essays and Introductions*, 387–394; Yeats, *Uncollected Prose*, 1: 105; 2: 163, 245.

¹³⁸ On their ideas of festivals, see Yeats, *Uncollected Prose*, 2: 164, 154, 185–196; Tagore, *Towards Universal Man*, 54, 55; Tagore, letter to Rani Mahalanobis (Maitra) [October 16, 1929], in Tagore, *Selected Letters*, 365, 366. On their hope for a nation uniting all religions, see Yeats, *Uncollected Prose*,

Tagore and Yeats also commented on other features they hoped to see in a post-colonial nation that, again, would provide a harmony of opposites. For example, just as they liked a balance of past and present, both authors thought there was no reason not to combine modern Western science and technology with traditional culture. They did not suggest that a nation adopt all features of Western politics and economics in the public sphere and reserve the private sphere for traditional spiritualism, as did many other nationalists. Rather, they argued that only the best features of Western technology should be adopted, and then be combined with, and transformed by, higher indigenous values. Tagore especially thought that modern science was essential for India, not so that the nation could defeat others, but in order to liberate "human souls from the dark dungeon of matter" and allow people to pursue higher cultural goals.¹³⁹ This science, however, could be beneficial only if the negative features of Western economics—for example, the capitalism that benefited elites at the expense of the masses—were changed by the adoption of more traditional ideals. Both authors proposed a balance between rich and poor within a co-operative economic system that combined modern socialism with ancient feudalism, especially in the form of an aristocracy of talent who worked for the good, and with the cooperation, of the common people. Western science and industry applied selectively in such a system and under the direction of higher spiritual values would help, rather than harm, the nation.¹⁴⁰

Finally, in politics both authors hoped to achieve an equilibrium between the central state and local government, as they believed had been achieved in the best ages of their nations' pasts. Neither Yeats nor Tagore wanted a nation with a strong central state.¹⁴¹ Yeats, for example, disliked the over-powerful state that he thought

1: 20, 405; Yeats, *Explorations*, 337; Tagore, *Towards Universal Man*, 44–66, 146, 147, 152; Tagore, *Nationalism*, 97–106, 122–124; Tagore, *Tagore: An Anthology*, 140, 239, 240. As Yeats described it, his religion was "now a little Christian, now very Indian, now altogether Celtic and mythological," and it appreciated Krishna, Christ, and Dionysus equally. Yeats, "A Symbolic Artist and the Coming of Symbolic Art" (December 1898), in Yeats, *Uncollected Prose*, 2: 133; Yeats, *Autobiography*, 339. According to scholars, both Yeats and Tagore tried in their own poetry to "dechristianize" or "dehindiize" traditional symbols so that people of all religious beliefs could appreciate them. See Ramazani, *The Hybrid Muse*, 42; Chaudhuri, "The Flute of Modernity," 45, 46.

¹³⁹ Tagore, "East and West," 206. See also Tagore, *Towards Universal Man*, 63, 167, 214, 215, 237, 245. Tagore hoped for "a synthesis of spirit and matter." Tagore, "The Unity of Education," 246. This was one reason he criticized Gandhi; he thought Gandhi's asceticism was imbalanced and "against life." Tagore, letter to Charles Freer Andrews, March 5, 1921, in Tagore, *Selected Letters*, 260; Tagore, "A Poet's School" (1926), in Tagore, *Towards Universal Man*, 287, 288, 299. For more on both authors' views of science, see Tagore, *Selected Letters*, 260, 261, 340; Tagore, *Angel of Surplus*, 129; Tagore, *Towards Universal Man*, 231–251, 241, 246; Tagore, *Tagore: An Anthology*, 213, 214; Yeats, *Explorations*, 340.

¹⁴⁰ On economics, see Yeats, *Essays and Introductions*, 68, 210, 265; Yeats, *Memoirs*, 139; Yeats, *Explorations*, 278; Yeats, *Uncollected Prose*, 1: 165; Tagore, *Towards Universal Man*, 302–340. Tagore especially liked the idea of cooperative living he read in Irish works, such as those of Horace Plunkett and A. E.'s *The National Being*. Tagore, "Cult of the Charka" (1925), in Bhattacharyya, *The Mahatma and the Poet*, 108, 109. On aristocracy, see Yeats, *Uncollected Prose*, 1: 165; 2: 334; Yeats, *Explorations*, 312, 337; Yeats, *Autobiography*, 368; Tagore, *Angel of Surplus*, 92; Tagore, *Towards Universal Man*, 315–322; Tagore, letter to Frieda Hauswirth Das, March 27, 1933, in Tagore, *Selected Letters*, 423.

¹⁴¹ It was partly because of their dislike of an over-powerful central state that neither Yeats nor Tagore accepted Soviet communism, or Italian or German fascism, despite an initial interest in fascism expressed by both. Yeats was involved briefly in an Irish version of fascism in 1933, and Tagore was interested in Mussolini in 1926. However, Tagore changed his mind by the end of the year, and Yeats had rejected fascism by 1935. Both authors were attracted to fascism because of a perceived commitment to intellectual and cultural excellence (Mussolini even sent Tagore's school a gift of books), but as soon

had begun in Elizabethan England and was responsible for the British domination of Ireland. As he commented in 1921, "in many ways a great state kills all under its shadow like a horse chestnut."¹⁴² However, neither author accepted the nationalist idea, for example of Gandhi and de Valera, that their countries should be defined only by small, isolated villages. Rather, they hoped for a balance. As Tagore also put it, a central state may be necessary, but it should be part of a government system like that of ancient India, where "the state was only a part of the people. The mass of the population had its own self-government in the village community."¹⁴³

The cosmopolitan national culture envisioned by Tagore and Yeats, therefore, would incorporate many opposites. Because they saw no difference between the best ages of the past and present, East and West, there was no reason why a balance could not be achieved between the modern and traditional, foreign and native, religion and science, elites and masses, and local and national governments. Both authors realized that this was a very difficult ideal, what Yeats called an ideal of "an impossibly noble life" or Tagore a "supreme ideal," and that it would "take time to grow."¹⁴⁴ But they insisted that their ideal should take precedence over "immediate victory, immediate utility," as Yeats put it, and should be realized before any attempts were made to achieve independence, because there could be no "reformation of society . . . without the regeneration of the hearts of men" occurring first.¹⁴⁵ In other words, without the acceptance of true cosmopolitan values, real independence could never be achieved. But if those values were adopted, both authors were confident that their nations not only would be great, but also could "come to the rescue of humanity," as Tagore put it, or, in the words of Yeats, "become a chosen race, one of the pillars that uphold the world."¹⁴⁶ At that point, independence would be an easy task. According to Tagore, when India, by the achievement of a great ideal, could "prove that she is

as they were made aware of its violence and suppression of freedom, they abandoned their interest. See, for example, Tagore, *Selected Letters*, 328–335, 403, 437, 438; Yeats, *The Letters*, 655, 656, 851, 887; Yeats, *Explorations*, 424; Stanfield, *Yeats and Politics*, 21–25, 40–111; Cullingford, *Yeats, Ireland and Fascism*; Grattan Freyer, *W. B. Yeats and the Anti-Democratic Tradition* (Totowa, N.J., 1981); Radharaman Chakrabarti, "Tagore: Politics and Beyond," in Thomas Pantham and Kenneth L. Deutsch, *Politics in Modern India* (New Delhi, 1986), 176–191. Tim Pat Coogan suggests that Yeats's support for the Irish fascist movement "was in fact prompted more by anti-de Valera feelings than by the temporary inclination towards fascism," while Ramazani argues that "Yeats's late applause for right-wing dictatorship could be seen as arising in part from the ferocity of his anticolonialism." Coogan, *Eamon de Valera*, 505; Ramazani, *The Hybrid Muse*, 24.

¹⁴² Yeats, letter to George Russell [A. E.], March 29 [1921], in Yeats, *The Letters*, 666. See also Yeats, "Edmund Spenser" (1902), in Yeats, *Essays and Introductions*, 356–383. For Tagore's criticisms of the modern Western central state, see, for example, Tagore, *Towards Universal Man*, 49–53; Tagore, *Selected Letters*, 335.

¹⁴³ Tagore, letter to Charles Freer Andrews, July 20, 1926, in Tagore, *Selected Letters*, 334. This idea of India as a civilization defined almost entirely by its village communities is, of course, Orientalist. See Inden, *Imagining India*, 131–161. However, while both Tagore and Yeats liked rural peasants in villages, they also enjoyed the intellectual life of large cities such as Calcutta, Dublin, and London. This may be why Tagore wanted to "harmonize the divergence between village and town." Tagore, "City and Village" (1928), in Tagore, *Towards Universal Man*, 306.

¹⁴⁴ Yeats, "Preface to the First Edition of *The Well of the Saints*" (1905), in Yeats, *Essays and Introductions*, 303; Tagore, "India's Epic," 238; Tagore, *The Home and the World*, 130. See also Yeats, *Uncollected Prose*, 2: 320; Bhattacharya, *The Mahatma and the Poet*, 118; Tagore, *Nationalism*, 38.

¹⁴⁵ Yeats, "Poetry and Tradition," 260; Yeats, "The Philosophy of Shelley's Poetry" (1900), in Yeats, *Essays and Introductions*, 69. See also Tagore, "The Problem of India," 240.

¹⁴⁶ Tagore, letter to C. F. Andrews, in Bhattacharya, *The Mahatma and the Poet*, 60; Yeats, "Ireland and the Arts" (1901), in Yeats, *Essays and Introductions*, 210.

morally superior to the people who rule her by their right of conquest," independence would come naturally because Indians could meet the English as their equals, and "all reason for antagonism, and with it all conflict [would] disappear."¹⁴⁷ Real freedom, thus, would be achieved by periphery and metropolis alike.

Unfortunately for Tagore and Yeats, few nationalists in India or Ireland were willing to wait for the kind of nation they wanted before achieving independence. Yeats died in 1939, and Tagore died two years later, in 1941. Neither lived to see his hopes become reality or the extent to which his predictions came true. And neither gained any widespread popularity for his ideas of nationalism. This is hardly surprising. A nationalism that does not contain a "message of collective salvation," because it is not progressive and teleological, can be of little interest to people who are desperate to be saved.¹⁴⁸ In short, a nationalism as idealistic as that of Yeats and Tagore can hardly inspire heroic action for immediate independence; nor did they want it to do so.

This does not mean that their nationalism should be dismissed as the fantasy of two early-twentieth-century poets. It was shared by other artists and critics at the time, and it may be returning as an important cultural ideal among postcolonial artists today, many of whom practice the sort of hybridity and cultural critique that Yeats and Tagore advocated.¹⁴⁹ Yet another cosmopolitan moment, brought on by a process of globalization that bears some striking resemblances to early-twentieth-century imperialism, may be on the horizon. In addition, postcolonial scholars and theorists of cosmopolitanism may wish to consider Tagore and Yeats more carefully, because their nationalism was far less imitative of modern Western discourse than other nationalisms; they avoided Orientalist dichotomizing, imperial historical meta-narratives, and the valorization of modernization and statism. This, in turn, may mean that it is not necessary to abandon the practice of history entirely, as some scholars have suggested must be done because of its complicity with imperialism.¹⁵⁰ Rather, different ways of approaching history, more like those of Tagore and Yeats, could be explored. Finally, Tagore's and Yeats's theories indicate that it is not entirely unrealistic to hope for a new cosmopolitanism, which respects cultural dif-

¹⁴⁷ Tagore, letter to Mahatma Gandhi, April 12, 1919, in Tagore, *Selected Letters*, 218; Tagore, quoted in Hay, *Asian Ideas*, 45. See also Yeats, "Emmet," 325–327.

¹⁴⁸ Smith, *Nations and Nationalism*, 83.

¹⁴⁹ Jahan Ramazani provides excellent examples of how postcolonial artists attempt this hybridity in poetry in English, and he argues that many were influenced by Yeats. Ramazani, *The Hybrid Muse*. See also Edward Said, "Globalizing Literary Study," *PLMA* 116, no. 1 (January 2001): 65; S. Shankar, "Midnight's Orphans; or, Is a Postcolonialism Worth Its Name," *Cultural Critique* 56 (Winter 2004): 64–95. According to commentators on visual art, a "cultural hybridity—the mixing or juxtaposition of outside elements with indigenous forms and techniques—has been a key part of modern Asian art." And so too is a simultaneous "critique of political and social conditions," such as sectarian violence and intolerance, government censorship and repression, gender and class inequality and oppression, and "nationalistic aesthetics and bigotry." Vishakha N. Desai, "Foreword," in Apinan Poshyananda, *Contemporary Art in Asia: Traditions/Tensions* (New York, 1996), 13, 14; Poshyananda, "Roaring Tigers, Desperate Dragons in Transition," *ibid.*, 29.

¹⁵⁰ Some critics claim that the only hope for a truly non-Orientalist and indigenous understanding of the past is to abandon history altogether for ahistorical or even "antihistorical" constructions, such as myths and patternless narratives that deny historical time. This type of representation of the past not only would disrupt the "master narratives authorized by imperialism," but it also would be more authentic because it was found in most precolonial and premodern societies. Prakash, "Postcolonial Criticism," 15. See also Chakrabarty, "Postcoloniality"; Prakash, "Writing Post-Orientalist Histories"; Nandy, "History's Forgotten Doubles."

ference while insisting on some fundamental universal values. This may provide the key to the construction of the “different modernity” for which Partha Chatterjee is looking, by suggesting a better way to negotiate between the modern and traditional, West and East, than either adopting one side or the other, or restricting one to the public and the other to the private sphere.¹⁵¹ Rather, a cosmopolitanism like that of Tagore and Yeats could do what Sheldon Pollock argues is essential for the future—adopt a philosophy “of *And* rather than *Either/Or*.”¹⁵² If this is the case, then not only was Tagore correct when he declared, “the poet is the best historian,” it also may be true that poets make the best cosmopolitan theorists as well.¹⁵³

¹⁵¹ Chatterjee, “The Disciplines in Colonial Bengal,” in Chatterjee, *Texts of Power*, 27.

¹⁵² Pollock, “Cosmopolitan and Vernacular,” 625. See also Beck, “The Truth of Others,” 438, 444.

¹⁵³ Tagore, “The Nature of Krishna,” 214. In fact, Sheldon Pollock’s recent work supports this assertion of Tagore because he suggests that cyclic views of history may be historically accurate. According to Pollock, in the past two thousand years, Europe and South Asia witnessed a millennium of cosmopolitan “modes of cultural and political being,” followed by a millennium of vernacular modes that is currently “drawing to a close.” That a “new” cosmopolitanism is so fashionable among scholars today may indicate the beginning of a new cycle. Pollock, “Cosmopolitan and Vernacular,” 592. The duration and dating of Pollock’s two-thousand-year cycle is almost identical to Yeats’s “Great Year.”

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Reopening the “Opening of Japan”: A Russian-Japanese Revolutionary Encounter and the Vision of Anarchist Progress

SHO KONISHI

IN THE SPRING OF 1874, the Russian populist and international revolutionary leader Lev Mechnikov (1838–1888) sailed to Japan in order to observe and participate in the Meiji Ishin, commonly known in English as the “Meiji Restoration.”¹ Japan was still in the throes of disorder and conflict as he disembarked in Yokohama. Comparing the Ishin to revolutionary movements in Europe, Mechnikov called it “a complete and radical revolution, the kind we know only from history.”² Seeking to right a common misunderstanding among many in the West about the causes of the Ishin, he described it as being of native origin. He argued that the Ishin was not simply a political reaction to external pressure on Japan to adopt Western civilization and become involved in capitalist development. Rather, it was a complex revolution from within, based on centuries of social, cultural, and intellectual developments, that had merely been given further impetus by disturbances from abroad. Mechnikov would eventually accord the Ishin global significance for human progress in a different direction altogether from Western modernity.

Historians have rarely questioned one aspect of the birth of modern Japan: the “Opening of the Nation” to the West, or *kaikoku*, and the resulting initiation of civilization and progress. As a result, the meaning of *kaikoku* has been closed, and alternative narratives of modern Japanese history have essentially been precluded from the historiography on Japan. By exploring Mechnikov’s private encounter with Ishin Japan on the non-state level beyond the imagined East-West divide, it may be possible to reopen the meaning of *kaikoku* and introduce the larger associated vision of cooperatist anarchist civilization and progress.³ At the very moment that Japan’s

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¹ In this article, only when referring to how nineteenth-century Russians described the events surrounding the overthrow of the Tokugawa feudal regime do I use the term “revolution.” Elsewhere I use the Japanese term “Ishin.” On the problem of rendering *Meiji Ishin* as “Restoration” in translation, see, for example, Tetsuo Najita, “Japan’s Industrial Revolution in Historical Perspective,” in Masao Miyoshi and H. D. Harootunian, eds., *Japan in the World* (Durham, N.C., 1993), 19–23.

² Lev Mechnikov, “Era prosveshcheniia Iaponii: Meidzi,” in A. A. Shcherbina, ed., *Iaponiia na perelome: Izbrannye stat'i i ocherki* (Vladivostok, 1992), 76. All translations are mine unless otherwise noted.

³ I use a new term, “cooperatist,” instead of “cooperativist,” to emphasize an ethic and subjectivity

borders opened to negotiation with the West and to the concomitant narratives of civilizational progress, they opened as well to alternative visions of progress. Mechnikov would give Japan's modern revolution world-historical meaning as a major catalyst for the advancement of humanity based on the principles of cooperatist anarchy. The resulting idea of progress would emphasize cooperation between people over Social Darwinist competition, and spontaneous free associations of peoples over the rule of law and state governance, as fundamental for the advancement of human life. It would be based on the premise that individual and group differences on multiple levels constituted an essential basis for a cooperative human society, making possible a modern subjectivity that simultaneously incorporated both the individual and the collective.

Mechnikov's encounter with Ishin Japan led him to refashion anarchism, transforming it from a Bakuninist ideology of primordial and violent destruction of the existing social and political structures into an evolutionary construct for developing a civilization on the basis of mutual aid.⁴ Mechnikov identified a dynamic model of civilizational progress in Japan that transcended the provincially bounded idea of the Russian commune. He was struck by the cooperative self-organization he observed among commoners during the Ishin. Cooperative practices enabled the people to have economic and social stability in their lives at a time when they were experiencing tremendous political instability, a lack of organizational guidance from above, and sudden dislocation to urban areas. Mechnikov noted the commoners' consciousness of and pride in their contribution to the larger society, with recognition in turn of others' contributing role. Japanese called this organizing ethic for the conduct of everyday life "mutual aid." He observed that the principle of mutual assistance had the capacity to extend beyond the confines of the immediate family, the neighborhood, and even the nation, and was marked by an intense effort to learn from and interact with the outside world, which he saw happening on many levels of society. Mechnikov viewed this ethic as essential for the advancement of humanity. The developing vision of progress and civilization inspired by the encounter between the Japanese ideas of *ishin* and Russian populist notions of *revoliutsiia* (revolution) would later constitute one of the most important intellectual bases for Kropotkinism, a leading current of modern anarchism.

Not only is Mechnikov's encounter revealing with respect to the open and unsettled nature of the early meanings given to the "beginnings" of modern Japan, but the alternative meanings given to those beginnings were salient for further action. Japanese intellectuals would turn the vision of cooperatist progress into one of the most important conceptual foundations for modern cultural life in Japan. For example, it heavily influenced the women's movement, the non-war movement, and the spheres of education, religion, language, literature, art, and even primatology. Transforming the idea of time itself, participants imagined and put into practice "coop-

of cooperation not limited to the enterprise of the cooperative, a society of persons for the distribution of goods.

⁴ While Mechnikov had conspired with Bakunin in revolutionary activities in the 1860s, he acknowledged that their relationship was fairly negative. Hoover Institution of War and Peace Archives, Stanford, California, B. I. Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 183, #34, Letter from L. Mechnikov to Vasilii Danilovich, January 29, 1884.

eratist anarchist modernity," a temporal belonging that transcended ethnic, racial, gendered, national, and other means of modern belonging.⁵

Our understanding of Japanese anarchism as a product of Western intellectual traditions has helped to prevent us from seeing cooperatist anarchism as a form of modernity in Japan. We have long defined anarchy, the absence of state governance and legal order, as characterizing the most primitive stage of human progress and civilization. By extension, the history of nineteenth-century anarchism has often conceived anarchism as an intellectual and cultural legacy of the social fury of the French Revolution, and thereby associated it with terrorism and the formless dreams of utopianism. Similarly, Japanese historiography has viewed anarchism in Japan as a reactionary impulse against the Western civilizational order, expressing an emotional preoccupation with "traditional" and "conservative" moral and spiritual values threatened by the West.⁶ Common to both of these characterizations is the notion that anarchism, whether by its ideals or in practice, was opposed to modernity.

The idea of Western modernity provided the starting point from which we have arrived at much of our scholarship on modern Japan. While existing explorations of an "alternative Japanese modernity" have attempted to examine how Japanese reconfigured and retranslated Western modernity into "indigenous" or "Japanese" national forms as historical difference, the modernity of the "West" nonetheless remained for historians the source that defined the terms of modernity in Japan.⁷ Studies of the diverse trajectories of alternative forms of modernity in the non-West have tended to speak of "hybridity" between two ultimately foreign elements, an oil-and-water mixture between the traditional and the new. The "multiple modernities" in the non-West have qualified as such through the indigenous development or reconfiguration of major modern elements already defined by the West and its historical experience, such as the public sphere, capitalism, and democratic political institutions.⁸ While our emphasis on these historical trajectories will undoubtedly continue to advance our historical understanding, at the same time it has caused us to overlook the creative transnational production of a cooperatist anarchist vision of human progress and civilization outside the epistemological limits of "East" and "West."

Proceeding from a similar logic, we have long studied the modern relationship between Russia and Japan from the perspective of state-to-state relations, beginning with the Russian expedition to Japan in 1853 led by Admiral Evfimii Putiatin. The story of the expedition's contribution to the "Opening" of Japan, followed by the

⁵ For a theoretical discussion on the reimagination of time and the possibility for alternative identities, see Lawrence Grossberg, "History, Imagination and the Politics of Belonging: Between the Death and the Fear of History," in Paul Gilroy, Lawrence Grossberg, and Angela McRobbie, eds., *Without Guarantees: In Honour of Stuart Hall* (London, 2000), 148–164.

⁶ See F. G. Notehelfer's important contribution to our earlier knowledge of Japanese anarchism, *Kōtoku Shūsui: Portrait of a Japanese Radical* (Cambridge, 1971). Other, more recent works that have similarly described anarchism in Japan include Germaine Hoston, *The State, Identity, and the National Question in China and Japan* (Princeton, N.J., 1994), 137–148; and Steven G. Marks, *How Russia Shaped the Modern World: From Art to Anti-Semitism, Ballet to Bolshevism* (Princeton, N.J., 2003).

⁷ See, for example, Julia Adeney Thomas, *Reconfiguring Modernity: Concepts of Nature in Japanese Political Ideology* (Berkeley, Calif., 2002).

⁸ For example, Dipesh Chakrabarty, *Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and Historical Difference* (Princeton, N.J., 2000); Shmuel N. Eisenstadt, ed., *Multiple Modernities* (New Brunswick, N.J., 2002).

Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905), which demonstrated Japan's rising power and permitted its entry into the Western international community of nation-states, is a familiar one. With the narrative of Western modernity repeated as essentially the sole historical meaning and value embedded in the history of Russo-Japanese relations, our accounts of that relationship have often been written from within the cultural fold of Western modernity. Ironically enough, the more we have expanded the ways to look at their interactions, the more we have solidified Western modernity as the master narrative for international history involving modern Japan. While making an enormous contribution to the volume of our historical knowledge, this has led us all the more to overlook the phenomenon under examination. Even studies in the fields of literature, theater, and art, which have added significantly to our knowledge of Russo-Japanese relations from a non-state perspective, have been construed largely within the conceptual framework of Russia's impact on Japan within a larger West-East binary and its unidirectional flow of culture.⁹

The purpose here is not to provide a single overarching characterization of the rich and variegated history of Russian-Japanese relations.¹⁰ Rather, examining the interlocking transnational networks of intellectuals that formed on the non-state level, beyond the cultural construct of the encounter between West and non-West, enables us to take a new approach to the "Opening" of Japan. As alien as the Russian-Japanese revolutionary encounter was to the mid-nineteenth-century culture of international relations of Western nation-states,¹¹ it provides us with an alternative lens through which to read *kaikoku* as a moment of rupture, thereby giving it new historical meaning and value.

From the standpoint of Western modernity, Europeans and Americans in Japan during the Meiji period believed that modern Japan owed its birth to the civilizing presence of the Western nation-states. Merchant Francis Hall observed the events largely through the lens of his business interests in Japan and the Western diplomatic activities that supported them. When he described the progress that foreigners were bringing to Japan as an eventual "good," he meant the extent of capitalist development as the measure of that progress. From another perspective, Isabella Bird was one of the very few Westerners to travel widely through Japan in the early years of Meiji. She described in minute detail the technologies of everyday life during her trip to Japan in 1878, revealing the "hopeless darkness" of the Oriental peasant's primitive lifestyle. Her descriptions referred to a hierarchy of peoples based on their level

⁹ Since the discussion of the "Western impact" of Russian literature on Japan and the resulting emergence of modern Japanese language and literature in Marleigh Grayer Ryan's 1965 work on Russianist Futabatei Shimei, our studies of the topic have not departed much from the conceptual framework of Russia's impact on the East. Ryan, *Japan's First Modern Novel: Ukigumo of Futabatei Shimei* (New York, 1965); Nobori Shōmu and Akamatsu Katsumaro, *The Russian Impact on Japan: Literature and Social Thought*, ed. and trans. Peter Berton, Paul F. Langer, and George O. Totten (Los Angeles, 1981); Marks, *How Russia Shaped the Modern World*; and Thomas Rimer, ed., *A Hidden Fire: Russian and Japanese Cultural Encounters, 1868–1926* (Stanford, Calif., 1995), a collection of essays by twenty scholars from Russia, Japan, and the U.S.

¹⁰ Recent Russian language studies have successfully unearthed new archival findings in relation to Russian-Japanese cultural relations. Much work by Russian scholars in this field has reflected a renewed interest in the history of the Russian Orthodox Church via its activities in Japan and East Asia. See, for example, the informative reports in V. S. Belonenko, ed., *Iz istorii religioznykh, kul'turnykh i politicheskikh vzaimootnoshenii Rossii i Japonii v XIX–XX vekakh* (St. Petersburg, 1998).

¹¹ On this culture of international relations, see Beate Jahn, *The Cultural Construction of International Relations* (New York, 2000).

of development in science, technology, and Christianity. From a diplomatic perspective, measuring modern progress by a nation's capacity for empire-building in the international arena, British Embassy secretary Ernest Satow assessed during the Ishin that Japan would never "get beyond a third or fourth rate position." Satow saw the general populace as a major reason for Japan's inability to improve its international ranking, because they "seemed to be too much mere imitators, and wanting in bottom."¹² The idea that an interest in taking from the outside world was a sign of backwardness contrasted starkly with assessments by Russian observers. Hall, Bird, and Satow provide us with examples of how Europeans and Americans—male and female, private and public—shared a vision of Western civilization and progress that included elements of state- and empire-building, rationality via science and technology, capitalism, and Christianity.

In contrast, Mechnikov attached tremendous meaning to the intellectual achievements of the Tokugawa period (1600–1868). He saw progressive aspects of the Ishin as the product of social and cultural developments that were already apparent in Tokugawa Japan. As someone who had been directly involved in revolutionary movements across Europe, Mechnikov was uniquely positioned to compare the Ishin at the moment of its occurrence with radical movements in the West. His fascination with the "Revolution in Asia" led him to examine it meticulously and to cultivate an extensive network of personal relationships with Ishin participants and intellectual figures in Japan. He further stood out in terms of his preparedness in the Japanese language.¹³ Having attained fluency in Japanese before he went to Japan, Mechnikov studied historical texts, literature, popular pamphlets, and scholarly works unmediated by translation to deepen his knowledge. Furthermore, distancing himself from the diplomatic and merchant communities of the treaty ports, he based his observations of Ishin Japan on his experiences as a private visitor essentially without citizenship, at a time when Westerners who came to Japan were under strict diplomatic protection and patronage.

Mechnikov's Ishin was both rooted ideologically in Russian radical thought and influenced by the perspectives of those in Japan who had lived through it. Thus, as much as Western interpretations of the Ishin were specific to the historical time and space from which they emerged, Mechnikov's accounts warrant historicization.

MECHNIKOV HAD BEEN INSTRUMENTAL in forming the larger discursive space of populism, a radical Russian political doctrine of the 1860s to 1880s. With the heightened state of political repressions in Russia at the time, Russian political dissidents re-

¹² Francis Hall, *Japan through American Eyes: The Journal of Francis Hall, 1859–1866*, ed. F. G. Notehelfer (Princeton, N.J., 1992), 414–415; Isabella Bird, *Unbeaten Tracks in Japan* (Boston, 1984); Ernest Satow, "Letter to F. V. Dickens," in Tetsuo Najita, ed., *Readings in Tokugawa Thought*, 3rd ed. (Chicago, 1998), 297–299.

¹³ Fully intending to travel to Japan in order to observe the "revolution" as it unfolded, Mechnikov went to the Sorbonne in 1872 to attend the only Japanese program in Europe. Mechnikov, "Vospominaniia o dvukhletnei sluzhbe v Iaponii," in Shcherbina, *Iaponiia na perelome*, 25. Dissatisfied with the poor quality and slow pace of education at the Sorbonne, however, he left for Switzerland to seek out Oyama Iwao, a military leader of the Ishin, for one-on-one study. Oyama was on assignment there to study military affairs and French. Yet he selected the Russian revolutionary to be his teacher. The two became so close that they decided to room together.

siding in Europe provided a mouthpiece for the populist cause. Mechnikov played a leading role in this small but active community of émigrés. He served as the tactical organizer of the group's dissident activities and as an articulator of its ideas through his many writings.¹⁴ His actions also extended far beyond the immediate Russian community; in the 1860s and early 1870s, he participated in or assisted revolutionary movements and uprisings in Poland, Spain, France, and Italy. In Italy he even fought and was wounded as a lieutenant in Giuseppe Garibaldi's military campaign for Italian unification.¹⁵

Impressed with the young radical's insights, the widely read émigré social critic Alexander Herzen frequently had Mechnikov contribute to his journal *Kolokol'*, which was banned in Russia. Mechnikov oversaw the opening of the journal's branch in Switzerland. Instrumental in maintaining the émigrés' direct underground ties to intellectual life in Russia, he created and ran an illegal publications transport route from Europe into Russia, which provided Russian readers with works from the émigré community.¹⁶ Mechnikov's steps were recorded in detail and stored in a thick file kept by the tsar's secret police. He used a number of irreverent pseudonyms to further attenuate his relationship to the state, hoping "to remind the Russian government as little as possible of my existence."¹⁷

The larger community of Russian intellectuals that Mechnikov belonged to questioned the narrative of civilizational progress in the West. Widely sharing the perception of a hierarchically bound Europe, Russian intellectuals increasingly believed that the revolutionary movement in the West was incapable of creating an equitable and free society. If some had anticipated the possibility for a new social order with the establishment of the Paris Commune in 1871, the violent suppression of the Communards solidified the belief that much of Europe was immature and ill-prepared for a successful revolution aimed at achieving social equality and justice.

Herzen's influential writings had earlier provided a devastating analysis of the virtual impossibility of a revolution in much of Western Europe, where a hierarchical order and a massive centralized government structure to rule over it were fully in place, instituted over centuries of development. The problem with Europe lay not in the institutional creation of freedoms, which the Russian intelligentsia generally considered to be successful, but in the ingrained customs of daily interaction, which were difficult to alter. Mechnikov's own account of his disenchantment with the revolutionary movement in France echoed the older Herzen's recollections of his experiences with the revolutions in Europe decades earlier. Mechnikov described the suppression of the Paris Commune by a public made up of a privileged class seeking

¹⁴ The Russian secret police considered Mechnikov's writings to be as dangerous as Nikolai Chernyshevskii's "What Is to Be Done?," the so-called bible of the Russian narodniki. Police reports stated that "What Is to Be Done?" and Mechnikov's autobiographical story "Bold Stride," which were published in the same issue of the journal *Sovremennik*, caused the landmark publication to be shut down.

¹⁵ Gosudarstvennyi arkhiv Rossiiskoi federatsii, Moscow (hereafter GARF), f. 6753, op. 1, d. 383, l. 34; Mechnikov, "Bakunin v Italii," *Istoricheskii vestnik*, no. 3 (1897): 824; "Iz perepiski deiatelei osvoboditel'nogo dvizheniia: Materialy iz arkhiva L. I. Mechnikov," in *Literaturnoe nasledstvo: Iz istorii russkoi literatury i obshchestvennoi mysli 1860–1890 gg.* (Moscow, 1977), 463; A. K. Lishina, "Russkii garibal'dits," in S. D. Skazkin, ed., *Rossiia i Italiia* (Moscow, 1968).

¹⁶ Mikhail Bakunin, *Pis'ma M. A. Bakunina k A. I. Gertsenu i N. P. Ogarevu* (St. Petersburg, 1906), 258.

¹⁷ GARF, f. 5770, op. 1, ed. khr. 156. Among the pseudonyms he often used were Leon Brandi and Emil' Denegri.

to maintain power and the uneducated, tradition-bound rural masses.¹⁸ Coming from two generations of Russian intelligentsia, the literary and theoretically oriented "fathers" and the action-oriented "sons," Herzen's and Mechnikov's ideas represented a broad swath of Russian revolutionary experience in Europe.¹⁹ "The European revolution was a failure" had become a cliché with Russian intellectuals by the early 1870s.

For many, the source of a new revolutionary way of life lay within Russia. Following a suggestion by Herzen in 1855, the agrarian lifestyle associated with the Russian agricultural commune came to provide a core principle for future development and revolution. The Russian state, in their view, was a foreign import that had been introduced by force, with no roots in native tradition. The path to revolution in Russia could thus be greatly simplified.²⁰ While the Russian commune served as an example of alternative development for the populist movement, it would be in Ishin Japan, with its radical openness to technological change and new ideas from abroad, that Mechnikov would identify a universal possibility for cooperatist anarchist human progress that transcended the provincialist claims of Slavophiles. Following his stay in Japan, he would acknowledge the severe limitations of the Russian commune as a model for socialist everyday life.²¹

For Mechnikov in the early 1870s, the revolution in Japan provided both a real and a metaphoric alternative to the conservativeness of "old Europe." He responded to the ongoing developments in Japan with sudden determination:

The horizon, which had hung heavy and foul over Europe, shone in the Far East with an unexpectedly bright light. We had been accustomed to thinking of [Japan] as an eternal bulwark of immobility, inertia, and stagnation . . . Japan suddenly stirred, awakened, and with unexpected life came to meet "white civilization," despite the unwise actions of Europe.²²

Mechnikov's resolve to go to Japan thus was not an attempt to go "to the people," in the sense of traveling to enlighten the backward masses and stir their revolutionary instincts. Rather, he was interested in studying the dynamics of a progressive revolution that had been accomplished in the East.

Other Russians who visited Japan during the Ishin similarly described it as a modern revolution unprecedented in Asia. Generally sharing a moral apprehension about the conduct of foreigners in Japan, Russians saw the Western presence as having disturbed as much as fueled the progress that ensued. They described Western Europeans in Japan, from sailors to diplomats, as having a misguided under-

¹⁸ Hokkaido University Northern Studies Special Collections, Hokkaido Colonial Office and Its Foreign Employees, Advisers, and Other Foreigners: Correspondence, Lev Mechnikov report, "La France Sous Mac-Mahon: Résumé politique," November 16, 1873.

¹⁹ My use of "fathers" and "sons" comes from Ivan Turgenev's popular novel on the social problem in Russia, *Fathers and Sons* (1862), which depicts two generations of Russian intellectuals. Mechnikov and Herzen mutually respected one another. Herzen said that Mechnikov was "the only one capable of thinking and writing." Mechnikov, in turn, often said of Herzen that "no man had left a deeper impression on his life." A. I. Herzen, *Sobranie sochinenii*, 30 vols. (Moscow, 1954–1965), 28: 10; and Olga Mechnikov, *The Life of Elie Mechnikov, 1845–1916* (Boston, 1921), 47.

²⁰ Herzen, *Sobranie sochinenii*, 24: 184; 6: 7. Mechnikov had similarly sought an embryo of future socialist development in the commune in the 1860s.

²¹ By 1881, Mechnikov would criticize the idealization of contemporary Russia as some kind of "good kingdom of limitless communalism." Mechnikov, "Obshchina i gosudarstvo v Shveitsarii," *Delo* 6 (1881): 227.

²² Mechnikov, "Vospominaniia," 23.

standing of civilization and progress and failing to incorporate social justice and brotherly love in their idea of universal development.²³ Even the leading Russian Orthodox missionary in Japan, Nikolai, who theoretically stood on the opposite political shore from Mechnikov, held remarkably similar views. Based on his exceptional knowledge of the Japanese language and history and his experiences in Japan during the Ishin, Nikolai viewed the “revolution” as the definitive beginning of a new era of progress predicated on religious faith in which the West had played only a peripheral role. For Nikolai, the Ishin was not just the violent overturning of an old sociopolitical order, but the natural product of a developed commoners’ society. He wrote that the “democratic” order of Japanese life not only had developed over centuries on home soil, but was more advanced than that of the most powerful Western nations. Like Mechnikov, he described the Japanese to Russian readers as among the most educated and cultured people in the world, with a highly developed popular culture rooted in centuries-old traditions of peasant education.²⁴

Grigorii Blagosvetlov, editor of the populist journal *Delo* in St. Petersburg, believed that Mechnikov could provide an account of Ishin Japan that would prove stimulating to the publication’s broad readership. In a letter to Mechnikov, he wrote:

Leaving behind old Europe with her routines and prejudices, you are setting out for a country that is beginning a new period of life. In Japan, everything is being re-created anew. Her awakening is a great and particularly interesting one for Europe to observe . . . Most important for *Delo* would be to give a good general view of the deep-seated reforms that Japan has achieved in recent times. If subjected to a general analysis and well explained, they would be edifying for us.²⁵

In keeping with the meaning of the Japanese term *ishin* as a vision of constructing everything anew, Blagosvetlov contrasted revolutionary Japan with old Europe. Meanwhile, Euro-American concepts of progress relegated the geographical space of the East, which often included Russia, to the temporal position of backwardness. Karl Marx, for example, objectified the “East” as eternally stagnant. He wrote in *Capital* that a true picture of ancient or feudal economies in Western Europe could be deduced from a close study of the “primitive forms” found in contemporary Russia and Japan.²⁶

By redirecting the capacity for progress away from the West, Russian intellectuals in the 1870s began to redraw the map of development and hierarchical order. With Japan seen as a locus of tremendous progress, the divide that marked the geography of difference between a stagnant East and an advanced modern West appeared to dissolve.

²³ See N. Bartoshevskii, *Iaponiia (Ocherki iz zapisok puteshestvennika vokrug sveta): Vzgliad na politicheskuiu i sotsial'nuiu zhizn' naroda* (St. Petersburg, 1868), and M. Veniukov, *Puteshestvie po Priamur'iu, Kitaiu i Iaponii* (Khabarovsk, 1970), 271–280.

²⁴ Iermonakh Nikolai, “Iaponiia s tochki zreniia khristianskoi missii,” *Russkii viestnik* 83, no. 9 (1869): 221–222.

²⁵ GARF, f. 6753, op. 1, ed. khr. 43.

²⁶ Karl Marx, *Selected Writings* (Indianapolis, 1994), 237–239, and Marx, *Kapital* (St. Petersburg, 1872), 616.

MECHNIKOV'S ESTABLISHMENT OF RELATIONSHIPS with likeminded Japanese would lead to a meeting of *ishin* and *revoliutsiia* in Japan. A physical meeting took place between the Russian revolutionary and Japanese radicals. Simultaneously, a dialectical relationship emerged, a meeting between the meanings of *Ishin* and revolution. A new understanding of the *Ishin* as an expression of cooperative civilization would develop out of these revolutionary networks.

In the years before his departure for Japan, Mechnikov had formed close ties with a number of former *shishi*, revolutionary samurai of the *Ishin* who had been sent to Europe to learn about the outside world. His self-identification as a wounded veteran of Garibaldi's war in Italy, graphically illustrated by his pronounced limp and wooden heel, led his Japanese acquaintances to identify him as an internationalist and a populist revolutionary.²⁷ Mechnikov's relationships with the *shishi* were established on an interpersonal and unofficial basis. He recalled, "I conducted all my agreements with Japanese in Europe exclusively in verbal fashion, outside of any official setting, and without any witnesses."²⁸ He was secretly given a private invitation to go to Japan to spend time with Saigō Takamori, a famous *shishi* who had become a charismatic leader in the new Meiji government. Mechnikov was assigned to work personally under Saigō, who would serve as his sole supervisor and patron. As part of the invitation, which was facilitated through Saigō's own family network, Saigō Takamori's younger brother, Saigō Tsugumichi, invited Mechnikov to live with him in his Tokyo home during the latter's stay in Japan.²⁹

At the time that he extended the invitation to Mechnikov, Saigō Takamori had been protesting the Meiji leadership's undignified bureaucratic assaults on the samurai as excessively harsh, particularly their policies toward the already poor country samurai. Saigō claimed that by attacking the warrior class that had fueled the spirit of the revolution and by implementing overly ambitious Westernization projects through greater centralization of the state bureaucracy, the Meiji leaders had betrayed the idealist motives at the root of the *Ishin*. In an attempt to revive a sense of spiritual dignity and idealism among Japan's future leaders, Saigō created a special school in Tokyo, the Shugijuku, to simultaneously develop warrior ethics and teach foreign knowledge. He used the annual stipend he was awarded for his leadership in the *Ishin* to found the school. The Shugijuku in this sense, then, was a linkage point between the national future and those who had died in the revolutionary past. Saigō declared in its charter that there could be no more appropriate way to use his stipend than to support a school to honor the memory of the dead, and to help the living prepare to follow their noble example.³⁰ As an accomplished revolutionary, Mechnikov was invited to serve as director of the Shugijuku as part of Saigō's project to revitalize the spirit of the *Ishin*.

Mechnikov, in turn, described Saigō as a populist revolutionary leader who was one of the common people. He recalled that Saigō had given up his immense power to voice his opposition to the policies of the Meiji government in order to adopt a

²⁷ Kido Takayoshi, *Kido Takayoshi nikki*, vol. 2: 1871–1874 (Tokyo, 1983), 337.

²⁸ Mechnikov, "Vospominaniia," 45.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 44–45.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 28. Saigō Takamori, *Saigō Takamori zenshū*, 6 vols. (Tokyo, 1976–1980), 3: 333.

simple agrarian lifestyle.³¹ Saigō's turn to an agricultural way of life as an expression of his beliefs seemed to fit with Mechnikov's own expectations of revolutionary leadership rooted in democratic and populist ideals. In fact, Saigō resigned from the Meiji government just before Mechnikov arrived in Japan, and the Shugijuku was closed. Saigō would be propelled to the head of the infamous Satsuma Rebellion, in which he led forty thousand troops to overthrow the Meiji government soon after Mechnikov's arrival.

Instead, Mechnikov would fulfill his assignment to inspire revolutionary idealism among his students as an instructor of Russian at the Tokyo School of Foreign Languages (TSFL), a major center for Russian language training.³² As the primary instructor for upper-level courses, he established a program that taught history from below and the Russian literary traditions of polemicism, satire, and critical realism, a curriculum that would be maintained for years thereafter by fellow Russian revolutionaries who came to teach at the school.³³ After Mechnikov's arrival, the program became an autonomous space within the university that some students identified with as an expression of revolutionary idealism. Many students came to view this space as separate from the state and its nation-building projects.

While an instructor at TSFL, Mechnikov developed extensive relationships with people whom he described as "the most important leaders of the Japanese progressive movement."³⁴ They were leaders of the Freedom and People's Rights Movement for social equality and popular political participation, which was gaining momentum throughout Japan. Within a few years of Mechnikov's departure from Japan, activists in the movement would organize almost two hundred political societies across the country. One of the most prominent of those with whom Mechnikov established a relationship was the theoretical leader of the movement, Nakae Chōmin, then president of TSFL.

In their private interactions with Mechnikov, the activists provided him with a unique source of knowledge about their movement. As he himself would acknowledge, much of his understanding of Ishin Japan depended on both his direct observations and his private relationships with a wide range of Japanese friends and acquaintances from all walks of life. His interpretation of the Ishin thus would come as much from his acquaintances as from his own expectations and personal experiences. Mechnikov described the extraordinary care his Japanese friends took to guide him in developing his knowledge of Ishin Japan: "I affectionately guarded [my acquaintances] every day and exploited them unscrupulously for the profit of my studies."³⁵ His interaction with Japanese from a nonhierarchical perspective shaped

³¹ Mechnikov, "Vospominaniia," 44–45. The scholarship on Saigō has neglected this aspect of his thoughts and activities between 1873 and 1877. Scholars have treated Saigō during this period as either preparing for civil war or retiring completely. Charles L. Yates suggests that his interest in adopting an agrarian lifestyle at this time appears to have been quite serious. Yates, *Saigō Takamori: The Man behind the Myth* (London, 1995).

³² Peter Berton, Paul Langer, and Rodger Swearingen, *Japanese Training and Research in the Russian Field* (Los Angeles, 1956), 16.

³³ Thanks to the staff at the Municipal Archive of Hokkaido for helping me to photograph Kojima Kurataro's class notes of Mechnikov's lectures held in the Kojima Kurataro Collection.

³⁴ Mechnikov letter to Mikhail Evgrafovich Saltykov-Shchedrin, in Saltykov-Shchedrin, *Literaturnoe nasledstvo*, 102 vols. (Moscow, 1931–2000), 13–14: 361–362.

³⁵ Mechnikov, "Vospominaniia," 32–34, and Lev Mechnikov, *L'Empire Japonaise: Pays-Peuple-Histoire* (Geneva, 1878), iv.

his knowledge of the event as a revolution from within, and informed him of the corresponding expectations among many in Japan, rooted in revolutionary ideals, for equality and cooperation on the individual, societal, and international levels. In this way, Mechnikov's original idea of *revoliutsiia*, rooted in the claims of Russian populism, fused with the actualities of the Ishin itself and was further shaped by the understanding of *ishin* among those who had led or experienced it.

In turn, the TSFL Russian program would impart knowledge about the Russian revolutionary movement to the Freedom and People's Rights Movement. After Mechnikov assumed the directorship of the program, a series of former populist prisoners and political exiles from Russia took teaching positions there.³⁶ Sixty-five books on Russian populism were published in Japan in 1881–1883 alone, and newspapers were filled with reports about the revolutionary activities in Russia.³⁷ Among the bestselling books in Japan during this period was an account of the Russian revolutionary movement written by Mechnikov's close friend Sergei Stepniak that had been translated for those involved with the movement in Japan. A student of Mechnikov's, Muramatsu Aizō, would lead one of the most infamous incidents of the movement, the Iida Uprising.³⁸ Participants linked their own movement to resurrect the perceived unfulfilled promises for equality in the Ishin with the revolutionary movement in Russia.

Saigō's concern with restoring the spirit of the Ishin had, by virtue of his inviting a Russian revolutionary to Japan, given the movement a new global meaning for human progress and civilization. In both the physical interactions between Russian and Japanese radicals and the resulting coalescing of meanings, *ishin* met *revoliutsiia*. This was a novel meeting that arose in the particular historical juncture of the Meiji Ishin and the Russian revolutionary movement in the wider world context. It emerged beyond the imagined divide between a backward and traditional Orient and a progressive and civilized West.

MECHNIKOV'S FIRST DAYS IN JAPAN were an unsettling encounter with total instability. He heard reports everywhere about an outbreak of uprisings in the south. A number of Ishin leaders with whom he had associated in Switzerland were involved. His patron, Saigō, had resigned from his post and left Tokyo.³⁹ "My situation was made all the more desperate by my complete lack of knowledge, my inability to orient myself," Mechnikov wrote of the chaos he found in Japan.⁴⁰ What he knew about

³⁶ Watanabe Masaji, a professor of Russian at Tokyo University of Foreign Languages (formerly TSFL), documents the "populist spirit" that continued at the school after Mechnikov in "Mechinikofu to Muramatsu Aizō," in Hara Teruyuki and Togawa Tsuguo, eds., *Surabu to nihon* (Tokyo, 1995), 133–156. Andrei Kolenko, for example, who taught at TSFL for more than six years, had been imprisoned and exiled for his political activities. In his recitation class, students were asked to memorize and recite poems subversive of the existing sociopolitical establishment, often reflecting radical populist thought or recalling the life of the political exile. Other political émigrés who taught in TSFL's Russian program were S. Iu. Gotskii-Danilovich, Nikolai Gray, and Aleksandr Stepanovich Bogomolov. *Kokuritsu kobun-roku monbusho no bu*, March 3, Meiji 9 (1876), 2A-25-1768; December 11, Meiji 9 (1876).

³⁷ Asukai Masamichi, "Roshia dai ichiji kakumei to Kōtoku Shūsui," *Shisō* 520 (October 1967): 1328.

³⁸ Watanabe, "Mechinikofu to Muramatsu Aizō."

³⁹ Mechnikov, "Vospominaniia," 42–47.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, 45.



FIGURE 1: Lev Mechnikov in samurai dress. Photograph courtesy of the State Archive of the Russian Federation. An examination of Mechnikov's encounter with Ishin Japan suggests that he identified with Ishin samurai not as relics of Oriental difference, but as cohorts for revolutionary change.

the Ishin and Japanese history from reading European books and journals was not enough to prepare him for what he witnessed and experienced in Japan. Mechnikov would be led to describe the Ishin as a conflict-ridden and multilayered experience, full of contradictions and competing claims about its meaning for Japan's future. Out of these observations would come his particular fascination with what he saw as the social foundation for a revolution from within, the nature of which seemed to be the opposite of the path of centralization and bureaucratization taken by Japanese political leaders.⁴¹

Mechnikov viewed Japan's revolution as offering the West a model for radical social reform. He observed the institutional and social elimination of hierarchical class structures and the creation of vast arenas of social mobility for the common people. He further noted that access to new knowledge had opened up on a vast scale.⁴² After traveling across Japan, staying at rural homes and visiting plebeian quarters of the cities, as well as factories and the Ashio copper mine, he wrote, "It is impossible not to be surprised at her unusual transformation. This is a complete and radical revolution, the kind we know only from history . . . Not a single branch of social and political life has remained untouched in this revolution."⁴³

Mechnikov's discussions of the historical developments within Japan that had led up to the Ishin were remarkably detailed. He noted that commentators had overly exaggerated the influence of American and European interference in Japanese affairs. He also refuted the testimonies of other foreign witnesses who explained the Ishin as simply a reactionary uprising against trade agreements with foreigners. Mechnikov believed that the Ishin had arisen out of cumulative domestic dissatisfaction and strife and was only exacerbated by the foreign presence.⁴⁴ It was a conscious response from a broad-based constituency to the need for progressive, liberal reforms, which they believed would be instituted with the overthrow of the Tokugawa government. The so-called patriots, or *shishi*, who emerged from the educated class had defined their goal as overthrowing the shogunate and the entire political order that came with it. Mechnikov told his readers that the *shishi* came from a variety of economic backgrounds, and could be identified mainly by their literacy and education. He pointed out that they had a shared social consciousness, and were willing to give up their status for the betterment of society as a whole.⁴⁵ The leaders of the revolution were committed to "change and replace not only the political structures, but also the very social essence of Japanese life."⁴⁶ The Ishin was thus not just about

⁴¹ For example, Mechnikov observed those Japanese elites "strolling down Parisian boulevards," and their leaders, "erecting progress and centralization according to the Napoleonic model," as "having hardly any understanding of the details and particularities of Japanese life." Ibid., 31–32.

⁴² See, for example, *ibid.*, 67–68; Mechnikov, "Era prosveshcheniia Iaponii," 76–77; Mechnikov, "Era iaponskogo prosveshcheniia," in Shcherbina, *Iaponiia na perelome*, 122–123.

⁴³ Mechnikov, "Era prosveshcheniia Iaponii," 76.

⁴⁴ Mechnikov, "Vospominaniia," 46–47; Mechnikov, "Era prosveshcheniia Iaponii," 88.

⁴⁵ In Élisée Reclus, ed., *Nouvelle géographie universelle*, 19 vols. (Paris, 1876–1894), 7: 847; Mechnikov, "Era prosveshcheniia Iaponii," 92–93. Japanese historians have since found that a considerable number of revolutionaries in the Ishin came from wealthy upper-class farm families. See, for example, Haga Noboru, *Bakumatsu kokugaku no kenkyū* (Tokyo, 1978). On the development of Tokugawa-era literary networks that would serve to unite radicals and revolutionaries across status lines, see Eiko Ikegami, *Bonds of Civility: Aesthetic Networks and the Political Origins of Japanese Culture* (New York, 2005).

⁴⁶ Mechnikov, "Era prosveshcheniia Iaponii," 80.

a single leader seizing power, or a coup by self-serving elites, as most Westerners believed; it was a social and political revolution with all the attendant demands and expectations.

At the same time, the revolution necessitated successful social *evolution*. Japan's arrival on the stage of world civilization was not an arbitrary act or a historical accident, but "an unavoidable result of Japanese life itself."⁴⁷ Throughout his various writings about the Ishin, for example, Mechnikov repeatedly drew upon Ōshio Heihachiro's 1837 "democratic" uprising, as he called it, as a symbolic action that disclosed the accumulation of intellectual developments over the course of the Tokugawa period.⁴⁸ It was the result not of a collision between a primitive, isolated society and an advanced civilization, he said, but of historical developments within Japan that had been under way for centuries.

Mechnikov discovered that even amid tremendous political and social chaos, the common people were able to go about their daily lives without direction from above. He noted that physical laborers in Japan had a remarkably developed consciousness of social participation, equal to that in other sectors of society. One of his strongest impressions was of the proud and confident boatmen who had greeted his ship when it first arrived. They were "brilliantly tattooed and stately figures, whose naked bodies were covered with bright white, blue, and red images of female faces, dragons, flowers, fossilized in fantastic arabesques."⁴⁹ Body tattoos or *irezumi* had become popular in the seventeenth century among laborers. Usually telling a story through their multicolored designs, they were a response to Tokugawa laws that dictated clothing styles on the basis of class. Laborers who wanted to express uniqueness often shed their government-sanctioned commoners' garb and instead wore nothing at all—except for the tattoos that covered their bodies.⁵⁰ Mechnikov found in the tattoos an expression of wit, aesthetic taste, and social pride. He conveyed to his readers that these people were not the legendary repressed and cowering dark masses of Oriental despotism, but vocal commoners, enthusiastic individuals with pride in their labor for society. Mechnikov seemed to have stumbled upon the bright masses of revolution.⁵¹

For Mechnikov, the Ishin was the revolution of the century. That social revolution was the result of cumulative social and intellectual evolution was further evidenced by the voluntary cooperative associations that he encountered across Japan. He found urban groups of volunteers who worked from their home regions as part of an active network involved with mutual aid. In this voluntary support system, Mech-


⁴⁷ Mechnikov, "Era iaponskogo prosveshcheniia," 116–117, 134.

⁴⁸ Mechnikov, "Era prosveshcheniia Iaponii," 86; Mechnikov, "Era iaponskogo prosveshcheniia," 117.

⁴⁹ Mechnikov, "Vospominaniia," 37.

⁵⁰ Mechnikov, "Era prosveshcheniia Iaponii," 55–56. Meanwhile, American and British travelers to Japan largely saw the tattoos as an exotic, savage custom reminiscent of an uncivilized, if idealized, Nature. Christine M. E. Guth, *Longfellow's Tattoos: Tourism, Collecting, and Japan* (Seattle, Wash., 2004), 142–158.

⁵¹ This view of a developed social and political consciousness among commoners during this period is echoed in more recent studies of commoners' participation in the Freedom and People's Rights Movement. Irokawa Daikichi and Roger Bowen attribute a widespread political consciousness and desire for social and political equality to substantial popular organization and participation in the movement. Irokawa, *The Culture of the Meiji Period* (Princeton, N.J., 1984); Roger Bowen, *Rebellion and Democracy in Meiji Japan* (Berkeley, Calif., 1980).



JAPONAIS TATOUÉ.

Dessin de E. Ronjat, d'après une photographie.

FIGURE 2: Tattooed laborer. Illustration for the entry on Japan in Reclus, ed., *Nouvelle géographie universelle*, 7: 769, which relied heavily on Mechnikov's contribution.

nikov saw the rootedness of cooperative practice in everyday existence. He observed that when the new Meiji government failed to provide institutional support for the demographic shift to urban centers, the economy depended on these informal local networks to help those in need. Students attending schools far from home benefited from voluntary cooperative associations back in their hometowns, which pooled vil-

lagers' money to help pay for their studies. The expressions of mutual aid that Mechnikov saw as integral to the revolutionary emergence of modern Japan were rooted in Tokugawa intellectual traditions.⁵²

Mutual aid as a progressive tendency in Ishin Japan was indicated by people's tremendous will to learn and to actively acquire new knowledge and techniques from others. The act of learning was thus not an expression of inferiority in relation to the object of study, but an indication of progressiveness of thought. Mechnikov described the active, bold, selective acquisition of European methods and ideas as evincing a cooperative ethic that, through a willingness to learn from the outside world and to establish mutually beneficial relations with others, was instrumental for civilizational progress. He emphasized that acquiring knowledge was a conscious act that the learner selectively manipulated as a tool for national well-being, rather than an inevitable divine flow of reason from civilized to uncivilized, West to East.⁵³ Instead of serving as a model for Westernization, Ishin Japan's rapid modernization offered an example of selective development in which scientific, technical, and intellectual advancements were rooted in cooperative values.⁵⁴

A number of Mechnikov's observations echoed interpretations of the Ishin then circulating among Japanese from commoners to intellectuals. Historian Irokawa Daikichi claims that millions of commoners believed that the Ishin was a revolution from within that would negate all divisions, achieve equality for all classes, and create a new world order that would include equality among nations.⁵⁵ Moreover, the idea of long-term evolution appears to have been circulating widely even among Japanese commoners at the time that Mechnikov was in Japan. Ishin-era commoners studied the history of political protests in Tokugawa Japan, focusing on the same Ōshio uprising that Mechnikov cited in his writings. Like Mechnikov, they used such incidents to question the assumption that the concept of popular rights was a recent import from the West.⁵⁶

Furthermore, Japanese commoners themselves used the language of mutual aid to give moral meaning to the Ishin. A widely circulated pamphlet on international commerce published in 1868 by the Osaka merchant Katō Sukeichi gave moral meaning to the practices of merchants, formerly the lowest class in the Tokugawa social order, by encouraging international trade as an expression of mutual aid. The pamphlet used a commonsense ethical vocabulary shared by many in Japan at the

⁵² Mechnikov, "Vospominaniia," 67–68. For suggestive essays on cooperatives within the Japanese context, see Tetsuo Najita, "Political Economy in Thought and Practice among Commoners in Nineteenth Century Japan," *The Japan Foundation Newsletter* 16, no. 3 (1988): 12–18; and Najita, "Past in Present: Danpenteki Gensetsu to Sengo Seishinshi," *The Journal of Pacific Asia* 3 (1996): 3–32.

⁵³ See, for example, Mechnikov, "Era iaponskogo prosveshcheniia," 108; Mechnikov, "Era prosveshcheniia Iaponiia," 102–103.

⁵⁴ Mechnikov's observations reflected widespread practices of cooperatist self-organization among commoners. Cooperatives expanded in a variety of forms following industrialization in Japan. Every Japanese town and village had some type of cooperative association. In 1923, for example, 14,000 cooperatives existed in Japan, with almost 3 million members nationwide. In 1935 in Hokkaido, 40.7 percent of all households were members of a cooperative, while in the Far Eastern Mountain region, 83.2 percent of all households were in cooperatives. Recognizing the role of cooperatives in the economy, the Japanese government actively supported them. Galen M. Fisher, "The Cooperative Movement in Japan," *Pacific Affairs* 11, no. 4 (December 1938): 478, 483–484.

⁵⁵ Irokawa, *The Culture of the Meiji Period*, 60.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, 48.

time to explain the moral value of international commerce.⁵⁷ For Katō, trade was a reciprocal provision (*oginau*) of goods that expressed mutual aid (*ai tasukeau*) as the truth or essential principle of human action (*hito tarino dōri*).⁵⁸ To trade surplus goods was to provide "strangers with what they have a need for, and thus to fulfill the duty of benevolence," Katō wrote.⁵⁹ Other countries were described as partners in mutual assistance through economic exchange. In this way, Katō's original text conveyed neither a sense of the foreignness of international trade nor the superiority of the West. The references in the treatise to language from an 1868 Ishin document called the Charter Oath reflected one interpretation of the Ishin as an ongoing revolutionary experience imbued with moral promise for the new sociopolitical order.⁶⁰ Katō thereby framed mutual aid as a means to fulfill the Ishin's promise of social equity.

A comparison of two translations from this Ishin-period text, one into Russian by Mechnikov and the other into English by the prominent British Japanologist Lord William George Aston, shows how they clarified the competing directions of progress that Japan's opening implied and thereby gave added meaning to the text. Mechnikov emphasized mutual aid throughout his translation as a basis for Japan's post-revolutionary development independent of the Western model of capitalism. Aston, on the other hand, interpreted the text as Katō's assertion that Japan had embarked on a path to join the community of civilized capitalist nation-states as an expression of a universal law of progress. Both Aston and Mechnikov appear to have conscientiously attempted to produce translations that were as true to the original as possible. Yet through only slight variations in their choice of words, they produced very different texts on the historical meaning of *kaikoku*.

Meaningful contrasts can be found throughout their translations, as can a sense of the different futures that the two men projected. For example, Aston translated one particular passage as follows:

Our Mikado has become convinced of the necessity of upholding the policy of commercial relations, and has caused our friendly intercourse and trade with foreign countries to be established on a liberal scale. This is the only course by which we can take our place in the community of nations, and remain true to natural principles of truth and justice.⁶¹

According to this version, "natural principles of truth and justice" can be achieved only by joining the community of nation-states, and by participating in capitalist interactions with the West. Free trade was to be conducted within the

⁵⁷ Katō Sukeichi, *Kōeki kokoro e gusa* (n.p., 1868). Although Katō's pamphlet circulated widely at the time of its publication, surprisingly little is known about Katō himself. A local Yokohama history study group uncovered some details about his earlier life, *Kaikō eno bakushin ryochū nikki* (Yokohama, 1996), but further study on him is overdue.

⁵⁸ Katō, *Kōeki kokoro e gusa*, 4.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 5–6.

⁶⁰ The Charter Oath, a document issued to the public in the name of the emperor in 1868, promised a series of revolutionary changes. The Oath would become a touchstone for much of the political contention in Japan in following decades. By borrowing language from it, Katō gave his discussion the weight of revolutionary meaning associated with the Ishin document. His text emphasized that Japan's opening should be in harmony with the just laws of nature, language reminiscent of the Charter Oath. International trade was thus to be practiced in a consciously moral manner as an expression of mutual aid, in accordance with the perceived promises of the Ishin. Aston and Mechnikov's translations can be seen as competing interpretations of the term "laws of nature" in revolutionary Japan.

⁶¹ W. G. Aston, "Remarks on Commerce by Katō Sukeichi," *The Phoenix* 20 (February 1872): 118.

limited community of civilized nation-states and “on a liberal scale.” This referred to the Western model of the liberal state as the protector of the liberal values of freedom of the individual and the rights of private property. For Aston, who would serve in British consular offices in Japan for twenty-three years and who would become the first British consul general in Korea, the liberal state of the West represented the basic unit for peace and order in the international arena. In its maintenance of free trade through support of international law and preservation of private property, the Western political model was the embodiment of “natural” (and therefore universal, or “true”) principles of liberty and “justice.”⁶²

Mechnikov translated the same passage thus:

Our Mikado has become convinced of the necessity to maintain friendly relations with them; only in this way can we take our proper place in the ranks of other nations, *without backing down from the principle of mutual aid and equity*.⁶³

This version posed the alternative phrase “mutual aid and equity” as the principles of truth and justice that needed to be defended, *despite* Japan’s participation in the Western community of nation-states. This implied that the international community of Western nation-states and the political and economic code of behavior on which that community depended were neither natural nor just. In the process of clarifying for his Russian readers Katō’s departure from Western understandings of international trade and relations, Mechnikov had given Katō’s text added polemical meaning.

In Aston’s version, moreover, free trade by virtue of its existence naturally leads to the mutual benefit and prosperity of everyone involved.⁶⁴ In Mechnikov’s version, trade is beneficial for the parties involved only “if it is done according to the demands of fairness and mutual aid.”⁶⁵ Mutual aid was something to be consciously achieved and practiced, not simply a natural outcome of capitalism.

Aston’s translation conveyed the inevitability of Japan’s opening up to capitalism and the modernity of the West. For the most part, his language reflects the interpretation of *kaikoku* and *Ishin* that we still use today. Mechnikov removed the inevitability of merging with the West’s modernity, and put the focus and meaning of future development in another arena altogether.

Out of the above dialectical interaction of knowledge with experience, expectation, and transnational contact, Mechnikov came to see the *Ishin* as a revolutionary fulfillment and model for his developing vision of human progress.⁶⁶ The *Ishin*

⁶² On the invention of the “state of nature” and its influence on the practice and idea of the international in the West, see Jahn, *The Cultural Construction of International Relations*.

⁶³ Mechnikov, “Era prosveshcheniia Iaponii,” 99; my emphasis.

⁶⁴ Aston translated, “At present, there is every reason to believe that any petition asking permission to form companies after the European model, will, if presented to the proper authorities, be favorably received as a proposal eminently conducive to the prosperity of the people of Japan. There is nothing to prevent such associations from being durably established.” Aston, “Remarks,” 119.

⁶⁵ Mechnikov translated it as follows: “Now, if someone requests from the government permission to establish trade associations based on the European model, the government not only will not refuse, but will be very pleased. Because the time has come when Japan must have its own system of durable associations, *founded on the principles of mutual aid and equity*. Only in this way can our commercial development expand.” Mechnikov, “Era prosveshcheniia Iaponii,” 99–100; my emphasis.

⁶⁶ Russian scholars on Mechnikov have asserted, in contrast, that Mechnikov viewed the *Ishin* as an unfinished bourgeois revolution. See, for example, K. S. Kartasheva, *Dorogi L’va Mechnikova* (Mos-

emerged for him as an idea and relative accomplishment of a nonhierarchical, co-operative society, and by virtue of its location in Asia, opened up the possibility for its realization on a global scale. For Mechnikov, the notion of revolution was now inseparable from social evolution.

MECHNIKOV RETURNED TO SWITZERLAND in 1876 with an intellectual key that would open the door to a new era, a beginning for a new human history. He conveyed the progressiveness of the revolution in Japan in books and several series of articles for influential journals in Russia and Europe during the 1870s and 1880s. With the publication of his historical and ethnographical studies, *L'Empire Japonais*, and his contribution to the chapters on Japan and China in *Nouvelle géographie universelle*, an authoritative encyclopedia on world geography compiled by the anarchist theorist Élisée Reclus, he became recognized as one of the top Japanologists in Europe.⁶⁷

Simultaneously, Mechnikov would provide an intellectual foundation for the development of one of the principal currents of modern anarchist thought. In the late 1870s and 1880s, leading anarchists spoke of evolution in Social Darwinist terms. Reclus defined evolution for those in the West as the rising consciousness among the masses of the need for solidarity to overthrow the ruling classes in a violent struggle.⁶⁸ Viewing Western Europe as at the highest level of social evolution, Reclus defined progress for the rest of the world as its inevitable Europeanization and homogenization.⁶⁹ At the time, anarchism was synonymous with violence and terrorism, used by elites in an attempt to stir the masses to revolt. Peter Kropotkin and Reclus supported terrorist acts of "propaganda by the deed" and popular expropriation of property by force.

Mechnikov then shifted the focus of anarchism to a distinct vision of universal human evolutionary development. His contributions to anarchist theory, which have been entirely forgotten in the history of the movement, were inseparable from his interpretations of the Ishin.⁷⁰ While revolution was for Mechnikov a real stepping-stone toward anarchism, he envisioned a future cooperatist anarchist civilization that would be hard-won and dependent on a highly developed culture at all levels of society. That civilization would be achieved through the widespread development of a cooperatist consciousness and corresponding social practices. After his encounter with Ishin Japan, Mechnikov saw mutual aid as a natural law for civilizational progress toward "anarchy."

cow, 1981), 23; and A. A. Shcherbina, "L. I. Mechnikov—Sovremennik i issledovatel' burzhuaznoi revoliutsii v Iaponii," in Shcherbina, *Iaponiia na perelome*, 3–22.

⁶⁷ Documentation of Mechnikov's achievements in Japanology can be found in his personal archive in GARF, f. 6753, op. 1, dd. 36 and 38. See also Reclus, *Nouvelle géographie universelle*, vol. 7, and Reclus, "Predislovie Elize Reklü," in Mechnikov, *Tsivilizatsiia i velikie istoricheskie reki: Stat'i*, ed. V. I. Evdokimov (Moscow, 1995), 219.

⁶⁸ Mechnikov, "Revolution and Evolution," *The Contemporary Review*, September 1886, 412–437; Reclus, *Evolution et Révolution* (Geneva, 1880, 1884; Paris, 1891).

⁶⁹ Marie Fleming, *The Geography of Freedom: The Odyssey of Élisée Reclus* (Montreal, 1988), 180–183.

⁷⁰ Even works on Russian anarchism do not mention Mechnikov's name. See, for example, Martin A. Miller, *Kropotkin* (Chicago, 1976); Caroline Cahm, *Kropotkin and the Rise of Revolutionary Anarchism, 1872–1886* (Cambridge, 1989); Paul Avrich, *The Russian Anarchists* (New York, 1978).

In 1789, French revolutionaries had envisioned that an enlightened government would fashion a new nation on the basis of grand abstract ideals. According to this idea, the rational being had the right to rule the less rational. Meanwhile, “philosopher kings” had no place in Mechnikov’s understanding of Ishin as the new vision of the future world. Mechnikov believed that the “old order” lay in unexpected places, in oneself and in one’s everyday interactions with others.⁷¹ The accomplishments of a successful revolution ultimately depended on the mundane, on people’s struggle for existence rather than self-sacrifice for abstract moral or political causes. Instead of the grand illusions of utopia, Mechnikov looked to achievements in everyday life. Change came about when people responded to necessity in ways that fostered a cooperative ethic. Human agency arising out of the basic human needs of daily life was for Mechnikov the source of progress for civilization.

Viewing Social Darwinism as merely the straitjacketing of Darwin’s discoveries into a Malthusian framework of competition for limited resources, Mechnikov criticized Marx and other contemporaries for echoing Malthus’s ideas in their views of society.⁷² On this point, Mechnikov was part of a wider sphere of Russian intellectual efforts, particularly in the scientific world, to discredit the Darwinist metaphor of competitive survival of the fittest as the engine of natural evolution. This anti-Darwinian understanding was so common among Russian intellectuals that Daniel P. Todes termed it a “national style” of reaction to Darwin.⁷³ Russian biologists—prominent among whom was Lev Mechnikov’s younger brother Ilya, who would go on to win the Nobel Prize for his phagocytic theory of inflammation—sought a law of evolutionary development in the animal and plant world that was fueled not by competition and struggle, but by cooperation. At the time of Lev’s scholarship on Japan, this effort was still limited to the fields of natural science. Lev integrated the basic ideas of cooperation in evolutionary development among animals into his studies of culture, society, and civilizational development.⁷⁴ It took his encounter with the progressive revolutionary society of Ishin Japan for him to fashion an idea from the Russian natural sciences into an anarchist law of human civilizational development.

Mechnikov concluded that the cooperative aspect of human nature is stimulated by the natural environment. The more difficult and dangerous that environment, the greater the obstacles to survival, the more developed is human consciousness of the need for social cooperation in order to overcome those obstacles. Survival of the fittest, then, is accomplished not through individual or collective competition, but in social cooperation to surmount the obstacles placed before us.⁷⁵ Mechnikov wrote:

Nature gives its inhabitants a choice: *death or solidarity*. There are no other paths for humanity. If humanity does not want to die, then people must unavoidably resort to solidarity

⁷¹ This understanding can be found, for example, in Mechnikov’s unpublished report to his sponsors in Japan, “La France Sous Mac-Mahon.”

⁷² Mechnikov, “Revolution and Evolution,” 430.

⁷³ Daniel P. Todes, “Darwin’s Malthusian Metaphor and Russian Evolutionary Thought, 1859–1917,” *Isis* 78, no. 4 (December 1987): 538.

⁷⁴ Mechnikov, “Revolution and Evolution”; Mechnikov, “Shkola bor’by v sotsiologii,” in Mechnikov, *Tsivilizatsiia*, 186–192; Mechnikov, *Tsivilizatsiia*, 238–253. Mechnikov refers to ichthyologist K. F. Kessler’s landmark talk on the “law of mutual aid” in nature, published as “O zakone vziamnoi pomoshchi,” *Trudy Sankt-Peterburgskogo Obshchestva Estestvoipyatelei* 2, no. 1 (1880): 124–127.

⁷⁵ Mechnikov, *Tsivilizatsiia*, 273–282.

and mutual, collective work . . . This is the culmination of the great law of progress and the law of the successful development of human civilization.⁷⁶

In this way of thinking, human civilization was not attained by eliminating the weak to enrich the strong. Mechnikov redefined culture as human achievements gained through mutual aid.

Mechnikov had observed in Japan that a collaborative response to the challenges of nature provided a major impetus for cultural and social creativity. As he described it, the mountain ranges divided the island nation into so many different communities that there was wide linguistic variety across the different regions, to the point that the language spoken in one area could not be understood elsewhere. Those divisions of the island had also forced its inhabitants to develop a political order that for millennia had consisted largely of small, autonomous federations. In addition, the ruthlessness and violence of the ocean had compelled the people to develop a highly cooperative and therefore highly developed culture.⁷⁷

Mutual aid as a factor of modern civilizational development was dependent on one's capacity to express multiple talents and thereby to play multiple roles in society. There were an infinite number of co-actors, and thus there were infinite possibilities for mutual gain. As a society advanced over time, the spheres in which mutual aid could be practiced became ever broader. Individual uniqueness was maintained in the very act of cooperation, as cooperation itself required the incorporation of various capabilities and thoughts to be successful. In Mechnikov's thinking, an individual is capable of cooperation only by maintaining her or his own unique talents.⁷⁸ This view of human existence became the basis for his thoughts on freedom and social equality. Freedom was achieved not by separating oneself from others, but rather by doing for others. The individual merged with others in the act of doing, but without the loss of individual uniqueness.

What was society for Mechnikov? He severely criticized what he termed the "Struggle School" of sociology. Adherents of this view categorized societies as stable entities defined by ethnicity, race, or class, ordered along a hierarchy of civilizational development. In describing a never-ending competition for existence, they implied the eventual disappearance of the weaker social elements. For Mechnikov, human society and culture were continuously evolving expressions of the laws of nature.⁷⁹ He divided the world into three spheres of activity—inorganic, biological, and sociological—each with its own set of natural laws. The inorganic sphere consisted of physical and chemical processes that could be explained by Isaac Newton's law of gravity. The biological sphere was defined by expressions of the desires for food and sex, and incorporated the world of plant and animal individualities, which competed and changed in accordance with Charles Darwin's law of the struggle for existence. Mechnikov further proposed a new, third sphere of development, which he termed sociological. It incorporated the world of associations and networks, the world of interests beyond the boundaries of individual biological existence. He defined this

⁷⁶ Ibid., 443.

⁷⁷ Mechnikov, "Vospominaniia," 29–31, 39.

⁷⁸ Mechnikov, *Tsivilizatsiia*, 85–99.

⁷⁹ Mechnikov, "Shkola bor'by v sotsiologii."

space as the sphere of cooperation, which included both human and nonhuman interactions.⁸⁰

According to Mechnikov, one sphere followed another in order of increasing complexity and variety of processes and forms.⁸¹ In turn, he defined society as consisting of complex and expanding varieties of cooperative associations and networks. Society, therefore, did not exist as a stable, concrete entity or entities primordially defined, but rather was constantly being formed and re-formed in a progression of social life. This cooperative sphere contained expanding possibilities for associating with and doing for others.

Finding the roots and possibilities of a progressive culture of mutual aid in Japan had enabled Mechnikov to develop a global application for cooperatist civilizational development. This essentially de-centered the world away from the West, and gave centeredness to what had always been the referent of backwardness. The "West," then, suddenly became backward with respect to the demands of progress and civilization. Westerners arrived in Japan ill-prepared to meet the Meiji Ishin on cooperative terms. Commodore Matthew Perry's initiation of peaceful relations through the persuasion of force was a barbaric introduction of Western "civilization," Mechnikov wrote.⁸²

By reconstituting time, Mechnikov had reconceptualized the world order. However, while the West had lost its inherent superiority, a new problem emerged. Mechnikov had created another hierarchy by using Ishin Japan as a model of revolutionary achievement. If time created a hierarchy based on its measurement of progress, nature might be able to level out that hierarchy by creating difference, that is, different paths to the attainment of cooperatist civilization colored but not determined by human interactions with various environments.⁸³ In nature lay the source of humans' freedom to determine a society's own path to cooperatist development beyond primordial identifications of ethnicity and race. Nature provided Mechnikov with the possibility for a heterodoxy of developmental forms.

A dominant conception of nature and history in the West during the last decades of the nineteenth century had come to embody a hierarchical order that Mechnikov sought to overturn. He severely criticized racially ordered versions of Social Darwinism, which took an extreme form among eugenicists, who proposed that a new, just social order could be built through the natural selection of a special race of people.⁸⁴ Mechnikov went beyond the assumptions of nineteenth-century anthropologists who treated the different human races as different species, either in actuality or in essence.⁸⁵ For him, ethnic or racial amalgamation in a society was a progressive quality, which had characterized and contributed to the great civilizations of the past: "Generally speaking, the great historical civilizations were the re-

⁸⁰ Ibid., 164–165.

⁸¹ Ibid.

⁸² Mechnikov, *L'Empire Japonaise*, ii; Mechnikov, "Vospominaniia," 67–68; Mechnikov, "Era prosveshcheniia Iaponii," 76–77, Mechnikov, "Era iaponskogo prosveshcheniia," 122–123.

⁸³ Mechnikov differentiates his work from geographical determinism in *Tsivilizatsiia*, 262, 323.

⁸⁴ Ibid., 290–310.

⁸⁵ According to John S. Haller, Jr., Charles Darwin explained the phenomenon of races as "various human types that 'remained distinct for a long period.' In such cases, the varieties might just as well be called species." Haller, "The Species Problem: Nineteenth-Century Concepts of Racial Inferiority in the Origin of Man Controversy," *American Anthropologist* 72 (1970): 1319–1329.

sult of cooperative work by the most complex blend of different ethnological elements, a blend in which it was impossible to even roughly determine and sort out the participation of 'whites,' 'yellows,' and 'blacks.'"⁸⁶ In his use of externally visible traits to identify various peoples, Mechnikov applied nineteenth-century scientific approaches to the study of racial origins. Yet his conclusion that racial and ethnic mixing was natural and linked with cultural development departed from those traditions. Combining his observations of body structure, facial features, and skin color with his hypotheses about the origins of Japanese cultural practices, Mechnikov identified people in Japan as being of diverse interethnic origins. For example, he noted that the widespread predilection for public nudity in Japan was absent elsewhere in East Asia: "In connection with several other indicators, this naturally led me to think that the ancestors of this teeming crowd before me must have come not from the Asian continent, but from the tropical islands, populated to this day with diverse and little-studied interethnic Malay-Polynesian tribes."⁸⁷ He was further struck by the diverse features and variety of skin tones that he saw.⁸⁸ He concluded, "The Japanese type represents much greater variation and fluctuation than the population type of any European country, and this alone is sufficient to suggest that today's Japanese nation originated from multiple tribal elements."⁸⁹

Mechnikov also emphasized the influence of people's surroundings on their behavior, which was in keeping with European trends in social science at the time. However, his approach and conclusions differed from what Paul Rabinow has described as the shared interest of "regulating the normal" among social scientists in late-nineteenth-century France. According to Rabinow, French sociologists' examinations of people's surroundings were a response to the need to provide a powerful social glue for class antagonisms. The sociologists were ultimately seeking external factors controllable by the state that could regulate the collective behavior of society, whether of the French working class or its colonial peoples.⁹⁰ Meanwhile, Mechnikov emphasized human agency, people's creative ability to overcome adverse surroundings. Rather than striving to create an environment in which human behavior could be directly controlled, he endeavored to reveal how human beings use their wits and strengths within a powerful natural environment to create positive conditions for the collective good.⁹¹

He came to see the cultures of port cities and islands, where the powerful forces of the ocean and the wrath of its storms made existence precarious, as likely sites for advanced cooperative social development. This idea could be affirmed by studying areas that were considered primitive or undeveloped. Between his departure from Japan in 1876 and his death a decade later, Mechnikov traveled to island nations and ports across the Pacific, including San Francisco, Hawaii, Thailand, Indonesia, Vietnam, Sri Lanka, and Singapore, to further explore this idea.⁹²

In his final, culminating work, *Civilization and the Great Historical Rivers*, Mech-

⁸⁶ Mechnikov, *Tsivilizatsiia*, 300.

⁸⁷ Mechnikov, "Vospominaniia," 54; Mechnikov, "Era prosveshcheniia Iaponii," 103.

⁸⁸ Mechnikov, "Vospominaniia," 56.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 57.

⁹⁰ Paul Rabinow, *The French Modern: Norms and Forms of the Social Environment* (Chicago, 1989).

⁹¹ See, for example, Mechnikov, *Tsivilizatsiia*, 262.

⁹² GARF, f. 6753, op. 1, d. 38; GARF, f. 6753, op. 1, d. 67, ll. 1-2.

nikov ordered space and time to reveal the general progression of human beings from coerced cooperation among early civilizations, toward increasing levels of voluntary mutual aid in the form of free associations. He observed that the achievement of freedom had been integrally associated with human societies' relationship with water as the source both of life and of hardship and the struggle for survival. Only through cooperation, not competition, were humans capable of surviving and controlling water and thereby producing increasingly complex and advanced societies. While peoples such as the Cossacks were undoubtedly free, Mechnikov wrote, they were lacking in mutual cooperation, and thereby represented a primitive form of human civilization.⁹³ From the river civilizations to the civilizations on the seas, and finally ending with oceanic civilizations, where people's everyday lives revolved around the most dangerous and inhumane bodies of water, humans developed more advanced, cooperative societies. In this picture, while technology itself was not a measure of human progress, it was a frequent companion to progress when used collaboratively for survival.

Mechnikov's new construct of civilizational progress incorporated existing ideals predicated on a hierarchy of social competition and capitalism as only one stage in the advancement of the world toward increasingly complex cooperative human relations. He divided world history into three major periods, each characterized by a corresponding sociopolitical type. The River Period, when the Euphrates and Tigris, Indus and Ganges, Yellow River and Yangtze became the cradle of civilization, was characterized by unprecedented despotism. The Sea Period began with the moment of the appearance of cross-sea trade and the cultural interactions of the Greeks and Romans. Oligarchy became the fundamental form of government among these societies. The most recent, modern period, the Ocean Period, began with the declaration of human rights. Mechnikov divided the Ocean Period into two stages: the Atlantic Era, which spanned the opening of America to the beginning of gold fever in Alaska and Russia's colonization of its eastern region; and the Global Epoch, which was to be the period of greatest human cooperation and anarchy, given impetus by interactions across the Pacific toward the end of the nineteenth century and the rise in internationalisms among people on the non-state level.⁹⁴ Before his death in 1888, Mechnikov had planned to write two more volumes of *Civilization*, as an expansive exploration of the role of free associations in the formation of transoceanic international society as the most advanced known stage of human development.⁹⁵

Mechnikov took pains to overcome cultural, racial, and geographical determinism by showing that the character and social composition of a civilization depended to a considerable extent on how its people adjusted to their surroundings through cultural production and social organization. In writing a nature-centered history that focused on the influence of bodies of water on human societies, he broke through the hierarchical divide between East and West, and made possible the development of advanced free and cooperative associations in the West as well.⁹⁶ The result of this intellectual practice was that the West was no longer inherently behind Japan.

⁹³ Mechnikov, *Tsivilizatsiia*, 259–262.

⁹⁴ *Ibid.*, 258–259, 263–270, 325–443.

⁹⁵ Reclus, "Predislovie," 221, and Mechnikov, *Tsivilizatsiia*, 446.

⁹⁶ Mechnikov directly critiques the East-West paradigm of civilizational development in *Tsivilizatsiia*, 276–277.

This was a modernity that constructed a heterodoxy of developments and styles aimed at the global attainment of cooperatism. In his theory of social evolution's identification of mutual aid as a principle of progress for human civilization, Mechnikov delegitimized the naturalization of competition and aggression that had undergirded hierarchically arranged categories of race, class, gender, and nation under Social Darwinism.

ALTHOUGH PROHIBITED IN RUSSIA, Mechnikov's *Civilization* was widely read in Russian intellectual circles and beyond. Thinkers as classically far apart in their beliefs as the philosopher Vladimir Solov'ev, the "father of Russian Marxism" Georgii Plekhanov, and the anarchist Reclus strongly recommended it to the public. In fact, the appearance of *Civilization* marked the moment when Russian radical thought shifted from the populist belief in a divergent Russian path to the single path of world development envisioned by Russian Marxists. Although Mechnikov had clearly opposed Marx, Plekhanov was intrigued by Mechnikov's idea of universal development beyond the East-West divide and used it to defend his crucial monist view of history for the applicability of Marxism in Russia. Plekhanov wrote that *Civilization* answered some of the most fundamental intellectual problems of the day.⁹⁷ For him, the work resolved the question of apparent inequality in world progress through a scientific study of the effects of nature on social relations. In key essays defending Marxism, he expressed his excitement about Mechnikov's work, writing, "we urgently advise our readers to acquaint themselves with it, or better yet, to study it."⁹⁸ It is not surprising, then, that one of the only two works reviewed in the opening issue of Plekhanov's journal of Russian Marxism, *Social Democrat*, was *Civilization*.⁹⁹ When Mechnikov died, Plekhanov wrote his obituary.¹⁰⁰

Reclus, who committed himself to completing the unfinished *Civilization* after Mechnikov's death, wrote that the book "opened a new era in the history of science" by "founding a truly scientific morality."¹⁰¹ Kropotkin, who was becoming the leading anarchist theorist, closely echoed Mechnikov's ideas in his own work.¹⁰² He integrated Mechnikov's construct of cooperatist civilizational development as a basis for

⁹⁷ James White, "Despotism and Anarchy: The Sociological Thought of L. I. Mechnikov," *Slavonic and East European Studies* 54, no. 3 (1976): 395–411; Georgii Plekhanov, "O knige L. I. Mechnikova," in Plekhanov, *Sochineniia*, 24 vols. (Moscow, 1922–1928), 7: 15–28.

⁹⁸ Plekhanov, "O knige L. I. Mechnikova," 28. For Plekhanov's references to *Civilization* in his defense of Marxism, see also Plekhanov, *Selected Philosophical Works*, 5 vols. (Moscow, 1974–1981), 1: 415, 475, 610, 699; 2: 147, 651.

⁹⁹ Plekhanov, "O knige L. I. Mechnikova."

¹⁰⁰ Asserting that Mechnikov was the best symbol of a generation, Plekhanov wrote in his obituary, "Mechnikov was one of the most amazing and kindest representatives of that generation of the '60s, to whom our social life, our science, and our literature owe so much." Plekhanov, "L. I. Mechnikov," in *Sochineniia*, 7: 327. Plekhanov was not the only one who thought of Mechnikov as the symbol of a generation. Plekhanov and the other leaders of the Russian Marxist group called Liberation of Labor contributed money to erect a memorial to Mechnikov in Switzerland. About 120 people, Russian émigrés across Europe, made contributions toward its purchase. They also participated in the design of the memorial, which was open to public vote among contributors. GARF, 6753, op. 1, ed. khr. 86.

¹⁰¹ Reclus, "Predislovie," 221.

¹⁰² Mechnikov worked with Reclus in organizing financial and political support for Kropotkin while the latter was imprisoned in France, and he became a close friend of the Kropotkin family. Professionally, the two corresponded about their mutual work in the anarchist movement. Hoover Institution of War,

his anarchist theories of ethical human progress. With dedication and respect, Kropotkin also worked to complete *Civilization* after Mechnikov died, at the very moment when he began to “move beyond criticism of the present order to a more detailed consideration of the future society.”¹⁰³ Kropotkin even worked on a biography of Mechnikov, whom he called “the purest, most beautiful expression” of the Russian populist movement, a sentiment that was shared by many in the Russian émigré community.¹⁰⁴ According to letters to Kropotkin from Mechnikov’s wife, Ol’ga, the biography was going to devote considerable space to Mechnikov’s experiences in and scholarship on Japan.¹⁰⁵ It was not a coincidence that Kropotkin simultaneously dedicated himself to writing his famous anarchist study *Mutual Aid*, which was published in various forms beginning in 1890.¹⁰⁶ In it Kropotkin essentially echoed Mechnikov in identifying mutual aid as the engine of human progress and civilization. Like Mechnikov, he characterized the Darwinian “struggle for existence” among human beings as dependent on mutual assistance, not competition, for success. Further, he viewed sociability as a basic human instinct. These key elements of a scientifically based ethical anarchism that incorporated a vision of civilizational development would give so-called Kropotkinism in Japan a wide appeal.

Cooperatist anarchism would cut across the grain of Japanese society in the first quarter of the twentieth century, making it a virtual phenomenon in intellectual life. Even celebrity writer Arishima Takeo expressed this broader public sentiment in 1905 by calling for a “cleansing and rectification of history” through cooperatist anarchism.¹⁰⁷ A graduate of elite American universities, Arishima had been a disciple of Nitobe Inazo before his conversion to cooperatist anarchism. Nitobe has long been considered the foremost Japanese representative of “internationalism” and Western cosmopolitanism. That Nitobe served both as the leading professor of colonization theory at Tokyo Imperial University and as under secretary general of the League of Nations reflects well this notion of peace and world order.

Converting to a new world order and redefined internationalism, Arishima’s cooperatist anarchist turn appeared complete when his historicity was expressed in his diary: “I hope that America will wake from the slumber of ancient tradition and further the progress of universal brotherhood. The state must go.”¹⁰⁸ Here, the pro-

Revolution and Peace Archives, B. I. Nicolaevsky Collection, Box 183, #34, ll. 6–9; GARF, f. 1129, op. 3, ed. khr. 285, ll. 1–2; GARF, f. 1129, op. 2, ed. khr. 1747, ll. 1–15.

¹⁰³ Miller, *Kropotkin*, 192.

¹⁰⁴ GARF, f. 6753, op. 1, ed. khr. 9, l. 18.

¹⁰⁵ GARF, f. 6753, op. 1, ed. khr. 9.

¹⁰⁶ When Mechnikov died, Kropotkin asked Mechnikov’s family to keep him in mind if they wanted someone to sort through the deceased’s papers and complete his unfinished writings, the most important of which was *Civilization*. Kropotkin was at the time part of the central committee overseeing the erection of Mechnikov’s memorial. Although Kropotkin’s biography of Mechnikov was apparently never published, he worked seriously on it for quite some time. Mechnikov’s wife, Olga, even moved from her home in Switzerland to live at the Kropotkins’ home just to help him write it. GARF, f. 1129, op. 3, ed. khr. 285, 286; GARF, 6753, op. 1, ed. khr. 9. It was also during this time that Kropotkin was working on the earliest drafts of *Mutual Aid*. The earliest appearance of a part of the work was an 1890 article entitled “Mutual Aid among Animals,” *Nineteenth Century* 28 (1890): 337–354, 699–719. However, the fully developed work on civilizational progress that we now know as *Mutual Aid* did not appear until 1902. Peter Kropotkin, *Mutual Aid: A Factor of Evolution* (London, 1902).

¹⁰⁷ Arishima Takeo, “Rokoku kakumeitō no rōjo,” *Mainichi shimbun*, April 5–10, 1905.

¹⁰⁸ Arishima Takeo, *Arishima Takeo zenshū*, 16 vols. (Tokyo, 1979–1988), 9: 5.

gressive America that he had originally set out to study in order to link Japan to the wider world via Western cosmopolitanism was sharply flipped upside down. The reconfiguration of time had transformed the spatial world around Arishima, in the process altering his subjective belonging to that world. Arishima never opposed "the West" or "America" per se, but rather the modernity in which he believed that many Americans located themselves. In fact, probably no school of thought came closer to providing an intellectual basis for a peaceful relationship with America than did cooperatist anarchism. In response to the Russo-Japanese War, Arishima and many others helped to form the non-war movement, in reference to which historian Hyman Kublin suggested that Japanese and Russians during this period provide us with one of the most successful and unique cases of antimilitarism in a time of war in modern history.¹⁰⁹

Through an expansion of his ties with Japanese radicals, Mechnikov's construct of cooperatist progress and civilization was reconfigured in Japan as a way to link participants to the wider world through the vision of cooperatist anarchism. Kōtoku Shūsui, a leading figure in the non-war movement and a disciple of Freedom and People's Rights leader Nakae Chōmin, initiated a personal correspondence with Kropotkin following the war. Kōtoku introduced a number of Kropotkin's works into Japan, translating them himself. He became one of the country's most prominent anarchist thinkers. While there were echoes of Mechnikov and Chōmin's ties in the bond that developed between Kropotkin and Kōtoku, none of them knew about their mutual transnational connections. Together they formed a crucial link in an expanding interlocking network, an epistemic organ of cooperatist anarchism and its temporal belonging that transcended racial and national boundaries.

Kōtoku found that the network community provided the best means to distribute his writings and translations of Kropotkin's works even before they had been made officially available to the public. While both men's works were banned for the most part, people were still able to widely access them. In fact, the network of cooperatist anarchists across Japan functioned so well that when Kōtoku translated a work by Kropotkin, his tactic for getting it out to as many people as possible was first to sell the thousands of copies that he had printed out via personal networks, and then to sell it through bookstores after it had already circulated nationwide. As Kōtoku expressed in his private correspondence to Kropotkin in 1908, "The police, of course, will try to seize all copies. But too late!"¹¹⁰ Numerous intellectuals, even in remote Hokkaido, were able to obtain Kōtoku's translations.¹¹¹ In this way, prohibited knowledge traveled both within and across national boundaries, concretizing networks in the process.¹¹² With the ideas of cooperatist anarchism circulating through a variety of movements and interest groups, no institution existed to coordinate the members of this larger community. Informal interlocking networks were able to or-

¹⁰⁹ Hyman Kublin, "The Japanese Socialists and the Russo-Japanese War," *The Journal of Modern History* 21 (March–December 1950): 322–323.

¹¹⁰ GARF, Kropotkin P. A. Collection, f. 1129, op. 2, ed. khr. 1418, ll. 18–19. Letter from Kōtoku, December 26, 1908.

¹¹¹ GARF, Kropotkin P. A. Collection, f. 1129, op. 2, ed. khr. 1418, l. 9. Letter from Kōtoku to Kropotkin, May 14, 1907.

¹¹² The context is unique in this discourse, but the way in which they circulated knowledge via networks is not. Book lending practices during the Edo period, for example, circulated a tremendous amount of information quickly.

ganize participants' activities without the need for institutions, reflecting the very nature of cooperatist anarchist thought.

The epistemological capacity of cooperatist anarchism provided the intellectual foundation for a variety of distinctive cultural and social movements in Japan during the first decades of the twentieth century, and came to define a form of "democracy [*demokurashi*]" by 1920. Students at Tokyo Imperial University founded Shinjinkai, the New Man Society, in 1918 in the pursuit of "democracy." Its famous journal, *Demokurashi*, led off its first several issues with articles featuring discussions of cooperatist anarchism. In its first year, almost every issue featured Kropotkin's thought. The aim of the organization was expressed as "*jinmin no naka e*," which was a translation of the Russian populist slogan "*v narod*," or "to the people."¹¹³ *Demokurashi* changed its name over time, finally settling on *Narodo* [*Narod*, "The People," in Russian], using the Russian word that referred to the popular subject of the populist movement. With the title appearing in both Japanese and Russian on the cover of the journal, it did not lose the transnational intellectual roots of their activities.

Cooperatist anarchist progress and civilization and its anti-hierarchical world order offered alternative realities that united movements and interest groups beyond national, racial, gender, or other hierarchical categories. Cultural movements and societies inspired by cooperatist anarchism included the people's arts movement, the Anti-Discrimination Society, the children's education and literature movement, the proletarian literature movement, the Esperanto movement, the National Student Union, and the women's movement.¹¹⁴

It was the idea of anarchist democracy that fueled the first international relief effort in Japan to be spontaneously organized from below. In response to the famine that struck Russia in the early 1920s during its revolutionary civil war, local clubs and associations, including Shinjinkai, established the Russia Famine Assistance Movement. This national-scale civic endeavor drew together a myriad of small groups from a variety of specialties and occupations across Japan, including music schools, the miners' union, dental schools, local women's clubs, and agricultural institutes.¹¹⁵ The movement stood out for its ability to unify so many local associations in a mutual effort to assist people outside Japan, representing a modern selfhood that transcended national borders. In the name of saving the "Russian people endangered by imperialism," the movement was organized during Japan's military intervention in the civil war, and reflected a public effort to put the competing internationalism of cooperatism into practice. The unwritten history of this humanitarian relief movement as an expression of anarchist *demokurashi* could revise our understanding of spontaneous civic organization and democracy building in Japan as a postwar, post-Occupation phenomenon.¹¹⁶ Such internationalist expressions of the temporal be-

¹¹³ George O. Totten, "Akamatsu Katsumaro: Political Activist and Ideologue," in Nobori and Akamatsu, *The Russian Impact on Japan*, 79.

¹¹⁴ The Japanese Esperanto movement for international language equity, led by anarchists, had the largest number of non-European Esperanto participants in the world, including the United States. Treating language not only as a transnational communication tool, but also as having potential control over one's interiority, anarchist intellectuals learned and taught the "neutral" language of Esperanto.

¹¹⁵ Kensetsu sha domei shi kanko iin kai, *Waseda Daigaku Kensetsu sha domei no rekishi: Taishōki no v narod undō* (Tokyo, 1979), 173.

¹¹⁶ For a history of civic organization in postwar Japan, see Wesley Sasaki-Uemura, *Organizing the Spontaneous: Citizen Protest in Postwar Japan* (Honolulu, 2001).

longing of cooperatist anarchism reveal a fresh concept of participation in a world order distinct from pan-Asianism and Western cosmopolitanism.

A powerful current of the feminist movement in early-twentieth-century Japan also gave expression to anarchist *demokurashi*, often symbolized by Kropotkin's *Mutual Aid*. Leading figures in the women's movement, including the self-proclaimed anarchists Itō Noe and Takamure Itsue, and female laborers reflected a modern vision of cooperatist human progress and civilization and its corresponding subjectivity in their thoughts. Many of these feminists continued to be closely involved in the wider network of cooperatist anarchists until World War II. For example, Takamure, known as the pioneer of women's history in Japan, saw in cooperatist anarchism the answer to the problem of Western modernity's hierarchy of gender and capitalist human relations, on the one hand, and the official national ideology that created hierarchically gendered constructs of the family as subjects under the emperor-patriarch, on the other.

The domestically rooted cooperatist activities that prospered in Japan were "the reality of anarchism in Japan" for anarchists such as Itō Noe, who found in those everyday practices a global significance for modernity. Much as Mechnikov himself had witnessed decades earlier, she wrote that anarchism had existed and continued to exist in everyday practice. Therefore, it was this "reality" that "we should consciously work on."¹¹⁷ Like many of those who took part in cooperatist anarchism, Itō placed primary value on the everyday practices of cooperatism and its corresponding anti-hierarchical relationality and subjectivity.

Cooperatist anarchists also contributed to the emergence of a Japanese brand of Marxism. An irony of historical dialectic, perhaps, it was the Marxist teleological view of history dominant in Japanese social sciences that would help to erase this very intellectual history under exploration.

THE ENCOUNTER BETWEEN Mechnikov and Japanese who experienced the *Ishin*, and the corresponding conceptual encounter between *ishin* and *revoliutsiia*, led to the emergence of a new global meaning for the *Ishin*. *Ishin* Japan came to represent an impulse toward the global realization of human progress based on the anarchist principles of mutual aid. It was this alternative meaning given to the *Ishin* in the wider world that would later materialize in modern Japan as the cultural and social phenomenon of cooperatist anarchist modernity. This transnational encounter and the resulting vision of civilizational progress reopen the meaning of the "Opening" of Japan that has been used to represent the beginning of Japan's embarkation on the path toward Western modernity, whether in self-colonized, reconfigured, or hybridized forms.

Western modernity has long provided the internal logic for the writing of history on modern Japan. This logic has often interlinked our use of archives or sources of historical evidence, the method of investigation, theory, and historical narratives of modern Japan. To understand the emergence of this phenomenon, it was necessary to construct an alternative logic of history that linked together archives, method,

¹¹⁷ Itō Noe, *Itō Noe zenshu*, vol. 2 (Tokyo, 1970), 464–474.

concept, and theory, such as the tracing of non-state, non-organizational-level transnational relations and their resulting social thought, by means of Russian archival holdings on discredited revolutionaries and their broader network of acquaintances. Such interstices of transnational activity provided a space in which a new time was imagined. At this intersection, networks were formed and ideas were exchanged and transformed outside the encounter between East and West, and beyond the bifurcated imaginaries of internationalism as Western cosmopolitanism and encountering nationalism, and of power and resistance/accommodation. In reopening the opening of Japan in this way, and in identifying the beginnings of a temporal belonging distinct from the imagined time-space of Western modernity, we can attempt to open up new dimensions for modern history writing.

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Rethinking the Socialist Construction and International Career of the Concept “Bourgeois Feminism”

MARILYN J. BOXER

ON BASTILLE DAY 1889, German socialist Clara Zetkin announced to delegates from twenty countries assembled in Paris on the centennial of the French Revolution that “the emancipation of women, together with that of all humanity, will take place only with the emancipation of labor from capital.” Zetkin assured these founders of the Second International that they need not fear losing “proletarian” women to others who were claiming to advance their interests, especially the women’s rights groups who held their own international congresses in the French capital that summer. Despite her own comfortable origins as the daughter of a schoolteacher and a doctor’s widow who had herself co-founded a women’s rights organization, Zetkin denounced the nonsocialist “bourgeois women’s movement” as a vain effort “built upon sand . . . [with] no basis in reality.” While challenging her overwhelmingly male audience to recognize women’s need for paid work to ensure their economic independence, she emphasized in this speech that “bourgeois” women offered no solution to the “woman question.” Speaking at a women’s rights congress in Berlin in 1896, she startled participants by declaring herself their “adversary [*Gegnerin*].”¹

Zetkin’s message would reverberate far and wide and last into the twenty-first century, bolstered in its long life by New Left and feminist activists and scholars, including historians of the 1970s generation. In 2004, anthropologist Kristen Ghodsee, assessing the condition of women in postsocialist Eastern Europe, asserted that “not much has changed since 1907,” and quoted Zetkin’s speech at the First International Congress of Socialist Women, held that year in Stuttgart: “There cannot be a unified struggle for the entire [female] sex . . . No, it must be a class struggle of all the exploited without differences of sex against all exploiters no matter what

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¹ For a portion of Zetkin’s 1889 speech, translated by Susan G. Bell, see Susan Groag Bell and Karen M. Offen, eds., *Women, the Family, and Freedom: The Debate in Documents*, 2 vols. (Stanford, Calif., 1983), vol. 2: 1880–1950, 87–91, quotations on 87, 90; also in Zetkin, *Clara Zetkin: Selected Writings*, ed. Philip S. Foner (New York, 1984), 45–50. For 1896, see Rosalie Schoenflies, Lina Morgenstern, Minna Cauer, Jeannette Schwerin, and Marie Raschke, eds., *Der Internationale Kongress für Frauenwerke und Frauenbestrebungen in Berlin, 19. bis 26. September 1896* (Berlin, 1897), 394–396, quotation on 394. At the latter conference, French feminist Eugénie Potonié-Pierre introduced the new word “feminism”; *ibid.*, 40.

sex they belong to." Socialists must not, Zetkin had stressed, collaborate with "bourgeois feminists," even on issues of common concern. Drawing on this speech, Ghodsee suggests that the development of educational and advocacy institutions modeled on those created by women in "the West" threatens postcommunist Eastern European women with a new kind of "cultural feminism" that, like the earlier "bourgeois feminism" to which she likens it, is inappropriate to their real interests. Other scholars attest to the persistence of this concept.²

"Bourgeois feminism," however, is a slippery term that relies on a notion of "class" that has been substantially "reworked" in light of cultural studies and gender analysis. Historians today point to multiple ways in which gender and class work together, showing, for example, how wives *sans profession* became in the nineteenth century a marker of upwardly mobile masculinity. The binary distinction between public and private that underlay both scholarly and popular notions of gender has similarly been challenged, and the "public sphere" itself is seen to have been constructed so as to exclude women.³ But no one has yet looked critically at how earlier, dichotomous notions of class and gender relationships have affected women's movements and their historians.

The construct that Zetkin and socialists of her era developed to distance themselves from burgeoning women's rights movements had its origins in European class politics at the turn of the twentieth century.⁴ That construct was redeployed by leftists in a later period of feminist militancy, and historians had a role in passing along the politics and rhetoric of the earlier age to a new generation of students and activists. In addition to questioning the class basis on which this long-accepted distinction rests, we need to create new histories of feminism that are no longer en-

² For a recent reference to Zetkin and her 1907 speech, see Kristen Ghodsee, "Feminism-by-Design: Emerging Capitalisms, Cultural Feminism, and Women's Nongovernmental Organizations in Post-socialist Eastern Europe," *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 29, no. 3 (Spring 2004): 727–753, quotations on 732, 733. For other examples of the persistence of this idea, see Francisca de Haan, Krassimira Daskalova, and Anna Loufti, eds., *A Biographical Dictionary of Women's Movements and Feminisms in Central, Eastern, and South Eastern Europe, Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Budapest, 2006). German historian Gisela Bock finds the term "bourgeois feminism" to be "as ubiquitous today" as in Zetkin's day; personal communication, May 2006.

³ John R. Hall, "The Reworking of Class Analysis," in Hall, ed., *Reworking Class* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1997), 1–37. For new approaches to labor history particularly salient to understanding women and class, see Lenard R. Berlanstein, ed., *Rethinking Labor History: Essays on Discourse and Class Analysis* (Urbana, Ill., 1993), esp. William H. Sewell, Jr., "Toward a Post-Materialist Rhetoric for Labor History," 15–38. Kathleen Canning observes that gender analysis has "revitalized" the field of labor history; Canning, *Gender History in Practice: Historical Perspectives on Bodies, Class, and Citizenship* (Ithaca, N.Y., 2006), 124. On class and gender formation, see Leonore Davidoff and Catherine Hall, *Family Fortunes: Men and Women of the English Middle Class, 1780–1850* (Chicago, 1987); and Geoffrey Crossick and Heinz-Gerhard Haupt, *The Petite Bourgeoisie in Europe, 1780–1914: Enterprise, Family and Independence* (London, 1995), 97–98; also Ava Baron, "Gender and Labor History: Learning from the Past, Looking to the Future," in Baron, ed., *Work Engendered: Toward a New History of American Labor* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1991), 1–46. On "binary distinction," see Sonya O. Rose, "Class Formation and the Quintessential Worker," in Hall, *Reworking Class*, 133–166, esp. 139–144; and Rose, *Limited Livelihoods: Gender and Class in Nineteenth-Century England* (Berkeley, Calif., 1992), 193. On excluding women from the "public sphere," see the summary in Laura L. Frader and Sonya O. Rose, "Introduction: Gender and the Reconstruction of European Working-Class History," in Frader and Rose, eds., *Gender and Class in Modern Europe* (Ithaca, N.Y., 1996), 11–19.

⁴ For a pioneering analysis of the invention of "bourgeois feminism," see Françoise Picq, "'Bourgeois Feminism' in France: A Theory Developed by Socialist Women before World War I," trans. Irene Tilton, in Judith Friedlander, Blanche Wiesen Cook, Alice Kessler-Harris, and Carroll Smith-Rosenberg, eds., *Women in Culture and Politics: A Century of Change* (Bloomington, Ind., 1986), 330–343.

cumbered by problematic assumptions about women and putative class interests or by socialist politics of the past. Such a reinterpretation might also shed light on the limitations of the European Left and its lost opportunities in the long process that Geoff Eley has termed “forging democracy.”⁵

THE ORIGINS OF THE CONCEPT “bourgeois feminism” lie deep in the early history of Marxian socialism. Both Marx and Engels portrayed the working-class woman as a victim of (industrial) capitalism, Marx offering a detailed portrait of the death of a twenty-year-old milliner from overwork, and Engels reporting his observation in England that “most of the prostitutes of the town had their employment in the mills to thank for their present situation.” In his landmark book *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (1884), Engels famously declared that “within the family, he is the bourgeois and the wife represents the proletariat,” but neither he nor Marx showed sympathy for organized feminism. For Marx, it represented “false women’s emancipation”; he declared that “German women should have begun by driving their men to self-emancipation.” Engels wrote to an American correspondent in 1891 that, thanks to efforts to organize socialist women, “the antiquated semi-bourgeois women’s rights asses will soon be ordered to the rear.”⁶

The most widely read of the male socialists on the woman question, however, was the German leader August Bebel. In the introduction to his classic work *Woman under Socialism* (1883), Bebel noted that “the hostile [*feindliche*] sisters have . . . a number of points of contact, on which they can, although marching separately, strike jointly [with socialists].” While the extent of Bebel’s support for nonsocialist women’s movements is disputed, early in his career he did assist his countrywoman Louise Otto-Peters in creating a women’s emancipation organization, and he also acknowledged that “working-class women have more in common with bourgeois women or aristocratic women than do working-class men with men of other social classes.”⁷

On women’s issues, however, the most influential socialist activist of the time was

⁵ On the limitations of the European Left, and gender politics as its “greatest weakness,” see Geoff Eley, *Forging Democracy: The History of the Left in Europe, 1850–2000* (Oxford, 2002), quotation on 112.

⁶ On “false women’s emancipation,” see F. A. Sorge, *Briefe und Auszüge aus Briefen von Joh. Phil. Becker, Jos. Dietzen, Friedrich Engels, Karl Marx an F. A. Sorge und Andere* (Stuttgart, 1921), 37; for “milliner,” see Karl Marx, *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy*, vol. 1, trans. Samuel Moore and Edward Aveling (1867; repr., New York, 1902), 280–281; on “self-emancipation,” see Marx, *Letters to Dr. Kugelmann* (New York, 1934), 82. Frederick Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State* (1884; repr., New York, 1942), 65–66; and Engels, *The Condition of the Working-Class in England in 1844*, trans. Florence Kelley Wischnewsky (1845; repr., London, 1952), 181; on “asses,” see Engels quoted by Hal Draper and Anne Lipow, “Marxist Women versus Bourgeois Feminism,” *Socialist Register* 13 (1976): 179–226, quotation on 217.

⁷ August Bebel, *Woman under Socialism*, trans. from the German 33rd ed. by Daniel De Leon (New York, 1971), 5; originally published in 1883 as *Woman in the Past, Present, and Future*. *Feindliche* is sometimes translated as “enemy”; see Draper and Lipow, “Marxist Women versus Bourgeois Feminism,” 189. On the broader significance of translations and Bebel’s pioneering use of “gender-neutral” terms, see Anne Lopes and Gary Roth, “A Note on Translation,” in Lopes and Roth, *Men’s Feminism: August Bebel and the German Socialist Movement* (Amherst, N.Y., 2000), 19–27. On Otto-Peters, see Lopes and Roth, *Men’s Feminism*, 90. On Bebel’s support of feminist legislative reform, see Bebel, *Woman under Socialism*, 112; also Richard J. Evans, *Comrades and Sisters: Feminism, Socialism, and Pacifism in Europe, 1870–1945* (Sussex, 1987), 28–29. For qualification of Bebel’s feminism, see Richard Stites, *The Women’s Liberation Movement in Russia: Feminism, Nihilism, and Bolshevism, 1860–1930* (Princeton, N.J., 1978), 234–236. For Bebel’s 1878 speech on “more in common,” see Lopes and Roth, *Men’s Feminism*, 199.

Zetkin, who articulated and strenuously maintained what became the orthodox Marxist-socialist position on women's rights movements. Her 1889 Paris speech became what German women's historian Ute Frevert terms "the manifesto of the proletarian women's movement."⁸ Although early in her career Zetkin expressed strong support for many goals of the women's rights movement, she came to view it as a "serious, dangerous power of the counter-revolution" that must be stopped. She sincerely believed that the condition of women, to whom she once referred as "slaves," would be remedied only through socialist revolution.⁹ Zetkin prescribed a "clean break [*reinliche Scheidung*]" between proletarian parties and other political movements. Despite continuing to advocate some feminist goals, she expressed "extreme animosity" toward the idea of sisterhood, using derisory language such as "stupid feminist dreams about harmony" to describe feminist politics, and calling feminists "muddle-headed, wishy-washy, weak." By the mid-1890s, she had set in motion a worldwide movement to pillory nonsocialist women's rights efforts. Her biweekly journal, *Die Gleichheit* [Equality], addressed to women workers and party members, "untiringly differentiated between socialist and bourgeois women, socialist and bourgeois tactics," Jean Quataert has said. Her rejection of "bourgeois feminism" was "ostentatious," commented her French contemporary, the socialist and feminist activist Madeleine Pelletier. Women's historians have termed it "savage" and "vicious." It was also enormously effective.¹⁰

Who were these "bourgeois feminists" who posed such an alleged danger to working women? Prevailing marriage and property laws in late-nineteenth-century Europe ensured that *bourgeoises* rarely enjoyed the privileges and power of the capitalist *bourgeois*. Some rejected the values of the marketplace, and many continued women's traditional philanthropic work to aid poor women. Increasingly, however,

⁸ Ute Frevert, *Women in German History: From Bourgeois Emancipation to Sexual Liberation* (New York, 1989), 141.

⁹ Clara Zetkin, *Zur Geschichte der proletarischen Frauenbewegung Deutschlands* (1928; repr., Berlin, 1958), 209. On Zetkin's formulation of socialist theory on women, see Werner Thönnessen, *The Emancipation of Women: The Rise and Decline of the Women's Movement in German Social Democracy, 1863–1933*, trans. Joris de Bres (1969; repr., Frankfurt-am-Main, 1973), 39–46. For Zetkin's reference to women as slaves, see Robert Stuart, "Whores and Angels: Women and the Family in the Discourse of French Marxism, 1882–1905," *European History Quarterly* 27, no. 3 (1997): 339–369, quotation on 343–344.

¹⁰ On "clean break," see Alfred G. Meyer, *The Feminism and Socialism of Lily Braun* (Bloomington, Ind., 1985), 52. For "extreme animosity," see Stites, *The Women's Liberation Movement*, 237. For "stupid dreams," see *Frauenrechtlerische Harmoniedüselei*, the title of Zetkin's response to a new feminist journal; *Die Gleichheit* 5, no. 1 (January 9, 1895): 6. See also the citation by Alfred G. Meyer in Lily Braun, *Selected Writings on Feminism and Socialism*, trans. and ed. Alfred G. Meyer (Bloomington, Ind., 1987), 43. Meyer translates Zetkin's title as "Women's Libbers' Stupid Dreams about Harmony." For "muddle-headed," see Jean H. Quataert, "Unequal Partners in an Uneasy Alliance: Women and the Working Class in Imperial Germany," in Marilyn J. Boxer and Jean H. Quataert, eds., *Socialist Women: European Socialist Feminism in the Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries* (New York, 1978), 112–145, quotation on 116. For "untiring," see Quataert, "Feminist Tactics in German Social Democracy 1890–1914: A Dilemma," *IWK: Internationale Wissenschaftliche Korrespondenz zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung* 13, no. 1 (March 1977): 48–65, quotation on 56 n. 41. For Pelletier, see Richard J. Evans, *The Feminists: Women's Emancipation Movements in Europe, America, and Australasia, 1840–1920* (London, 1977), 172. On "savage," see Richard J. Evans, "The Concept of Feminism: Notes for Practicing Historians," in Ruth-Ellen B. Joeres and Mary Jo Maynes, eds., *German Women in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries: A Social and Literary History* (Bloomington, Ind., 1986), 247–258, quotation on 248. Evans here emphasizes the "depth of the divisions" between the socialist women's movement and feminism (253). For "vicious," see n. 17 below. A recent biographer sees the Lutheranism of Zetkin's early years as partially responsible for her ideological rigidity; see Tânia Puschernat, *Clara Zetkin: Bürgerlichkeit und Marxismus: Eine Biographie* (Essen, 2003).

daughters of bourgeois families also worked for pay. As teachers, postal or sales clerks, and low-level administrators, they in no way fit the image of the socialist ideal, the laborers in “the great virile trades . . . heroes who brought about the second industrial revolution,” as Michelle Perrot puts it. Nevertheless, they were assumed by socialists to be, in Rosa Luxemburg’s inimitable phrase, “the parasites of the parasites of the social body.”¹¹

In linking the words “feminism” and “bourgeois,” socialists drew on a well-developed terminology laden with negative affect. Beyond “bourgeois classes,” myriad usages abound: bourgeois deviation, bourgeois family, bourgeois individualism, bourgeois morality, bourgeois respectability, and, of course, bourgeois feminism—but rarely bourgeois socialism. But what does “bourgeois” mean? An imaginary other, a negative stereotype, even a mod way to say *passé*—“so last year”? Once a marker of residence or legal order, by the late decades of the nineteenth century it had become merely a pejorative epithet.¹² Heavily influenced by Marxist notions of a “bourgeois revolution,” it was (and is) used to denigrate not only individuals but, through a kind of conceptual and linguistic slippage, also the ideas and aims of a political movement, namely feminism.¹³

But the term has long been contested. In 1968, Canadian historian Shirley Gruner, examining its usage in France in the 1830s, declared, “The word ‘bourgeoisie’ has never had the good fortune to be defined in any strict sense.” It was associated with several social theories, including Saint-Simonianism and Marxism, of course. Definitions at that time ranged from “a small capitalist elite” to “the immense majority of the population.” It was used confusingly by Fourierists “both to mean the mass of small craftsmen and artisans and to mean the neo-feudal capitalists.” Gruner wondered if it had any further usefulness. Two decades later, studying the “bourgeois experience” in nineteenth-century Europe, Peter Gay found “a Babel of definitions.” He points out that it could refer to the vast majority who were neither nobility nor peasants, but also that in mid-century, “Parisian proletarians used *bourgeoise* to designate respectable, sober working-class housewives whose husbands were afraid of them.” Penned by writers such as Gustave Flaubert, Arthur Schnitzler, and Émile Zola, the word became an insult. Flaubert, who named himself “bourgeoisophobus,” told George Sand, “Axiom: Hatred of Bourgeois is the beginning of all virtue.”¹⁴

¹¹ On bourgeois women’s values, see Bonnie G. Smith, *Ladies of the Leisure Class: The Bourgeoises of Northern France in the Nineteenth Century* (Princeton, N.J., 1981). Smith opens her book with the question, “What is a bourgeois woman?”; *ibid.*, 3. On “heroes,” see Michelle Perrot, “1914: Great Feminist Expectations,” in Helmut Gruber and Pamela Graves, eds., *Women and Socialism/Socialism and Women: Europe between the Two World Wars* (New York, 1998), 27. For “parasites,” see Rosa Luxemburg, “Women’s Suffrage and Class Struggle,” in Luxemburg, *Selected Political Writings of Rosa Luxemburg*, ed. Dick Howard (New York, 1971), 216–222, quotation on 220.

¹² Sarah Maza, *The Myth of the French Bourgeoisie: An Essay on the Social Imaginary, 1750–1850* (Cambridge, Mass., 2003). “‘So bourgeois’ [fashion hawker] Hugh mutters after her. ‘So last year’”; observation at a New York City fashion show described in the *New York Times*, February 11, 2004, A26. On definitions of “bourgeois” in French dictionaries and popular usage, see Adeline Daumard, *Les Bourgeois et la bourgeoisie en France depuis 1815* ([Paris], 1987), 35–44.

¹³ Madeleine Pelletier once remarked, “What the socialists reprove isn’t feminism. It’s the feminists”; Pelletier, “Bourgeois Feminism and Socialist Feminism,” *Le Socialiste*, May 5, 1907.

¹⁴ Shirley Gruner, “The Revolution of July 1830 and the Expression ‘Bourgeoisie,’” *Historical Journal* 11, no. 3 (1968): 462–471, quotations on 469–471. Peter Gay, *The Bourgeois Experience: Victoria to Freud*, 5 vols., vol. 1: *Education of the Senses* (New York, 1984), 20; on writers and Flaubert as “bour-

More recently, Sarah Maza has ascribed the French bourgeoisie to a "social imaginary." After its prerevolutionary use as a legal category disappeared, she states, the "bourgeoisie" became a negative, a way to describe "what *someone else* was." It carried a taint inherited from the old regime, implying both "unearned privilege and cultural deficiency."¹⁵ Bourgeoisophobia persisted; generations later, some leftist students even initially "dismissed the civil rights movement as 'bourgeois'; . . . since the blacks sitting in at Woolworth lunch counters were college students, it meant that they were middle class and not the workers or sharecroppers of revolutionary prediction."¹⁶

TODAY IT APPEARS that Zetkin's position rested less on any clear socioeconomic distinction among women than on ideology, political strategies, and perhaps personal rivalries.¹⁷ It also depended, as Eley importantly points out, on relationships among labor, socialist, and liberal parties that, in each national context, set the parameters within which women could act.¹⁸ While many profound differences marked the lives of working-class and leisured women, Zetkin's stance ignores the extent to which many members of the reviled bourgeois class stood closer in social background and political outlook to the socialists themselves than to the "parasites." Her position reflected the socialist leaders' fears of diverting attention away from class struggle and of alienating the artisanal core of their working-class support, who for the most part held traditional views about women.¹⁹ Zetkin adamantly refused all invitations to collaborate; in one notable incident in 1895, she even engaged in a published dispute with her socialist colleagues after declining to serve on a proposed cross-class

geoisophobia," see Gay, *Schnitzler's Century: The Making of Middle-Class Culture, 1815–1914* (London, 2001), 29. The other amorphous term with which "bourgeois" is sometimes linked, "middle class," carries less affect. Jürgen Kocka, who in his study of nineteenth-century German society uses the latter's adjectival form "interchangeably with 'bourgeois,'" points out that "the attractiveness of a concept rarely correlates with its precision . . . The middle class has never been a class, at least not in the Marxist sense"; Kocka, *Industrial Culture and Bourgeois Society: Business, Labor, and Bureaucracy in Modern Germany* (New York, 1999), 231–233.

¹⁵ Maza, *The Myth of the French Bourgeoisie*, 3, 5, 195.

¹⁶ Eleanor Hakim, speaking of her cohort of graduate students at the University of Wisconsin; Hakim, "The Tragedy of Hans Gerth," in Paul Buhle, ed., *History and the New Left: Madison, Wisconsin, 1950–1970* (Philadelphia, Pa., 1990), 252–263, quotation on 256.

¹⁷ Zetkin's adamant refusal to entertain collaboration with nonsocialist women and the rivalry for leadership are major themes of a study of feminism and German socialism that predates the resurgence of women's history. Its author sees Zetkin's "anti-feminism" as bordering on "fanaticism," and her presentations as "spirited, biting, and not infrequently vicious." See Jacqueline Strain, "Feminism and Political Radicalism in the German Social Democratic Movement, 1890–1914" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Berkeley, 1964), 67, 81. For Zetkin's rivalry with Braun, see Jean H. Quataert, *Reluctant Feminists in German Social Democracy, 1885–1917* (Princeton, N.J., 1979), 107–133; on differences with Luise Zietz and others, see *ibid.*, 164–165, 202–205.

¹⁸ Thus the split was less strong in Britain than in Germany. See Eley, *Forging Democracy*, 30–31; and Geoff Eley, "German Liberals, the Well-Ordered Public, and the Patriarchal Nation, 1860–1920," paper presented at the conference "Wilhelmine Germany and Edwardian Britain—Cultural Contacts and Transfers," University of Oxford, March 2006. I thank Professor Eley for sharing this paper with me.

¹⁹ For example, when a group of Swedish socialist women submitted a proposed resolution for the international socialist women's conference in 1910, chastising socialist men who deserted women whose children they had fathered, Zetkin appealed to them to withdraw it; Renée Frangeur, "Social Democrats and the Woman Question in Sweden: A History of Contradiction," in Gruber and Graves, *Women and Socialism/Socialism and Women*, 425–426.

commission—a “mishmash commission,” she said—to study working conditions for women factory workers, a project they thought she should support.²⁰

In her efforts to uphold her vision of class struggle and to avoid cross-class collaboration, Zetkin moved away from Bebel and his criticism of the limits imposed on women by motherhood, domesticity, and traditional gender roles. As the primary voice on women's issues of German Social Democracy (the SPD), Europe's largest and dominant socialist party; as founder and leader of the socialist women's international; and as longtime editor (1891 to 1917) of the socialist women's journal, Zetkin had broad and profound influence. Following her lead, working-class leaders everywhere were “haunted,” in Quataert's view, by concern lest “their” women “be intimidated by their bourgeois sisters to pursue purely feminist goals.” They strove incessantly to repudiate those who sought to breach the class divide.²¹ Zetkin's ideas recur in the works of well-known socialist women in several other countries, notably Eleanor Marx in England, Alexandra Kollontai in Russia, and Louise Saumoneau in France—the latter two of whom became Zetkin's devoted younger followers, and each of whom exerted significant influence in her own country. All agreed on the importance, in Eleanor Marx's words, of “organis[ing] not as ‘women’ but as *proletarians*; not as female rivals of our working men but as their comrades in struggle.” (Still, less separatist than the others, Marx proposed that “where the bourgeois women demand rights that are of help to us, we will fight together with them.”²²)

Kollontai's major contribution to the theory of “bourgeois feminism,” a lengthy 1908 “antifeminist polemic,” was written expressly to undermine potential class collaboration. Under her influence, socialist women attacked women suffragists aggressively, appearing at feminist meetings to harass speakers and disrupt proceedings. Although her personal history contradicted her words, the nobly born Kollontai exaggerated the feminists' “selfish class character.” She wrote, “Between the emancipated woman of the intelligentsia and the toiling woman with calloused hands, there was such an unbridgeable gulf, that there could be no question of any sort of point of agreement between them.” One biographer describes Kollontai as the “scourge of the bourgeois feminists.”²³ Ironically, she developed one of the most

²⁰ On “mishmash commission,” see Richard J. Evans, “Bourgeois Feminists and Women Socialists in Germany, 1894–1914: Lost Opportunity or Inevitable Conflict?” *Women's Studies International Quarterly* 3 (1980): 355–376, esp. 367–368.

²¹ For the controversy within German socialism over contraception, including strong statements against it by Clara Zetkin and Rosa Luxemburg, see R. P. Neuman, “Working Class Birth Control in Wilhelmine Germany,” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 20, no. 3 (1978): 408–428. On Zetkin's support for traditional gender roles, see Lopes and Roth, *Men's Feminism*, 200–201, and Karen Honeycutt, “Clara Zetkin: A Socialist Approach to the Problem of Woman's Oppression,” *Feminist Studies* 3, no. 3/4 (Spring–Summer 1976): 131–144, esp. 135–136. For “haunted,” see Quataert, *Reluctant Feminists*, 111.

²² Kollontai accompanied Zetkin on her 1909 visit to Britain; see Karen Hunt, *Equivocal Feminists: The Social Democratic Federation and the Woman Question, 1884–1911* (Cambridge, 1996), 68 n. 55. On Zetkin as Kollontai's mentor, see also Beatrice Farnsworth, *Aleksandra Kollontai: Socialism, Feminism, and the Bolshevik Revolution* (Stanford, Calif., 1980), 26. For Eleanor Marx, see Draper and Lipow, “Marxist Women versus Bourgeois Feminism,” 225–226; emphasis in original. But Marx saw “no more in common between [feminist leader] Mrs. Fawcett and a laundress than we see between Rothschild and one of his employees”; *ibid.*, 225.

²³ Kollontai wrote *The Social Bases of the Woman Question* (1908) in preparation for the First All-Russian Women's Congress, and she held some fifty meetings with working women to coach them, before leading the group to the event “with clear instructions to disrupt it”; Farnsworth, *Aleksandra Kollontai*, 30–34, quotation on 33. For a detailed description of the 1908 congress, see Linda Harriet Edmondson,

radical critiques of women's roles in family and sexuality of her era, for which she was criticized by Lenin and rejected by many others.²⁴

In France, the first published call to establish a separate female constituency for Marxist socialism appeared in 1899. It initially expressed ambivalence toward feminism. The conveners, who termed themselves "socialist feminists," acknowledged the "legitimacy of [feminist] claims, regarding them as reforms whose realization would improve the situation of women," and declaring, "we will defend them as such." This appeal reappeared without change for at least five years, but its authors, who included Saumoneau, soon dropped the f-word and increasingly emulated Zetkin's strident opposition to "bourgeois feminism." Aiming "to tear socialist and proletarian women away from feminist confusionism," Saumoneau "adhered to the letter" of Zetkin's caution against cross-class cooperation.²⁵ Like her mentor, she attacked her opponents' character, describing them as "naïve, deranged and hysterical." Historian Charles Sowerwine states that "Saumoneau not only broke with the feminist movement, but also prevented the socialist women's movement from putting any emphasis on the struggle for equality between the sexes and even from taking into account the problems of women in recruiting them to the party. Women would come into the socialist party as citizens, like the men, or they would not come at all." In France, even after World War I, "socialist women simply continued to repeat Saumoneau's arguments," says Paul Smith. "Saumonisme" prevailed, says Christine Bard, referring to 1936, when, with a socialist government in power, socialist women opted not to press for the right to vote. Saumoneau "continued as a destructive power behind the scenes," says Helmut Gruber, ensuring that female participation was limited to those few willing to join the overwhelmingly male party and brave the inhospitable masculine ambience of local meetings.²⁶

A fourth socialist woman of this era who strongly voiced similar suspicion of nonsocialist feminists was the Dutch leader Henriëtte Roland Holst-Van der Schalk. In 1898, when Dutch feminists organized a national exhibition on women's work, Roland Holst urged working-class women to boycott it, publishing a pamphlet in

Feminism in Russia, 1900–1917 (London, 1984), 86–93. For "antifeminist polemic," see Stites, *The Women's Liberation Movement*, 437; on harassment, see *ibid.*, 252; on "class character," see Richard Stites, "Women and the Revolutionary Process in Russia," in Renate Bridenthal, Susan Stuard, and Merry Wiesner-Hanks, eds., *Becoming Visible: Women in European History*, 3rd ed. (Boston, 1998), 424. Stites credits Kollontai with destroying the Russian Women's Union; Stites, *The Women's Liberation Movement*, 214. Kollontai wrote that "during the period of the first revolution . . . the bourgeois women's movement posed a serious threat to the unity of a working-class movement"; in Alexandra Kollontai, *Selected Writings*, ed. Alix Holt (New York, 1977), 50. Her comment on "unbridgeable gulf" is quoted in Stites, *The Women's Liberation Movement*, 228. For "scourge," see Beatrice Farnsworth, "Bolshevism, the Woman Question, and Aleksandra Kollontai," in Boxer and Quataert, *Socialist Women*, 186.

²⁴ See Kollontai, *Selected Writings*.

²⁵ For the full text of the appeal and repeat notices, see Marilyn J. Boxer, "Socialism Faces Feminism in France, 1879–1913" (Ph.D. diss., University of California, Riverside, 1975), 188, 191. "Confusionism" quoted in Boxer, "Socialism Faces Feminism," in Boxer and Quataert, *Socialist Women*, 92; on "letter," see Christine Bard, *Les Filles de Marianne: Histoire des féminismes, 1914–1940* (n.p., 1995), 90.

²⁶ Charles Sowerwine, *Sisters or Citizens? Women and Socialism in France since 1876* (Cambridge, 1982), 134, 186; see also Sowerwine, *Les Femmes et le socialisme* (Paris, 1978). Paul Smith, *Feminism and the Third Republic: Women's Political and Civil Rights in France, 1918–1945* (Oxford, 1996), 80; Bard, *Les Filles de Marianne*, 345; Gruber, "French Women in the Crossfire of Class, Sex, Maternity, and Citizenship," in Gruber and Graves, *Women and Socialism/Socialism and Women*, 279–320, quotation on 283.

protest.²⁷ In hostile language that vied with Zetkin's invective, Roland Holst called the exhibition leaders "hypocritical, fork-tongued, cowardly . . . middle-class feminists." At a preliminary meeting called to inform working women of exhibition plans, she expressed "great anger, the speaker stamping her feet and her eyes 'ablaze with hatred and scorn,' while she shouted insults at the president herself."²⁸

How much influence these socialist women had outside leadership circles and beyond major cities is uncertain.²⁹ What is clear is that, while maintaining many different positions on other issues, most other socialist parties adopted the Second International's and the SPD's party line of anathematizing "bourgeois feminism."³⁰ Some leaders, despite personal ambivalence, divorced themselves from nonsocialist feminist groups, although few expressed opposition in such vituperative language as Zetkin, Kollontai, Saumoneau, and Roland Holst.³¹ In fact, many socialist women distinguished between formal, organizational collaboration and cooperation among individuals. This point was recognized in 1900 at the first conference of German socialist women, where it was agreed to leave it to individuals to decide whether to "occasionally or temporarily work alongside 'women's righters' and other bourgeois elements." In many cases, especially at the local level, they did collaborate.³² The "clean break" policy advocated by Zetkin, and reinforced by the socialist leadership, however, forced many left-leaning women to choose. A Dutch internationalist lamented in 1911 that "the SD [Social Democratic] women refuse to take a leaflet from the hands of a woman with the badge of the suffragists, although it is an appeal written by Bebel . . . himself."³³

Rivalry over organizational power and resources played a major role in shaping the conflict. Socialist parties had access to substantial resources unavailable to women's groups. Lily Braun, who vied with Zetkin for leadership in Germany, noted that working-class women's opportunity to ally with a large, powerful party meant that "proletarian women . . . had the potential of being politically effective; bourgeois women did not." When a new socialist women's group was formed in Paris in 1913,

²⁷ Henriëtte Roland Holst-Van der Schalk, *Een Woord aan de vrouwen der arbeidende klasse naar aanleiding der nat. tentoonstelling van vrouwen-arbeid* (Amsterdam, 1898), 19.

²⁸ Maria Grever and Berteke Waaldijk, *Transforming the Public Sphere: The Dutch National Exhibition of Women's Labor in 1898*, trans. Mischa F. C. Hoyick and Robert E. Chesal (Durham, N.C., 2004), 48–49.

²⁹ Patricia Hilden and Christine Bard offer some insight into the situation in the north of France and the southeast, respectively. Bard suggests that Saumoneau and the party line had some influence at Lyon; Bard, *Les Filles de Marianne*, 241. Regarding the major textile cities in the north, Hilden states, "In general, the national SFIO's campaign against bourgeois feminism found few echoes in the Nord federation"; Hilden, *Working Women and Socialist Politics in France, 1880–1914: A Regional Study* (Oxford, 1986), 256. Richard J. Evans, reporting on attitudes among Hamburg pub-goers toward women suffragists, cites some workingmen who, influenced by Zetkin's views, said, "the bourgeois feminists . . . are basically in favour of suppressing women workers"; in Evans, *Proletarians and Politics: Socialism, Protest and the Working Class in Germany before the First World War* (New York, 1990), 165.

³⁰ For an illustrative case of the means through which the German party influenced others in the Second International, see Georges Haupt, *L'historien et le mouvement social* (Paris, 1980), 151–197.

³¹ See, e.g., the struggle of Anna Kuliscioff; Claire LaVigna, "The Marxist Ambivalence toward Women: Between Socialism and Feminism in the Italian Socialist Party," in Boxer and Quataert, *Socialist Women*, 146–181.

³² Ute Frevert, *Women in German History*, 146; I have altered the translation of *Frauenrechtlerinnen*, substituting the more common usage "women's righters" for "legalists." For a similar decision by Swedish Social Democrats in 1905, see Evans, *The Feminists*, 169.

³³ Leila J. Rupp, *Worlds of Women: The Making of an International Women's Movement* (Princeton, N.J., 1997), 35. On suffrage as a divisive issue among internationalists, see *ibid.*, 135–139.

Pelletier predicted sarcastically that “it will leave feminism behind to please the men in the party.” An Austrian socialist, describing her colleagues, noted, “Beginners in the class struggle, they were anxious to maintain their prestige vis-à-vis their male comrades.”³⁴ Criticism by socialist women of “bourgeois feminism” was at the least a shrewd strategy.

The socialists’ ardent castigation of “bourgeois feminism” persisted through the interwar period, despite male socialists’ participation in so-called bourgeois governments during the Popular Front of the 1930s. It was most influential where socialist parties adhered closely to the principles and politics of the Second International, less so, for example, in Great Britain. It appeared as far away from its origins as China in the 1920s and Vietnam in the 1930s.³⁵ It was, of course, affected by the rise of welfare states, with support from nonsocialists and socialists alike, and by changing communist policies. “Feminism,” however, had come to signify “bourgeois feminism.” The legacy of class division persisted, so that, as Mineke Bosch comments about the Dutch women’s movement, when feminism reemerged in the 1970s, conflicts between a “bourgeois” women’s movement and a “proletarian” movement were taken entirely for granted by activists.³⁶ They soon made their way into the academy as well.

AFTER WORLD WAR II, claims for women’s rights on the left reemerged with the founding by French communists in 1945 of the Women’s International Democratic Federation, to pursue the fight against fascism and to represent working-class women. Caught up in Cold War politics, the WIDF, Leila Rupp states, “continued the well-worn socialist tradition of hostility to the bourgeois women’s movement,” contending with older international women’s organizations for representation at the United Nations.³⁷ A short collection of excerpts from writings by Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, published in 1951 as *The Woman Question*, offered as an appendix a selection by Zetkin from her famous 1920 interview with Lenin, including Lenin’s counsel to “draw a clear and ineradicable line of distinction between our policy and [bourgeois] feminism.” Reprinted in 1970, this publication appeared that year on the reading list for the first course in women’s history taught in the first women’s studies program in the United States.³⁸

³⁴ On shifting views over collaboration, see also Evans, *The Feminists*, 170–177; on the U.S., see Mari Jo Buhle, *Women and American Socialism, 1870–1920* (Urbana, Ill., 1981), 221–229. For Braun, see Meyer, *The Feminism and Socialism of Lily Braun*, 57–58; for Pelletier, see Sowerwine, *Sisters or Citizens?* 130; for the Austrian case, see Meyer, *The Feminism and Socialism of Lily Braun*, 53. Two French historians, Laurence Klejman and Florence Rochefort, assert that the real audience of the French socialist women leaders was male socialists; Klejman and Rochefort, *L’Égalité en marche: Le Féminisme sous la Troisième République* (Paris, 1989), 215.

³⁵ On China, see Christina Gilmartin, “Gender, Politics, and Patriarchy in China: The Experiences of Early Women Communists, 1920–27,” in Sonia Kruks, Rayna Rapp, and Marilyn B. Young, eds., *Promissory Notes: Women in the Transition to Socialism* (New York, 1989), 101; on Vietnam, see Christine Pelzer White, “Vietnam: War, Socialism, and the Politics of Gender Relations,” *ibid.*, 177.

³⁶ Mineke Bosch, “History and Historiography of First-Wave Feminism in the Netherlands, 1860–1922,” in Sylvia Paletschek and Bianka Pietrow-Ennker, eds., *Women’s Emancipation Movements in the Nineteenth Century: A European Perspective* (Stanford, Calif., 2004), 65.

³⁷ Rupp, *Worlds of Women*, 47; see also Karen Offen, *European Feminisms, 1700–1950: A Political History* (Stanford, Calif., 2000), 386–387.

³⁸ *The Woman Question: Selections from the Writings of Karl Marx, Frederick Engels, V. I. Lenin, Joseph Stalin* (New York, 1951), 89. Lenin’s comment is also translated as “strong, ineradicable line against the

By the time that feminism reappeared as a highly visible movement, many of its demands had been achieved in the countries where “first wave” feminists had been most active. Believing, mistakenly, that their predecessors had limited their quest to the vote, some “second wave” feminists distinguished between what they called “equal rights feminism” and “women’s liberation.” Their new demands included elimination of many restrictions on women’s lives that they associated with “bourgeois” society, including “bourgeois morality” and sexual repression. Given the experience of many new leaders in New Left movements, it is no surprise that dichotomous thinking about the relationship between feminism and socialism reemerged, along with criticism of the “bourgeois character” of the woman suffrage movement by activist author Kate Millett and others. The “bourgeois feminist movement” of the suffragists constituted a “trap,” wrote Robin Morgan in the emblematic text of 1970, *Sisterhood Is Powerful*.³⁹

Class issues infused the politics of women’s liberation from its beginnings. Many activists perceived capitalism as an obstacle to the equality of women as well as of the working classes. In Britain, the women’s liberation journal *Red Rag*, in its inaugural issue of 1972, announced its support for “revolutionary change in society, for ending capitalism and establishing socialism.” In France, where anti-bourgeois sentiment was particularly strong and feminism subject to “aggressive” ridicule, feminists of the 1970s were, in historian Florence Rochefort’s words, “profoundly anchored in the new left and the extreme left.”⁴⁰ By linking feminism to socialism, activists could show their recognition that women’s liberation intended far more than relieving Betty Friedan’s unhappy housewives of “the problem that has no name.”⁴¹

Two of the earliest and most influential activist-scholars, Juliet Mitchell and

bourgeois movement for the ‘emancipation of women,’” in Lenin, *The Emancipation of Women: From the Writings of V. I. Lenin* (New York, 1966), 110. For early women’s studies syllabi, see Sheila Tobias, ed., *Female Studies I* (Pittsburgh, Pa., 1970), and Florence Howe, ed., *Female Studies II* (Pittsburgh, Pa., 1970); for the first women’s history course in the first women’s studies program, taught by Roberta Salper, see Howe, *Female Studies II*, 89.

³⁹ Judith Hole and Ellen Levine trace the influence of the left, old and new, through the beginnings of women’s liberation in the United States in *Rebirth of Feminism* (New York, 1971), 114–122. Shulamith Firestone’s *The Dialectic of Sex*, which blazed a meteoric path through the radical women’s movement and appeared on many early women’s studies course outlines, set out to perform the task left undone by the masters, to apply the dialectic method to the “sex class,” women; Firestone, *The Dialectic of Sex: The Case for Feminist Revolution* (New York, 1970). See also the reflective essays in Rachel Blau DuPlessis and Ann Snitow, eds., *The Feminist Memoir Project: Voices from Women’s Liberation* (New York, 1998). For England, Sheila Rowbotham has provided a close analysis of the rebirth of feminism among women active in the New Left. See esp. Rowbotham, *Promise of a Dream: Remembering the Sixties* (London, 2001), and “Appreciating Our Beginnings,” in Rowbotham, *Threads through Time: Writings in History and Autobiography* (London, 1999), 73–83. On “bourgeois character,” see Kate Millett, *Sexual Politics* (Garden City, N.Y., 1970), 84; for “trap,” see Robin Morgan, ed., *Sisterhood Is Powerful: An Anthology of Writings from the Women’s Liberation Movement* (New York, 1970), xxii.

⁴⁰ For Britain, see Barbara Caine, *English Feminism, 1780–1980* (Oxford, 1997), 256. For France, see Florence Rochefort, “Les féministes,” in Jean-Jacques Becker and Gilles Candar, eds., *Histoire des gauches en France*, 2 vols., vol. 2: *XXe siècle: À l’épreuve de l’histoire* (Paris, 2004), 108. For aggressive ridicule, see Elaine Marks and Isabelle de Courtivron, eds., *New French Feminisms: An Anthology* (Amherst, Mass., 1980), x. On the new feminism in Italy as “genetically linked to the New Left,” see Yasmine Ergas, “1968–79—Feminism and the Italian Party System: Women’s Politics in a Decade of Turmoil,” *Comparative Politics* 14, no. 3 (April 1982): 253–279, quotation on 256. For a survey that mentions socialist influence on second wave feminism in other European countries, including Greece, the Netherlands, and Spain, see Gisela Kaplan, *Contemporary Western European Feminism* (New York, 1992).

⁴¹ Betty Friedan, *The Feminine Mystique* (New York, 1963). For Friedan’s political origins in the “old

Sheila Rowbotham, emerged from leftist groups in England, where the new feminism was closely related to the labor movement. The new women's movement on the left is sometimes dated from the appearance in 1966 of Mitchell's article "The Longest Revolution" in the *New Left Review*, which reminded readers of the Marxian legacy and the socialist failure to solve the problem of women's subordination. What held women back, in Mitchell's analysis, was the "traditional," that is to say, the "bourgeois" family. But Mitchell also cautioned against too early a class division among the new feminists. "Perhaps in the future, the biggest single theoretical battle will have to be that between liberationists with a socialist analysis, and feminists with a 'radical feminist' analysis. But that future has come too soon. The conflict is premature because neither group has yet developed a 'theory.' The practice which is that theory's condition of production has only just begun." Mitchell avoided using the term "bourgeois feminism," preferring instead to identify feminists who believed that equality could be won without a socialist revolution as "liberal."⁴²

Sheila Rowbotham, a "worker student" in history whose pioneering 1972 book, *Women, Resistance, and Revolution*, linked women to the cause of socialist revolution, employed the term "bourgeois feminist" only in the final sentence of her introductory chapter. But she intended it in no derogatory sense, simply as an attribute of women who had very early challenged the status quo in women's roles. She also offered a revisionist reading of socialist policy, arguing that feminist "changes will not follow a socialist revolution automatically but will have to be made explicit in a distinct movement now, as a precondition of revolution, not as its aftermath."⁴³

Writing retrospectively, Rowbotham noted the extent to which leftist movements of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries had caricatured feminists and made feminism into a "dreaded bogey." These "over-simplified caricatures of 'bourgeois feminism' which concertina-ed several kinds of feminism into one grotesque creature . . . have been taken too much at face value by socialist women writing history." She herself had failed, she said, to problematize the relationship between socialism and feminism sufficiently, or to challenge an "uncritical acceptance of a simple polarity between socialism and feminism." "It was not," she wrote in a subsequent book, "a simple question of reactionary middle-class feminists versus enlightened working-class socialists."⁴⁴

left," see Daniel Horowitz, *Betty Friedan and the Making of "The Feminine Mystique": The American Left, the Cold War, and Modern Feminism* (Amherst, Mass., 1998).

⁴² A 1968 strike by factory women helped spur organization by leftist women; see Rowbotham, *Threads through Time*, 80–81. Mitchell also noted, "The liberation of women remains a normative ideal, an adjunct to socialist theory, not structurally integrated into it . . . The family as it exists at present is, in fact, incompatible with the equality of the sexes"; Juliet Mitchell, "Women: The Longest Revolution," *New Left Review* 40 (November–December 1966): 11–37, quotations on 15, 36. On the need for new theory, see Mitchell, *Woman's Estate* (New York, 1971), 90–91; for "liberal feminist," see *ibid.*, 66. On the influence of Mitchell and Rowbotham, see, e.g., Anna Coote and Beatrix Campbell, *Sweet Freedom: The Struggle for Women's Liberation* (Oxford, 1982), 8–9.

⁴³ Sheila Rowbotham, *Women, Resistance, and Revolution: A History of Women and Revolution in the Modern World* (1972; repr., New York, 1974), quotations on 35, 247. Rowbotham opens with protests by seventeenth-century aristocratic and bourgeois women, in a chapter she titles "Impudent Lasses."

⁴⁴ On "bogey," see Sheila Rowbotham, "Introduction," in *The Daughters of Karl Marx: Family Correspondence, 1866–1898*, commentary and notes by Olga Meier, trans. and adapted by Faith Evans (New York, 1979), xvii–xi, quotation on xxxv; on "caricatures" and "polarity," see Rowbotham, "The Women's Movement and Organizing for Socialism," in Rowbotham, Lynne Segal, and Hilary Wainwright, eds.,

The new women's history was strongly influenced by developments in labor history. Both Mitchell and Rowbotham had studied with E. P. Thompson, the famous British activist-scholar who helped to bring about new perspectives on working-class and socialist history.⁴⁵ But by neglecting women in his classic work *The Making of the English Working Class* (1963), he sensitized female activist-scholars to the "cult of masculinity" greatly admired by the left. In a perceptive account of Thompson's influence and the difficulties arising from it, titled *What's Left?*, Julia Swindells and Lisa Jardine state the problem: "What is admissible within the Thompson enterprise of retrieving working-class consciousness as a 'suitable' topic for historians is going to be a problem for subsequent radical history, particularly when social history belatedly remembers the women. The 'value' of working-class men's experience is authorized by culture, and in that account the women provide the 'virtue' via the family. But in that case, the women will always appear in the account as bourgeois."⁴⁶

Similar problems arose in radical movements in North America, France, Germany, Italy, and elsewhere. As women turned "personal" into "political" issues in the politics of 1960s radical movements, they often found themselves shoved aside and belittled. "We are trashed as bourgeois feminists irrespective of the political position we take," commented Dorothy E. Smith, a Canadian Marxist feminist activist-scholar. "If you are working-class they'll humiliate you with your sex and class ignorances, if you're middle-class they'll call you a petty bourgeois deviationist," complained Rowbotham.⁴⁷ This rejection of leftist women's perspectives contributed substantially to shaping the new women's movement, in which women on the left played a formative role.

Beyond the Fragments: Feminism and the Making of Socialism (London, 1979), 63–64 and 151 n. 19; on conventional stereotype, see Rowbotham, *Hidden from History: Rediscovering Women in History from the 17th Century to the Present* (1973; repr., New York, 1974), 79.

⁴⁵ Rowbotham reflects on the links between radical history in Britain and the U.S. as well as inspiration drawn from Western Marxist theorists whose work "illuminated aspects of women's oppression which were not part of conventional socialist ways of seeing." See Sheila Rowbotham, "New Entry Points from USA Women's Labour History," in Margaret Walsh, ed., *Working Out Gender: Perspectives from Labour History* (Aldershot, 1999), 9–28, quotation on 11.

⁴⁶ Julia Swindells and Lisa Jardine, *What's Left? Women and Culture in the Labour Movement* (London, 1990), 12, 68; emphasis in original. They also state that for adding feminism to Marxist analysis, Mitchell "was promptly excommunicated by the NLR fraternity"; *ibid.*, 70. "Cult of masculinity" is from Beatrix Campbell, *Wigan Pier Revisited: Poverty and Politics in the Eighties* (London, 1984), 98–99. Joan Wallach Scott also points to the difficulty of including women in the language of class; see "On Language, Gender, and Working-Class History," in Scott, *Gender and the Politics of History* (New York, 1988), 53–67, esp. 64–65.

⁴⁷ Dorothy E. Smith, *Feminism and Marxism: A Place to Begin, a Way to Go* (Vancouver, 1977), 33; Sheila Rowbotham, *Woman's Consciousness, Man's World* (London, 1973), 38. Statements that both helped launch the new feminism and connected it to Marxism grew out of women's protests at meetings of SDS (Students for a Democratic Society), including widely distributed and much-anthologized essays by Roxanne Dunbar, "Female Liberation as the Basis for Socialist Revolution" (1968), and Margaret Benston, "The Political Economy of Women's Liberation" (1969). See also Lydia Sargent, ed., *Women and Revolution: A Discussion of the Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism* (Boston, 1981); Rowbotham, "Appreciating Our Beginnings," in Rowbotham, *Threads through Time*, 73–83; and Rowbotham, *Promise of a Dream*. A historian of the American left, James Weinstein, states, "Initially, the women's movement saw itself as entirely outside of, or even opposed to, the organized socialist movement, largely because socialist parties and groups had traditionally seen 'the woman question' as secondary to trade union or political electoral activity, but also because of the social conservatism of much of the socialist movement. Radical feminism grew up in opposition to the socialist movement in much the same way as black cultural nationalism emerged in reaction to the politics and social relations of the white left." Weinstein, *Ambiguous Legacy: The Left in American Politics* (New York, 1975), 165.

Two developments of the 1970s brought increased prominence to the assumption of a deep class division among activist women, in which use of the word “bourgeois” to castigate nonsocialist feminists continued. One was a self-identified socialist feminist movement whose adherents began a search for new theory to remedy flaws in the work inherited from nineteenth-century socialists.⁴⁸ The second movement, also heavily influenced by nineteenth-century socialist thought, was the academic field of women’s studies. The terminology and the legacy of disdain for “bourgeois feminism” appear often in the literature of both movements.

Socialist feminists drew on Engels to legitimize women’s claims; some cited Mitchell; most assumed a socialist revolution essential to women’s liberation. While factional politics split women’s movements, numerous theorists tried to integrate socialism and feminism by developing materialist explanations that, unlike Marxism, included human reproduction and linked the systems of “patriarchy” that governed family life with relations of production. Others inveighed against “bourgeois feminism.” “Today we polemicize with ‘bourgeois’ and ‘petty-bourgeois’ feminists,” said Mary-Alice Waters in 1972. “Many of us are dissatisfied with a strict bourgeois feminism,” wrote Charnie Guettel in 1974. “Bourgeois and proletarian women confront each other in the labor market, and bourgeois women are one of the instruments used to undercut the wages of proletarian women . . . today [just as] in Clara Zetkin’s day,” wrote Marlene Dixon in 1977. Like their predecessors in the Second International, these women assured their male colleagues of their commitment to socialist revolution and of their rejection of nonsocialist feminisms.⁴⁹

Aiming to reduce the conflict, theorist Lise Vogel noted that Zetkin, in an 1896 speech, did not propose a simple dichotomy but divided women into groups, separating out the “ruling-class women of the Upper Ten Thousand” from the lower and middle bourgeoisie who constituted the core of the bourgeois women’s movement, and whose demands she then considered “entirely justified.” In Vogel’s view, Zetkin’s later intransigent opposition to nonsocialist women reflected her resistance to reformism within the socialist movement as well as her pragmatic politics. (“Most revisionists and at least some reformists in the SPD were, in fact, closely allied to bourgeois feminism,” as they more generally favored collaboration with liberals, states Richard J. Evans.⁵⁰)

During the later 1970s and the 1980s, as feminism faded from the public eye, it reappeared in rapidly spreading women’s studies programs, where, from the begin-

⁴⁸ For a summary of socialist-feminist activism in the U.S., see Red Apple Collective, “Socialist-Feminist Women’s Unions: Past and Present,” *Socialist Review* 38 (March–April 1978): 37–57.

⁴⁹ The literature is huge. See, e.g., Annette Kuhn and AnnMarie Wolpe, eds., *Feminism and Materialism: Women and Modes of Production* (London, 1978); Batya Weinbaum, *The Curious Courtship of Women’s Liberation and Socialism* (Boston, 1978); Zillah R. Eisenstein, ed., *Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism* (New York, 1979); Michèle Barrett, *Women’s Oppression Today: Problems in Marxist Feminist Analysis* (London, 1980); Cambridge Women’s Studies Group, *Women in Society: Interdisciplinary Essays* (London, 1981); Sargent, *Women and Revolution*. On “polemicizing,” see Mary-Alice Waters, *Feminism and the Marxist Movement* (New York, 1972), 35. On “dissatisfied,” see Charnie Guettel, *Marxism and Feminism* (Toronto, 1974), 1. On “instruments,” see Marlene Dixon, “Left-Wing Anti-Feminism: A Revisionist Disorder,” *Synthesis: A Journal of Marxist-Leninist Debate* 1, no. 4 (Spring 1977): 31–43, quotation on 33. Socialist-feminists “disengaged from feminism,” Beatrix Campbell later commented; Michèle Barrett, Beatrix Campbell, Anne Phillips, Angela Weir, and Elizabeth Wilson, “Feminism and Class Politics: A Round-Table Discussion,” *Feminist Review* 23 (Summer 1986), 16.

⁵⁰ Lise Vogel, *Marxism and the Oppression of Women: Toward a Unitary Theory* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1983), 108–109; Evans, *Proletarians and Politics*, 96.

ning, the influence of socialist thought was strong.⁵¹ Academic feminism drew heavily on the literature that informed the radical movements of the 1960s and early 1970s. Whatever the course discipline, many reading lists included works in which students encountered discussion of socialism's relationship to feminism. Engels's *Origin of the Family* appeared on many of the first syllabi in women's studies, along with Simone de Beauvoir's *The Second Sex* (1952) and Kate Millett's *Sexual Politics* (1970), both of which rely on Engels. Essays by socialists Margaret Benston, Marlene Dixon, and Roxanne Dunbar that linked women's liberation to socialist revolution appeared repeatedly.⁵² The first women's studies textbooks, which generally included some effort to explain the origins of women's "oppression" and concomitant proposed solutions, tended to define women's movements using oversimplified terms. As Michèle Barrett and Anne Phillips write, "1970s feminism assumed one could specify a *cause* of women's oppression . . . [one that] lay at the level of *social structure* . . . In the taxonomies so beloved of the period—as of many commentators subsequently—feminisms were divided into their liberal, socialist, and radical varieties." The notion of "bourgeois feminism" (sometimes identified as "liberal feminism") found a place alongside socialist feminism and radical feminism as one of the "Big Three" frequently cited by historians and feminist theorists.⁵³

Not only did this practice confuse class origins and class outlook, it defied the reality that feminism's constituency persisted in cutting across alleged class borders. It obscured the fact that feminism also transcended racial lines. Even though, as Zillah Eisenstein points out, "The 'bourgeois' woman has not really been identified yet in terms of a class analysis specifically pertaining to women," she was readily targeted for dismissal. The founders of the women's studies program at San Diego State chastised themselves and others associated with the university for their "petit bourgeois" biases. In 1974, when the African American Combahee River Collective,

⁵¹ At San Diego State University, where the first integrated program in women's studies was launched in 1970, the first chair offered the job was the Marxist Marlene Dixon, who declined but personally solicited another socialist feminist, Roberta Salper, who accepted. The initial curriculum included a course entitled "Status of Women under Various Economic Systems" that highlighted communist societies. But after "three years of struggle," working "inside the beast" (their term for the university), the early San Diego State women's studies faculty asked themselves whether it was "a waste of our time . . . to be teaching and working with petty bourgeois students." The following year they decided it was, and, embattled with the administration over governance issues, they resigned en masse. For Dixon and Salper, see Roberta Salper, "Introduction," in Salper, ed., *Female Liberation: History and Current Politics* (New York, 1972), 22. On early San Diego State women's studies, see *Women's Studies Program: Three Years of Struggle* (San Diego, Calif., 1973), and Women's Studies Board, San Diego State College, *Women's Studies and Socialist Feminism* (San Diego, Calif., 1974); also Marilyn Jacoby Boxer, *When Women Ask the Questions: Creating Women's Studies in America* (Baltimore, Md., 1998), 164–166. On conflicts in women's studies, see also Ellen Messer-Davidow, *Disciplining Feminism: From Social Action to Academic Discourse* (Durham, N.C., 2002).

⁵² For course outlines, see Tobias, *Female Studies I*, and Howe, *Female Studies II*. Roxanne Dunbar's "Female Liberation as the Basis for Social Revolution," written early in 1969 as a response to an SDS resolution, was reprinted in Morgan, ed., *Sisterhood Is Powerful*, 477–492, which was a popular selection among academic feminists. Margaret Benston's "The Political Economy of Women's Liberation" (brochure, Boston, n.d.; reprinted from *Monthly Review*, September 1969) included writings from Lenin as an appendix.

⁵³ Michèle Barrett and Anne Phillips, "Introduction," in Barrett and Phillips, eds., *Destabilizing Theory: Contemporary Feminist Debates* (Stanford, Calif., 1992), 2–3, emphases in original. On "Big Three," see Mary Maynard, "Beyond the 'Big Three': The Development of Feminist Theory in the 1990's," *Women's History Review* 4, no. 3 (1995): 259–281. As feminist theorist Donna J. Haraway points out, "Any . . . taxonomy is a re-inscription of history"; Haraway, *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature* (New York, 1991), 159–160.

identifying its politics as socialist, published the first book on “black women’s studies,” it rejected support for a leading black feminist group, the National Black Feminist Organization, for its “bourgeois-feminist stance.” Introducing a reprint of Clara Zetkin’s work in 1984, activist Angela Davis opined that “bourgeois feminists today . . . have a great deal to learn from Zetkin’s analysis.”⁵⁴

HISTORIANS, MEANWHILE, set out to recover the heritage of socialist women and feminist socialists. As a research topic, the relationship between feminism and socialism offered several attractions. It provided entrée for young historians into the popular subfield then dubbed the “new social history.” It offered attractively untrodden ground, including virtually untouched archival materials. It also offered a chance to contribute to the wider movement for social change. History, at least on the left, seemed to allow for “making a statement.” Perhaps it also offered what Virginia Woolf described as “the glamour of the working class and the emotional relief afforded by adopting its cause.”⁵⁵ No one snickered at the idea of working-class history, and, of course, no one wanted to be “bourgeois.”⁵⁶ Like earlier feminists who applauded the socialists for their stance on women’s rights, the new historians of women also appreciated the recognition that socialist parties had afforded women’s causes—“the first in all countries,” as the secretary-general of the National Council of French Women, Mme. Avril de Sainte-Croix, declared in 1907.⁵⁷

At that time, however, one could read basic texts about socialism without encountering a single reference to women.⁵⁸ The focus was on ideology and organizations, political parties and trade associations, strikes and protest marches; the rhetoric was dominated by the language of class, and the working class was embodied in the artisan, factory hand, or miner, its “quintessential worker” clearly male.⁵⁹

⁵⁴ Zillah Eisenstein, “Developing a Theory of Capitalist Patriarchy and Socialist Feminism,” in Eisenstein, *Capitalist Patriarchy and the Case for Socialist Feminism*, 5–40, quotation on 38 n. 27; The Combahee River Collective, “A Black Feminist Statement,” in Gloria T. Hull, Patricia Bell Scott, and Barbara Smith, eds., *But Some of Us Are Brave* (Old Westbury, N.Y., 1982), 13–22, quotation on 20; Angela Y. Davis, “Foreword,” in Foner, *Clara Zetkin*, 11.

⁵⁵ For a sample “statement,” see the following: “History—least of all labour history—is not an abstract intellectual pursuit. It is also a political statement, a personal choice about the past . . . It is to *Labour History*’s credit that it continues to provide a forum for ‘activist’ as well as academic, the young and innovative as well as the privileged and professional elite”; “Introduction,” special issue, *Women, Work and the Labour Movement in Australia and Aotearoa/New Zealand*, ed. Raelene Frances and Bruce Scates, *Labour History* 61 (November 1991): x. For Woolf, see Virginia Woolf, *Three Guineas* (San Diego, 1938), 177 n. 13.

⁵⁶ For one notable activist’s memory of this concern, see the interview with Jane Fonda by Robin Morgan in *Ms.* 16, no. 1 (Winter 2006): 36.

⁵⁷ Mme. Ghénia Avril de Sainte-Croix (writing as “Savioz”), “L’Indépendance économique de la femme,” *L’Humanité*, January 17, 1907; she was co-founder of the National Council of French Women, author of *Le Féminisme* (Paris, 1907), and an international feminist activist. I thank Karen Offen for this reference; on Sainte-Croix, see Offen, “‘La plus grande féministe de France’: Mais qui est donc Madame Avril de Sainte-Croix?” *Archives du féminisme*, Bulletin no. 9 (December 2005): 46–54.

⁵⁸ Among the exceptions are G. D. H. Cole, who includes a six-page chapter on “Socialism and the Rights of Women, 1914–1931” in Cole, *A History of Socialist Thought*, vol. 4, pt. 2: *Communism and Social Democracy, 1914–1931* (London, 1958), 839–845, and a chapter on Flora Tristan in vol. 1: *Socialist Thought: The Forerunners, 1789–1850* (London, 1953), 183–188; and George Lichtheim, who offers a brief discussion of Tristan as the “first socialist to have lived the connection between the emancipation of her sex and the ending of wage slavery,” in Lichtheim, *The Origins of Socialism* (New York, 1969), 69.

⁵⁹ The term is borrowed from Sonya Rose, “Class Formation.” In Rose’s view, “the ‘quintessential worker problem’ . . . has blinded historians from recognizing how both gender and race have been con-

Sources included organizational records, proceedings of party congresses, party platforms, personal papers of party leaders, and periodical publications supported by party funds. Labor history told of men and organizations. As Beatrix Campbell wrote (of Britain), "The socialist movement . . . [was] swept off its feet by the magic of masculinity, muscle and machinery," and its historians failed to challenge this perception.⁶⁰

Despite New Left influences, the initial challenge to consensus history did not extend to women's interests. French labor historian Michelle Perrot, who became one of the founders of French women's history, tells a revealing story of resistance by Trotskyist, Maoist, and other radical students. In 1973, when sociologist Andrée Michel introduced analysis of the family into the first women's history course in France, she "was reproached . . . They said they did not want to hear about family models; the family was bourgeois."⁶¹ The historiography also reflects the long dominance in the academy of structuralism. In this heyday of the "longue durée," not only was biography all but banished from the historical profession, it was doubly suspect on grounds of elitism. The term "women worthies" took on a pejorative cast, while women workers and women on the left attracted disproportionate scholarly interest.⁶²

Rowbotham introduced her readers to Anna Doyle Wheeler, Flora Tristan, Eleanor Marx, Alexandra Kollontai, Angelica Balabanoff, Emma Goldman, and many other socialist women.⁶³ Werner Thönnessen's 1969 study (which appeared in English in 1973) of the SPD's stance toward women brought prominence to Clara Zetkin and her German party. Thönnessen charged "the [bourgeois] women's movement . . . [with its] problem-ridden aim of legal equality" with responsibility for society's ability to "liquidate the proletarian women's movement." He credits "bourgeois feminism," along with "proletarian anti-feminism" and the SPD's turn to reformism ("revisionism"), for having "banished women's liberation once and for all into the realm of utopia."⁶⁴ Another pioneer of German women's history, Amy Hackett, quoting Zetkin's view of sisterhood as "sentimental simpering about harmony," wrote in 1972 that "the deepest split in German feminism was between Social Democratic and bourgeois women."⁶⁵

Although France occupied a much lesser place in the story, as the nation whose

stitutive of class identities"; 139, emphasis in original. Although her focus is not on women, Carole Biewener's "Class and Socialist Politics in France," *Review of Radical Political Economics* 19, no. 2 (1987): 61–76, is useful for understanding how basic class concepts served to eclipse women's roles as workers.

⁶⁰ Campbell, *Wigan Pier Revisited*, 97.

⁶¹ Michelle Perrot, "Twenty Years of Women's History in France: Preface to the English Edition," in Perrot, ed., *Writing Women's History*, trans. Felicia Pheasant (1984; repr., Oxford, 1992), viii–ix. See also the interview with Perrot about resistance to women's history by *gauchistes* in *Radical History Review* 37 (1987): 27–38.

⁶² Cf. Linda Harriet Edmondson's 1984 comment that most of the research on women in tsarist Russia had thus far focused on revolutionaries, with little attention given to the "bourgeois feminists," in Edmondson, *Feminism in Russia*, x.

⁶³ Rowbotham, *Women, Resistance, and Revolution*.

⁶⁴ Thönnessen, *The Emancipation of Women*, 10. Thönnessen sees the socialist turn to reformism, which he says favored "proletarian anti-feminism," as responsible for the demise of German socialism; *ibid.*, 164–165.

⁶⁵ Amy Hackett, "The German Women's Movement and Suffrage, 1890–1914: A Study of National Feminism," in Robert J. Bezucha, ed., *Modern European Social History* (Lexington, Mass., 1972), quotations on 355, 356.

history had long attracted more Anglophone historians than any other non-English-speaking country, it also gained considerable notice in the 1970s. Russia's revolutionary history and the prominence of its radical women likewise drew attention to links between socialism and feminism. Between 1975 and 1979, several unpublished dissertations and at least seven monographs and collections of essays appeared in English, focusing on socialist women and highlighting the division between "bourgeois feminism" and "socialist feminism."⁶⁶ Generalizations based on three national histories, featuring Zetkin, Saumoneau, and Kollontai, soon found their way into women's history and women's studies courses, and greatly affected interpretations and evaluations of women's movements.

Important works of this period include Berenice Carroll's 1976 anthology, offering two chapters on socialism and feminism, one on Engels (and Marx) and another on the "bourgeois" women's movement in Germany and its association with liberalism.⁶⁷ The same year, *The Socialist Register* published an aptly titled article, "Marxist Women versus Bourgeois Feminism," that included in translation important primary sources by Bebel (including his reference to "the enemy sisters") and Zetkin as well as Rosa Luxemburg, and also brought Eleanor Marx into the "war" fought by German Marxist women "to counteract the influence of bourgeois feminism."⁶⁸ That year also, Richard J. Evans published the first of a series of works through which he helped to establish Germany as the paradigmatic case of socialist relations with feminism. Taking as a starting date 1894, the year that marked the formation of a national federation of German women's organizations and their (contested) vote to exclude socialist women's groups (though not working women), Evans called attention to the class antagonism that made alliance "impossible," despite what he calls their "wide agreement of aims."⁶⁹

Studying the socialist-feminist connection in France, Sowerwine in 1978 also pointed to signal events in the early years of the two movements. During a struggle for dominance among socialist factions at a formative meeting of the French Workers' Party (POF) in 1880, feminist leader Hubertine Auclert and her group chose to support a Proudhonist-influenced group that envisioned only traditional roles for women, over their Marxist-oriented, and theoretically more feminist, rivals. Sow-

⁶⁶ For Ph.D. dissertations, see Karen Honeycutt, "Clara Zetkin: A Left-Wing Socialist and Feminist in Wilhelminian Germany" (Columbia University, 1975); Amy K. Hackett, "The Politics of Feminism in Wilhelmine Germany, 1890–1918" (Columbia University, 1976); and Boxer, "Socialism Faces Feminism in France, 1879–1913." Linda Edmondson lists eight dissertations on women in Russia between 1968 and 1981, all but one on women in radical movements; Edmondson, *Feminism in Russia*, 177.

⁶⁷ Ann J. Lane, "Women in Society: A Critique of Frederick Engels," in Berenice A. Carroll, ed., *Liberating Women's History: Theoretical and Critical Essays* (Urbana, Ill., 1976), 4–25; and Amy Hackett, "Feminism and Liberalism in Wilhelmine Germany, 1890–1918," *ibid.*, 127–136. It is worth noting that Lane, in her essay dating from 1972, criticizes the absence of women workers in E. P. Thompson's revisionist work. For criticism of Draper's and Lipow's stance on feminism, see Rowbotham, Segal, and Wainwright, *Beyond the Fragments*, 152 n. 27.

⁶⁸ Draper and Lipow, "Marxist Women versus Bourgeois Feminism," 180, 189. Draper and Lipow trace the split back to a struggle for primacy within the German workers' movement between Lassalleans and Marxists; *ibid.*, 182–183.

⁶⁹ Richard J. Evans, "Bourgeois Feminists and Women Socialists in Germany, 1894–1914: Lost Opportunity or Inevitable Conflict?" *Women's Studies International Quarterly* 3 (1980): 355–376, quotation on 359. Evans titled chapter 2 of his *Comrades and Sisters* "The Impossible Alliance." Reasons for the vote included not unfounded fears of repression by police: in 1894, a women's "educational club" in Nuremberg was dissolved for sending a representative to a socialist meeting; see Quataert, "Feminist Tactics," 51.

erwine attributes the choice to the power of private property over feminist claims in their scale of values (and generalizes from it to "bourgeois feminists"). Other possible readings of this event (including my own) suggest alternative explanations, including personal rivalries and loyalties as well as the differing definitions of socialism and feminism that divided factional leaders and their followers. Auclert's biographer points out, importantly, that even before the contentious meeting, the collectivist group had already rejected allying with the advocates of women's rights.⁷⁰

A second event that affected relations between socialist and feminist women occurred during the International Congress on the Condition and Rights of Women in Paris in 1900. In a debate over the scope of proposed labor legislation, a dispute arose over whether to include domestic servants, as socialist participants advocated. The controversy itself, while brief, led to an extended, bitter, and highly personalized argument between two founders of the newly formed "socialist feminist" group and a nonsocialist leader of the conference, and it supposedly soured relations between women's groups permanently. Following Sowerwine, Robert Stuart, a historian of the POF, views the "notorious" conflict as "emblematic of the irreconcilable class conflict dividing militant French women."⁷¹ But a rereading of the conference proceedings raises the question of whether this confrontation outweighs an important proposal, termed "minor" by Sowerwine, by the "bourgeois" journalist and conference convener Marguerite Durand. This plan called for minimum piecework rates, female labor inspectors, and extension of labor legislation to domestic workers and commercial employees (categories that included the vast majority of women workers). Without denying that some feminists did oppose socialism, this history could also be written to highlight the efforts of "bourgeois" women to improve conditions for working-class women.⁷²

"Bourgeois" women, for example, were not always dismissive of domestic servants. Just two years earlier, at the summer-long exposition on women's work organized by Dutch "bourgeois" women at the Hague, servants were offered free entrance and were included as speakers in an extensive, embedded conference on

⁷⁰ See Sowerwine, *Sisters or Citizens?* 26–28; Sowerwine, "The Socialist Women's Movement from 1850 to 1940," in Renate Bridenthal, Claudia Koonz, and Susan Stuard, eds., *Becoming Visible: Women in European History*, 2nd ed. (Boston, 1987), 399–426, esp. 405–406; Boxer, "Socialism Faces Feminism in France, 1879–1913," 103–113. Claire Moses follows Sowerwine on this, in Moses, *French Feminism in the Nineteenth Century* (Albany, N.Y., 1984), 223–224. On factionalism among French feminists, see Wynona H. Wilkins, "The Paris International Feminist Congress of 1896 and Its French Antecedents," *North Dakota Quarterly* 43, no. 4 (Autumn 1975): 5–28. For "Auclert's biographer," see Steven C. Hause, *Hubertine Auclert: The French Suffragette* (New Haven, Conn., 1987), 67.

⁷¹ Robert Stuart, "'Calm, with a Grave and Serious Temperament, Rather Male': French Marxism, Gender and Feminism, 1882–1905," *International Review of Social History* 41, pt. 1 (April 1996): 57–82, quotations on 76, 77.

⁷² Sowerwine, *Sisters or Citizens?* 75–77. For the *compte-rendu*, see *Congrès international de la condition & des droits des femmes tenu les 5, 6, 7 et 8 septembre 1900* (Paris, 1901), 73–79. The "bourgeois feminist" leader Maria Pognon reported that after the altercation, working women delegates to the conference stated their appreciation for her help over the previous year, and offered her their support. See Pognon, "Expliquons-nous," *La Petite République*, September 18, 1900, 1. Durand and Pognon both joined socialists to call for state support of mothers, unwed and married; Anne Cova, "French Feminism and Maternity: Theories and Politics, 1890–1918," in Pat Thane and Gisela Bock, eds., *Maternity and Gender Policies: Women and the Rise of the European Welfare States, 1880s–1950s* (London, 1991), 119–137, esp. 123–125. For a women's movement that viewed socialism as a "social poison," see Nancy R. Reagan, *A German Women's Movement: Class and Gender in Hanover, 1880–1933* (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1995), quotation on 73.

domestic service. Lily Braun, cast out of German Social Democracy as too “bourgeois,” suggested that a domestic servants’ union be organized, and called on servants “to strike against the semi-feudal relationship under which they work.” In 1899, when she formally proposed the inclusion of female servants in labor legislation under consideration at the Reichstag, “her party comrades discouraged her, arguing that maids were not genuine proletarians.” Braun’s efforts on behalf of household workers elicited the charge that she was “deflecting the working class from its struggle for power.” In Russia, following the Revolution of 1905, feminists organized a union for domestic workers; they also encouraged peasant women to claim access to land and voting rights, and drew many working women into their suffrage efforts.⁷³

These complexities notwithstanding, in 1978, when Jean Quataert and I published a collection of essays about socialist women in five European countries, we inadvertently contributed to the revival of class-based categorical thinking about feminism. In our introduction, we defined the terms “socialist feminism” and “bourgeois feminism” primarily in terms of ideological heritages. Although we described many of the socialists as artisans or employees of small shops, even as intellectuals, rather than as prototypical “proletarian” factory workers, and noted that the feminists labeled “bourgeois” included teachers and white-collar workers as well as leisured women, we did not delve further into class identity. Nor did we criticize the solidly “bourgeois” (if not upper-class) origins of most of the socialist leaders. We tended to categorize our subjects just as the socialists of that era had done.⁷⁴

The unexamined definition of “bourgeois feminism” and the alleged gulf that lay between its adherents and the socialists found their way into women’s history also through textbooks. The first and for a decade the only text designed specifically for survey courses in European women’s history, *Becoming Visible* (1977), offered chapters on modern France, England, Russia, Germany, and Spain, all with a leftist slant; and in its second and third editions (1987, 1998) it included a selection by Sowerwine on socialism and feminism that passed along the unexamined use of “bourgeois feminism.” While admirably summarizing the origins and significance of the socialist response to socioeconomic changes wrought in working-class women’s lives, this chapter also exaggerated the depth of the division between women’s groups, as well as the success of socialist parties in attracting women workers.⁷⁵

What, for instance, if the nonsocialists had been described by historians not as

⁷³ On Holland, see Grever and Waaldijk, *Transforming the Public Sphere*, 195–200. On Braun, see Meyer, *The Feminism and Socialism of Lily Braun*, quotations on 63, 64, and 142. Evans also follows Sowerwine on this; Evans, *Comrades and Sisters*, 40. Stites states that servants constituted a “blind spot” for feminists; Stites, *The Women’s Liberation Movement*, 223. On Russia, see Rose Glickman, *Russian Factory Women: Workplace and Society, 1880–1914* (Berkeley, Calif., 1984), 243–244.

⁷⁴ Boxer and Quataert, *Socialist Women*, 5–8. Exceptional work that did examine women’s class status included Gerda Lerner, “The Lady and the Mill Girl: Changes in the Status of Women in the Age of Jackson,” *Midcontinent American Studies Journal* 10, no. 1 (Spring 1969): 5–15, and two essays in Carroll, *Liberating Women’s History*: Hilda Smith, “Feminism and the Methodology of Women’s History,” 368–384, and Sheila Ryan Johansson, “‘Herstory’ as History: A New Field or Another Fad?” 400–430.

⁷⁵ Sowerwine writes, “Even in the countries where the socialist women’s movement was weakest, it reached more women than the bourgeois feminists ever hoped to reach”; Sowerwine, “The Socialist Women’s Movement,” 421. If doubtful in other cases as well, this statement wholly ignores mass religious and patriotic women’s movements that attracted large numbers in several countries; for the latter in Germany, see Frevert, *Women in German History*, 137. Picq writes that “socialist women abandoned working women”; Picq, “‘Bourgeois Feminism’ in France,” 341. She refers to the infamous Couriau

"bourgeois" but as "liberal" feminists or "suffrage" feminists; or, following German and Russian usage, as "equal rights feminists"; or, for the French case, as Karen Offen did some years ago and Carolyn Eichner and Florence Rochefort have done more recently, as "republican feminists"? Gisela Bock points to some feminists who avoided the ambivalent word "bourgeois," which in German refers to citizenship as well as class status, by referring to the "civic women's movement." Jean Quataert now prefers "reform feminist" to her earlier usage. For socialists and some historians of the 1960s and 1970s, however, to borrow from Rochefort, "the [feminist] movement was just as pejoratively 'bourgeois' as it had been for their predecessors near the end of the nineteenth century."⁷⁶

For the generation of activist-historians who began professional careers in the early 1970s, the emphasis on socialist women leaders and their opposition to "bourgeois feminism" served a political purpose. Claire Moses observes that these "constructions" of women's history allowed the new feminists "to stake out a position more radical than that of [their] grandmothers . . . [and their] mothers." "We therefore reclaimed the Socialist women for feminism, denying their self-naming," she adds.⁷⁷ "The dichotomies—Women and Labour, Sex and Class, Feminism and Socialism have been the intimate inhabitants of both my psyche and my intellectual work (if the two can be separated)," Sally Alexander recalls.⁷⁸

It seems curious now that, given the influence of E. P. Thompson, more studies of socialism and feminism in the 1970s did not emphasize the impact of culture on the formation of consciousness for socialist and feminist activists in the earlier period. By the mid-1980s, however, following Joan Scott's influential challenge to apply gender analysis to historical studies and the flowering of cultural studies, new perspectives on individual identity and class consciousness began to dissolve old dichotomies. Where the 1982 English edition of Sowerwine's book bears the title *Sisters or Citizens?*, Evans's 1987 study of feminism, socialism, and pacifism in Europe features inclusion in its title, *Comrades and Sisters*. In this work, Evans notes that the doctrine of a sharp separation between working women and "bourgeois feminists" promulgated by Zetkin, Saumoneau, and Kollontai was "by no means an inevitable extrapolation of the fundamentals of Marxism."⁷⁹

affair, in which French printers ejected a member for allowing his (union-qualified) wife to work in the trade, and only "bourgeois feminists" supported her protest.

⁷⁶ Karen Offen, "Exploring the Sexual Politics of Republican Nationalism," in Robert Tombs, ed., *Nationhood and Nationalism in France: From Boulangism to the Great War, 1889–1918* (London, 1991), 195–205; Carolyn J. Eichner, *Surmounting the Barricades: Women in the Paris Commune* (Bloomington, Ind., 2004), 5, 9–10, 26, 61; Florence Rochefort, "The French Feminist Movement and Republicanism, 1868–1914," in Paletschek and Pietrow-Ennker, *Women's Emancipation Movements*, quotation on 78; Gisela Bock, *Women in European History*, trans. Allison Brown (Oxford, 2002), 119; Jean H. Quataert, *Staging Philanthropy: Patriotic Women and the National Imagination in Dynastic Germany, 1813–1916* (Ann Arbor, Mich., 2001), 82.

⁷⁷ Claire Moses, "Debating the Present, Writing the Past: 'Feminism' in French History and Historiography," *Radical History Review* 52 (1979): 79–94, quotation on 84. In Moses's view, the grandmothers evoked "the National Woman's Party (suspect for its relationship to the Republican Party)," and the mothers, the members of the "National Organization for Women (suspect for its relationship to the Democratic Party)."

⁷⁸ Sally Alexander, "Women, Class and Sexual Differences," *History Workshop Journal* 17 (Spring 1984): 125–149, quotation on 127.

⁷⁹ Evans, *Comrades and Sisters*, 59. For women in the interwar French socialist party as "neither comrades nor sisters," see Gruber, "French Women in the Crossfire," 280.

Evans's point reappears with emphasis in a biography of Bebel that appeared in 2000. Examining Zetkin's ascendancy over Bebel in shaping Marxist thought on collaboration with nonsocialist women, Anne Lopes and Gary Roth note, "Until Zetkin, no one had implied [that to 'cross class'] was unmarxist. The marxian legacy, as it has come to be known in the subsequent historiography, is largely a fiction created by Zetkin herself . . . The social democratic outlook already included the gamut of bourgeois feminist interests and mostly did so with greater consistency and fervor." In the eyes of these authors, historians who deemphasized Bebel's feminism "merged the history and the historiography."⁸⁰

In fact, there was a long history of efforts to link socialism and feminism. In the pre-Marxist era in France, the definition of the "feminine" that shaped romantic socialist conceptions encompassed all women. From the Saint-Simoniennes of the 1830s, through the revolutionaries of 1848 and the Communardes of 1871, "proletarian" women collaborated with "bourgeois" women. Many women identified as "bourgeois feminists" considered themselves socialist and participated in socialist organizations.⁸¹ Some socialist women, even in Zetkin's own party, rejected her policy of absolute noncooperation. Some working-class women joined "bourgeois" groups, and many in the latter ranks worked to improve working-class women's employment skills and educational opportunities. Indeed, in many instances, nonsocialist feminism grew out of women's work to aid impoverished and abused women.⁸² Common goals, such as winning the vote, opposing militarism, or resolving the "motherhood dilemma," sometimes elicited collaboration, sometimes "parallel wars."⁸³ Even the alleged "litmus test" of class loyalty, protective legislation, on close examination by historians from nine European countries as well as Australia and the United States, turns out to be anything but. Trade union women, fearing loss of employment, often opposed it, and division appeared in socialist and nonsocialist women's groups alike. Rather than a clear-cut struggle between "bourgeois feminists" and defenders of women workers, positions on restricting female labor ran the gamut among adherents of all political persuasions.⁸⁴

⁸⁰ Lopes and Roth, *Men's Feminism*, 45, 222.

⁸¹ See, e.g., Jeanne-Victoire [Jeanne Deroin], "Call to Women," *La Femme libre* 1, no. 1 (1832), in Bell and Offen, *Women, the Family, and Freedom*, vol. 1: 1750–1880, 146–147; also Moses, *French Feminism in the Nineteenth Century*, 136–142; Eichner, *Surmounting the Barricades*, 2, 24, 69–95. Naomi J. Andrews demonstrates how "gender shaped socialism's definition of the good society" in the July Monarchy; Andrews, *Socialism's Muse: Gender in the Intellectual Landscape of French Romantic Socialism* (Lanham, Md., 2006), xvii.

⁸² On working-class women sympathetic to "bourgeois feminism" such as Jeanne Bouvier and Henriette Coulmy, see Bard, *Les Filles de Marianne*, esp. 184–186. On cross-class efforts, see, e.g., Frevert, *Women in German History*, 100–103. On opposition to Zetkin in the SPD, see Strain, "Feminism and Political Radicalism," 140–142, 208. On links between welfare work and the emergence of feminism, see Bock, *Women in European History*, 111–116.

⁸³ On motherhood as an issue crossing "class" lines, see Ann Taylor Allen, *Feminism and Motherhood in Western Europe, 1890–1970: The Maternal Dilemma* (New York, 2005); for "parallel wars," see Ida Blom, "Modernity and the Norwegian Women's Movement from the 1880s to 1914: Changes and Continuities," in Paletschek and Pietrow-Ennker, *Women's Emancipation Movements*, 125–151, quotation on 138.

⁸⁴ The term "litmus test" is used by Moses, "Debating the Present," 84, and by Sheila Rowbotham in *Women in Movement: Feminism and Social Action* (New York, 1992), 14. The wrong assumption appears in Ingrun Lafleur, "Five Socialist Women: Traditionalist Conflicts and Socialist Visions in Austria, 1893–1934," in Boxer and Quataert, *Socialist Women*, 215–248, esp. 237. For the comparative study, see Ulla Wikander, Alice Kessler-Harris, and Jane Lewis, eds., *Protecting Women: Labor Legislation in*

Largely since the 1990s, new historical scholarship has emerged from Northern and Eastern Europe and far beyond that shows the global purchase of the concept “bourgeois feminism,” while also blurring the dichotomous lines it suggests.⁸⁵ In Denmark and Sweden, where socialists collaborated with liberals to achieve democratic parliamentary institutions, barriers between “bourgeois” and socialist women’s groups were often breached.⁸⁶ In Ukraine, the Galician leader Natalia Ozarkevych Kobrynska, portrayed by Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak, argued explicitly against Zetkin, advocating linkages between the two social movements and rejecting the socialist denigration of feminism as “bourgeois.”⁸⁷ In Hungary, where in the early twentieth century socialists “nervously guard[ed] their charges against any ‘bourgeois influence,’” Judith Szapor notes that some socialists nevertheless formed alliances with “bourgeois” feminists to campaign for the vote, and even tried to put into practice Lily Braun’s proposals to resolve domestic servants’ problems by creating communal households. Although Hungarian feminism later became what Andrea Pető terms “an isolated stream,” echoes of an antifeminist heritage persisted in post-1989 Hungary. “Feminists were considered aliens by conservative Christians, and bourgeois by the labor movement.”⁸⁸ In Bulgaria, according to Krassimira Daskalova, ideological divisions over class collaboration split the socialists in 1903 and left “feminism” stigmatized as “bourgeois,” while also stereotyped as opposing “‘traditional Bulgarian values’ of love, marriage, and family.”⁸⁹ In Poland, states Jill Bystydzienski, “State propaganda successfully managed to belittle the feminist cause and to plant almost unanimous disdain for western feminism presenting it as a bourgeois preoccupation of well-to-do, disaffected, mainly American

Europe, the United States, and Australia, 1880–1920 (Urbana, Ill., 1995). In Scandinavia, opposition from trade union women who feared loss of work sometimes sufficed to quash proposals for restrictions; *ibid.*, 215, 236–237, 247–248, 273–274. For a thoughtful comparative discussion of the controversy and its relation to citizenship and maternalism, see Bock, *Women in European History*, 158–173.

⁸⁵ Class issues also arose in Latin America, for example, within the suffrage movement in Uruguay. Christine Ehrick suggests, however, that the familiar European/North American model does not really suit the Latin American context. See Ehrick, “*Madrinas* and Missionaries: Uruguay and the Pan-American Women’s Movement,” *Gender and History* 10, no. 3 (November 1998): 406–424.

⁸⁶ See Ida Blom, “Prelude to Welfare States: Introduction,” in Gruber and Graves, *Women and Socialism*, 415–420; Frangeur, “Socialist Democrats and the Woman Question in Sweden,” and Hilda Romer Christensen, “Socialist Feminists and Feminist Socialists in Denmark, 1920–1940,” *ibid.*, 478–503. These studies confirm Eley’s point regarding the influence of relationships between liberal and socialist parties on degrees of collaboration among women’s groups.

⁸⁷ Martha Bohachevsky-Chomiak, *Feminists Despite Themselves: Women in Ukrainian Community Life, 1884–1939* (Edmonton, 1988), 80, and “Feminism in Ukrainian History,” *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 7, no. 1 (Spring 1982): 16–30, esp. 20. See also Bohachevsky-Chomiak, “Socialism and Feminism: The First Stages of Women’s Organizations in the Eastern Part of the Austrian Empire,” in Tora Yedlin, ed., *Women in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union* (New York, 1980), 44–64.

⁸⁸ Judith Szapor, “Sisters or Foes: The Shifting Front Lines of the Hungarian Women’s Movements, 1896–1918,” in Paletschek and Pietrow-Ennker, *Women’s Emancipation Movements*, 189–205, quotations on 199; Andrea Pető, “Hungarian Women in Politics,” in Joan W. Scott, Cora Kaplan, and Debra Keates, eds., *Transitions, Environments, Translations: Feminism in International Politics* (New York, 1997), 153–161, quotation on 159.

⁸⁹ On the split into “broad” and “narrow” socialism, see Krassimira Daskalova, “Bulgarian Women in Movements, Laws, Discourses (1840s–1940s),” *Bulgarian Historical Review* 27, no. 1–2 (1999): 180–196, esp. 186–188; on stigma and stereotype, see Daskalova, “The Women’s Movement in Bulgaria after Communism,” in Scott, Kaplan, and Keates, *Transitions, Environments, Translations*, 162–175, quotations on 163 and 170.

women.” Any emerging feminism today must define itself as neither “Western” nor communist.⁹⁰

Disdain for feminism reached Asia as well. In China, Bebel was translated in the early 1920s, and the Chinese Communist Party adopted the advancement of women as a basic tenet. But despite party work undertaken to improve the condition of women, Chinese leaders found it useful to denigrate “feminism”; the word itself, as Wang Zheng shows, became a negative term, usually accompanied by the adjective “bourgeois” and often qualified as well by “Western.”⁹¹ Kumari Jayawardena writes that when feminism arose in South Asia in the 1970s, “The Left brought out the old quotations on the Woman Question, while dismissing feminism as a dangerous Western import.”⁹²

These examples serve to show that, as the editors of a 1989 collection of globally ranging essays on women and socialism state,

The enduring power of these early debates should be underlined. They have resonated through every socialist movement in the twentieth century without exception . . . From China to Nicaragua, this nineteenth-century model has been consciously adopted, even when its appropriateness was, at the least, open to question. While other aspects of the Marxist-Leninist program . . . have been adapted to national conditions, this element has remained remarkably unchanged, whether the country deploying the theory was Asian, Southeast Asian, African, European, or Latin American.⁹³

Phrases such as “capitulation to bourgeois feminism” and “knuckled under to bourgeois feminism” were commonly employed, and the term “bourgeois feminism” was used to label behavior deemed to favor “individualism” or to defy traditional strictures about female conduct.⁹⁴

THE CONCEPT “BOURGEOIS FEMINISM” rested on reductionist constructions of class status and political interests that are a poor fit for the realities of women’s lives. In an era when level of skill and control over production served to define male workers’ identity, and in turn profoundly affected the ideology and language of class, women were assumed to have no work-derived identity. Instead, most women became “pro-

⁹⁰ Jill M. Bystydzienski, “The Feminist Movement in Poland: Why So Slow?” *Women’s Studies International Forum* 24, no. 5 (2001): 501–511, quotation on 503.

⁹¹ Wang Zheng, *Women in the Chinese Enlightenment: Oral and Textual Histories* (Berkeley, Calif., 1999). The book is based on interviews with five members of the first generation of Chinese feminist activists. For transliterations and definitions of “feminism,” see *ibid.*, esp. 7–9, 133–134, 339–342; also Sasha Su-Ling Welland, “What Women Will Have Been: Reassessing Feminist Cultural Production in China—A Review Essay,” *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 31, no. 4 (Summer 2006): 949. Wang now refers to party work among women in Shanghai as “state feminism”; Wang, “‘State Feminism’? Gender and Socialist State Formation in Maoist China,” *Feminist Studies* 31, no. 3 (Fall 2005): 519–551.

⁹² Kumari Jayawardena, “Some Thoughts on the Left and the ‘Woman Question’ in South Asia,” in Kruks, Rapp, and Young, *Promissory Notes*, 359–366, quotation on 363.

⁹³ Kruks, Rapp, and Young, “Introduction,” *ibid.*, 7–12, quotation on 9.

⁹⁴ On “capitulation,” see Elizabeth Waters, “In the Shadow of the Comintern: The Communist Women’s Movement, 1920–43,” *ibid.*, 29–56, quotation on 51; on “knuckled under,” see Christina Gilmartin, “Gender, Politics, and Patriarchy in China: The Experiences of Early Women Communists, 1920–27,” *ibid.*, 82–105, quotation on 101; on individualism and traditional roles, see Christine Pelzer White, “Vietnam: War, Socialism, and the Politics of Gender Relations,” *ibid.*, 172–192, and Delia D. Aguilar, “Third World Revolution and First World Feminism: Toward a Dialogue,” *ibid.*, 338–344.

letarian” or “bourgeois” on the basis of their relationships to men.⁹⁵ But, as Rochefort concludes, “The women designated by socialists as ‘*bourgeoises*’ were for the most part situated well to the left on the political spectrum.” In her view, the socialist attack on feminism in the Second International “did not bring about a major schism within the [French] feminist movement; for feminists it remained possible to have a twofold commitment.”⁹⁶ Studies from postcommunist Eastern Europe also show that “many women . . . seemingly identified as both feminists and socialists without much effort.”⁹⁷

Class ascription also reflected a gendered double standard. While socialists adopted working-class identities for themselves and ignored the “bourgeois” class origins of men whose views they approved, they labeled women of similar background with the term of opprobrium. This practice did not go unnoticed. Maria Grever and Berteke Waaldijk cite a Dutch journalist who argued in 1898 that “the proletariat judged rich women more harshly than rich men, while capitalists victimized poor women more than poor men.”⁹⁸ In 1907, French feminist Nelly Roussel said, “Two women of the opposite classes may have more common interests, more similar sources of revolt, consequently more terrain for entente than have a man and a woman belonging to the same milieu . . . There are no ‘managerial classes’ among us.”⁹⁹ In her 1936 memoir, Jeanne Bouvier, a working-class Frenchwoman, also complained, recalling that “feminists are all treated as ‘bourgeoise,’ but the husbands of these feminists, if they are members of a political or philosophical party of the left, are not ‘bourgeois.’” In contrast, as Christine Bard points out, “Economically, teachers, especially when single, belong to the working-class . . . [But because] their educational level allowed them to participate in intellectual circles, *voire ‘bourgeois,’*” a designation they denied. Although historians and sociologists long ago recognized the nature and significance of the “new class” into which so many working women were drawn, these insights eluded most socialist leaders and early historians of socialist and feminist relationships.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁵ Kathleen Canning distinguishes usefully between class as an analytic concept and as “postulated identity or ideology”; Canning, “Gender and the Politics of Class Formation: Rethinking German Labor History,” *AHR* 97, no. 3 (June 1992): 736–768, quotation on 767. Women, argues Diane P. Koenker, faced “exclusion from the male world of class”; see her “Men against Women on the Shop Floor in Early Soviet Russia: Gender and Class in the Socialist Workplace,” *AHR* 100, no. 5 (December 1995): 1438–1464, quotation on 1463. On masculine identity and class formation, see also Ava Baron, “On Looking at Men: Masculinity and the Making of a Gendered Working-Class History,” in Ann-Louise Shapiro, ed., *Feminists Revision History* (New Brunswick, N.J., 1994), 146–171.

⁹⁶ Florence Rochefort, “The French Feminist Movement and Republicanism, 1868–1914,” in Paletschek and Pietrow-Ennker, *Women’s Emancipation Movements*, 77–101, quotation on 86.

⁹⁷ This was true especially of Bulgarian and Polish women; Francisca de Haan, Krassimira Daskalova, and Anna Loufti, “Introduction,” in de Haan, Daskalova, and Loufti, *Biographical Dictionary of Women’s Movements and Feminisms*, 9.

⁹⁸ The journalist, Ida Heijermans, was the sister of a well-known socialist; Grever and Waaldijk, *Transforming the Public Sphere*, 202.

⁹⁹ Nelly Roussel, *Quelques Lances rompues pour nos libertés* (Paris, 1910), 48.

¹⁰⁰ Jeanne Bouvier, *Mes mémoires*; or, *59 Years of the Industrial, Social, and Intellectual Activity of a Workingwoman* (Paris, 1983), 243–244, also quoted in Bard, *Les Filles de Marianne*, 185; on teachers, *ibid.* On the role of intellectuals in the Second International, see Patricia van der Esch, *La Deuxième Internationale, 1889–1923* (Paris, 1957), 35–36. For weaknesses in the Marxist critique of the bourgeoisie, see Robert Stuart, *Marxism at Work: Ideology, Class and French Socialism during the Third Republic* (Cambridge, 1992). Stuart, on the other hand, credits the POF with identifying women clerks as “proletarian”; Stuart, “Gendered Labour in the Ideological Discourse of French Marxism: The Parti Ouvrier Français, 1882–1905,” *Gender and History* 9, no. 1 (April 1997): 115.

Studies of the class backgrounds of socialist women and of nonsocialist feminists drawn from British, Bulgarian, Dutch, German, Spanish, and Swedish history of the early twentieth century suggest further confusion. Few socialist women worked for pay; they were socialists by sympathy but not "proletarian." Fewer performed labor that produced "surplus value." In Bulgaria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden, most were stay-at-home wives of socialist men. Many British feminists came from working-class origins, but typically worked in service occupations, especially as teachers. In the British suffrage movement, those who held dual commitments to labor movements and to feminism tended to be undercounted. In the Netherlands, few feminists were wealthy women.¹⁰¹ It is not clear that the class backgrounds of socialist women and feminists were "very different," as Sowerwine has alleged.¹⁰² Given a paucity of data, mixed reports, generational shifts, and national differences, as well as multiple varieties of socialism and of feminism, assertions about feminists' and women socialists' "class" backgrounds seem at best to be premature. In any case, Marxist class definitions and categories offer little insight.

RHETORIC MASKED THE REALITY that party allegiance did not parallel class differences among women. As a political movement, feminism has never been "bourgeois" in the sense that Marxists proposed. "Bourgeois feminism" was invented by socialist women and did not exist as a discrete, identifiable, class-based women's movement. Nor was there as absolute a class divide between women's groups as socialist leaders and some of their historians asserted. This allegation allowed a strategic shift in socialist perspectives on the woman question to take place, from the more collab-

¹⁰¹ Evans cites a prewar survey in Hamburg that found only 1,601 of 11,684 women members engaged in paid employment; Richard J. Evans, "Politics and the Family: Social Democracy and the Working-Class Family in Theory and Practice before 1914," in Richard J. Evans and W. R. Lee, eds., *The German Family: Essays on the Social History of the Family in Nineteenth- and Twentieth-Century Germany* (London, 1981), 266. Mary Nash cites an occupational survey of a 1926–1927 Spanish socialist women's group that found only 1 of 527 members working in an industrial occupation; Nash, "'Ideals of Redemption': Socialism and Women on the Left in Spain," in Gruber and Graves, *Women and Socialism*, 350–351. Of the approximately 1,000 members of the Bulgarian social democratic women's organization in 1922, 457 were housewives, 212 were "workers," 56 were "craftsmen," and about 75 were employed in clerical and professional occupations; Krassimira Daskalova, "Bulgarian Women's Movements (1850s–1940s)," in Edith Saurer, Margaareth Lanzinger, and Elisabeth Frysak, eds., *Women's Movements, Networks and Debates in Post-Communist Countries in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries* (Weimar, 2006), 413–437. On wives, for France, see Claude Willard, *Les Guesdistes: Le mouvement socialiste en France, 1893–1905* (Paris, 1965), 362 n. 1; for Germany, see Evans, *Comrades and Sisters*, 61, and Quataert, *Reluctant Feminists*, 19; for the Netherlands, see Ulla Jansz, "Gender and Democratic Socialism in the Netherlands," in Gruber and Graves, *Women and Socialism*, 217; for Spain, see Nash, "Ideals of Redemption," 350; for Sweden, see Frangeur, "Social Democrats and the Woman Question," 428. For the British suffrage movement, see Olive Banks, *Becoming a Feminist: The Social Origins of "First Wave" Feminism* (Brighton, 1986), 11, 16; and Jiang Park, "The British Suffrage Activists of 1913: An Analysis," *Past and Present* 120 (August 1988): 147–162, esp. 157, 161. For the Netherlands, see Myriam Everard, "Het burgerlijk feminisme van de eerste golf: Annette Versluys-Poelman en haar kring," in Marjan Schwegman, Ulla Jansz, et al., eds., *Op het Strijdtoneel van de Politiek: Twaalfdejaerboek voor vrouwengeschiedenis* (Nijmegen, 1991), 106–137.

¹⁰² Sowerwine states that "the socialist women, if they were not so much of the working classes as they claimed, were nonetheless from class backgrounds very different from those of the feminists"; *Sisters or Citizens?* 186. Picq also challenges Sowerwine on this point; Picq, "'Bourgeois Feminism' in France," 330. Geoff Eley and Keith Nield point out that "socialist parties always contained a far richer sociology than a simple class-political argument would imply"; Eley and Nield, "Farewell to the Working Class?" *International Labor and Working-Class History* 57 (Spring 2000): 1–30, quotation on 20.

orative views of August Bebel and others to Clara Zetkin and her followers, who portrayed feminism as if it were the complaint of a special interest group. The socialists, says Quataert, “promoted their own gendered form of identity politics.” As a political strategy for rejecting feminism, it helped socialists claim “proletarian” values for themselves, while it masked the motivations of its formulators and their failure to create a woman-centered socialism that might effectively attract women workers.¹⁰³

If the purpose, conscious or unconscious, of the enemies of “bourgeois feminism” was to squelch any potential for unity among women’s movements, they succeeded, probably beyond what they could have imagined. The concept spread around the globe, and it persisted for a century as a means to discredit nonsocialist women activists. Feminism fell into a double bind. It was suspect as “bourgeois,” but also came to be rejected, especially in formerly communist countries after 1989, for its association with socialism.¹⁰⁴ In the 1980s, as identity politics and the language of race and ethnicity replaced class as a central focus, “bourgeois” lost its place as the epithet of choice, but left behind a divisive residue. The dichotomizing concept also owes its long life to the scholars, myself included, who employed the term, and failed to challenge its validity. Today, however, received ideas and inherited dichotomies elicit criticism. Comparing nineteenth-century women’s emancipation movements, the editors of a 2004 volume conclude, “There was more crossing of borders between feminism and socialism than the long-established image of the ‘hostile sisters’ would lead us to suppose. Historiography has also exaggerated the rift between the two wings of the women’s movement for political reasons.”¹⁰⁵

Feminism is one of the most misunderstood movements of modern times, and historians have contributed to the misjudgment. The “most lasting legacy” of the socialist rejection of feminism as “bourgeois” was not, as Sowerwine asserted, “the development of separate organization for working-class women and a consequent articulation of their distinct concerns.”¹⁰⁶ Whether the latter ever happened is debatable. What is certain, in my view, is that the most far-reaching legacy for women was the socialists’ success in spreading disdain for feminism, on the ideological grounds that to be a practicing feminist was to be “bourgeois.” The association be-

¹⁰³ On identity politics, see Quataert, “Socialisms, Feminisms, and Agency: A Long View,” *Journal of Modern History* 73 (September 2001): 603–616, quotation on 614.

¹⁰⁴ On rejection of feminism in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe after the fall of communism, see Tanya Renne, ed., *Ana’s Land: Sisterhood in Eastern Europe* (Boulder, Colo., 1997), and Barbara Einhorn, “An Allergy to Feminism: Women’s Movements Before and After 1989,” chap. 6 in Einhorn, *Cinderella Goes to Market: Citizenship, Gender and Women’s Movements in East Central Europe* (London, 1993). “Distaste for feminism is about the only thing in which there is great continuity between communism and capitalism,” states Lynn Turgeon; Turgeon, “Afterword,” in Valentine M. Moghadam, ed., *Democratic Reform and the Position of Women in Transitional Economies* (Oxford, 1993), 357.

¹⁰⁵ Sylvia Paletschek and Bianka Pietrow-Ennker, “Women’s Emancipation Movements in Europe in the Long Nineteenth Century: Conclusions,” in Paletschek and Pietrow-Ennker, *Women’s Emancipation Movements*, 301–333, quotation on 326. See also Virginia Sapiro, “A Woman’s Struggle for a Language of Enlightenment and Virtue: Mary Wollstonecraft and Enlightenment ‘Feminism,’” in Tjitske Akkerman and Siep Stuurman, eds., *Perspectives on Feminist Political Thought in European History from the Middle Ages to the Present* (London, 1998), 122–123; and Ulla Jansz, “Women or Workers? The 1889 Labor Law and the Debate on Protective Legislation in the Netherlands,” in Wikander, Kessler-Harris, and Lewis, *Protecting Women*, 189.

¹⁰⁶ Charles Sowerwine, “Socialist Women’s Movement,” in Bridenthal, Stuard, and Wiesner, *Becoming Visible*, 3rd ed., 383–384.

tween socialism and feminism was, as Karen Offen declares, “a lethal relationship . . . From a feminist perspective, organized socialism in Europe—and more broadly, the social democratic left—has a lot to answer for.”¹⁰⁷ Geoff Eley states, “Socialist parties’ claims to be the vanguard of democracy, rallying all progressive causes to their banner, foundered on this gender neglect.”¹⁰⁸ The socialist stance toward feminism hindered both movements in achieving mutually desired goals.¹⁰⁹

The history of the European Left’s relationships with women and feminism is an important part of political history that needs reassessment. Historians today might begin by opening previously closed categories and replacing organizational approaches with thematic, women-centered frameworks.¹¹⁰ With a reconceptualized question that employs gender as a category of analysis and redefines politics to include sexual politics, identifies the many positive contributions of nonsocialist feminists to the lives of women workers, and examines such neglected topics as the impact on socialist politics of concepts of motherhood and the population question, understanding of historical relationships between socialist and feminist movements and their consequences for democratic movements and society would be clarified and enriched. This revision would recognize the importance of feminism’s history to the history of the left and to modern history as a whole, with new appreciation for how categorical class thinking and political commitments affected both its history and historians.

¹⁰⁷ Offen, *European Feminisms*, 11. Olive Banks also sees the effects of socialism on feminism as “quite profound” and finds “the decline of ‘first-wave’ feminism” in Britain to have been “in part at least a consequence of its alliance with socialism”; Banks, *Becoming a Feminist*, 105, 160. Richard Evans blames divisions within the German women’s movement for its failure to achieve a range of early-twentieth-century feminist goals, as well as for losing “the biggest battle of all—against the Nazis . . . almost without a shot being fired”; Evans, “Bourgeois Feminists and Women Socialists,” 356.

¹⁰⁸ Eley, *Forging Democracy*, 113. Eley points out that feminism “brings the principle of democracy to the center of the private sphere”; see Geoff Eley, “Nations, Publics, and Political Cultures: Placing Habermas in the Nineteenth Century,” in Nicholas B. Dirks, Geoff Eley, and Sherry B. Ortner, eds., *Culture/Power/History: A Reader in Contemporary Social Theory* (Princeton, N.J., 1994), 318.

¹⁰⁹ Cf. Robert Stuart’s opinion that “[t]he vexed relationship between gender and class, between feminists and socialists, has shaped both the rise and fall of socialism’s challenge to capital—the greatest ideological drama of our epoch”; Stuart, “Whores and Angels,” 339.

¹¹⁰ Developing a different, women-oriented framework is one of the goals of an excellent recent study of socialism and feminism in England; see June Hannam and Karen Hunt, *Socialist Women: Britain, 1880s to 1920s* (London, 2002), esp. 202–206. For another recent study showing how complex, fluid, and situational the relationships were, see Annmarie Hughes, “Fragmented Feminists? The Influence of Class and Political Identity in Relations between the Glasgow and West of Scotland Suffrage Society and the Independent Labour Party in the West of Scotland, c. 1919–1932,” *Women’s History Review* 14, no. 1 (2005): 7–31.

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Reviews of Books

METHODS/THEORY

IAN TYRRELL. *Historians in Public: The Practice of American History, 1890–1970*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2005. Pp. xii, 348. Cloth \$57.00, paper \$23.00.

In this painstaking account of American historians and their relationship to the public, Ian Tyrrell seeks to place current controversies about the teaching, writing, and wider understanding of American history in context. He succeeds admirably.

Tyrrell's departure point is contemporary criticism that academic historians have lost their influence with the American public. He claims a "great American jeremiad" holds sway in contemporary America that traces this decline to professionalization in the discipline of history, a preoccupation with "multiculturalism and cultural fragmentation" (p. 12), and the relentless narrowing that has accompanied specialization. Into the breach have rushed "nonacademic" purveyors of historical knowledge—filmmakers, amateur historians, popularizers of various stripes—who have managed to displace, in the public eye, highly trained scholars as authoritative experts on the American past. Historians themselves, Tyrrell notes, have engaged in much hand wringing over this alleged state of affairs. Ongoing discussion about how to "reconnect" with their potentially vast audiences and achieve restoration in the public eye continues to animate the discipline and reinforce the notion that much ground has been lost.

Tyrrell invites his own readers to act like historians and take a longer view. He examines "the cycles of public involvement" of academic historians, "charting their ups and downs" (p. 3) from 1890 to 1970. In truth, much of his study focuses on the period before 1950. (The 1960s surface now and then and are quickly surveyed in a brief epilogue.) Throughout, Tyrrell finds a much more complex story than the current mythic tale of declension would allow. Not only have historians been deeply engaged with the public throughout the last century, the debate and the hand wringing over how best to advance popular engagement in and understanding of the past are not new either.

Tyrrell notes that attacks on specialization ensued the moment historical scholarship began to take shape as an academic discipline in the 1880s. Forced to con-

front the complaint, professional historians of various political sensibilities often embraced the charge in the interest of pressing their own particular advantage. As Tyrrell points out, "'specialization' and 'narrowness' quickly became pejoratives used, in effect, to advance other causes such as the popularization of history, attacks on the nature of training for university teaching, and attempts to incorporate new themes in the discourse of history" (p. 26).

Tyrrell persuasively demonstrates that throughout the twentieth century academic historians sought to engage the public in countless ways: as readers, in the schools and in museums, through mass media, by means of government service, in work with state and local historical societies, to name a few initiatives. Often they met with notable success. In the 1920s, Progressive historians tapped into the expanding "middlebrow culture" and succeeded in exploiting a growing public readership. Indeed, Tyrrell concludes that "reaching out to the general reader . . . was one of the foremost achievements of Progressive Era historiography" (p. 61).

The academic historians' exertions did little, however, to satisfy their critics. One was Allan Nevins, who bristled in the face of professorial assertions of control over historical research and scholarship. Tyrrell identifies Nevins as a key figure who sought to bridge the worlds of scholarly and popular history from the late 1930s through the mid 1950s. Ultimately, "the holy grail of combining academic history's best with outstanding writing for popular audiences was not attained" (p. 67) in Nevins's *American Heritage* magazine. Tyrrell attributes the failure in part, though somewhat vaguely, to an increasingly conservative political climate and the magazine's self-satisfied upper-middle-class readership.

Tyrrell's inquiry combines prodigious research into the activities of multiple generations of historians with sweeping interpretations of their larger significance. He recounts imaginative ventures that most scholars today will have forgotten about and that deserve to be recollected. In the 1930s, for example, radio seemed an especially promising way of linking historians and the public. Academic historians found the new medium particularly alluring, Tyrrell speculates, because its emphasis on "linearity . . . appealed to historians' sense of

progression through time" and "its focus on sound could privilege words" (pp. 87–88). Thus from 1937 to 1947 the American Historical Association sponsored a radio show, *The Story Behind the Headlines*, that probed the complex historical underpinnings of current events. Most programs focused on political and military history, and the end of World War II as well as difficulties in securing ongoing commercial sponsorship eventually doomed the show. Nonetheless, the enterprise demonstrated creative engagement by historians in new forms of media well before the onset of television.

Each foray into public life came with costs, Tyrrell emphasizes, most of them unanticipated by the scholars and organizations involved. Participation in federal programs during the New Deal and service during the war years tied historians to "the state," Tyrrell argues, in ways that rewarded attention to the recent past, and fueled suspicion about the worth of "official" history. Each attempt to "popularize" academic history raised a new wave of anxiety about the discipline, its practitioners, and the merits and substance of modern historical study. Yet throughout, Tyrrell insists, "historians have sought to deal with questions of popularization and overspecialization and to move beyond elitist constraints to incorporate new social movements and conditions" (p. 251).

This record of their successes and failures should sober those who imagine that a lack of commitment, interest, and effort account for divisions in our own time between academic historians and the public they have long sought to address.

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PENELOPE PAPAILIAS. *Genres of Recollection: Archival Poetics and Modern Greece*. (Anthropology, History, and the Critical Imagination.) New York: Palgrave MacMillan. 2005. Pp. xv, 301. Cloth \$85.00, paper \$26.95.

If Italo Calvino had been a historian, he might well have written a book like this one: clever, thoughtful, elusive, erudite, a bit involuted. At once a study of Greek history, of the way Greek history is studied, and of the meaning of history both as concept and discipline, the book zeroes in on the pivotal moments in Greece's difficult twentieth century in the effort both to better understand that century and to understand how it is that professional historians have managed so thoroughly to delude themselves into thinking that they hold a monopoly on the past and on historical production. The ground shifts beneath the reader's feet.

A central question in the book, as Penelope Papailias puts it in her opening pages, is "how people learn the habits of history and come to frame . . . experience and that of those close to them in particular and often quite limiting ways" (p. xiv). Why, for instance, did the Greek American Papailias, like so many other second-generation immigrants who travel back to their parents' and grandparents' countries, think to ask questions about

folkways, village life, and the supposed "old country" but not to ponder the effect of specific geopolitical upheavals or her parents' participation in them? Papailias came of age in an American world suffused with nostalgia and devoted to the narratives of emigration and immigrants, and her first efforts at historical inquiry were shaped by it. As she explains it, her book is, in large part, a second, much more considered attempt to probe the Greek past—now through the voices of those who had learned quite different "habits of history"—the "genres of recollection" to which her title refers.

Thus Papailias chooses to focus on the very things that narratives of nostalgia turn away from: trauma, displacement, and, perhaps above all, the irrefutability of change. If nostalgia is about stasis, and seeks an Eliadean *ilmo tempus* in which time, "authentic," stands still, the episodes Papailias deploys in her study revolve around the opposite: change, rupture, discontinuity. Since its inception less than two centuries ago, Greece has undergone stunning, unthinkable transformation and seen a rapid series of mass population movements into, out of, and within the country: first with territorial expansion that doubled the country's size in less than eighty years, then with the population exchanges of the post-World War I period, the Nazi occupation, bitter civil war, and breathtaking urbanization. The narrators Papailias chooses for these events are historians in the most expansive sense of the term: writers and collectors of testimonies, historical fiction, jottings, memoirs, and local histories. All claim authority in some way, but not in the way of the doctorate-holding Western academic. On the one hand, the result is an arresting cross-section of some of the most critical moments in Greek history. (Here "cross-section" is not intended to denote superficial treatment; indeed, Papailias's treatment of each episode and actor is replete with microhistorical detail.) But on the other hand, the result is kaleidoscopic: one closes Papailias's book with a view of Greek history that is, peculiarly, at once deep and fleeting. The book thus makes its argument both experientially and narratively: there is no monolithic "Greece" or "Greek history," both must be disaggregated. Be that as it may, it is readers who already know Greek history who will find this book the most fascinating and who will extract the most from it.

Those with an antipathy for the self-referential will, at points, be uncomfortable; even as Papailias presents her readings and interpretations of the various sources she uses, she also presents the feedback she has received on those readings and interpretations, and how it has varied depending on whether her reader was historian or anthropologist, Greek or American. The effect is peculiar, a bit like watching early returns on election night before one has gone to vote oneself. But of course, that is again in part the point: the reader is prompted to reconsider, perhaps, his or her own response, even as s/he is formulating it. Similarly, those who do not like "theory" may be put off, as the fascinating "primary" material—often gripping and detailed accounts of wrenching events, experiences, and emo-

tions—rapidly gives way to a Bakhtinian or Benjaminian reading of it. But these caveats are a matter of one's cup of tea, and not of quality, which in Papailias' book is consistently high. Her book is itself a new genre, and marks an important, quirky contribution to several disciplines at once.

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COMPARATIVE/WORLD

GORDON M. SAYRE. *The Indian Chief as Tragic Hero: Native Resistance and the Literatures of America, from Moctezuma to Tecumseh*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2005. Pp. x, 357. Cloth \$55.00, paper \$22.50.

How is it that Indian "chiefs" like Metacom and Pontiac, once despised as devious inhuman foes, have ended up as celebrated and revered heroes? The question has tantalized historians, whose explanations include the time-honored practice of idealizing the enemy for the sake of self-glorification. It is a form of boasting to raise your defeated enemy to the status of superhero. There is also the less-than-conscious wish of conquerors in wars of aggression to assuage guilt, especially when victory includes genocide and appropriation of the foe's homeland. With impressive erudition and insight Gordon M. Sayre's book challenges such older explanations by recasting ambivalence as a sign of a new cultural amalgam of mixed white and native origin. The conquering culture projected its own values and wishes on symbolic enemies it called "chiefs," while natives absorbed enough Western culture, especially religion and politics, to make the projection plausible. "Indian chiefs" get to be "tragic heroes" as a result of reciprocal mimesis, each side mimicking and adopting elements of the other's ways.

Covering events and figures over three centuries of white-Indian relations, Sayre locates his story on "the middle ground," a conceptual turf where Europeans and natives produce a third thing, the imagination if not the full realization of a blended or hybrid culture of mutuality. "Middle ground" implies a process whose foremost sign, in Sayre's narrative, is the Indian whose conferred status as "chief" and whose defeated aspiration to prevail over fate qualifies him, in the eyes of the conquerors who thereby bring their own cultural inheritance to bear, as "tragic." It is a subtle and at its best a powerful argument. Sayre concedes that Indian versions of "intercultural" experience remain unplumbed largely because of the formidable gap between the oral and the written, but an idea of "middle ground" reciprocity informs the entire book.

Extraordinarily rich in narrative detail and historical allusion, the book is predominantly a literary study. It treats seven moments of "resistance" from Moctezuma and Cuauhtemoc in sixteenth-century Mexico to Metacom in seventeenth century New England and Pontiac and Tecumseh in the late eighteenth and early nine-

teenth centuries in the upper United States and in Canada. The primary concern is how certain historical figures and events have been depicted in epic poetry, drama, fiction, biography, memoir, and historical and ethnological narrative, and to some extent in visual imagery: depicted and reconstructed as "the white man's Indian" but also as tokens of reciprocal desire. While each chapter mounts an abundantly detailed scenario of setting and act, the main focus is on principles and modes of the representations. Drawing from René Girard on rituals of sacrifice and "mimetic rivalry," Hayden White on "emplotment" of historical events, Richard White on "the middle ground" as a historical form of sociality, and of course Aristotle on tragedy, Sayre fashions a supple instrument of literary analysis and interpretation. Sometimes it may feel as if the book gets bogged down in its own abundance of fact and theory, but the cogency of the argument survives its occasional verbosity.

Fascinating particulars regarding each episode of resistance fill the book with recollections of perceived tragic heroism by writers who were there at the events they describe, like Hernán Cortés and William Henry Harrison, or by writers who constructed their narratives and fictions from archives and lore, like historian Francis Parkman and the dramatist John Augustus Stone (*Metamora*). Stories of battles with Indians provided primary entertainment and intended enlightenment about "civilization" then and since, and dramatic death scenes of many an "Indian chief" made many a literary career, especially during the "craze" for Indian dramas and novels in the 1830s. Also fascinating and important is the book's hemispheric and comparativist scope. Sayre shows skillfully that a similar logic appears in Spanish and French as in English texts. His book makes a major effort to underscore parallels north and south in uses of the Indian figure to support of revolutionary anticolonial and republican ideals in virtually coeval nationalizing moments of Mexico, Canada, and the United States.

Some readers may find the argument too weighted down with "theory," also with too frequent prolepses like "as we shall see." You cannot always tell the forest from the trees. But the book deserves the most serious attention not only for its breadth and depth of detail but for its historiographical argument about the value of literary study to historical understandings. The book complicates its opening question about demonized foes turned into redemptive heroes and challenges historians to reexamine fundamental assumptions about popular uses of the trope of "the Indian chief," one of American culture's archly over-determined artifacts. Why the need for tragic heroes, and why Indians? How did the tragic "chief" relate to the African slave? Sayre offers a compelling brief comparison with the Denmark Vesey rebellion. He argues that by the early republic representations of the sacrificial "other" and the semi-magical "Indian chief" helped construct a race-based ideological rationale for the nation. The book lays down

a robust challenge to historians to pursue these questions further with comparable subtlety and learning.

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NEIL KAMIL. *Fortress of the Soul: Violence, Metaphysics, and Material Life in the Huguenots' New World, 1517–1751*. (Early America: History, Context, Culture.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2005. Pp. xxiv, 1058. \$75.00.

This is an ambitious, unsettling, initially stimulating, but ultimately tedious and unconvincing book. Over a thousand pages long, it ranges across the cultural and intellectual history of early modern Europe and North America, connecting (or claiming to connect) the metaphysics of sixteenth-century Paracelsianism to the furniture made by craftsmen of Huguenot origin in seventeenth and eighteenth-century New England and New York. Essential to the connection is the fact that many of the Huguenot joiners active in the American colonies hailed from the province of Saintonge, home during the first generation of the French Reformation to the potter-chemist-architect-author Bernard Palissy. Palissy, in turn, is the central figure in the first third of the book, which offers an extended reading of his oeuvre and presents him as the founder and ur-expositor of a distinctive tradition of rural Saintongeais artisan Protestantism, heavily inflected by pietism and Paracelsianism, that parted company with orthodox Calvinism in permitting believers to dissimulate their deepest convictions and in encouraging a focus on inward spiritual transformation. This world view, Neil Kamil suggests, was passed down to subsequent generations of artisans from the region, who found it particularly appealing in times of persecution.

The book does not move in a straight line from Palissy to colonial leather side chairs and the joinery of the Friends Meetinghouse in Flushing, New York. Kamil also discerns important echoes of Palissy's world view in the ideas and activities of John Winthrop, Jr., Robert Fludd, Kenelm Digby, William Hogarth, the Huguenot *galérien* Elias Neau, the anonymous artist who engraved a view of Neau for the 1749 London edition of *A Short Account of [His] Life and Sufferings*, and even Menocchio and Jacques-Louis Ménétra. Extended hermeneutic riffs on texts or objects made by these figures or by colonial North American craftsmen alternate with briefer sections that contextualize them. (One chapter devotes fully 145 pages to a single painting by Hogarth, *Noon, L'Eglise des Grecs, Hog Lane, Soho*.) The best way to convey the author's main argument—and the character of his prose—is to cut and paste from the first three pages of the book. “Beginning with the French civil wars of religion in the 1550s, Huguenot artisans from the southwestern regional culture that supplied the vast majority of French refugee craftsmen and women to New Amsterdam and New York in the seventeenth century mastered an apocalyptic shift from the corporate and militaristic ‘place of security’—epi-

tomized by the massive, immobile (and hence militarily vulnerable) medieval fortress system protecting La Rochelle—to a reformed program of protection based on the skills construction of portable and individualistic modes of personal security, deployed mostly in domestic space.” This artisanal security was rooted in mastery of manual skills and natural materials and deeply informed by models of Paracelsian natural philosophy. “This program also promoted natural camouflage through personal and religious dissimulation, inner spiritual knowledge of local earth materials, and socio-economic and spiritual cooperation across confessions and especially refugee groups exiled by persecution.” New York became the site of “social, cultural, economic and spiritual interaction between Huguenot artisanal networks and the many other Protestant, spiritualist, and artisanal traditions that developed in similar New World historiographies based on experience of religious violence, enlarging an international process of soulish convergence.”

Kamil is at moments a gifted expositor of unfamiliar world views. He convincingly shows that Paracelsian themes were more widely diffused in sixteenth and early seventeenth-century French and English culture than historians unfamiliar with this tradition are likely to have suspected. But he does not successfully establish that a common, well-articulated outlook consistently informed the texts and artifacts he examines. His readings of individual paintings, prints, and pieces of furniture often seem forced and unconvincing. His prose can be strained and difficult. And while the book ranges across an incredibly broad range of topics, its treatment of the topic I know best, Old World Huguenot culture, contains enough small misunderstandings to sap my faith in the author's mastery of the rest of the topics he examines as well. What is one to make of the sentence: “Everyone adumbrated the economic historian Warren Scoville's primary assertion of the baneful effect of religious persecution on French economic development” (p. 545), when the chief argument of Scoville's *The Persecution of the Huguenots and French Economic Development* (1960) was that the revocation of the Edict of Nantes was not as harmful to the French economy as previously thought? To call the royal siege of La Rochelle of 1628–1629 “confessional genocide” (p. 409) is overheated. While many French Protestant families certainly possessed copies of the Beza-Marot psalter, François Perrin's printer's mark of the narrow and wide gate only appears on the title page of one among many editions that circulated, and so can hardly be deemed the “most familiar [image] in Huguenot culture” (p. 624, Fig. 14.16). Examples such as these could be multiplied. On first picking up this book I was excited and challenged by its vast ambition and bold thesis. By the end I was laboring to finish it.

PHILIP BENEDICT
University of Geneva

P. J. MARSHALL. *The Making and Unmaking of Empires: Britain, India, and America c. 1750–1783*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2005. Pp. vi, 398. \$55.00.

Lord Charles Cornwallis was defeated in America in 1781 but he was victorious in India in 1792, statesman-like in Ireland in 1800, and a peacemaker with France in 1802. Once again governor-general, he died in India in 1805. The geography and chronology of Cornwallis's imperial career make both of P. J. Marshall's points.

One: the American Revolution did not divide a "first" British empire from a "second," as Vincent T. Harlow famously contended. Rather, Marshall tells us, the growth of British authoritarianism, nationalism, and racism, that is, imperialism, during and because of the Seven Years' War, actually enlisted in the cause of empire Irish, Bengali, West Indian, and Canadian elites. Because they were embattled with alien majorities, most of the imperial elites pledged allegiance to the British monarchy and submitted to the Westminster Parliament after 1763. They continued to do so for generations to come. For most of the empire, the American Revolution was but another episode in the second hundred years' war with France, not a constitutional divide.

Two: successful American resistance to military government and parliamentary pretensions coincided with an equally successful extension of British rule in India by force and under parliamentary supervision. Marshall's combining and contrasting Indian and American experience of the British Empire destroys the hegemony of the American Revolution in imperial historiography. Simply put, the Tea Act of 1773, which had such dire consequences in Anglo-American relations, was an unintended consequence of Parliament's supervision and support of the Indian segment of the British Empire.

To weigh India equally with America in the balance of British empire, Marshall brings to bear his forty years of scholarship on the British conquest of India as the consequence of Indian domestic and dynastic conflict, Anglo-Indian commercial relations, and Britain's worldwide imperial war with France from 1754 to 1763. Marshall's life work was epitomized by his edition of and contributions to the eighteenth-century volume of *The Oxford History of the British Empire* (1998). Here appeared the essays on Britain in Asia and in North America during the eighteenth century that are expanded in the present text. *The Oxford History* also collectively codified a scholarly consensus about the political dynamics of eighteenth-century empire: the predominance of the fiscal-military state; an expansive commerce and a professional military as the metropolitan agencies of empire; the cooperation of provincial elites with the imperial metropolis in finance and administration; a cooperation secured by negotiations that produced a shared standard of political legitimacy. It was Marshall's particular contribution to insist upon the commonality of these imperial processes across the entirety of the British Empire, not just in the Atlantic

world but also in Asia and even in the Pacific. These consensus and that contribution are the foundations of the present work.

As a companion to the *Oxford History*, this book echoes its encyclopedic scope as well as its now-orthodox interpretation of imperial processes and their alteration during and because of "the Great War for the Empire." The book also incorporates Marshall's recent, incisive, manuscript research. Marshall opens with a discussion of British expansion, primarily commercial and cultural, and migration, both slave and free. The author insists that this expansion was distinct from the empire, which was primarily political and military. It was empire that was transformed by the 1754–1763 war. Both in India and North America, military victory converted commercial connection into territorial empire and changed negotiated polities into authoritarian governments. For India, "a despotic administration supported by a standing army" (p. 228) was imposed by Parliament's Regulating Act of 1773.

As John Dickinson put it, "we are not Sea Poys or Marattas, but British subjects who are born to liberty, who know its worth, and who prize it high" (p. 271). Dickinson's declaration demonstrated American apprehension of Indian developments. So it forecast "the unmaking of the British empire in North America . . . the achievement of the elites in the thirteen colonies." They resented the replacement of "transatlantic negotiation" by "dictation from Whitehall, usually in the form of acts of a would-be sovereign parliament" (p. 284). What failed in America succeeded in India. So a final chapter, on the world war of 1775–1783, features the integration of India into the empire. It concludes "that the making of empire in India and the unmaking of empire in America belong to the same phrase of Britain's imperial history" (p. 379).

Magisterial as it is, this work's parallel treatment of India and America, its origins in the encyclopedic *Oxford History*, and its incorporation of disparate historical hypotheses lead to duplication, repetition, cross-referencing, and inconclusiveness. "Making and Unmaking" is a description as well as a title. Marshall, however, does not waver from his primary point: the unity of imperial history in the later eighteenth century and the importance of India in that history. Readers of this multitudinous study are left to reconcile, collate, and choose from its rich materials. Every student of empire will be informed and enlightened by the exercise, even if they do not accept the judgment of the Cambridge eulogist of 1794 that "History in her proudest page [will] proclaim Cornwallis' matchless praise, and vanquished Tippoo's shame."

STEPHEN SAUNDERS WEBB
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BRIAN W. RICHARDSON. *Longitude and Empire: How Captain Cook's Voyages Changed the World*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press. 2005. Pp. xvi, 240. \$85.00.

Readers of history have been treated in recent years to numerous hyperbolically titled books promising to explain, through a single topic, how the modern world was made or changed. Brian W. Richardson's volume enters the lists by exploring the cultural significance of Captain James Cook's three voyages to the South Pacific (1768–1780). Informed more by cultural studies than by historical scholarship per se, Richardson's fluently written book argues that the Cook voyages marked a transformation in modern thinking about space, nationhood, classification, and empire.

Richardson's point of departure lies in the contemporary, compendious published volumes that described each of Cook's expeditions. These volumes offered their readers more than travelogue, as we might call it today; they were, among other things, ethnographies, navigational guides, natural histories, and artistic works all in one. The books were produced with the support of the British admiralty, which had sponsored the voyages in the first place, and whose involvement in South Pacific exploration has made scholars now view Cook's journeys as proto-imperial undertakings. The books were also massively popular: John Hawkesworth's account of the first Cook voyage was the most frequently borrowed title from the Bristol Library in the 1770s, ahead of the Earl of Chesterfield's *Letters to His Son* or Laurence Sterne's *Tristram Shandy* (p. 14).

Drawing on Paul Carter's work on "spatial history," Richardson reads these texts as setting out an "epistemological strategy, a mode of knowing" (p. 8). His study centers around several organizing themes or tropes: cartography, nations and states, collections, and empire. The most thought-provoking chapters concern the contributions of the Cook voyages to Enlightenment political thought. There is a reason that anthropologists and others have been drawn so strongly to the South Pacific: the islands sprinkled across the region presented an intriguing range of societies, cultures, and political systems. Richardson argues that the variety of native peoples Cook and his crew encountered—and the variety of civilizations (or stages of civilization) those peoples appeared to represent—upset older notions of a simple dichotomy between civilization and savagery. Cook's findings showed Europeans that there were, in fact, many different kinds of "savages," and thereby challenged "a tendency to reduce all articulations of difference to a binary opposition between the self and the other" (p. 109). Richardson also emphasizes the centrality of the island as a territorial unit to these new conceptions of political culture. He contends that by linking forms of social organization to specific island spaces, the accounts produced by Cook and his peers contributed to a new territorial understanding of the nation-state.

If one wants to identify a British figure who embodied Enlightenment attitudes, in all senses of the word, Cook is an excellent choice; indeed, his commitment to science, discovery, and the national interest (to say nothing of his martyrdom in the line of duty) made him a hero at the time. Richardson convincingly points to sev-

eral ways in which Cook's voyages intersected with or reflected the larger intellectual and cultural reconfigurations of the Enlightenment world. In so doing, he adds another volume to the rich literature that has interpreted these voyages as seminal contributions to the modern episteme.

But Richardson offers little proof of how Cook's voyages catalyzed such shifts, of how they actually "changed the world," as opposed merely to taking place in a world that was changing. Throughout the book, cause-and-effect relationships are impressionistic at best. Richardson is not concerned with "what really happened in the voyages or what Cook was really like" and self-consciously does not engage with "the issues that have animated recent Cook scholarship" (p. 16). Unfortunately, his discussion of well-worked topics such as empire ends up being hazy, and his evidentiary base is at times thin. For example, to support the argument that the published accounts of the Cook voyages organized information in an "imperial" manner, Richardson reproduces a Canadian postage stamp from 1898 with the familiar Victorian red-tinted map of the British Empire (p. 179). There are also numerous small inaccuracies; to cite one, coastal profiling was by no means "no longer needed" by Cook's time (p. 73). Even the promise of a reception-based approach to the texts remains unsatisfied, as elementary questions of readership and response are left unresolved. Instead, sweeping declarations abound: "Before his voyages, the world was uncertain and dangerous; after them, it was clear and safe" (p. 198). For whom?

The book reads well, is attractively illustrated, and contains some suggestive insights that bear further development. As an interdisciplinary interpretive text, it could perhaps find a place in classes on Enlightenment travel or the history of the Pacific. As a contribution to serious scholarship on British empire and exploration in general, or the Cook voyages in particular, it often seems adrift.

MAYA JASANOFF
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ALEXANDER WOODSIDE. *Lost Modernities: China, Vietnam, Korea, and the Hazards of World History*. (The Edwin O. Reischauer Lectures, 2001.) Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2006. Pp. 142. \$22.00.

The insight that there are multiple "modernities" with timeframes that do not necessarily coincide with Western periodization is not new, but Alexander Woodside takes the issue a great deal further and puts it provocatively into the frame of global history. In this book, which is a reworked version of the Edwin O. Reischauer Lectures he delivered at Harvard University in 2001, Woodside argues that aspects of rationalization usually associated with "modernity" resulting from the rise of capitalism and industrialization are also found, independently and with their own timetables, in the preindustrial societies of China, Korea, and Vietnam. Indeed, it is Woodside's stated aim radically to change:

conventional Eurocentric views of what “modern” means. To substantiate his arguments, Woodside chose two institutions common to all three “mandarinates” as prime examples: the civil service examinations and the social welfare systems.

In a panoramic overview, Woodside discusses the institution of civil service examinations in Tang China and their adoption, at different times, in Korea and Vietnam. Staffed by “mandarins” selected on the basis of meritocratic rather than hereditary criteria, all three bureaucracies thus overcame, albeit to differing degrees, the “irrationality” of feudal types of government organizations. Obviously, the social and political conditions in Korea and Vietnam differed from those of China, despite their shared Confucian and Buddhist cultures, and “refeudalization” always constituted a substantial threat. Korea was perhaps the most “feudal” of the three as the examinations never fully obliterated the aristocratic demand that only those with certified social *yangban* credentials be admitted. In the case of Vietnam, where hereditary regional lords shared power with the emperor, it is amazing that the examination system was adopted at all. Nevertheless, these examinations based on merit rather than social background were, as Woodside contends, unique to Asia and predated similar systems developed much later in the industrial West.

These postfeudal meritocracies were not, however, without “hazards.” Based primarily on texts, they were in danger of being subverted by contestations over textual exegesis. Who, then, possessed the authority to mediate when “textual politics” threatened governmental stability with factional divisions? An equally serious challenge to the bureaucratic system emerged from the large numbers of unsalaried “sub-official functionaries” who pursued their tasks often on a hereditary basis and thus largely without the moral constraints imposed on the regular officialdom. Would a further “mandarinization,” Woodside asks, have helped to strengthen the bureaucratic systems from below? Did not the introduction of the examination system destroy the critical “feudal” value of loyalty?

The second area where Woodside locates East Asian precursors of the much later Western “welfare bureaus” is the provisions taken in all three mandarinates to alleviate economic deprivation of the populace. From the classic “equal fields” system to state-sponsored granaries for famine relief and experimentations with tax reform, policies to combat poverty seem to have often remained ineffective due to the gap that existed between the state and local needs. This “solidarity deficit,” Woodside states, was filled by community compacts, but these instruments of local control—in China sponsored by the state, in Korea instituted by local elites—did not necessarily ameliorate poverty and defuse popular discontent, as the widespread rebellions in China and Korea in the nineteenth century demonstrated.

Finally, Woodside considers the dismantling of the three mandarinates under the impact of Western ex-

pansion into East Asia in the nineteenth century. Indeed, the “mandarins” were made the scapegoats for their countries’ humiliation, and the examination systems were consequently scrapped. Such “iconoclasm” was succeeded in the late twentieth century by a kind of “remandarinization” fueled by extreme “science worship” and the introduction of “modern” civil service test methods. This amounted to a certain rehabilitation of the “traditional” mandarin so thoughtlessly cast away in favor of the “modern” civil servant.

In sum, Woodside’s principal argument, indeed appeal, is that institutions such as the civil service examinations, conventionally labeled as premodern, should be reexamined in the light of a more comprehensive definition of “modernity” that no longer hinges on the Western calendar, but allows for the possibility of multiple modernities different in time and space. Indeed, Woodside concludes, “the recovery of the multiple sources of the modern that have been lost” will also lead to a new appreciation of the West’s own modernity.

With a dazzling array of data drawn from Western and East Asian history, Woodside unfolds his arguments at breathtaking speed and in astonishing detail. This richly textured book does not make for easy reading, but its message is sure to raise the debate on what is “modern” to a higher level of comprehension that will necessarily take the context of global history into full account.

MARTINA DEUCHLER
University of London

DAVID BRION DAVIS. *Inhuman Bondage: The Rise and Fall of Slavery in the New World*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2006. Pp. 464. \$30.00

Evaluating this book is a complicated, somewhat daunting, task: the historiography of slavery and abolition—the landscape into which this book now enters, and from which we read it—has been profoundly shaped during the past decades by the previous contributions of its author. It is therefore an eagerly awaited book, and also one that will probably be saddled with the burden—one probably not wished for by David Brion Davis—of being seen as “definitive” in some sense. Happily, it lives up to what readers expect from Davis: it is engagingly written and impressively broad in its scope and analysis. While full of strong and well-documented interpretations, it is also a pleasingly open and balanced work, one that reads as an insightful intervention into an ongoing conversation, crystallizing but also prodding that conversation, returning to old questions and posing new ones, and along the way challenging us with the complexities and variations in the story of slavery in the Americas.

The book originated in a course taught by Davis on the history of slavery in the New World, first as a summer seminar for high school teachers, and then as an undergraduate course at Yale, starting in the 1990s. The text itself, Davis explains, was reconstructed from the lectures for this course, and this is reflected in the

work's organization and style. Each chapter in the work has a slightly different optic, but they each have the feel of a good lecture, combining broad contextualization with illustrative anecdotes and analyses of specific texts and debates, tied together with transitions that smoothen the journey across different levels of analysis.

The central focus of the book is slavery in North America, but Davis has done an admirable job of situating that history in a broader context. The reigning context for much of the book is indeed not so much North American as Anglo-Atlantic. The second half of the book, which focuses on a discussion of the nineteenth century—its slave revolts, its abolitionist movements, and its emancipations—is, at every turn, aware of the complicated circuits of political, ideological, and economic influence that shaped events. Building on his own research while also integrating and debating the work of other scholars, Davis tells a riveting story of how slavery was dismantled in the British Atlantic and North America. In so doing, he raises questions about why the processes were so different in each context, and consistently reminds us of how surprising and unpredictable developments were during this period. Without every abandoning his central conviction that abolitionist thought was a crucial motor for change, he shows that the progress of antislavery was never linear or consistent, and involved as many ruptures, reversals, and contradictions as it did consistencies and consolidation.

In this context, Davis returns, as all historians of this topic must, to the thesis of Eric Williams's *Capitalism and Slavery* (1944). While taking stock of the many critiques of Williams's work, Davis ultimately concludes that many of the "most important insights" remain valid. If Williams was likely mistaken about the direct capital investment of plantation profits in the Industrial Revolution and the "decline" of the plantation economy, he was broadly correct that the economic system generated by the Atlantic slave system contributed, as Davis writes, "both by the effects of its products on consumerism and by the imagery of the seminaked laborers being driven by the whip—to structural transformations in British life that made abolitionism acceptable to almost everyone employed by the West India lobby." This insight does not, Davis argues "diminish the moral vision and accomplishments of the abolitionists" (pp. 248–249). But, as he suggests, we still need to know a great deal more particularly about the attitudes of the millions who participated in the famous antislavery petition campaigns in Britain in order to comprehend what took place. Davis, then, provides a very subtle and balanced interpretation of what we have learned from several decades of intense debate about Williams's work.

The first half of the work, as well as the epilogue, goes far beyond the Anglo-Atlantic context and indeed the Atlantic itself, tracing out aspects of the history of slavery and racial constructions stretching back to Antiquity. Perhaps inevitably, the sections containing these ambitious transhistorical reflections are less cohesive

and well-connected than the others, and will likely generate more discussion and critique regarding their interpretation of the long-term development of "anti-black racism" in the Islamic and Iberian contexts. But Davis's broad description of how Africa became the central supplier of slaves to the Americas is convincing and effective, and places North American slavery in effective context by emphasizing that the region was, at least in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a quite marginal zone in Atlantic slave system. His focus on North America, then, never leads him to overstate its importance in the broader history of the Atlantic.

One of the most compelling chapters of the book, modestly titled "Some Nineteenth Century Revolts and Conspiracies," places the famous actions of Nat Turner and Denmark Vesey in a relation to the series of British Caribbean revolts—in 1816 in Barbados, 1823 in Demerara, and 1831 in Jamaica—that preceded abolition there. He nicely examines the interplay among them, always attentive to the distance between how slave revolts actually took place and how they were represented, and emphasizes the enormous restraint of British Caribbean rebels, who, as he points out, killed far fewer whites in all three insurrections than were killed in Turner's much smaller revolt. This comparative analysis helps to expand the discussion of the now well-studied (and, particularly in the Vesey case, hotly debated) cases of insurrection or planned insurrection in the U.S. within a larger optic.

It is through these sorts of comparative insights that Davis's book ultimately makes its most enduring and impressive contribution, showing how a history of slavery in North America can be both a detailed and sophisticated reading of the intricacies of local politics and a broad, informed, and elegant reinsertion of this history into the much broader scope of slavery in the Atlantic world. For this, as for the many contributions that have preceded, many readers will certainly be as grateful as I am.

LAURENT DUBOIS
Michigan State University

REBECCA J. SCOTT. *Degrees of Freedom: Louisiana and Cuba after Slavery*. Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 2005. Pp. 365. \$29.95.

Pierre Carmouche, an artisan and activist from Donaldsonville, Louisiana, reached Cuba in summer 1898. Having witnessed the U.S. Supreme Court's endorsement of racial segregation in *Plessy vs. Ferguson* (1896) and his own state's march toward the constitutional disenfranchisement of African American voters, Carmouche lobbied fellow black Louisianans to take up arms for Cuban independence and the distant prospect of equal rights and citizenship for Afro-Cubans and African Americans alike. Finding no color line in Cuba, Carmouche's volunteers observed how transracial patriotism, civil rights, and nationalist unity animated former bondspeople like Bárbara Pérez, who smuggled ammunition to the rebels and then shared news and po-

litical commentary with audiences of African, Chinese, Spanish, and Cuban descent. To be sure, the antiracist ideals of José Martí neither erased the conspicuous economic inequalities of Cuban life nor guaranteed the promise of transracial citizenship for Pérez, but for Carmouche, Cuban independence offered a glimpse into the possibilities and potential for inclusive, cross-racial citizenship; possibilities, of course, that were now unachievable in the American South.

Rebecca J. Scott's compelling narrative explores the meaning of citizenship and freedom for Carmouche, Pérez, and thousands like them in Louisiana and Cuba. Like Carmouche's volunteers, Scott's comparative analysis navigates the Gulf of Mexico to examine the processes by which citizenship and civil rights were defined and contested in two broadly similar economies whose political trajectories deviated sharply by the end of the nineteenth century. Her book explains how each society evolved, yet simultaneously hints at the various possibilities available for freedpeople, their erstwhile masters, and federal authorities in defining and constraining public and political rights. Scott privileges the agency of individuals in shaping a "vernacular sense of the deeper meaning of freedom" (p. 269), yet she elegantly fuses the perceptions and actions of cane workers with those of politicians and activists on the national and colonial stage. The attention to the microdynamics of larger processes enables Scott to move seamlessly from a conflict over wages in the canefields to the struggle for power by Republican activists in the Louisiana legislature or the gradual dissolution of slavery by colonial authorities in Cuba.

While aspects of the narrative will be familiar to American and Cuban historians, Scott adds substantial nuance by demonstrating how, even in situations of extreme constraint, freedpeople engaged with cross-national theories over citizenship and challenged employers and political masters to assert their civic rights within the public sphere. Scott's attention to grass-roots resistance in the Louisiana sugar belt chronologically extends John C. Rodrigue's important monograph *Reconstruction in the Cane Fields: From Slavery to Free Labor in Louisiana's Sugar Parishes, 1862-1880* (2001) and similarly argues that former slaves were active participants in the construction of postemancipation Louisiana. In the fields and cane mills, they exercised an in-fra-politics of informal and formal negotiation with their employers, and in the political realm, black Louisianans sought a triad of civil, political, and public rights. In both geographical areas, Scott underscores the presence of cross-class alliances and associational politics that ultimately challenged white power, albeit unsuccessfully in Louisiana where racial segregation was firmly entrenched by 1898. In Cuba, by contrast, sustained associational activism bore fruit in increased electoral rolls as Afro-Cubans nudged the island nation toward universal manhood suffrage in 1901.

Scott's lucidly written and prodigiously researched volume commands attention among scholars of colonial and postemancipation societies. The author's attention

to the interlocking nature of labor, race, and citizenship offers timely signposts for future scholarship on the evolution of citizenship within the Atlantic world. Cuba, for instance, was not alone in its attention to transracial patriotism in politics and syncretism in national culture; Brazil, Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico all placed creolization at the forefront of nationalist thought. Scott's attention to the manifestation of public rights philosophies among the recently emancipated also engages with a growing body of literature on the nineteenth-century Caribbean. The extent to which such concepts filtered down to the grassroots, however, remains unclear. As Scott indicates, debates over public rights drew on Christianity, French and American revolutionary ideologies, the Haitian struggle, and the republican creed of 1848. African American activists may have espoused such values, but it remains in doubt whether illiterate and uneducated cane hands engaged forcefully with abstract philosophies. Certainly recent work on slavery in Louisiana suggests that bondspeople embraced a more pragmatic and material sense of the wage economy and customary rights. The enslaved gained what they could from the brutish sugar regime but seldom demonstrated a rights consciousness that would blossom so rapidly following emancipation. Freedmen unquestionably sought better wages, but whether material needs or an incipient rights philosophy underpinned such activism remains uncertain. These reservations aside, Scott's book adds significantly to the growing scholarship on postemancipation labor relations and vividly portrays the multiple possibilities for citizenship in the circum-Caribbean.

RICHARD FOLLETT
University of Sussex

VACLAV SMIL. *Creating the Twentieth Century: Technical Innovations of 1867-1914 and Their Lasting Impact*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2005. Pp. ix, 350. \$35.00.

Vaclav Smil's book is intended for a popular audience and provides the general reader with clearly written overviews of the development of four key technological innovations that he argues are the foundation of modern civilization: electricity, internal combustion engines, new materials, and communication and information technology. Each of these technologies is the subject of a separate chapter intended to provide evidence for Smil's central argument that the period 1867 to 1914 marked a "profound and abrupt discontinuity with such lasting consequences [that it] has no equivalent in history" (p. 13). But the chapters on individual technologies do not provide a sustained analysis of this argument, which he presents in his opening chapter.

Readers familiar with the history of technology will immediately wonder about both the beginning and end points of what Smil terms the "Age of Synergy." One of the most notable problems arises over his failure to deal at all with the telegraph. Not only was this the first telecommunications technology, setting the framework for

both telephone and radio communication, but it was also one of several technologies that fit a key attribute of this period: "the extraordinary concatenation of a large number of scientific and technical advances." Furthermore, as Smil acknowledges, the sciences of chemistry and energy conversion advanced rapidly during the first half of the nineteenth century. The development of new dyestuffs and sustained steam engine innovations grew out of these advances just as the telegraph emerged as a consequence of scientific research on electricity. The factors that led Smil to choose 1867 seem arbitrary: the development of the first practical dynamo and open-hearth steel furnace, the patenting of the sulfite pulping process, the introduction of dynamite, and, probably most significantly, the formulation of the second law of thermodynamics. Finally, while Smil's stories of technical development are multinational (European and American), he chooses this date because it was at this time that the gross domestic product of the United States, which he calls the indisputable leader of this era of technical development, surpassed that of Britain.

While World War I sets one obvious boundary for the other end of Smil's Age of Synergy, he relies once again on some specific innovations to make his case: the commercialization of ammonia synthesis, Henry Ford's moving assembly line, the tungsten-filament lamp, and Robert Godard's patent for a multiple-stage rocket, as well as Neil Bohr's model of the atom. Treating the tungsten-filament lamp as a key innovation seems particularly arbitrary given the arguments that he makes elsewhere that the modern light bulb is the best example of "a relatively complex artifact that has remained basically unchanged during nine decades of the most rapid technical innovation in history" (p. 274). At the same time, Smil dismisses without much evidence the idea that twentieth-century innovations after World War I, which include such things as transistors, computers, television, communications satellites, jet engines, and biotechnology, could have the same "epoch-making sweep" and "lasting impacts" as those between 1876 and 1914.

A particularly unsatisfying chapter is that titled "A New Civilization." Here the reader might expect Smil to begin addressing other factors that helped create the Age of Synergy; however, the "missing perspectives" that he offers in this chapter are yet more personal details about the era's leading inventors. The final chapter also fails to return in a sustained way to the argument with which he opens the book. Instead Smil offers an unsystematic account of some contemporary views to show that the people who experienced this era viewed it as a fundamentally new one in human experience. The problem, of course, is that the perception that technology was fundamentally altering everyday life was a common one in the period preceding his Age of Synergy—the era of the now much-disputed first industrial revolution.

Ultimately, this is a book about the impact of technology on society with little attention to any social, cul-

tural, economic, or political influences that might have contributed to technical developments and their relatively rapid diffusion. It is also relentlessly optimistic about the positive impact of each of these technologies, with engineering and economic efficiencies providing the scale for evaluation. I suspect these efficiencies are the reason that Smil treats the tungsten-filament lamp as such a crucial advance. For readers interested in a good summary of the key technical developments of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, they will find much to value in Smil's book. Those interested in a more sustained analysis of how science and technology became synergistic or of the factors that created the modern processes of innovation will be disappointed.

PAUL ISRAEL
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ERIC D. WEITZ. *A Century of Genocide: Utopias of Race and Nation*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2003. Pp. 360. \$29.95.

Over the past few years, the comparative and transnational study of genocide, until a decade ago the province of a small group of social scientists, has attracted tremendous attention and a notable body of scholarly work. Eric D. Weitz's compelling book, published in 2003, was one of the first historical studies on the subject. While it faced some sharp criticism in the first round of reviews, mostly from specialists, it has withstood the test of time and has become a point of reference for the ongoing effort to explain genocide, the reality of the murder or entire groups of human beings and the theories or concepts informing its study, in all its ramifications. The book's argument, and its set-up, are probably too complex in order to make it truly popular, but it is written lucidly and elegantly, which makes it a pleasure to teach and to debate.

The title raises wrong expectations. Weitz focuses on exemplary cases—Nazi Germany, the Stalinist Soviet Union, the Red Khmer in Cambodia, and the Serbian/Yugoslav regime of Slobodan Milosevic—in order to derive general conclusions about genocide. The Armenian and the Rwandan cases are discussed briefly in the introduction and conclusion, but I am not the only one to wonder whether it is a lack of knowledge, which Weitz acknowledges with regard to Rwanda, that keeps them at the margins. A certain artifice of selection is the price to be paid for stringent comparison. The question is whether or not this selection is tautological in the sense that it confirms, or unduly limits, the author's thesis.

The main argument is, as far as I can see, a creative and original adaptation of Hannah Arendt's *Origins of Totalitarianism* (1968). Genocide, Weitz argues, results from utopian ambitions when tied to ideologies of race and backed up by state power. It occurs, moreover, under conditions of extreme social crisis. Weitz roots genocide in the zeal to generate homogeneous societies, which he sees articulated in racism and nationalism. Both are anchored firmly in the Enlightenment tradi-

tion. The genocides to be explained are thus distinctly “modern” enterprises rather than atavisms, the resurgence of ancient hatreds—notwithstanding an ancient and premodern history of the wholesale slaughter of conquered populations. (They are also products of a “western” or westernizing imagination, although the implications of this facet of the argument are less well thought out.) While Weitz is particularly good in tracing the rise of modern racism and its intertwinement with nationalism, he is, much like Arendt, rather more circumspect and even coy about communism, let alone Marxism, which leads him to a quite contorted argument about Stalinism as a racialized and, in any case, nationalizing regime. Whether or not this is the case is a much debated issue. But the salient point is that, although three of the case studies refer to (post)communist regimes, communism itself is not implicated. Arendt struggled with the same issue, although her problem was that she thought of Karl Marx as part of the Enlightenment tradition, in contrast to racism and nationalism.

If utopias of homogeneous societies, conjoined with state power, are the root cause of genocide, it takes specific methods and mechanisms of categorizing and classifying populations to translate the root causes into actual practice. The latter, in turn, facilitates but does not necessitate a politics of purging unwanted populations, which, in any case, is as much a state-induced process as it is a social and cultural one. Weitz highlights rituals of dehumanization (implicitly pointing to the strength of social bonds and power of moral inhibitions), but he is open to the fact that all manner of people get into the act of extirpating are exterminating for reasons that have nothing to do with the ideological root cause.

Weitz’s analytic schema proves to be very useful, and it contributes greatly to the stringency of this comparative argument. I see two problems, though. First, the analytic schema can be read as a presumed “logic” of genocide that cascades from ideology through categorization and ostracization on to ritualized purges. We are better off thinking of them as elements, rather than stages, of genocide. Among other things, this might make the Yugoslav case fit a bit better. Second, contrary to Weitz (and, perhaps, influenced too much by my own understanding of the German and Soviet cases), I think there is a significant step from extirpating populations (often associated with “ethnic cleansing”) to what Weitz calls “ultimate purges,” the extermination of entire populations. Weitz, it should be emphasized, insists on the distinct nature of such “ultimate purges” and identifies Nazi Germany and Khmer Rouge Cambodia as distinctly genocidal regimes, but his explanatory mechanism never gets us there. This is peculiar because, although he insists on the multiplicity of genocides, he does not join another group of scholars (like Hans Christian Gerlach or, with a different emphasis, Mark Levene) who emphasize the polymorphous and pervasive nature of “genocidal” violence.

Weitz’s analytic schema is well suited for recalling and explaining the extraordinary violence of national-

izing states and, possibly, of “etatizing” nations, but it is not ultimately useful where it matters most: in explaining the extermination of entire populations (which, it should be added, always occurs in the context of pervasive violence that cannot and must not be shoved into the background). Since Weitz’s approach is so distinctly Arendtian, it might be well worth rethinking and taking literally her fear that genocide, as murder of one branch of humankind, implicates a threat to all others. This applies not only to the potential recurrence of genocide, but also to the pervasive and polymorphous violence that accompanies it.

Like all comparative cases, Weitz’s bold approach is open to the critique of specialists. The most salient one is that the Yugoslav case was not the best possible choice. Rwanda would have been better. But in an overall assessment, it is really the Arendtian paradigm that limits the book. Weitz demonstrates how to make excellent use of it. But the main thrust of the emergent historiography on genocide has moved into a different direction. It takes the violence of colonialism not simply as background, but as defining moment (Dirk Moses). It highlights “zones of genocide” (Levene) rather than individual acts of genocide. And it deepens the understanding of the “ritual,” the purging and purifying nature, of genocide (Jacques Semelin). Last but not least, given the high quality of work on violence by Russian, German, and, above all, Eastern European historians, we might reasonably expect new thought on the old totalitarian paradigm as well.

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HEIDE FEHRENBACH. *Race after Hitler: Black Occupation Children in Postwar Germany and America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2005. Pp. xiii, 263. \$29.95.

This thoughtful and carefully researched book represents some of the best scholarship being done on postwar Germany today. Taking as her topic the “brown babies” fathered by American GIs, Heide Fehrenbach explores the broader cultural themes of sexuality and national identity that inform her subject.

As the subtitle indicates, this book is not a history of all Africans in Germany but only of those few thousand fathered by black American GIs in West Germany, mostly in the years 1945 to 1960. These were not the only blacks in West Germany—students, diplomats, and entertainers were among the others—but they were the largest group until the African political refugees of the 1970s and 1980s arrived. The story of blacks in East Germany is an entirely different one; they were largely African university students or, later, guest workers from Mozambique.

Fehrenbach takes as her focus the years from 1945 to about 1960 in West Germany. For her this is a formative period for later attitudes. As Fehrenbach writes, in these years race changed from something associated first and foremost with Jews to something related to blacks. Fehrenbach points out the irony of the U.S. ar-

riving to bring democracy and freedom using a military that was only integrated in 1948. She notes, "the American occupation and democratization of Germany coincided with a postwar push by African Americans and white liberals at home to democratize American society and its institutions" (p. 3), including the army.

The question of sexual contact between German women and Allied soldiers has been a sensitive one since 1945. The mass rapes by the Red Army prophesized by Nazi propagandists did, in fact, occur as the Soviets pushed west. Although the victims were loath to speak of these crimes, German authorities eased access to abortion for such cases from the spring of 1945 through 1946. Other sexual contact between German women and Allied soldiers was less clearly coerced. Both white and black American soldiers fraternized with the "Frolleins." In fact, African American GIs felt they commanded a new respect as members of a victorious army. As Fehrenbach writes, though, "relations between black GIs and white German women were condemned not because they were perceived as coercive . . . but because women willfully embraced them for material advantage, sexual pleasure, and romance" (p. 65).

The children born of interracial liaisons puzzled policy makers. Should they be adopted into German or American homes, or raised together in a special orphanage? All of these options were tried. Matters were further complicated as the parents were mostly unmarried, and not all men acknowledged paternity or paid support. As Fehrenbach explains, this was widely discussed but nonetheless a moot point. "The West German state had retained paternal power over all illegitimate children and their unwed mothers upon its founding in 1949" (p. 70). Unwed mothers and their illegitimate children were both represented by male guardians.

It is an asset of this work that Fehrenbach looks at both German and American responses to the "brown babies." But the statistics she cites are a bit confusing. From 1945 to 1949, there were 94,000 occupation babies, of whom 3,000 were of mixed racial heritage (p. 2). Yet later in the book she informs us that "by 1968 experts estimated that in the two decades since the war as many as seven thousand black German children had been adopted by American citizens" (p. 133). If so many children did end up in the U.S., it would have been interesting for her to have pursued their story further.

One of the strengths of this book is that Fehrenbach embeds the question of Afro-German children in a wider cultural discussion. Her very impressive chapter on the *Toxi* films shows how a numerically small population could have a much larger resonance.

Fehrenbach is right to be cautious in her use of terminology. While terms like half-breed (*Mischling*) were popular after the war, and later the term "colored" (*farbig*), today the terms Afro-German and Black German are used interchangeably.

A new wave of scholarship on Afro-Germans has emerged over the last fifteen years in both history and cultural studies. One good interdisciplinary introduc-

tion to the field is edited by Patricia Mazón and Reinhild Steingröver, *Not So Plain as Black and White: Afro-German History and Culture* (2005). Fehrenbach's chapter on the *Toxi* films first appeared there. Although Fehrenbach's book is centered on German events, it should be of interest to scholars working on the African diaspora as well as American historians of race and ethnicity.

PATRICIA MAZÓN

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MOGENS PELT. *Tying Greece to the West: US-West German-Greek Relations 1949–74*. (Studies in 20th & 21st Century European History, Volume 5.) Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press. 2006. Pp. 454. \$64.00.

This book by Mogens Pelt shows how Greece was made to serve the strategic interests of the United States between 1949 and 1974, and how West Germany helped it to do so. The subject of American-Greek relations in these years is controversial, and since 1980 it has been the subject of many books and articles by academics, diplomats, and journalists. This book draws on a wider range of archival material than any of its predecessors do: chiefly U.S. diplomatic papers and also those of West Germany and, to a lesser extent, the United Kingdom. As the State Department archive is subject to a twenty-five-year rule, while its West German and British counterparts are subject to thirty-year rules, Pelt was able to use much material only recently made available. Most of the archives of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and other intelligence services remain closed, as do all of the Greek archives. However the open collections contain some CIA material.

Pelt has already published a book and three articles about the Metaxas dictatorship in Greece and its economic relations with Germany in 1936–1941. The current work, which is based on a Ph.D. dissertation, is clearly argued and shows sure judgment in interpreting its sources. The choice of subject matter is largely dictated by the availability of archival sources. Thus the relations of American diplomats with successive Greek monarchs are described in unnecessary detail, while those of the CIA with politically active Greek army officers get little attention. Yet the officers were active throughout the period, and ruled the country from April 1967 to July 1974, while the CIA agents remained in close contact with them throughout the period of the book. As the author states, Greece was one of the few countries where the CIA station chief was more powerful than the ambassador, and the CIA was not accountable to the State Department, and might act without even presidential authorization. Until CIA archives become available, we cannot know for sure—as Pelt emphasizes—whether the United States was really innocent of complicity in the overthrow of the parliamentary regime in April 1967. The opposition of the State Department to this coup is already known, and Pelt presents new evidence of it. He also shows that the Na

tional Security Council concurred with the State Department. Inexplicably, the book almost entirely ignores the events leading to the collapse of the dictatorship in July 1974, which ended an era of American political dominance in Greece. The reader is left suspended in midair. It remains open to question how far U.S. agencies were guilty of encouraging, or failing to prevent, the disastrous Cyprus policy of the dictatorship. Most of the Greek people since 1974 have believed in at least some degree of American guilt.

While most of the book is based on primary sources, much of it covers ground made familiar by previous works. The book needs to show what it adds to them, and in this respect it is not very successful. Pelt shows that the British ex-diplomat C. M. Woodhouse was biased in favor of successive monarchs and the CIA. He also shows the anti-American bias and scholarly defects of Alexis Papachelas. He does not, however, show what he adds—apart from fresh documentation—to the authoritative appraisals of American policy toward Greece by John O. Iatrides and Theodore Coulombis.

The book is uneven in coverage of Greek domestic affairs. For most of the period, the book relies on secondary sources or on the American archives. Important works like those of Ilias Nikolakopoulos and Jean Meynaud (available in Greek translation from the French original) are neglected. But Pelt does use extensive new material in Greek relating to the downfall of democracy in 1965–1967.

The most original and valuable part of the book is its account of West Germany's role in the economic reconstruction of Greece in the 1950s, and in the admission of Greece as an associate member of the European Economic Community in 1961. The West German government acted as a conscious agent of U.S. policy in the eastern Mediterranean region, and could do so because of West Germany's economic strength in western Europe and its importance as a market for Greek tobacco.

Largely because of the information relating to West Germany, the book is an important contribution to the literature on the American security system in Western Europe during the Cold War.

DAVID H. CLOSE

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GARY S. CROSS and JOHN K. WALTON. *The Playful Crowd: Pleasure Places in the Twentieth Century*. New York: Columbia University Press. 2005. Pp. viii, 308. \$32.50.

This book by Gary S. Cross and John K. Walton is remarkable for a number of reasons, not least that it manages to tie together two different research projects on either side of the Atlantic and still achieve fluency and synthesis. It is noteworthy whenever a jointly authored book achieves this, but here the process has clearly given a new momentum to the research undertaken by both scholars, and the result is an engaging and fully realized comparative project.

Cross and Walton examine four paradigmatic devel-

opments in the history of twentieth-century leisure: the rise and decline of Coney Island in New York; the evolution of the British seaside resort of Blackpool; the replacement of "Coney" style pleasures (what the authors call "industrial saturnalia") with the invented nostalgia of Disneyland; and the more grounded nostalgic pleasures of the Beamish museum of industrial and social history. The comparisons yield a greater understanding of the development and direction taken by each of these leisure places, as well as highlighting their significance to the crowds who visited in huge numbers.

The book is extensively researched: from local planning issues, technological innovations, climate differences, to regional, class, and national demographics. Each comparison between Coney Island and Blackpool reveals that although these two resorts emerged at roughly the same time, generalizations about modern leisure do not offer a full understanding of mass engagement with commercial pleasures. Instead, Cross and Walton show that no matter how "mass" entertainment is, the way an amusement resort develops and how it is experienced is always a matter of local, economic, and social contingency.

The writers chart the parallel rise of both resorts in detail: like an amusement park ride the book illuminates the pleasures and attractions that were offered to industrial crowds. While Coney Island and Blackpool both developed because of the attraction that their beaches and amusements held for nearby working classes, the authors illustrate why "Blackpool would adapt and survive for the balance of the century and beyond, while Coney Island would slide into ruin and nearly disappear" (p. 55). Climate differences in the two locations, for example, meant that buildings constructed at Blackpool were intended to endure (weather and time), while those at Coney Island were intended to amuse but not remain; many of the latter expired in fire after just a few seasons. This had a big impact on the way the amusements were experienced: Coney's pleasures were big and brash, playful, highly inventive, continually changing, yet temporary, while the thrills at Blackpool were more staid, steeped more deeply in permanence and tradition.

The use of public money also underlay the different fate of the two locations: at Coney Island, New York Park Commissioner Robert Moses undertook to eradicate the "catchpenny" amusements, yet so little public money was committed to public leisure facilities that it merely went into economic tailspin. While Blackpool certainly faced moral censure from reformers, local government officials worked more cooperatively with local businesses to ensure that the resort remained commercially viable, using public money to provide municipal leisure facilities that would complement rather than compete with commercial leisure operators. Ultimately, the more homogenous demographic of the Blackpool crowd, less threatening to the middle class than the one that emerged at Coney Island, led reformers to scorn rather than eradicate working-class fun. The different experience of leisure in each location thus

depended on local, corporate, class, and community decisions that in the one case led to decline and in the other to a more enduring pleasure place.

In the final two chapters, the authors make clear that while Coney Island spiraled down into dereliction, arson, vandalism, and degeneration, the spirit of "industrial saturnalia" that had fueled pleasures there transformed into the "consumerist saturnalia" of Disneyland. Offering an escape from the seedy and problematic realities so apparent at Coney Island, Walt Disney adapted aspects of the amusement park to appeal to a new leisure aesthetic that demanded "uplift," education, and family-centered fun. While a very different type of leisure place, this also happened at the Beamish museum in Britain. Both Disneyland and the industrial museum appealed to a wide audience through the creation of a sense of a shared heritage: Disney's emerged as a fantasy heritage that could transcend divisive social realities, and Beamish's offered "real" heritage that merged opposing class interests into a common shared pleasure in the past. The differences are as instructive as the similarities.

For its engaging style, fascinating content, and excellent production values and as a model of collaborative scholarship, this book contributes much to the history of twentieth-century amusements.

SUSAN CURRELL
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ASIA

RICHARD BELSKY. *Localities at the Center: Native Place, Space, and Power in Late Imperial Beijing*. (Harvard East Asian Monographs, 258.) Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2005. Pp. xii, 318. \$45.00.

Richard Belsky's book examines scholar-official *huiguan* (native-place lodges) in late nineteenth-century Beijing, focusing on their function as nodes of bi-directional interaction between the center and the regions. The author argues that native-place connections were incorporated both formally and informally into the day-to-day political process of Qing Beijing and must be considered constitutional elements within the late imperial political system.

The book demonstrates that the first native-place lodges were founded by scholar-officials in Beijing during the Ming Yongle period (early fifteenth century). They in turn inspired the establishment of merchant/handicraft *huiguan*. *Huiguan* were places for socializing, celebrating festivals, discussing events at home, and debating personal and regional affairs. While *huiguan* in late imperial China outside Beijing catered primarily to merchants, the majority of Beijing *huiguan* were scholar-official lodges, established by and maintained on behalf of China's national political elite, such as government officials and examination candidates, providing them with short-term residence. Beijing *huiguan* declined in the twentieth century, due to changes in the demographic groups served by the lodges, an intellec-

tual turn against traditional social forms, and the moving of the capital to Nanjing after 1927.

The book contributes to the dialogue on how *huiguan* and native-place ties affected identity formation among urban sojourning communities. It challenges Max Weber's argument that native-place ties had a divisive effect because they prevented the sojourners from developing "oath-bound communities," which in turn led to their lack of autonomy from the imperial government and hindered China's social and economic development. Along the line of William Rowe's suggestion of a multiplication rather than a substitution of social identities, and Bryna Goodman's studies on Shanghai *huiguan* members' "accretion of identities" instead of displacement of native-place identities for more "modern" ones, Belsky argues for a more compatible relationship between the sojourning elites' regional and imperial identities. In his view, regional identity did not hinder the scholar-officials to develop identification with the "imperium"; it contributed to it. Xuanan, an area created by urban ethnic segregation in the early Qing, became a place where *huiguan* concentrated and served to bring elite men of different regions together. A cosmopolitan elite culture developed there, through which a sense of "imperium" was forged. A detailed examination of religious rituals at *huiguan* reveals that the figures worshiped were those whose accomplishments were primarily of an imperial rather than a local nature; thus such activities promoted simultaneously identification with one's native region, with an empire-wide elite, and even with the imperial project itself.

Through three fascinating case studies, the author argues that Beijing native-place ties and lodges facilitated regional interests in the capital and vice versa. In the case of Weng Tonghe, native ties served as conduits for local interests to influence central administrative decisions. Li Hongzhang and his father Li Wenan, by contrast, mobilized native-place ties to shape events in their home region during the suppression of the Taiping. While all these rich examples prove convincingly the importance of native-place ties in the capital city, the specific role of *huiguan* in them, however, is not so self-evident. The focus on *huiguan* somehow constrains the arguments and limits the author from developing a more rigorous thesis on the importance of native-place connections in the capital. Besides, in all these cases, the regional interests coincided with those of the central government. This leaves one wondering what would have happened in situations of conflict? Maybe the extremely powerful Anhui *huiguan* in the post-Taiping era could be read in different lights.

The book proves the significant role of native-place ties and *huiguan* in the 1890s reform movement. The concentration of scholar-officials in Xuannan and the availability of *huiguan* as gathering spaces facilitated the exchanges of information. Particularly interesting is the discussion on the chopped bonds (*yingjie*) system, an institutionalization by the central government of scholar-officials' native-place ties. Only compatriot metropolitan officials of rank six or above were authorized to

issue a *yinjie* which was required for any of a broad range of activities in the capital. In 1898, such *yinjie* was similarly required for all the petitions from the elites to the court. One of the petitions organized by Kang Youwei failed to arrive at the court in time because it did not carry a compatriot *yinjie*, for it was signed by candidates from multiple regions instead of a single province. The author stresses examples of the movement being facilitated by native-place ties, such as petitions that obtained *yinjie* reaching the court. It might be more to the point, however, to realize that the court's insistence on *yinjie* in fact hindered the movement. There were, after all, disharmonies in the "symbiotic relationship."

The issue of transformation of elite identity from the Qing to the republican period is hinted but not elaborated in the book. Belsky implies that the "imperium" consciousness of the cosmopolitan elites, which was achieved through native-place identities, informed the emergence of a concept of "national" China in the late nineteenth century and contributed to China's evolution from a late imperial to a national social-political system. He argues that in Beijing the process had its roots in urban transformation that started in the eighteenth century, and that national consciousness emerged as a potent political force in Beijing by the 1890s, well before similar developments in Shanghai.

This book is the product of solid empirical research on an extensive range of materials, including gazetteers, stele inscriptions, government reports, and *huiguan* records. It contains a very useful review of previous scholarship on *huiguan* and native ties. A highly accessible, clearly written, and jargon-free book, it should be read by all students of late imperial and early modern Chinese history.

MADELEINE Y. DONG
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MERLE GOLDMAN. *From Comrade to Citizen: The Struggle for Political Rights in China*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2005. Pp. viii, 286. \$39.95.

In view of increasing political strife in post-reform China, which is both volatile and violent, Merle Goldman presents a timely context and analysis. Using primary and secondary data, she argues that significant political changes have accompanied the country's extraordinary economic transformations in recent decades. Based on her intimate knowledge of China's political history, she chronicles how establishment intellectuals and dissidents have challenged the Chinese Communist Party in thought and action, especially in asserting citizens' political rights. Deviating from both Confucian literati and modern intellectual traditions, such rights struggles have moved political engagement beyond elite circles and into grassroots organizations.

Goldman provides important details on protest movements and their leading participants. She argues that in the post-reform era, protests based on rights consciousness and rules conscientiousness are blurred.

After a brief historical background on the tradition of protest in the late imperial and early republican periods, her book charts rights activism starting with the Democracy Wall movement in 1978–1979. Ironically, leaders used the language and their experiences of the Cultural Revolution to break new political ground. With China's partial market liberalization and global exposure as background, Goldman tracks an ever-growing diversity of protest movements ranging from the Beijing Social and Economic Sciences Research Institute to unofficial movements such as those organized by Tiananmen Mothers, local farmers, unemployed workers, and Falungong. Ideological debates in China have gravitated toward the New Left and Liberals, each gaining visibility through organized channels and with backing from different party factions. Goldman anticipates the activism of an emerging middle class and a public sphere made increasingly visible by Internet technology. Intertwined with descriptions of activism are glimpses of how post-Mao regimes have tolerated, subverted, and resisted ideological and organizational challenges.

Goldman focuses on the political actions of key individuals and groups in China. Her definitions of intellectuals and protestors and of state power and rights seem circumscribed. Although this allows her to engage with specific literature on recent protest movements (e.g. Elizabeth Perry, Kevin O'Brien, and Yu Jianrong), there is certain disconnect when she moves from specific issues to general concerns about civil society and public sphere. Goldman does not delve into debates on whether the concepts can be applied to historical or contemporary Chinese society, nor does she explore conceptual developments on the nature of state power and the construction of citizenship in an increasingly global age.

If one moves from treating power as exercised by an organized state machinery to power associated with a cultural language of dominance, the force of the state and possible channels of resistance take on broader form and meaning. Art, music, literature, theater, and film, for example, are means used in past political mobilizations. In post-reform China they remain vibrant forums for a public eager for political reading. Moreover, these channels, both elite and popular, are rapidly commodified by a global market in cultural and institutional terms. Dissidents and regimes alike are increasingly skilled using them to test limits and exert soft power. Adding this dimension to Goldman's accounts will broaden the definition of her target populations, be they intellectuals or workers, and highlight their diverse, overlapping, and often contradictory positioning with regard to a lingering socialist structure, an advancing market, and a nationalistic agenda. It gives the subject of state power and protest against it the complexity and nuance they deserve.

A question on the historical impact of the Maoist period naturally follows: to what extent has the ideological and institutional power of the Maoist state been internalized to the point that it shapes the very language of

resistance today, a process I term “state involution”? Such meaning-based and historically constructed treatment of power and agency leads to dialogues with the comparative works of James C. Scott, Timothy Mitchell, and K. Sivaramakrishnan.

Although Goldman discusses change, her conceptual categories of intellectuals, workers, and peasants remain quite static. This prevents her from appreciating the complex human landscape in the making in post-reform China. A “floating population” totaling upwards of one hundred million have moved from rural provinces to cities and special economic zones along the coast, engaging in urban infrastructural construction and factory work. They are accompanied by massive numbers of professionals and entrepreneurs. The fluid experiential boundary between them is dramatized by the intense rights debate in the wake of the brutal beating death of a migrant university graduate, Sun Zhigang, in a Guangzhou village enclave. It highlights the need for a new conceptual parameter that can adequately take into account the volatility of social positioning and the simultaneous drawing of hard boundaries based on inherited administrative status and social labeling. Goldman’s thesis will live up to its potential if the basic conceptual categories used to organize her research are reconstituted to give process the necessary attention.

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BRUCE L. BATTEN. *Gateway to Japan: Hakata in War and Peace, 500–1300*. Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press. 2006. Pp. xv, 183. \$25.00.

This is the story of Hakata, a bay on the north shore of Kyushu, the westernmost of Japan’s main islands. Because of its proximity to the Asian mainland and its excellence as a harbor, Hakata served as the principal entry point or “gateway” to Japan during much of the country’s ancient and medieval periods. The story of Hakata is clearly of major importance to premodern Japanese history. But it has been told by historians (at least those writing in English) largely in terms of its high points—Hakata was, for example, the main focus of attack of the Mongol invasions in the late thirteenth century—rather than as a continuous record of affairs in western Japan, especially foreign relations, over a long period of time. In this book, Bruce L. Batten narrates and analyses the Hakata story for eight hundred years, providing us with a detailed and coherent picture of Hakata in both Japanese and East Asian history during that time.

The book is divided thematically into four main sections: “War,” “Diplomacy,” “Piracy,” and “Trade.” The “War” section focuses primarily on the seventh century, when Japan was in the midst of a period of extensive cultural borrowing from the continent (China and Korea) that lasted some three centuries, from the late 500s to the mid-800s. This was a dynamic age in East Asia that witnessed both the reunification of China after

nearly three hundred years and movements—spurred by China’s unification—toward greater centralization in both Korea and Japan. Japan had long been involved militarily in Korea, an involvement that reached a climax and an end in a great battle in 673 on the west coast of Korea, in which Japan was decisively defeated by a combined force of Koreans and Chinese. The central question that the author addresses in this section is the extent to which the 673 battle may have accelerated Japan’s centralization. There was fear after the battle of a potential invasion from either China or Korea or both, a fear that prompted the building of extensive defense works and the mobilization of forces in Hakata and elsewhere. In other countries at other times, such military efforts tended to strengthen central governments. Did this happen in late seventh-century Japan?

The section on “Diplomacy” is devoted mainly to a discussion of the meaning of diplomacy or peaceful interaction among states in Japan’s ancient age and a description of the structure and functioning of Dazaifu, the central government’s branch in Kyushu that was located inland from Hakata. Dazaifu managed the coming and going of envoys and missions to and from Japan. At times, it simply handled these envoys and missions itself: it did not allow them to penetrate further into the country. At other times, Dazaifu served as a first stop for foreigners who were then permitted to journey on to the central government. I found this to be one of the most informative sections of the book, not only because it provides much information about diplomatic functioning in ancient Japan but also because it presents a fascinating overview of “diplomacy” throughout East Asia during this time.

The “Piracy” and “Trade” sections continue the account of foreign relations through Hakata in the ancient age. One of the author’s aims is to distinguish among diplomacy, piracy, and trade, which often merged one with another. Particularly interesting and informative in the piracy section is a detailed account of the mysterious Toi Invasion of 1019, when fierce marauders (possibly Koreans) attacked and plundered Hakata and nearby areas. Although the author does not say so, the Toi Invasion may well have been the most serious intrusion—after the thirteenth-century Mongol Invasions—by foreign attackers into Japan during premodern times.

Most of the foreign trade in early Japan was conducted within the framework of diplomacy, mainly through the formal Japanese missions sent to China between 600 and 838. If this can be considered “public” trade (and to the Chinese it was not trade at all, but the limited marketing of goods that was allowed to accompany the rendering of tribute to the Chinese emperor) later trade was essentially “private” and was handled primarily by Chinese trading ships visiting Japan. Yet even this private trade, which was handled through Hakata, was constrained by rules established by the central government. As Batten concludes, it was a very limited trade and was in line with the largely isolationist

policy that the court in Heian (Kyoto) adopted after the 838 mission to China.

In conclusion, I rate this book highly. It is well researched and well written and fills a conspicuous gap in the English-language literature on Japanese history. I recommend it strongly.

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ANDREW BERNSTEIN. *Modern Passings: Death Rites, Politics, and Social Change in Imperial Japan*. (Studies of the Weatherhead East Asian Institute.) Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press. 2006. Pp. xi, 242. \$39.00.

Disposing of the dead is an uncomfortable subject. It causes unease of various kinds in various circumstances: grief, of course, but beyond that it can still prompt fears in different regions of the world. Are the dead really dead, or simply moving to another world, better or worse, and if so, what should mourners do to obtain the best possible outcome for those they have lost? Even if corpses are removed from sight, are the dead still around in some inchoate form, dispensing rewards and punishments to their descendants, friends, and enemies at will? Should the body be buried immediately to spare the sight of corruption? Should it be promptly embalmed to look its best when summoned by the last trump? Should it be consigned to the flames? In earlier societies, too, should it have been provided with food, money, and, at least for the elite, attendants to accompany it to a new life?

Japan, like other societies, has gone through some of these stages, as Andrew Bernstein's scholarly monograph demonstrates, passing from the burials that dominated most of Japan's history to cremation, once customary only to the believers of Jodo Shinshu but now, in modern Japan, virtually universal. Other traditions have also been retired, as the Japanese countryside has been pulled into the habits of the metropolis. The funeral director, as elsewhere, has emerged, relieving the family, for a price, of the washing, dressing, and confining of the corpse; providing the hearse; hiring the crematorium; employing the priest to chant the sutras; and abbreviating the traditional Buddhist rituals to a virtual vanishing point. The modernization of Japanese funerary practices—no more lengthy funeral processions, no more space wasted for body burials, cemeteries placed where they do not interfere with commerce or agriculture—fits very nicely into the lifestyle of contemporary Japan.

But, as Bernstein shows, this situation did not come about easily. Cremations are now standard in Japan, but this, he observes, is a recent development, noting that burials kept pace with cremations until well into the twentieth century. At the core of his book is Bernstein's analysis of the fierce arguments that came to a head in the middle to late nineteenth century over whether or not the dead should be cremated. On one side were Japanese nativists (chief among them Tokugawa Nariaki, the chauvinistic daimyo of Mito), newly

energized by the looming crisis of the nineteenth century and patriotically supporting burials, which they claimed were the only way to dispose of Japanese dead. On the other side were those who, for a variety of reasons—convenience, religion, hygiene, considerations of space in a crowded land—objected. The triumphalist Meiji government, with its bit between its teeth, strenuously opposed to Buddhism in all its forms, prohibited cremation in 1873, claiming that the practice was inhumane, and that the gases emitted by crude crematoria were hazardous to health. Opponents, however, played up the problem of space; cremated remains were compact, sparing land for other, more urgent purposes. Bones and ashes, too, they claimed, posed far less threat to public health than corpses moldering in the ground. Some also, mendaciously, pointed to the West, claiming cremation as the wave of the future. Two years later the Meiji government, spearheaded by a modernizing Home Ministry, backed away from its earlier prohibition, ultimately declaring freedom of religion and, at the same time, undercutting many of the funerary duties that were formerly the right of Buddhist temples. By 1884 all deaths had to be certified by physicians; without that certification, and without notification of local bureaucrats, no permit for cremation or burial could be issued. The state, in other words, had taken control, indulgently permitting religious ceremonies, on the grounds of separation of state and religion, but tenaciously grasping the most important rights and duties of responsible government: establishing regulations for burials, cremations, and the proper use of graveyards.

Now when Japanese citizens dispose of their dead they preserve to some extent the customs of the past: the mortuary tablet bearing a Buddhist title, a photograph of the deceased shrouded in black, the truncated funeral service, the offerings of incense and *kōden*, the cremation followed promptly by the gathering of the bones by family members, and the anniversary services. But white robes (the traditional mourning color) have gone, and so, too, has the funeral procession. In Japan, as in the West, funerals have become streamlined, with the funeral director moving efficiently to see that the family's concerns are satisfied. A dismal trade it may be, but it is also, in the modern world, a necessary one.

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BARAK KUSHNER. *The Thought War: Japanese Imperial Propaganda*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press. 2006. Pp. ix, 242. \$45.00.

This book concisely and incisively engages several major issues of interpretation regarding Japan's mobilization for the Pacific War. While some points affirm a broad approach to defining responsibility for Japan's military aggression from 1931 to 1945 that is now well established, other arguments break important new ground.

Barak Kushner leaves no doubt that the effort to pro-

duce propaganda to support Japan's wars in China during the 1930s and the war against the Anglo-American powers after 1941 involved not just the military but also civilians from a number of different professions: academics, journalists, entertainers, and advertisers. In many cases, these civilians volunteered to help out, spurred by both patriotic fervor and an opportunistic desire to promote careers or business by contributing to the war effort. The example that is most fully discussed is the comedians of the traditional *rakugo* style and the newer, two-person *manzai* style, who traveled to China in "comfort brigades" and "we want to make you laugh brigades" to entertain the troops. After their return, they wrote patriotic accounts of their experiences for an eager mass audience. Citing such examples, this book sides with those who have argued against the view that during the 1930s the Japanese military dragged a reluctant populace to war and who have stressed that prominent civilians willingly and, in at least some cases eagerly, made important contributions to wartime mobilization. Kushner adds an intriguing observation that the diffuse character of Japanese propaganda enabled it to penetrate more deeply into Japanese society and to survive the trauma of defeat and foreign occupation.

If Japanese wartime propaganda had multiple sources, this study contends that it also voiced a variety of messages. Kushner takes issue with previous interpretations of Japanese wartime propaganda that perceived it as centered on either fanatical emperor-worship or racism toward Westerners as well as other Asians in the proposed hierarchical organization of the Greater East Asian Co-prosperity Sphere. Japanese propagandists, the book points out, also highlighted the theme of Japan's modernity as exemplified by its high standards of public health and technology.

In this regard, perhaps Kushner's most intriguing and provocative insight centers on his assertion that wartime propaganda, which aimed to instill hatred of the Allies as enemies, ended up helping prepare the Japanese to accept defeat and to cooperate during the Allied occupation from 1945 to 1952. At the time, the lack of resistance or overt hostility by the Japanese stunned American troops when they arrived in Japan. Kushner argues that rather than reflecting popular exhaustion from the war or the shallow impact of Japan's wartime propaganda, this reversal of popular attitudes resulted from conscious propaganda efforts in the weeks after defeat to advocate the people's cooperation with the Allied forces. Government officials and the police emphasized the need for social stability and for continuing to pursue the goal of modernity, albeit under drastically changed circumstances. Indeed, prominent figures in creating Japan's wartime propaganda even ended up working for occupation authorities to help convey its goals to the public.

Some issues raised in this study merit a fuller analysis. While Kushner asserts that Japanese propaganda delivered multiple messages, he focuses on the promotion of the nation's modernity as most important. One can wonder how the significance of that theme can be mea-

sured in comparison to the growing emphasis in the 1930s on the benevolence of imperial rule and the centrality of the national polity (*kokutai*) in governmental and right-wing publications, not to mention the intensification of the army's identity as the emperor's army (*kōgun*), which helped mobilize and motivate millions of troops. On another point, a major historiographical debate revolves around the issue of whether wartime Japan was "fascist"; Kushner notes that the participation of many sectors of the society in creating propaganda might fit the concept of "democratic fascism" (pp. 26, 32), but he does not elaborate. He briefly asserts that the effectiveness of Japan's mobilization for war surpassed that of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy but does not explain how or why in any detail (p. 118). The organization of the book could also be tightened, as chapter five does not advance the main arguments, although it provides provocative analyses of the effective anti-Japanese propaganda of the Chinese Communist Party, the partially successful propaganda of the Nationalist Party in China, and the inept propaganda of the American military during the Pacific War.

Overall, this book makes a strong case that Japanese propaganda, deriving from various sources and with various messages, effectively mobilized the people for war and that government officials did maneuver to prepare the Japanese to continue to build a modern nation amid a shattering defeat and occupation by foreign powers. As the author suggests, the continued prominence after 1945 of leaders in wartime propaganda efforts—and, one might add, the effectiveness of wartime propaganda—may help explain the reluctance of government officials and other Japanese to delve into issues of war responsibility.

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CHARLES K. ARMSTRONG, GILBERT ROZMAN, SAMUEL S. KIM, and STEPHEN KOTKIN, editors. *Korea at the Center: Dynamics of Regionalism in Northeast Asia*. (Northeast Asia Seminar.) Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe. 2006. Pp. xiii, 319. Cloth \$84.95, paper \$29.95.

Is Korea indeed at the center of Asian regionalism? The question provides a theme and a title for this ambitious collection of conference papers. Scholars assess a regional role from the turbulent late nineteenth century through the Japanese colony and early years of the Cold War, before concluding with competing regimes in divided Korea today. Separate essays on socialist versus capitalist regional orders, on concepts and continuities in regionalism among Korea's neighbors, and on relatively understudied regional issues of environment and South Korea's cultural wave will attract a wide audience. Russian and Chinese regional policy garner some attention, but it is the chapters on Japan's regional rhetoric and reality that may prove the strength of this collection. Breadth of coverage is seldom matched by depth, but the volume does offer an excellent and in-

deed unique introduction to Korea's place in Asian regionalism.

An initial section on Korea at the turn of the nineteenth century includes essays on the concept of region in Japan by Takashi Inoguchi and in Korea by Hahm Chaibong, complemented by Alexander Lukin's essay on Russian regional policy, and Kirk W. Larsen's on regional trade. The peninsula offers a geographical center or pivot in the period, albeit, as Charles K. Armstrong notes in the volume's conclusion, with Korea as object rather than actor. The following section on "Colonialism, Cold War, and Their Legacies" extends the focus to exploratory reviews of capitalist hegemony by Bruce Cumings, and then of the Soviet socialist order by Stephen Kotkin and Armstrong. In a further essay on colonial transportation infrastructure, Daqing Yang then moves between socialist and capitalist orders. Chung-in Moon and Seung-won Suh conclude the section by going to the core of the regional dynamic on the peninsula in bilateral relations with Japan.

A final section on contemporary regional dynamics brings us back to the opening argument about South Korea as a catalyst for Northeast Asian regionalism. Gilbert Rozman draws on his earlier writings to highlight South Korean regional initiatives. Samuel S. Kim provides the foil here with insistence that China rather than South Korea serves as catalyst, and says of the two Koreas only that North Korea "seems to be the primary driver of Northeast Asian regional geopolitics" (p. 167). Subsequent essays in this final section open up discussion of contemporary regional dynamics, whether of environment, economy, or culture, but without the breadth or conceptual clarity of those by Rozman or Kim.

Students, scholars, and policy makers will find much in this volume to extend our understanding of Korean regionalism beyond the traditional scholarly poles of China and Japan. Readers may well be surprised by the strength of the essays on Japanese policy in a book on Korean centrality, particularly those by Inoguchi, Yang, Moon, and Suh and finally the piece by Tsuneo Akaha. Curiously, a bilateral Japan-South Korea focus on regional dynamics, as opposed to a multilateral "regional" focus, sheds new light on competition and conflict between neighbors. Indeed, a regional order appears problematic from the book's preface and Kotkin's breathtaking premise of a "regional order that does not preclude nationalism but makes cooperative use of it" (p. vii). Fortunately, contributors turned their attention instead to the tension between nationalism and regionalism. The Korean "centrality" argument raised in Rozman's introduction also does not reflect the emphasis on a Japanese or U.S. imperium in most of the chapters. Moreover, any discussion of centrality must include a more substantive review of China's role in the region, particularly in relation to the two regimes on the peninsula.

A strong edited volume often opens up a topic with insightful questions and initial comparisons, and this book is no exception. Further study, for instance, of the

interaction of capitalist and socialist regional orders may help us understand China's recent enthusiasm for regional initiatives and U.S. indifference. The role of geography and associated spatial metaphors in shaping the concepts of region is likewise evident in the volume. Terms such as "centrality" and "pivot," or Japan's co-prosperity "sphere," and the "great crescent" in U.S. containment policy highlight spatial integration in a political hierarchy. Closer theoretical attention to the interaction of geographical place and geopolitical space would greatly enhance our study of regionalism. The theme of agency is addressed directly only in Armstrong's brief conclusion, and may well offer the most fertile area for further scrutiny of a Korean role in East Asian regionalism. Whether market-driven regionalization or state-driven regionalism, assumptions about cooperation and sharing of national interest seem less relevant than the competition for comparative advantage in markets, for greater geopolitical security, or more simply, for survival among stronger powers. Regional cooperation and/or competition have been central to survival strategies on the peninsula from the late nineteenth century. Closer attention to domestic and international dynamics promoting South Korea's regional initiatives would tell us much of the interplay of nationalism and globalization, as well as of reactive versus proactive efforts at survival.

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WILLIAM R. PINCH. *Warrior Ascetics and Indian Empires*. (Cambridge Studies in Indian History and Society 12.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 2006. Pp. xi, 280. \$90.00.

This book deals with the important phenomenon of warrior ascetics in North Indian history. It begins with a description of warrior ascetics in the time of Akbar and ends, effectively, with the suppression of the phenomenon by the British in the early nineteenth century. There also is a rather unsatisfactory chapter that, almost as an afterthought, briefly examines the relation between Mohandas K. Gandhi and Hindu ascetics. William R. Pinch describes in convincing detail the transformation of warrior ascetics into ascetic soldiers, and much of his narrative focuses on the illustrious career of Himmat Bahadur, also known as Anupgiri Gosain, India's most successful military entrepreneur in the 1800s. With great care, Pinch shows a world in which Nath Yogis, Saiva Sanyasis, and Vaishnava Bairagis, as well as Muslim Fakirs, all engaged each other and the powers that be. Mughal rulers were deeply interested in these itinerant groups of warrior ascetics for military reasons, as well as for their magical powers. It is a world that cannot usefully be described in terms of Hindu-Muslim antagonism, although nationalist historiography has tended to do so. Many other binary distinctions such as secular and religious, renouncing and worldly, spiritual and material also do not apply. That is not to say that there is no internal debate about this phenom-

enon. Some Muslim authors condemned Akbar's interest in warrior ascetics on Islamic grounds. Some Hindu authors criticized the ascetics using theological arguments. None of the contemporary sources, however, was at a loss when it came to understanding this form of asceticism as an integral part of its society.

The British began their stay in India by attempting to participate in Indian society and thus made ample use of warrior ascetics as they struggled to establish themselves. Yet ultimately the British ended up deploying their resources in India for a total transformation of Indian society, including the repression of warrior asceticism as it threatened British control. Pinch is good in showing the militarization of the warrior ascetics and their use by the British as what Pinch calls "Company gosains." With their expertise in waging war in Bundelkhand and their skill at gathering military intelligence, the ascetics (numbering in the tens of thousands) were crucial allies in the battles against the Marāthas. Gradually, however, with the expansion of British control, the ascetics became marginalized. An important element of their marginalization was the application of British-Indian civil law to the inheritances of ascetics who had both celibate descendants and natural offspring. The intricacies of gender and spiritual sexuality in Hindu asceticism and the faltering attempts of British magistrates to grasp them make for fascinating reading in the chapter that Pinch devotes to the legacy and inheritance of the great leader Anupgiri. The roles of women, marriage, offspring, and especially adoption in disputes among Hindu ascetics continue to be important up to the present day.

The history of warrior ascetics is extremely important for understanding precolonial India. It is a history that is very hard to write, since the ascetic groups clothe their past in hagiography and in narratives that go against the grain of modern understandings of history. Pinch circumvents this serious difficulty by limiting himself largely to British sources. This explains why he tells us little about the role of the warrior ascetics in the rule and in the culture of the Shi'a Nawabs of Awadh—he would need Persian sources for that—and nothing about the theologies of nirguna and saguna bhakti (different forms of devotion) that are crucial to asceticism, because he would have to engage the devotional literature. His discussion of tantric influences on warrior asceticism is based on secondary sources, and we get to know little about the ritual practices in which the warrior ascetics engaged. These limitations are understandable and have not prevented Pinch from writing a fine and useful book, but a more sophisticated account would require a critical engagement with the nature of the archive. The author, however, seems to think that such an engagement would align him with postmodernism and has thus chosen to base his story almost entirely on British sources. Given the importance of that story, we should be grateful to Pinch for gleaning many details from such sources. Nevertheless, I feel that aspects such as ascetic ritual, devotional practice, and magical power, as well as the trading and mon-

ey-lending activities in which these ascetics simultaneously engaged, remain understudied.

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RICHARD M. EATON. *The New Cambridge History of India*. Volume 1, part 8, *A Social History of the Deccan, 1300–1761, Eight Indian Lives*. (The New Cambridge History of India.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 2005. Pp. xiii, 221. \$75.00.

Over the past few decades a quiet revolution has been occurring in American scholarship on the premodern history of the Deccan, that extensive, relatively remote, isolated, and mostly semi-arid part of India that constitutes the plateau to the south of the Narmada river, the territory now comprised by the three linguistically defined states of Maharashtra, Karnataka, and Andhra Pradesh. Once a backwater of Indian historiography, the new social history of the Deccan in medieval and early modern times has reached a level of sophistication and depth comparable to that for the better-known north. To a considerable extent this is due to the imaginative work done by a cluster of historians which of one time or another have been associated with the University of Wisconsin, Madison, most notably Richard M. Eaton, Cynthia Talbot, Phillip B. Wagoner, John F. Richards, and the Telugu scholar Velcheru Narayana Rao.

This beautifully illustrated, slim volume provides an excellent introduction to a new body of highly original work for all students of South Asia, general readers as much as cognoscenti. It updates previous general accounts of the Deccan or parts thereof, including Burton Stein's *Vijayanagara* (1989), which appeared as Volume 1.2 of the *New Cambridge History of India*.

The book is organized around the "lives" of eight major players of Deccani history (more precisely "careers," as the actual biographical material is rather limited). These are presented in chronological order in eight successive chapters. Pratapa Rudra (r. 1289–1323), the last king of the Kakatiya dynasty (1163–1323) of the eastern Deccan, illustrates in the first chapter how a regional Hindu kingdom was submerged under the earliest wave of Islamic imperialism originating in the northern Khalaji and Tughluq dominions, and how this led to the emergence of interregional sultanates and Pratap Rudra's being assimilated into a Perso-Islamic lexical and political universe. Chapter two is about Muhammad Gisu Daraz (1321–1422), a Chishti Sufi shaikh who lived most of his life in Delhi but went at the age of seventy-one to the south, not long after the North Indian capital was sacked by Timur in 1398, and whose mausoleum in Gulbarga became the most important object of Muslim religious devotion in the Deccan. The career of this shaikh illustrates the important process of the stabilization and indigenization of Indo-Muslim society and polity in the area under the independent Bahmani dynasty (1347–1518), particularly in its religious aspects. Chapter three focuses on

the career of Mahmud Gawan (1411–1481), a cosmopolitan, high-born “long-distance merchant” and man of letters, later also a prime minister and general under the Bahmanis, who, being of Iranian origin, illustrates the incorporation of the Deccan into wider networks of commerce. Mahmud Gawan’s career also exemplifies the emergence of a rift between “Deccanis” (descendants of North Indian migrants born and raised in the Deccan, as well as African Habshi slaves) and the more prestigious “Westerners” (*gharbian*), mostly from Iran, that was such a pervasive feature of all Muslim polities of the Deccan between the fifteenth and seventeenth centuries and often erupted into violence. In chapter four we encounter Rama Raya (1484–1565), a “generalissimo” first under the sultans of Golkonda and later the dynasty of Vijayanagara, the “City of Victory” on the Tungabhadra river in the southern Deccan. The aim of this chapter is to show that the Vijayanagara empire between the fourteenth and sixteenth centuries was, in effect, both Hindu and, borrowing a term from Marshall Hodgson, “Islamicate” (much like the later Marathas of the western Deccan) rather than a bulwark against Islamic intrusion or a victim of Islamic aggression. Chapter five is about Malik Ambar (1548–1626), the famous Ethiopian or “Habshi” military slave under the Adil Shahi dynasty of Bijapur and the Nizam Shahi dynasty of Ahmadnagar. Chapter six highlights the career and work of Tukaram (1608–1649), a devotional Marathi poet who exemplifies the importance of non-Brahman devotional cults in Maharashtra and the contribution of vernacular writing to the formation of linguistic communities. Chapter seven is on the Hobsbawmian “social bandit” Papadu (fl. 1695–1710) in Mughal Telangana. And the book ends with a chapter on a well-known Maratha heroine, Tarabai (1675–1761), whose career narrative serves to illustrate the rise of Chitpavan or “Konkanastha” brahmins in the expanding eighteenth-century Maratha polity—which was in effect becoming an Islamicate “Brahman Raj.”

This last choice may seem odd and inspired, perhaps, by the desire not to make it look as if Deccani history was made by just men. It surely was not, but it would have been more appropriate to focus this chapter about the rise of the Chitpavan brahmins on the career and life of Nana Phadnis, the Peshwa’s *vakil* who dominated later eighteenth-century India from his Deccan capital in Pune, and who, unlike Tarabai, was a Chitpavan brahman himself and quite representative of that numerous, intriguing, and industrious caste. He was perhaps unique in the Deccan in that he wrote his autobiography.

By and large, however, the choice of individuals for the book’s main narratives seems judicious. Beyond this, it may be asked whether it was a good idea to “use the lives of vivid personalities as instruments to investigate and illuminate social processes fundamental to the history of the Deccan between the early fourteenth and mid-eighteenth centuries” (p. 4). In some respects it may have been: it adds color to the presentation, and is in line with a current of interest in the biographies of

major Muslim figures. At the same time, it may have led to more fragmentation than was necessary. The contradiction between biography and social history is never entirely resolved.

One other objection should be raised against the overall interpretation of Deccani history advanced in this book. Eaton shows throughout the book that religion and politics are closely intertwined but argues, in complete contradiction to this, that the Deccan sultanates were “secular.” Islamicists know quite well that the separation of state and religion in the premodern Muslim world, from the ninth century onward, was almost entirely nominal (and sometimes not even that). The sultans did in practice always play a religious role. They acted as the protectors of Islamic religious institutions. And they had their names read in the Friday prayers. The dividing line between the religious and the political was always very unclear and remained so into modern times. Moreover, for premodern Muslims (and quite a number of modern ones) religion was not just a private matter. Eaton’s decision to substitute the awkward “Persianized Turks” for “Muslims” is therefore unfortunate. I hope that in subsequent editions of this work he puts the “Muslims” back in again (as well as an entry for “Islam” in the index).

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CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

MARTIN F. AUGER. *Prisoners of the Home Front: German POWs and “Enemy Aliens” in Southern Quebec, 1940–46*. (Studies in Canadian Military History, number 9.) Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press. 2005. Pp. xii, 227. \$85.00.

Late in World War II, Martin F. Auger’s grandfather was allotted a German prisoner of war to help on his Quebec farm. Sixty years later, his grandson explored an experience few Canadians and even fewer Quebecers remember. Thanks to the new Canadian War Museum, we can share what he learned.

When Canada went to war in 1939, its wide-ranging War Measures Act allowed it to open two camps and to intern German aliens of military age as well as Canadians who showed Nazi or kindred disloyalty, among them, by 1940, the popular mayor of Montreal, Camillien Houde. When Benito Mussolini attacked France, a rather larger representation of Italian Canadians entered the camp because of real or alleged Fascist sympathies. So far, civilian internment had followed the precedents of 1914, with rather more moderation.

Meanwhile, in Great Britain, a government wrestling with imminent Nazi invasion amid a thick cloud of rumor and incipient panic, decided to lock up every German citizen, regardless of the fact that two-thirds of them were refugees from Nazism. Having done so, the British realized that their 75,000 prisoners might be a time bomb if the Nazi hordes swarmed ashore. Surely

Canada, its largest ally in 1940, would take on this burden. As usual, Canada's wartime government initially balked. W. L. Mackenzie King's Liberals instinctively resisted commitments.

Then, as the British government had already loaded a ship with internees, Ottawa yielded, and a desperate search for accommodation began. Since the internees would disembark at Quebec City, Quebec sites were a top priority, ranging from a federal experimental farm at Farnham, to some railway sheds near Sherbrooke, to a long-abandoned border fort at Île aux Noix. World War I veterans, hurriedly enlisted in a Veterans' Guard of Canada, provided sentries. A former POW, Colonel H. N. Streight, took charge. Conditions, at least initially, were grim.

They soon improved. Internees ranged from teenagers to octogenarians, but plenty had the skills needed to repair huts, install plumbing, and provide education and cultural life. Since the internees were prisoners of Britain, not Canada, Ottawa could do little to relieve the obvious injustice of holding German Jewish and Communist refugees from Adolf Hitler in the same camps as committed Nazis. Canada's prewar rejection of Jewish refugees suggests that the government may even have been reluctant to do that little. However, by early 1941, the British came to their senses; internees in Canada became refugees, and many won passage to England by joining the British Army's Pioneer Corps. Some 996 waited impatiently to become Canadian immigrants.

The internees' place in Canadian camps was promptly taken, again at British request, by German military prisoners. Again Ottawa balked; again the compromise was that the prisoners were Great Britain's responsibility, not Canada's. Losing thousands of prisoners to the Japanese at Hong Kong and to the Germans at Dieppe, as Auger reminds us, gave Ottawa a very direct incentive to adhere faithfully to the Geneva Convention of 1929, for fear of reprisals against Canadian soldiers. Geneva regulations could sometimes work to the internees' disadvantage, since the custodial power was compelled to return prisoners only to their homeland. When Canada disposed of its prisoners at the end of the war, they were returned to their captor, Britain, where most were diverted to the hard labor of reconstruction for a couple of years. All requests to remain in Canada were denied, although many of the men returned as immigrants.

Fear of reprisal made Canada reluctant to launch the vigorous denazification programs undertaken by Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States, and the eventual efforts to re-educate so-called "White" or anti-Nazi prisoners seem to have been ineffective. "Black" prisoners at Grande-Ligne even formed Hari-Kari clubs in which dedicated Nazis plotted a suicidal breakout and sabotage campaign for whenever Hitler's defeat was announced. In practice, Auger indicates, denazification worked better than the professionals believed. Anti-Nazi prisoners reported the names of

Hari-Kari fanatics, and the war ended in 1945 without incident.

Auger limited himself to the smaller prison camps in southern Quebec while giving readers an adequate overview of national policies and all the information he could glean from published reminiscences of former internees and prisoners. The bulk of both categories were confined in much bigger Canadian camps, mostly in Ontario and Alberta, where conditions were harsher and Nazi-led resistance resulted in violence and the murder of alleged Allied collaborators. Anyone seeking a fuller account will be assisted by Auger's bibliography and may want to start with Jonathan Vance's comprehensive *Objects of Concern: Canadian Prisoners of War Through the Twentieth Century* (1994).

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BILL WAISER. *Saskatchewan: A New History*. Photographs by JOHN PERRET. Calgary, Alberta: Fifth House. 2005. Pp. 563. \$37.95.

This book provides an excellent account of Saskatchewan's historical development from the presettlement period of the late nineteenth century to the present. It ends with a consideration of some of the most daunting challenges the province faces for the future. The prose is lively and lucid. Bill Waiser has the innate ability (that so many scholars lack) to present historical information in such a way as to entertain as well as inform. This is particularly admirable in a survey study and it certainly earns the gratitude of the reader.

Waiser adeptly handles a great array of subjects. His knowledge and ostensible understanding of Saskatchewan's major political battles and his refreshing descriptions of the best known provincial leaders from Walter Scott and Ross Thatcher of the Liberal Party to Tommy Douglas, Allan Blakeney, and Roy Romanow of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation/New Democrats, to Grant Devine of the Conservatives are both insightful and engaging. Waiser has particular empathy for Douglas, the "extremely accessible leader," who regularly applied the "sheer force of his personality" to bring sound management to rural Saskatchewan and the economy at large while spearheading the drive to create the modern Medicare system. It must be emphasized, however, that this is much more than a political or even a politics-centered work. Native issues, farming and ranching, urban development, protest movements, prohibition, women's suffrage, economic depression, and war are nicely balanced by rural sports and culture and such things as the coming of mechanization, electricity, radio, and talking pictures.

Waiser's narrative is, on the whole, optimistic—at times even eulogistic. However, he pulls no punches when it comes to showing the darker side of life. He illustrates the racist attitudes of the Anglo majority toward Austro-Hungarians, Ukrainians, Mennonites, Doukhobors, the French and, during war, Germans. He

is particularly concerned about the historical ill-treatment of Aboriginals and Metis and unflinchingly quotes a deputy minister of the Department of Indian Affairs in 1920 who stated: "I want to get rid of the Indian problem . . . Our object is to continue until there is not a single Indian in Canada that has not been absorbed into the body politic, and there is no Indian question and no Indian Department" (p. 183). At the same time, with as much depth as could be expected from a survey account, Waiser illustrates the economic deficiencies of a farm economy based on a single crop and international markets, and he has little compunction about underscoring farmer shortsightedness, the cruel Royal Canadian Mounted Police treatment of Native peoples, and of striking miners' in 1931, and the inadequate representation for both women and Aboriginals in the provincial legislative assembly.

The major problem with the book as a historical work is Waiser's sporadic use of generalizations that rely more on clichés than hard-nosed historical evidence. Thus, for instance, he gives lip-service to the problem of rural depopulation in Saskatchewan and openly laments "the continuing disappearance of the family farm." While he clearly recognizes that mechanization has been a major factor in the expansion of individual agricultural holdings, he fails to acknowledge that families, not agri-business or corporations, have done most of the expanding. I would direct him to Paul Voisey's excellent study of the Vulcan wheat economy in the period from 1904 to the late 1920s as well as my own recent investigations of the ranching frontier. That the family farm unit was still in control on the prairies as late as 1971 is illustrated by the fact that at that time there were only 147 farms, or .0019 of the 76,970 farms in Saskatchewan, that could be described by the Canadian Census Reports as incorporated nonfamily operations.

Waiser also praises the Crows Nest Pass legislation that until 1994 subsidized the movement of western Canadian grain to the east. Many prairie farmers, as well as transportation historians like Ted Regher, have argued that the "crow rate" was one of the artificial supports that secured the grain processing industry for eastern Canada when it might have helped to diversify and improve the rural economy out west. Waiser's penchant for hyperbole also leads him to utter an array of rather unhistorical euphemisms. Thus, for instance, Ethel Catherwood's gold medal in 1928 was "one of the sure signs that Saskatchewan was well along the road to greatness" (p. 277); and "despite the broken dreams, the cruel setbacks, and the misery and deprivation," Saskatchewan people during the depression "never lost faith in the land and its ability to provide a good living" (p. 302).

These excesses aside, however, Waiser has written a very good book. It is an interesting, even compelling, read and will unquestionably be successful in reaching out to the general as well as the academic audience. It

will also almost certainly be seen as a model for the study of provincial and, indeed, state history.

WARREN M. ELOFSON
University of Calgary

CHRISTOPHER CLARK. *Social Change in America: From the Revolution through the Civil War*. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee. 2006. Pp. xiii, 342. \$27.50.

From Christopher Clark's first book, *The Roots of Rural Capitalism: Western Massachusetts, 1780-1860* (1990) onward, he has explored the theme of market and capitalist transformation in the young United States. He continues that exploration in this volume. The book is synthetic rather than monographic, drawing together Clark's mastery of a broad range of scholarship. Aiming at an upper-division undergraduate/graduate student readership, Clark tells how the United States moved from the small farmer/artisanal/slave plantation/merchant-capitalist society that emerged from the American Revolution to the industrial giant that followed the Civil War. I would gladly recommend this book to anyone, student or general reader, who wanted the sort of overview that the title promises.

As Clark notes, however, the large story of American social development cannot be a single narrative. He understands that American social history necessarily is writ small, in specific tales. Clark builds his book around six themes: families and households, the organization of work and labor, the emergence of new social structures, the relationships between elites and plebeians, regional differences, and persistent tension between extensive expansion and intensive development. Interwoven, these themes pervade the whole book.

Setting out that schema as he opens the book, Clark gives the most space to the problem of elites, which is another way of saying to the problem of social class. In two revolutionary moments, one as the British Empire broke up and one as the United States nearly failed, elites and plebeians confronted one another openly, even violently in America. But in most of the rest of Clark's account, social groups danced a Virginia reel of confrontation, mediation, coalition, and confrontation.

Clark's "they" is Whitmanesque. There is no single national elite in his pages. Nor is there a single working class, or a single group of agrarians. Yet there was an ultimately single prize worth contending for: the future direction of American society. E. P. Thompson described the making of the English working class; Clark has set out to describe the making of capitalist America, in a book about one-third the length of Thompson's.

Perhaps the biggest problem confronting anybody who attempts a class analysis of America is what to do about race. Clark is far too good a historian to exclude African Americans or to try to fold race into another schema. He recognizes that nineteenth-century American capitalist development rested heavily on the shoulders of enslaved workers. His black people are actors, not victims. But somehow they seem to have less "presence" than his northeastern capitalists and workers or

his westward-moving farmers, miners, and land grabbers.

Two important groups, however, are virtually absent from Clark's pages, whether as actors or for their place in the structural changes that Clark describes. Native Americans get some shrift, but not enough. Admittedly, the long drama of Native resistance and reorganization during the colonial era yielded to the onrush of the United States. But save for the abolition of slavery, the largest structural change in American social history was the wresting away of Native land and its transformation from communal property into capitalist private property. Iroquoia became New York State's booming, fermenting Erie Canal country. Choctaw, Chickasaw, and Caddo land morphed into the Cotton Kingdom. Richard White's "middle ground" became William Cronon's "great West." The Great Plains were contested, not simply conquered. This is much more than a story of victimhood. Like their white and black counterparts, Native Americans tried to cope with the changes swirling around them, which means coping with America as it made itself.

Clark simply does not mention the Hispanic-identified people whose southwestern homeland John R. Chávez has described in *The Lost Land: The Chicano Image of the Southwest* (1984). Their experience, too, is part of America's nineteenth-century transformation. No more than the eastern woodlands or the Midwestern prairies and plains was their country empty as the United States moved in on it.

Perhaps these gaps are more apparent from North Texas than from the Connecticut valley. They are real. But they do not detract from the fact that Clark has attempted a large story and has told it well.

EDWARD COUNTRYMAN
Southern Methodist University

JOHN J. DINAN. *The American State Constitutional Tradition*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 2006. Pp. 430. \$35.00.

Much twentieth-century scholarship views the American constitutional experience as embodied in the federal Constitution. That experience is defined by one constitutional convention that met in Philadelphia in 1787 and places enormous attention on the drafting and ratification of its constitution. This singular focus on the federal Constitution assumes that little of constitutional importance happened at the 100 other state constitutional proceedings in America before the Civil War and at the more than 100 additional conventions that met thereafter. If scholars notice state proceedings at all, these proceedings appear as mere variations on the constitutional themes of the federal convention.

More than twenty years ago, a handful of scholars (including the late Kermit Hall) urged an end to ignoring state constitutional convention proceedings. Some took up the call, including Laura Scalia and especially G. Alan Tarr. To a stunning degree, John J. Dinan builds on these works and far surpasses the use of state

constitutional convention debates by anyone preceding him. Dinan assumed the Herculean task of examining all of the extant state constitutional debates of 114 conventions that met between 1818 and 1984. His findings provide ample grounds for further research.

Dinan's considerable contribution is to find and highlight where in those often voluminous debates the delegates addressed key issues of constitutional structure and principle. This contribution alone will facilitate greater access to and use of these debates by scholars from a wide variety of disciplines. His book will be the starting point for reexamining and explaining a wide array of traditional constitutional concerns: the amendment and revision process, representation, and the separation and balance of powers. Dinan also shows how the state constitution drafters addressed issues that were not central to the federal drafters, such as constitutional provisions to protect social, economic, and environmental rights, or in some instances to shape the very character of citizens through promoting religion, education or restricting lotteries and liquor sales. Some of the more intriguing parts of Dinan's book examine the state constitution makers' debate over issues that have received far less attention in terms of the federal Constitution, such as the issue of bicameralism.

Dinan highlights the numerous departures state convention delegates made from the federal model after reconsidering the logic and consequences of prior experiences at both the state and federal level. This leads him to conclude that the state approach offered "the more authentic expression of the considered judgment" of American constitution-making and is thus "entitled to be viewed as the better expression of the accumulated wisdom and experience of American constitution-makers" (p. 276). Irrespective of whether American constitution-making in fact underwent an improvement over time, Dinan persuasively demonstrates a long-standing aspiration among state constitution makers to make constitutional progress.

Dinan's success in drawing together so many issues from so many conventions does have its downside. It risks losing track of the context of the conventions that spanned over 150 years. For instance, in focusing on a discrete issue of constitutional structure, Dinan frequently quotes delegates from a wide range of conventions over time and place (dividing them according to their support or opposition to specific issues) and treating them as if they were all contributing to the same argument for the same purposes and effect. Undoubtedly what a delegate from Connecticut said about constitutional revision in the early 1800s might use the same words as a delegate in Hawaii in the 1970s. But whether these words had the same meaning and significance to the two delegates, or to their listeners, or to the operation of government in the two states, is questionable. The politics and experiences that brought these delegates to address the issue would differ as well. If Dinan is assuming these words refer to the same thing and that the gap of a century and a half means nothing

this presumes a static polity that does not reflect our understanding of American political development.

But Dinan's accomplishment in identifying broad constitutional themes and identifying when they developed in different conventions over time and across space leaves ample room for further insights in the direction his work suggests: to probing why these constitutional concerns persisted for over a century and a half. Dinan explores how this might be attempted in his fine chapter five, which portrays shifts in thought about the principle of bicameralism over time while avoiding the somewhat formulaic organization of some other chapters in the book that adhere to a pro/con structure of presenting arguments of convention delegates.

This study provides a thorough exploration of how state constitution makers structurally departed from the federal model and the reasons they gave for doing so. Dinan's book permits us to better see the work of state constitution makers and more fully appreciate their contribution to the American constitutional tradition.

CHRISTIAN G. FRITZ
University of New Mexico

LEWIS L. GOULD. *The Most Exclusive Club: A History of the Modern United States Senate*. New York: Basic Books. 2005. Pp. xiv, 402. \$27.50.

This is an instructive book filled with interesting anecdotes and colorful personalities. Unlike most books about the U.S. Senate, which provide biographies of specific senators or hone in on pivotal eras, Lewis L. Gould's study guides readers through Senate history from the early nineteenth century to the current period. The book thus offers readers a clearer understanding of the full sweep of Senate history.

The book makes several contributions. One of the most important is to recover key senators who have been ignored by most historians. For instance, Gould devotes a chapter to Indiana's John Worth Kern, chair of the Democratic Caucus from 1913 to 1917. While textbooks recount the experience of President Woodrow Wilson, and sometimes highlight a legislator such as Robert La Follette or Claude Kitchen, Gould makes the convincing argument that Kern was essential to the expansion of the federal government in these years. At the same time, Gould reveals how well-known senators, such as Idaho Republican William Borah, often were filled more with hot air than legislative skill.

The book reflects Gould's talent as a storyteller. He effectively conveys the inner world of the Senate. We see the uglier side of life in this elite institution, such as a chronic struggle that some senators have faced with alcoholism. Through a closer look at the Senate, Gould also challenges conventional interpretations of U.S. History. In his account, for instance, President Wilson's intransigence and reluctance to negotiate were more influential to the failure of the League of Nations than the isolationist impulse driving the Senate.

The book is not as strong analytically. There are no

path-breaking claims about Congress, the American state, or political history. In terms of understanding the evolution of the Senate as an institution, moreover, Gould barely taps into the voluminous political science literature on this subject. This is unfortunate, since his book focuses on an area where true interdisciplinary conversation could occur. When political scientists are mentioned, they are used primarily for factual information or support rather than to make claims about their arguments. Nor does the House of Representatives make enough of an appearance. While there is value in understanding the Senate as a distinct body, the reality is that Senate and House evolved in relation to each other (despite what senators often like to say). There are numerous points in the book when readers will wonder what exactly was going on in the House. Readers may also be interested in how senators and representatives made decisions in anticipation of the conference committees where both chambers are forced to reach difficult agreements.

Finally, Gould misses an opportunity to help us understand how changes in policy transformed the dynamics within the Senate. One of the most useful contributions from political science has been to show how policy can influence politics. Take, for example, the rise of partisanship in the Senate after the 1950s. Policy change helped produce this result. The conflict over civil rights, for example, weakened the standing of the committee system as well as the bipartisan alliance of southern Democrats and Republicans. Reforms of federal budgeting that Congress enacted in 1974—combined with the diminished level of discretionary spending as a result of debt and entitlements—also helped to facilitate centralized decision making in a notoriously individualistic institution. To be sure, these issues are discussed in the book. But Gould does not tease out the implications to make strong arguments that would stake his own original interpretation.

Historians should read what Gould has to say. This is a smart and well-written book that will advance the underdeveloped literature on congressional history.

JULIAN ZELIZER
Boston University

JOHN GRENIER. *The First Way of War: American War Making on the Frontier, 1607–1814*. New York: Cambridge University Press. 2005. Pp. xiv, 232. \$30.00.

Much of American scholarship on the colonial era has focused on the cultural and political transformation of Englishmen into Americans in thirteen of Britain's American colonies. In the field of military history, this result-oriented investigation has produced the oft-told story of "Indianized" sharp-shooting frontiersmen fighting as irregulars (avoiding large-scale combat and focusing on small hit-and-run engagements). This narrative suggests that English colonists were militarily transformed from defensive-minded collectivists to offensive-minded individualists. Understandably, this storyline has been used as an allegory for a much wider

cultural transformation that explains not only the American victory in the War of Independence, but also the birth of American democracy, nationhood, and separatism.

Academic historians from both sides of the Atlantic have effectively challenged the validity, but not the appeal, of this explanatory model. John Grenier offers a novel approach to the birth of a uniquely American way of war by shifting the focus from "American tactics" (that is, the transition from defensive to offensive tactics) to logistics and martial culture. According to Grenier, what distinguished colonial forces in America from English forces in the Old World was their commitment to irregular and total war: targeting enemies' logistical resources, such as crops, food stores, villages, and noncombatants, rather than enemy troops themselves, who often proved too elusive. From the Indian wars of the early seventeenth century to the War of 1812, this strategy proved successful in undermining adversaries' ability and will to sustain the war effort. When viewed against this colonial and early national backdrop, Grenier concludes, acts of "extravagant violence" against noncombatants and civilian logistics in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries seem not as aberrations from the American way of war but as a re-emergence of Americans' "first way of war."

In an excellent introduction, Grenier traces and analyzes early American military historiography, positioning his book in the fields of early American history and early modern military history. Grenier does not make a case for "American tactics," yet he firmly maintains that exceptional conditions in North America transformed English colonists into exceptional Englishmen, alienated from the mother country by a uniquely American martial culture. If this sounds Turnerian in character, it is because this is very much a frontier study of American military history. In the chapter that covers the War of Independence, Grenier states that it "is an examination not of the War of Independence, but of the American-Indian wars that wracked the . . . frontiers" (p. 147). Grenier successfully demonstrates that these frontier wars conformed to the pattern of total war that characterized earlier Indian conflicts throughout the colonial era. However, the question remains whether one can legitimately draw conclusions about American military culture in the revolutionary period from these frontier wars. After all, Grenier himself points out that the "first way of war" was at odds with the martial conduct espoused by George Washington and most of his generals and successors.

Turnerian scholars face a difficult burden of proof. It behooves them to demonstrate that the frontier experience can legitimately be presented as the American experience, despite the fact that only a fraction of Americans experienced frontier life firsthand. Grenier contends that the martial culture of total war and extravagant violence that was born in frontier warfare against Native Americans became a defining characteristic of the American character and national ethos. Somehow this martial culture was transmitted to east-

ern military institutions and commanders, who held that "scorched earth" and violence against noncombatants were normal and legitimate. In this respect, the military transformation that colonists underwent in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries changed them from what they were—Englishmen—into what they would become.

Success or failure for Grenier's thesis rests not only on demonstrating that this frontier culture traveled eastward and shaped the attitudes of future generations of American commanders, but also that the irregular, or *petite guerre*, practices of the frontier were indeed unique to North America. Scholars who highlight the exceptionalism of American culture usually explain it as either a product of exceptional conditions, which created novel cultural and social customs, or a product of America's isolation, which allowed archaic practices and beliefs to flourish in the New World long after they disappeared in the Old. (The isolation model has come under increased criticism over the past twenty years with the rise of Atlantic history.) Grenier employs both explanations, pointing out that North America did not experience the changes that "civilized" European warfare in the eighteenth century by limiting the scope of violence and devastation directed at noncombatants. (One could point out that stereotypes regarding European limited warfare held true—if at all—only in large-scale campaigns against state-sponsored regular armies. When confronted with people's armies, partisans and war bands in the British Isles, the Continent and overseas, European armies were quite adept at targeting noncombatants and civilian logistics.) Grenier argues that the principles and traditions of European *petite guerre* and the martial character of the Wars of Religion survived and thrived in North America well into the nineteenth century. However, what contributed to the survival of these Old World attitudes in America were conditions unique to the frontier, which made irregular and total war more effective in North America than in eighteenth-century Europe.

Grenier's introduction indicates that he recognizes how relevant his work is to ongoing historiographical debates on American isolation, American exceptionalism, and the relative impact of the frontier experience on American culture (in this case, military culture). Anyone familiar with my own work will see that Grenier and I are on opposing camps in these debates. He has addressed the arguments of would-be critics like myself with a sound analytical framework and a well-researched and well-presented narrative. Scholars of American history and of military history will find this book thoughtful and highly provocative.

GUY CHET

University of North Texas

COLIN G. CALLOWAY. *The Scratch of a Pen: 1763 and the Transformation of North America*. (Pivotal Moments in American History.) New York: Oxford University Press. 2006. Pp. xvii, 219. \$26.00.

It is notorious that the roots of new wars often lie in the treaties that ended their predecessors. The Peace of Paris of February 1763, which terminated the conflict that became known in Europe as the Seven Years' War, and in North America as the French and Indian War, was no exception to this rule. Indeed, official news of the treaty that confirmed Britain's overwhelming victory over France had barely crossed the Atlantic before its consequences sparked fresh strife and upheaval. By the time the year was over, new British policies for America had been implemented and new attitudes formed: together, they would help to instigate events leading to another, and very different, Peace of Paris twenty years later—one with equally profound ramifications for North America and its diverse peoples.

The connection between the events of 1763 and Britain's recognition of American independence in 1783 is well known, but as Colin G. Calloway emphasizes, "the path to revolution was only one of many stories unfolding that year" (p. 165). While the long-term effects of the Peace are acknowledged in both the introduction and epilogue of this fine book, Calloway is chiefly concerned with the way in which it affected North America's "human geography"—the lives of its British, French, Spanish, Indian, and enslaved African inhabitants.

Calloway teases out the manifold significances of what was, by any measure, a momentous year worthy of inclusion within a series devoted to "Pivotal Moments in American History." Never before—or since—the Peace of Paris did greater swathes of American territory change hands, and, in Francis Parkman's words, at the mere "scratch of a pen." Worst of all after almost a century of bitter warfare with the English colonies, France surrendered all possessions east of the Mississippi River to Britain and ceded Louisiana to Spain. Britain also gained Florida, acquired in exchange for the recently captured Havana. Such tectonic shifts in territory were remarkable enough, but as Calloway demonstrates, the Peace of Paris did more than simply change the map: in addition "it set people and events in motion" (p. 14).

At just some 170 pages of text, this is a slim book. Yet its scope is impressive. Calloway covers much ground, both geographically, and through the range of themes tackled. This breadth is apparent from the opening chapter, which sets the scene with a thought-provoking overview of North America and its inhabitants in 1763. Employing techniques that characterize the entire book, Calloway deftly sifts a mass of primary and secondary sources for the most telling evidence. Here, and in the more focused chapters that follow, his analysis is spiked with vivid character sketches that zoom in on the experiences of individuals to highlight broader issues.

Through a series of scholarly works, most recently the award-winning *One Vast Winter Count: The Native American West before Lewis and Clark* (2003), Calloway has achieved eminence as an historian of the American Indian experience. He is therefore unusually well qualified to assess the significance of a year dominated by

Indian affairs. Their centrality was all too soon apparent when Britain's pruning of the expenses previously allotted to purchasing the goodwill of frontier tribes, a misguided move prompted by the debts incurred in beating France, contributed to the outbreak of the Indian war of independence associated with the Ottawa war chief Pontiac. Calloway gives a sympathetic portrait of this controversial and enigmatic figure, who was truly 1763's "man of the year" (p. 29), but he pursues a commendably even-handed line in his analysis of the conflict. The sheer viciousness of the French and Indian War, he argues, had already eroded the middle ground of coexistence between Indians and whites, ensuring that ensuing conflicts carried a new strand of racial hatred. The violence visited by exasperated tribesmen upon frontier settlers and redcoat garrisons, and the killing of peaceful Indians by the "Paxton Boys" were two sides of the same coin, with both groups equally culpable of "ethnic cleansing" (p. 16).

One of the book's most wide-ranging chapters, "Exiles and Expulsions," deals with the myriad dislocations resulting from the Peace of Paris. Spaniards happily swapped the hardships of Florida for the opulence of Cuba; and while the black-robed Jesuit missionaries who had spearheaded France's drive into Indian country were expelled from Louisiana, Acadians scattered far from their northern homes in the 1750s now gravitated to that same region in a folk movement by which an ostensibly Spanish territory became more French than ever before, acquiring a distinctive and enduring "Cajun" culture.

Well crafted, scholarly, and stimulating, this book offers fresh perspectives on a signpost year, making a convincing case for its recognition as much more than simply the starting point on the familiar road to revolution.

STEPHEN BRUMWELL
Amsterdam

J. A. LEO LEMAY. *The Life of Benjamin Franklin, Volume One: Journalist, 1706–1730*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2006. Pp. xiv, 549. \$39.95.

J. A. LEO LEMAY. *The Life of Benjamin Franklin, Volume Two: Printer and Publisher, 1730–1747*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2006. Pp. xiv, 647. \$39.95.

J. A. Leo Lemay's projected seven-volume biography of Benjamin Franklin is a labor of love balanced by thoughtful criticism. There is nothing like it. The first two volumes, treating the years 1706–1747, mine the primary sources and engage with old and new scholarship on Franklin and his environment. Although the freehand-drawn map of Boston inside the front cover of volume one is nearly impossible to make sense of, interior illustrations are abundant and inviting.

The two volumes introduce the multifaceted Franklin: swimmer, vegetarian, songwriter, chess player, journalist, printer, Shaftesburian, Freemason, deist, mathematician, social critic, concerned citizen. Franklin

adored John Locke's *Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690), but also the long forgotten *Logic; or the Art of Thinking* (1685). Here and throughout, Lemay identifies previously unheeded influences on Franklin's wit and skepticism.

Brother James's irreverent *New-England Courant* forms the centerpiece of volume one. Benjamin, as apprentice, stuck around for 111 issues before fleeing Boston in 1723. Lemay resurrects Nathaniel Gardner, occasional coeditor of the paper whose amusing sayings are appetizers for some of Ben's more pert aphorisms as Poor Richard. Gardner's various pseudonyms—take “Jethro Sham”—still evoke a chuckle, though the best of the *Courant* breed of writers has to be satirist John “Mundungus” Williams, who giddily tortured the English language. James Franklin shrewdly published his writers' opponents as well, fanning the flame of local controversy to sell more newspapers. The *Courant* was Ben's proving ground.

Lemay brings all of the players and their personae to life, revisiting the issues that absorbed them, such as smallpox inoculation and abuses traced to the existing social hierarchy, led by the hypergraphic Cotton Mather. Lemay tells us that the *Courant* writers, as a collective, influenced Franklin more than *Spectator*, more than Jonathan Swift. Identifying James's “genius,” he calls the *Courant* the first “proto-nationalistic American newspaper” (v. 1, p. 109). Its Congregationalist enemies saw its contributors in blasphemous terms, as members of an American Hell-Fire Club. The colloquy between James and the venerable Increase Mather is precious, as they argued like schoolboys whether the minister had really discontinued his subscription to the *Courant*, as he claimed.

All of this serves as a warm-up for Benjamin's subtly subversive Silence Dogood essays, which the sixteen-year-old submitted to the paper anonymously. Aside from the spur to his career, we are shown how these pieces symbolized the ascendancy of the print shop in the already very vital republic of letters. When James was jailed, and later went underground for printing material that was unacceptable to Boston's elders, Benjamin took over the paper. He learned how to gauge his audience, how to taunt, and how to achieve his intended effect.

As volume one proceeds, Franklin sells some books for ready cash and runs off to Philadelphia. He was “precocious and brilliant,” writes Lemay, “saucy, provoking, proud, and rebellious,” and at the same time resentful that he had been denied a Harvard education; owing to bitterness, then, his satires on religion were perhaps “too bold” (v. 1, pp. 207–209). In his adopted home of Philadelphia, Franklin pursued both the printer's trade and a social life. Trusting the unreliable Lieutenant Governor William Keith, who assured him of the government's printing business, he sailed to London in 1724, to acquire the tools he needed. Before departure, though, he stopped in Boston, outfitted as something of a dandy, pranced before his brother, and paid a call on the forgiving Cotton Mather.

In London, Franklin worked in the printing business and traveled in philosophic circles. He found a generous friend in a Bostonian, Dr. Zabdiel Boylston, the inoculation pioneer whose method had been criticized in the *Courant*, and met, among others, the freethinking Dr. Bernard Mandeville. He also ignored his intended, Deborah Read, driving her into the arms of a potter. If the first half of the opening volume centers on the *Courant*, in the second half, Lemay beautifully dissects Franklin's powerful, if not subversive, *Dissertation on Liberty and Necessity* (1725), in which the young thinker investigates the soul and human identity. After two years abroad, the American known for his water drinking returned to Philadelphia, where he became a master printer, formed the Junto, networked brilliantly, and wrote his own epitaph (later in his life to be widely circulated), in which he likened his body to “the Cover of an Old Book” bound to appear again “In a new & more perfect Edition.” Volume one ends with a portrait of Franklin's newspaper, the *Pennsylvania Gazette*, leading Lemay to conclude that the “audacious, entertaining, literary, humorous, salacious, intellectual” Franklin was “the ablest journalist and the greatest innovator of newspaper techniques of his day” (v. 1, pp. 455–456).

Volume Two opens with a compelling treatment of Franklin's foibles, exploring his sexuality and his reconnection with ex-fiancée Deborah, for whose disastrous first marriage he held himself responsible and whom he finally married in 1730. In this volume, we are able to glean something more of the inner man who “impatiently drummed his fingers on the table when his [chess] opponents were slow” (v. 2, p. 129).

The clever entrepreneur founded the Library Company in 1731, soliciting far more science and literature than theology. Initially aiming at furthering his own education and that of his Junto friends, Franklin transformed the project by acquiring prime real estate from the Penns. He navigated local politics in the pages of his newspaper, founded the Union Fire Company, made recommendations toward policing the streets more efficiently, and finally turned his attention to scientific improvements with his 1741 “new Invented Pennsylvanian Fire-Places.” The Franklin stove consumed less wood and provided better ventilation than stoves previously in use. Looking at Franklin as a man of opinions, Lemay dissects every one of his poses, points out contradictions where they exist, and takes particular interest in his subject's widely varying male and female personae. The author goes to town on the 1731 essay “Art of Virtue,” a main feature of Franklin's *Autobiography*.

In the latter part of volume two, Franklin the natural philosopher comes back to subjects of bawdy interest (“The Speech of Miss Polly Baker”) and commentaries on religion. One of the most intriguing discussions concerns the deistic dissertation *A Speech Deliver'd by an Indian Chief*, not previously attributed to Franklin. The Indian in question contests Christianization by pointing out that God would not have revealed himself to one portion of mankind and not another—for to say otherwise is to deny his omnipotence. How could the In-

dian's revered ancestors, not exposed to missionaries, be eternally condemned? What need was there for ministers as intermediaries between humans and their deity? In clarifying Franklin's purposes behind his satires, Lemay does some of his best analysis, describing Franklin's writing by the end of this period as "more savage" (v. 2, p. 554).

It might seem perverse to warn scholars against a book so essential that has been so extensively researched. But it must be said that Lemay's writing style often makes for arduous reading. Section subheadings pop up every page or two, giving his work the feel of (and as much warmth as) a string of encyclopedia entries. Some readers may not mind wading through a couple thousand words debating whether it was in 1717 or 1718 that the subject's newspaper-publisher brother commenced his printing operation. A 1718/1719 broadside about Blackbeard the Pirate requires four pages in order to track down all versions of a ballad loosely attributed to young Benjamin, though in the end the author readily concedes that "it is not much worse than the usual doggerel ballad. Not bad for a thirteen year old" (v. 1, p. 66).

Perhaps the problem lies in the editing. Lemay devotes a rambling thirty-one-page chapter to the plagiarizing Presbyterian minister Samuel Hemphill, an episode Franklin dispatched in a page or so in his *Autobiography*; it might warrant such coverage in a history of sectarian self-definition, but not in Franklin's biography. A failed 1739 movement to clean up the toxic eyesore caused by tanners along the Philadelphia dock drags on for ten pages. This is all emblematic of a larger problem: the overload of detail ultimately obscures and confounds the book's useful analysis. There appears to have been no research item that Lemay was willing to relegate to an endnote. An expert study loses narrative power through its encyclopedic approach.

In all fairness, the multivolume biography appears to have been intended as a resource more than as an absorbing read. It is filled with speculations, as in "Franklin probably read," "Franklin probably knew," and "One wonders if Franklin recalled." Thankfully, as the work progresses, the strategy of including extraneous material of debatable relevance to Franklin's character or career becomes a bit less unwieldy, and the reader is drawn to appreciate the underlying story.

Lemay is a first-rate scholar, and the first two volumes of his biography are especially valuable as a commentary on the *Autobiography* and for recovering the surrounding characters, from the versifying Uncle Benjamin after whom he was named to his Philadelphia patron, Speaker of the Assembly Andrew Hamilton, who advanced Franklin's printing career in the 1730s. With his immersion in eighteenth-century intellectual life, the author shows us how fiercely independent Franklin was. Lemay's in-depth analysis of Franklin's writings will answer the needs of the most inquiring historian.

ANDREW BURSTEIN
University of Tulsa

JOYCE E. CHAPLIN. *The First Scientific American: Benjamin Franklin and the Pursuit of Genius*. New York: Basic Books. 2006. Pp. 352. \$27.50.

Elaborately simple, ostentatiously modest, dogmatically moderate, Benjamin Franklin had a genius for marrying opposites in winning combinations. The author of positive and negative electricity wielded humility as a tool of self-promotion and rose through the society he called classless from artisan to gentleman. Indeed, Franklin elevated the practice of pairing contraries into a general theory encompassing both nature and society: no pleasure without pain, no buying without selling, no surplus without a deficit. No life without death. Or maybe in that one instance the rule might be suspended? The man who stayed meek by admonishing himself to "imitate Jesus and Socrates" aspired to immortality, and not just undying fame, either, but actual, eternal life. As Joyce E. Chaplin recounts in her remarkably engaging biography Franklin looked for his deliverance not to spirit but to science.

The idea that the natural sciences might actually deliver immortality so compelled Franklin that, to express it, he deviated more than once from his otherwise firm policy of understatement. These deviations fleetingly laid bare an attitude usually clothed in homely aphorisms and professions of temperance and restraint. It was, however, a fundamentally intemperate and unrestrained attitude regarding the possibilities that the natural sciences opened up for individual and social transformation. Arguably Franklin's most important invention, this stance—defined partly by its presentation in the guise of practicality and moderation—provides the organizing theme for Chaplin's important book.

What does it mean to have been the "first scientific American"? Franklin was the first person born in the Americas, Chaplin writes, to have achieved international renown for work in the physical sciences. But her analysis deftly highlights a more complex and momentous novelty, namely the use to which Franklin put his scientific reputation. He built it into a platform from which to enter and maneuver within political life.

Having early realized that natural knowledge "could blur the boundary between workingman and gentleman" (p. 38), Franklin began systematically to include natural philosophical material in his newspaper and almanac. He pursued the same tactic after the publication of his *Experiments and Observations on Electricity* (1751): with each successive edition or translation of this work, as Chaplin shows, Franklin's celebrity expanded, and the later editions juxtaposed social and political texts with the electrical and meteorological ones, helping to accomplish the transition from natural philosophy to politics. In perfect resonance with his contemporaries' guiding myth of American naturalism, and with Enlightenment theories of the natural origins of political legitimacy, and employing his habitual gift for coupling the elements of a contrast, Franklin translated nature as society, and natural as social authority. He did

this with such success that, Chaplin observes, he came to personify the American nation, his image reproduced in every possible medium: paper, canvas, metal, silk, wax, marble, china, in formal portraits and on daily objects from snuff boxes to cameo brooches.

In other words, the Franklin who emerges in this skillful new portrait developed a quintessentially American model of scientific statesmanship. To understand this model, one must take into account that Franklin's entire period of concerted experimental and theoretical work in the physical sciences—his studies of electricity—took up a total of just a few months, and those, moreover, were spread across about two years, between the winter of 1745 and the spring of 1748. As Chaplin points out, Franklin's reputation as a natural philosopher continued to develop after he had stopped publicizing new hypotheses and observations in the sciences, and long after his one, brief period of relatively intensive work in physics during the 1740s.

This is not to say that the work itself was unimportant; it transformed the discussion of electrical action in Europe and had lasting effects on the field of electrical physics. But the casual style of Franklin's electrical research, its intuitive, impressionistic basis, its strategic philosophical sketchiness, with theoretical quandaries left deliberately unresolved, these characteristics were crucial to its influence. Europeans embraced Franklinism and, indeed, Franklin and his followers promoted it, as a specifically American alternative to what Franklinists in America and Europe alike characterized as hidebound European system building.

Thus Franklin constructed his social and political platform from a particular image of natural science, one that was phenomenological, nonmathematical on principle, and intentionally vague about the physical mechanisms underlying observed effects. Franklinist science, that is to say, was formally casual. Franklin presented himself to the world not as a natural philosopher but, more strategically, as a printer who understood nature. Chaplin implies that the "distrust of philosophy, theory and learning [that] left its mark on antebellum America" (p. 344) emerged despite Franklin's legacy. Her complex account of that legacy suggests an added twist, however, by showing that Franklinist science encompassed both philosophy and an official distrust of philosophy. His theories came dressed as rejections of theory. Bypassing science altogether and staking his claims to nature direct: that was the brilliant move of the man who self-mockingly boasted, with characteristically humble arrogance, that his face was "as well known as that of the moon" (p. 1).

JESSICA RISKIN
Stanford University

STANLEY FINGER. *Doctor Franklin's Medicine*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2006. Pp. xiii, 379. \$39.95.

The University of Pennsylvania Press has honored the tricentenary of that paragon of North American institution building, Benjamin Franklin, with a volume dedicated to his place in eighteenth-century medicine as contributor, observer, and patient. The author, Stanley Finger, is a historian and former practitioner of the neurosciences and a longstanding admirer of Franklin. His summary of Franklin's contributions under the label "enlightened medicine" does not attempt a full and critical account of this medicine, which would be a welcome if large and thorny task to undertake for the North American colonies. Rather, this is a very full account of how one ubiquitous Founding Father interacted with and observed the practice and theory of eighteenth-century medicine in North America and in the countries he singled out for attention or graced with his presence (mainly England, Scotland, and France, but also Germany).

Finger bases this account on Franklin's own, apparently inexhaustible papers—both autobiographical writings and correspondence. His secondary sources do not go much beyond the general literature on colonial North American medicine, much of it written before the 1980s; many of these works are now classics that with few exceptions remain unchallenged by younger scholars. Thus, Finger's approach remains largely untouched by the complex social and cultural models used more recently and abundantly in European histories of medicine and health.

Nonetheless, while not contributing to the long overdue methodological update of the history of colonial North American medicine, this gently paced if sometimes overly discursive book may help revive interest in medical practice during the formative years of the republic. It lays out for the general reader, through a chronological narrative of health and illness behavior in Franklin's own life, how both the professional and leisured writing classes of the British colonies and their correspondents in Europe perceived chronic diseases and epidemics, discussed ways of coping with these and other tribulations of the body and mind, received various European trends both modish and passing, and began to establish, at least in the few large colonial cities, institutions of medical charity and learning. Examples are the well-known campaigns for and against smallpox variolization, in which the much maligned Cotton Mather played a crucial and enlightened role and Franklin sided with the variolators; the use of electricity as a therapeutic medium; and the "Folly of Mesmerism." Franklin in fact was asked to serve on the French commission examining the claims for Friedrich Anton Mesmer's magnetic cures because of his expertise in electric phenomena. The chapter on French medicine (pp. 199–218) could have benefited from a more solidly grounded treatment. For example, it would be of some interest to know how and where the physician and medical reformer, Dr. Pierre Cabanis, obtained some of his notions about medicalization of the hospital from a colonial setting lacking both medical hierarchies and the charitable monopolies of the Catholic Church.

As is often the case in biographical treatments, the wish to demonstrate Franklin's original contributions to medicine sometimes goes beyond the evidence. Medical statistics go back at least to the observations of John Graunt in seventeenth-century London; although Franklin's proficiency as a swimmer is impressive, the insistence on exercise or daily motion as preventive behavior is as old as most other basic medical advice; and the reader might be surprised to learn that Louis XVI possibly refused to order a pair of bifocals because he felt threatened by the competition of a foreigner (p. 258). Some of these trivial faults could have been avoided by more stringent copyediting, which might also have trimmed or relegated to the endnotes excessive explanatory digressions and corrected some errors, such as the use of the much later name of Haiti (p. 91) to refer to the rich French slave colony of Saint Domingue, which with Jamaica was suspected as the source of a stomach condition called the dry gripes.

More regrettable, however, are omissions rather than commissions. Other than bifocals, several medical publications (including John Tennent's *Every Man His Own Doctor* in 1734, with a German translation in 1736), and *Poor Richard's Almanac*, what in fact was the singular impact on American medicine and medical practice of the inspirations Franklin received from and distributed among his vast network of enlightened friends and correspondents in business, politics, and natural philosophy? He ensured membership—eagerly sought—for many of these luminaries in the American Philosophical Society, his lasting gift to the American *commerce scientifique* at a time when most men in the colonies were recipients of knowledge or at best providers of exotic specimens. Here, some of the larger context offered in the recent Franklin biographies by historians like Walter Isaacson (2003) and Gordon S. Wood (2004) would have been helpful. By trying to share with us all possible medical connections in domestic and foreign ventures, this book loses sight of what it was in both the man and his environment that enabled these contributions. There is general agreement on the universality of his talent and interests, but he was only one of a species for whom the eighteenth century was a rich breeding ground. That Franklin was able to transcend class and country of origin is an extraordinary story; that his interests included medicine places him in the abundant company of the learned and cultured men and women of his time, a fact for which this book offers ample, and often previously ignored, testimony.

RENATE WILSON

John Hopkins University

JEFFREY H. MORRISON. *John Witherspoon and the Founding of the American Republic*. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press. 2005. Pp. xv, 220. \$22.50.

The first chapter of this volume is titled "Forgotten Founder" and that captures much of the character of Jeffrey H. Morrison's book. John Witherspoon was, of course, the president of the College of New Jersey, soon

to become Princeton, during the founding period. Apparently fund raising was not as much a full-time job for college presidents in that day, so Witherspoon found time to be an active clergyman, a delegate to the Second Continental Congress and signer of the Declaration of Independence, a signer of the Articles of Confederation, and delegate to the New Jersey ratifying constitution. He was also a pamphleteer in the patriot cause, a sermonizer (of course), and the author of a series of lectures on moral theory that became perhaps the leading text book produced on that subject in those years in the colonies. Morrison is struck by the injustice of a man of such accomplishment not being better remembered. He makes a good start toward bringing Witherspoon more to mind.

Of course, Witherspoon has never been entirely forgotten. He has probably been best remembered as the teacher of James Madison, a student one might indeed be proud of. There were other leaders of the day who also passed through Witherspoon's classroom: Aaron Burr was one; so were twelve members of the Continental Congress, five delegates to the Constitutional Convention, forty-nine U.S. Representatives, twenty-eight U.S. Senators, three Supreme Court Justices, eight U.S. District Judges, one Secretary of State, three Attorneys-General, and two foreign ministers—and many state level officials (p. 4). Had there been a tradition of investigative journalism no doubt articles decrying the "Witherspoon cabal" would have sprung up all over the continent.

Morrison's study goes a long way toward remedying the lack of attention paid to Witherspoon. His book is not a biography, although it does contain much biographical information, as much as a study of Witherspoon's thought, particularly his political thought. It must also be said, however, that the book suffers in places from the agenda Morrison has set himself. It centers too much on trying to establish Witherspoon's worthiness, and thus Morrison is led both to overstate much and to miss opportunities for more significant types of analysis. For example, Morrison overstates the evidence for Witherspoon's influence on Madison, a deficiency particularly evident in a discussion intended to show how close Madison's "Memorial and Remonstrance" was to Witherspoon on religious liberty, or how much Madison may have owed to Witherspoon for his most famous achievement, the argument for the extended republic in *Federalist* #10. In fact, Madison and Witherspoon were not nearly as close as Morrison claims on religious liberty, a fact Morrison at times admits in a backhand sort of way, but which deserves far more focused treatment. The case for the extended republic connection is even less persuasive. Likewise Morrison tries to make the case that Witherspoon's "Lectures on Moral Philosophy" were a great—indeed the greatest—work of moral philosophy produced in America. But as Morrison himself brings out, these lectures, prepared for teaching purposes, were highly derivative from Francis Hutcheson's *System of Moral Philosophy* (1755), and while important as a transmitter of

Scottish moral sense philosophy, they do not qualify as great works of philosophy, nor their author as the most philosophical of founding-era Americans (pp. 66–67).

Despite these flaws, this is a genuinely useful, informative, and readable book. Morrison hits what should have been his overall theme in the last chapter when he treats Witherspoon as a great example of the synthesizing tendencies of founding-era American intellectuals. In other words, this volume shows us not merely Witherspoon in himself but Witherspoon as an exemplar of a much broader and peculiarly American phenomenon—the creation of the American amalgam. Witherspoon is particularly important for working hard to bring together the Enlightenment-liberal philosophy of John Locke with eighteenth-century Calvinism and Scottish moral sense philosophy. On this topic Morrison's book makes a great contribution and points toward yet more work that could be done. The author's ultimate success can be judged by the fact that he awakens, in this reader at least, a real desire to go and read more of Witherspoon.

MICHAEL P. ZUCKERT
University of Notre Dame

ALFRED F. YOUNG. *Masquerade: The Life and Times of Deborah Sampson, Continental Soldier*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf. 2004. Pp. x, 417. \$26.95.

Alfred F. Young's new book is the first full-scale scholarly biography of Deborah Sampson, the Massachusetts woman who disguised herself as a man to fight in the American Revolution. Over the last generation Sampson has become not only her state's "official heroine" but perhaps the war's best-known common soldier. Yet the specifics of her life have remained obscure. This account moves Sampson out of the realm of myth into history, offering a finely detailed portrait that is the fullest and most sophisticated examination of Sampson yet.

Young generally extends rather than dramatically upends the accepted understanding of Sampson's life. He adds new specificity to her early experiences, noting particularly the difficulties of being both poor and relatively (although informally) well educated. Young also explores more fully Sampson's decision to join the Baptist church with its close-knit community, its struggle for religious liberty, and its strict discipline—a careful attention to women's behavior that she experienced directly when she was expelled in 1782 for trying to enlist in the army as a man. She succeeded only upon her second attempt, serving in the Continental Army for seventeen months until the end of the war.

Young's portrait of Sampson's military service and its aftermath breaks more new ground. Rather than simply another enlisted "man," Young shows, Sampson belonged to an elite unit of soldiers. As a member of the light infantry, she served in the bloody, contested ground of Westchester, where soldiers and civilians fought each other in what Young calls "a chaotic, multilayered civil war" (p. 109). His careful sifting of military and other records as well as Sampson's own ac-

counts suggests further that she was an impressive soldier. Her sense of duty and her willingness to volunteer and to take the initiative made her, Young writes, "spectacularly successful" (p. 13). Young's account also discusses fully the specifics of Sampson's disguise, speculating at length on how she might have successfully hidden her body and her bodily functions even after being wounded. Here as elsewhere, Young focuses directly on evidence and explanation rather than narrative.

After a season in the field, Sampson served for most of 1783 as a waiter (a servant or orderly) to a general before being discharged in October 1783. Still only about twenty-three, she spent the remaining forty-four years of her life "guarding [her] persona" as a Revolutionary War soldier (p. 13). Beginning in the 1790s, she engaged in an extensive lobbying campaign that won her back pay from Massachusetts, then a federal pension, and later increasing amounts of support. This process also led her to the writer Herman Mann, who produced a lengthy—and not very trustworthy—book about her in 1797. Even more extraordinarily, Sampson offered a series of public talks (written by Mann) in New England and New York during 1802 and 1803, presentations that included her performing military exercises. Young suggests that this lecture tour, the first by an American woman, was even more revolutionary than serving as a soldier.

Young's book goes beyond the soldier. He carefully traces Sampson's attempts to lift herself and her family out of the hardscrabble poverty in which she was raised. Her post-Revolutionary War marriage to Benjamin Gannett, Jr., son of a significant town leader, did not bring the prosperity that she might have expected. Young views Gannett harshly, suggesting that he lacked his wife's energy and sophistication. The book concludes with an extensive discussion of Sampson's changing reputation and fame from her death to the present.

The account does not challenge Sampson's status as a heroine. Young may be too much of a partisan, for example blaming her memoirist Mann for reporting that she fought at Yorktown even though Sampson herself later repeated the claim under oath. But Young comes by his concern honestly. The book reveals an impressive commitment to intensive study of obscure sources and unexpected contexts, and to thoughtful consideration of possible interpretations—as well as to clear and compelling writing. It succeeds beautifully in returning the extraordinary story of Deborah Sampson to its original setting in Revolutionary and post-Revolutionary War America.

STEVEN C. BULLOCK
Worcester Polytechnic Institute

MAURA LYONS. *William Dunlap and the Construction of an American Art History*. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. 2005. Pp. xii, 182. \$34.95.

William Dunlap as an artist has faded from view, but as a writer who inaugurated the genre of histories of

American art he retains a lively presence in the literature of the field. With the publication of his *History of the Rise and Progress of the Arts of Design in the United States* in 1834, he established his authority as recorder of the key biographical events and artistic achievements of his predecessors and his contemporaries. It is Maura Lyons's project to show how Dunlap's prodigious text emerged, not as an objective encyclopedic account but as a narrative deeply inflected by Dunlap's residence in New York City, his affiliation with the National Academy of Design, and by his personal and professional quarrels. She tracks the history of the *History* from its initial qualified success in the 1830s to its eclipse at mid-century and to its subsequent rediscoveries in 1876 (that era of backward-looking exuberance), 1914 (when descendant Theodore Woolsey celebrated Dunlap as "The American Vasari"), 1930 (when the New York Historical Society published Dunlap's diaries), 1939 (when the Addison Gallery arranged an exhibition based on Dunlap's text), and the 1960s when dissertations and new editions of the *History* began to appear.

Drawing on period journals, letters, diaries, and the now-substantial literature on Dunlap and his era, Lyons positions the *History's* achievement within an account of the author's own biography, within the history of antebellum publishing, and within the context of New York City as an emerging arts capital. She recounts the author's attention to the moral dimensions of biography, including his own mea culpa concerning squandering opportunities during the three years he spent in Benjamin West's London studio. She makes clear that his opinions are classic for his era: "he liked paintings to be carefully finished, accurate in their representations of natural forms, and . . . moral in tone" (p. 53). Lyons could have made more of Dunlap's method, for his text is based not just on personal knowledge of many of the 300 artists included and research into manuscript documents and published sources concerning their careers, but also on testimony he solicited directly from his subjects, much of which he delivers "raw" as direct quotation. This technique gives an air of eye-witness authenticity and the flavor of documentary to his *History*, and suggests his strengths as an editor/bricoleur as well as an author.

Lyons emphasizes the ways in which Dunlap's was a New York-centric view; and she details Dunlap's involvement in public art events noted in the art press. She suggests that the lively presence of articles on art "demonstrate the influence of the print culture in constructing both the artistic profession and a viewing public in the United States" (p. 45), but this appears to be a circular argument. Because journalism survives, we hope it accurately reported and positively affected issues concerning both artists and their publics. Lyons is not alone in this hope; many art historians make this move, but it is worth pausing—especially in considering a narrative about the distorting lens of regional bias and personal pique—to ask whether key matters determining issues of creativity, value, viewership, patronage, and institution building more likely happened off stage,

in the studios or in the clubs or parlors where artists and patrons gathered and talked. One suspects that, in the world of infomercials Dunlap inhabited and contributed to, the straight story was seldom the public story.

Concerning the schismatic quarrel between the National Academy of Design (NAD) and the American Academy of Design (AAD), Lyons seems to accept the terms and perspective of Dunlap, who was a fierce proponent of the former and implacably hostile to the latter. But surely the rhetoric of egalitarianism associated with the NAD that she and Dunlap share is verbal posturing, deliberately overlooking the basic rationale for displaying art produced on spec: the sale of those works for as substantial a sum as possible. There was much lip service then as now about exhibiting art to educate the public and about the "independence" of artists, but the bottom line is and was the bottom line: successful sale, that is, the exchange of wealth for art. That the NAD was pro-producers and the AAD pro-consumers just underlines the mutual dependence of these cohorts. Dunlap's position vis-à-vis money—despite decades in the city and a personal bankruptcy—was naïve and utopic: "If he [the artist] truly loves his art his pecuniary wants will be few, and the wise and virtuous will be happy to administer to those wants, in fair exchange of their products for his, as equals, giving benefit for benefit" (p. 116). I wish Lyons had pried open this brief for socialism in which the wise and virtuous greengrocer, for instance, stood eager to exchange his melons for paintings. Clearly one of the struggles evidenced by Dunlap's overstatement is the repositioning of artists, artworks, and money during this period of adjustment between the eighteenth-century system (in which portraitists accepted specific commissions) and the nascent nineteenth-century third-party markets for non-portrait paintings executed speculatively. In either system, the works of art (and, I suspect, Dunlap's *History*), ended up in the same well-upholstered parlors.

MARGARETTA M. LOVELL
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TODD ESTES. *The Jay Treaty Debate, Public Opinion, and the Evolution of Early American Political Culture*. (Political Development of the American Nation: Studies in Politics and History.) Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press. 2006. Pp. xii, 267. \$34.95.

Todd Estes attempts to show how the fight over the Jay Treaty "altered the entire political system within which the nascent parties operated" (p. 213). Unfortunately, he fails in that ambitious task, although he has produced a detailed account of the various stages of debate and political maneuvering leading up to the ratification and implementation of the controversial treaty.

The Jay Treaty, signed in 1794 but not fully ratified by the United States until 1796, resolved some of the longstanding issues between Great Britain and America that remained after the American Revolution. Most important, Great Britain agreed to evacuate its forts in

the Northwest Territory and to allow ships under seventy tons to trade with the British West Indies. But the treaty ignited a storm of protest because many Republicans thought that the terms were overly favorable to the British. The ensuing debate has long figured in accounts of the battles between Federalists and Republicans in the early republic. It represents an important moment in the young nation's struggles to navigate the foreign policy difficulties created by the almost perpetual state of war between France and Great Britain during this period, and it also played a role in the formation of the first party system.

Estes provides a brief overview of the political context around the Treaty, including discussions of George Washington's neutrality proclamation and the Democratic Societies, both of which were harbingers of issues raised by the Jay Treaty. Then, he closely examines the debate itself and does a nice job of revealing the shifts in tactics and arguments among Federalists and Republicans as they alternately gauged and rallied public opinion on their behalf. He identifies several phases to the debate, each with its own idiosyncrasies and nuances, and writes extensively about the petitions that emerged from the various local meetings held by ordinary citizens. Far from the spontaneous effusions of an emerging "public opinion," these popular expressions were usually part of carefully orchestrated campaigns in which elite leaders tried not just to shape but to create public opinion, which they could then collect and deploy in their own debates.

Federalists ultimately emerged victorious, although only at a grave cost. In a grand historical irony, the Federalists elicited popular support in order to win the debate, but the Republicans would later employ those same tactics even more effectively and would bring an end to the deferential politics that Federalists hoped to preserve—all of which left Federalists ambivalent about the very methods that contributed to their success. As Estes notes, "While Federalists were often ideologically elitist, they were also operationally democratic" (p. 9). His final chapter shows the sometimes surprising responses of Federalists and Republicans in the wake of the treaty's final passage. Some Federalists felt dejected in victory as they foresaw an increasingly democratic American politics, while some Republicans were optimistic about what this shifting world would mean for their party.

At the heart of the debate over the Jay Treaty was a spirited argument about the role citizens should play in the new nation, and Estes argues that the petitions that emerged from popular meetings "asserted a newer, more modern understanding of the public's role in matters of political policy" (p. 130). Estes's point is a good one, but the Treaty debate may not represent the decisive shift he claims. Rather, this was one of many events in a long argument that stretched back at least to the revolution, if not earlier.

While Estes does a solid job of exploring the debate over the Jay Treaty, he tries to elevate the importance of it by contending that it "represented a landmark in

the development not just of political parties but of the conduct and content of political culture" (p. 6), but he provides little evidence to support that assertion. Although he does cite the various petitions and accounts that emerged from local meetings, the focus is mainly on the arguments used, not the nuts and bolts of political activity, and the book does not provide the grass roots view of political practices that can be found in books such as Simon Newman's *Parades and the Politics of the Street: Festive Culture in the Early American Republic* (1997). That leaves the book with a largely traditional focus on the words and arguments of elite politicians. To offer new insights on such a long studied topic demands close attention to the nuances and intricacies of elite political practices, as demonstrated in Joanne Freeman's *Affairs of Honor: National Politics in the New Republic* (2001), but Estes remains narrowly focused on the arguments themselves.

Although Estes's broad claims about the importance of the Jay Treaty as a turning point in the political culture are unconvincing, this book provides a solid overview of the arguments used to persuade an undecided nation.

ANDREW S. TREES
Horace Mann School

ROBERT E. WRIGHT. *The First Wall Street: Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, and the Birth of American Finance*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2005. Pp. vii, 210. \$25.00.

Robert E. Wright, a distinguished historian of early American finance, has written an unusual book that will interest both history buffs and academic historians. It uses the rise and decline of Philadelphia as the financial center of the early republic as a way of introducing the financial history of the young United States and advancing a finance-led interpretation of early American economic growth. Engagingly written and thoroughly researched, Wright's book summarizes and makes accessible a large and often obscure technical literature on early American financial history. While most Americans probably assume that Wall Street has always been the nation's financial nerve center, this is not the case. In fact, the country's initial financial center was Chestnut Street, the home of the country's first stock exchange, of the U.S. Mint, and the Bank of the United States and also the location of a vibrant insurance industry.

Philadelphia's dominant position in early American finance reflected the convergence of several factors. First, Philadelphia was the nation's political capital most years from the revolutionary tumults of the mid-1770s and the founding of Washington, D.C., in 1801. Second, Philadelphia was also the country's new commercial capital, and it replaced London as the focal point of mercantile information. Third, the city was blessed with several creative financial entrepreneurs, who provided necessary leadership. Finally, and perhaps most important, Philadelphia was the headquarter-

ters of both early U.S. central banks. The nation's financial center remained in Philadelphia until 1836, by which time the gradual loss of the advantages that had made possible its initial dominance allowed Manhattan to capture the lead. Philadelphia did not go quietly, however, but in its passing financed the industrialization of the Delaware Valley and in the process transformed the region's economy from one centered on export-oriented agriculture and import-oriented commerce into one focused on domestically oriented agriculture and industry—thus making greater Philadelphia for a time the industrial center of the United States.

Wright approaches his story biographically, with short essays on the careers of the major players in early American financial history, an approach that keeps his book lively and should hold the interest of students and the general reader. Along the way he offers a clear guide through the complex issues of early American finance. I intend to recommend this book to students who want to know more about the Jacksonian bank wars and the details of Hamiltonian finance. On the whole, Wright assumes the stance of a hardheaded defender of the market against those who worry about its excesses. Readers of a more liberal persuasion might find this annoying. I, however, wish he had been more consistent and applied his hardheaded approach to the conceptual tools currently used by historians. These he too often accepts without question. Thus on a single page (p. 43) he refers to the financial, transportation, market, and industrial revolutions, without warning readers that several of these concepts have been challenged in the recent literature. This caveat and Wright's politics aside, I recommend the book highly. The prose is lively and the explanations clear; the short discussion of money is perhaps the best introduction to that complex subject now available, and can be read with profit by any scholar forced to confront the complexities of monetary history.

RUSSELL R. MENARD
University of Minnesota

ROBIN L. EINHORN. *American Taxation, American Slavery*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2006. Pp. xii, 337. \$35.00.

In recent years, the study of slavery in colonial America and the United States has shown how the "peculiar institution" affected almost every aspect of American life: political, cultural, social, economic, demographic, ideological, legal, and intellectual. Studies have analyzed how the Founding Fathers treated their slaves, the mind of the master class, the political ideology of rural slaves, free blacks in a slave society, and regional differences among African Americans. But this book by Robin L. Einhorn is the first attempt to show how slavery affected the American tax system, and vice versa, over an extended period of time. The author shows how slavery influenced the American tax structure during a

period of more than three hundred years, offering a unique and in many ways previously unexplored view of both subjects. This is an analysis of how taxes were levied, on what types of property they were levied, where they were levied on what types of property, and how this changed in different states, even different locals, at different times. It is also an analysis of national trends, how tax policies emerged during the American Revolution to finance the war and the new government, and how the Constitution of the United States required that "direct taxes" be apportioned to the states according to the population.

Focusing initially on colonial tax systems, Einhorn compares and contrasts Virginia and Massachusetts, showing how Virginia levied an annual poll tax of "tithables" (free men plus slave men and women), taxed various exported and imported commodities at a flat rate (two shillings per hogshead of tobacco, for example), taxed carriages, and obtained operating funds from licensing taverns, legal fees, and quitrents (a small flat fee on each one hundred acres of land regardless of its use or value). Virginia levied a tax on imported slaves at a percentage of the price paid by the buyer, the single tax of the colony on an ad valorem basis, or percentage of the taxed item's value. While this structure seems complex, the author notes, the system in Virginia did not require local officials to "perform complex administrative tasks and nothing imposed serious administrative burdens on taxpayers" (p. 29). In contrast, Massachusetts taxed "polls and estates." The poll tax included a tax on free adult males sixteen and above; the estate tax included incomes from estates, both real and personal, including land, houses, commercial and industrial buildings, wharves, ships, livestock, slaves, profits from "any trade or faculty, business or employment" and "by money or commissions of profits" (p. 55). Town officials assessed the value of the estates. In this comparison, Einhorn argues, it is easy to see the impact of slavery on the colonies and on the functioning of democracy by viewing the two tax systems. Virginia maintained a simple and primitive system where local officials made few decisions about values and assessments; Massachusetts created a complex and sophisticated system where citizens voiced their opinions about every aspect of their lives in a contentious and participatory political process.

This theme runs throughout the book: slavery stifled the democratic and participatory process, influenced the debates under the Articles of Confederation about a direct tax, and had an impact on the debates at the Constitutional Convention about how to count slaves with regard to representation and proportional taxation (ending in a slave being counted as three-fifths of a person). The study examines the struggles during the 1790s and early 1800s between Federalists and Republicans and during the 1840s between Whigs and Democrats over various issues involving slavery and taxation. Among other things, the debates included how taxes would be assessed on slaves. "No one species of property from which a tax may be collected," a Tennessean

said, articulating the views of the slave owners, "shall be taxed higher than any other species of property of equal value" (p. 209).

Einhorn's book is not without its flaws; the contrast between "primitive" and "sophisticated" is probably overdrawn; the continual use of the word "elite" tends to obfuscate rather than illuminate; there is an unnecessary rhetorical flourish at the end of the book ("We must purge the legacies of the slaveholders and their demands for 'security' from our public life" [p. 255]). But for those seeking to understand complex and ever-changing systems of taxation, their relationship to local and national politics, and how the state and local systems were shaped by the "peculiar institution," this seminal and innovative investigation will provide many answers.

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MARK M. SMITH. *How Race Is Made: Slavery, Segregation, and the Senses*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2006. Pp. 200. \$29.95.

Mark M. Smith has written a short, thought-provoking book on the role of the senses—or more specifically, white sensory stereotypes—in constructing race in the United States. He applies this approach to great effect from the late eighteenth century through the *Brown v. Board of Education* decision (1954) to desegregate schools. Scholars of race, mirroring a broader tendency, have focused on vision at the expense of the other senses. Smith counters that white constructions of race became increasingly nonvisual (thus more visceral) and less subject to logic over the past two centuries.

From the late eighteenth century, race was constructed relatively unambiguously until a seeming crisis brought on by increased race mixing and an attendant inability to determine race on the basis of visible characteristics. Then followed a postbellum state of flux during which southern whites reformulated the racism of slavery into the racism of Jim Crow. Throughout this period, Smith maintains, they increasingly relied on senses other than vision in constructing and successfully stabilizing new conceptions of race in drastically changed circumstances.

In 1896, an interracial legal team used the light-skinned Homer Plessy to point out the absurdity of trying to determine race by visible features such as skin color, but southerners, with the Supreme Court dodging the issue, maintained that all the senses came into play, and that whites should not be subjected to the supposed smells and touches of blackness, leading to the separate but equal doctrine of segregation. Here Smith argues that the one-drop rule and local knowledge of a person's genealogy led to the increasing irrelevance of vision in southern white attempts at discerning race and that other senses became more important. That same logic holds just as well for the other senses, however, as

this sort of local knowledge was not necessarily based on sensory construction at all. But perhaps that is the point; Smith is more concerned with how southern whites *said* they were constructing race, not how they actually went about it. He is clear at every turn in pointing out that sensory stereotypes were bunk and that it was white power which gave them their potency.

Smith next considers how southern African Americans responded to these stereotypes, arguing for a common sense, materialist analysis on their part. If blacks looked, smelled, felt, or even tasted different than whites, it was not innate but rather due to the degrading material conditions of segregation. He is careful to note that southern African Americans were heterogeneous, somewhat divided among themselves along class lines, with "accommodated"—usually middle class—blacks more closely hewing to white stereotypes in an effort to sensorially pass or gain status. Smith misses an opportunity in not exploring divisions within black individuals as well as among them, the sense of twoness that W. E. B. Du Bois famously called "double consciousness." Du Bois sought to "lift the veil" that prevented whites from sensing the world as African Americans did, whether through "second sight" or the polysemous sounds of African American spirituals. This is a forgivable omission in a book that seeks to provoke further discussion rather than be authoritative.

Smith concludes with *Brown v. Board of Education*, which he likens to the bellows of a concertina, unnaturally squashing the races together according to white sensibilities. White responses were visceral and employed stereotypes that drew on all the senses to make an emotion-driven case that black and white looks, sounds, touches, tastes, and smells be kept separate. That case was avowedly irrational, claiming a moral authority garnered from gut level "true" responses of recoiling against integration's sensory "crowding." In the civil rights movement that followed, the rest of the world was treated to images of segregationists' hate-filled raw aggression, bringing attention to the virulence of southern racism that Smith makes explicable by uncovering the emotional quality of the sensory stereotypes that drove it. He sees the southern white response to *Brown* as a culmination of two centuries of constructing race increasingly on nonvisual terms, perhaps wisely ducking the issue of how these stereotypes are still played out—or not—down to the present.

A leitmotif is that the senses other than vision are inherently less rational and more emotional, and the book leans heavily on this distinction. Making the relationship between nonvisual senses and emotion a constant through time and space has great explanatory value. By invoking senses other than vision, whites were able to justify racism and segregation even though their logic was flawed and hypocritical. But is this division of the senses into rational and emotional ones itself historically contingent? Smith's history provokes reflection not only upon how people in the past sensed their

worlds, but also how our own socially constructed senses shape what we write and think today.

RICHARD CULLEN RATH
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TOM DOWNEY. *Planting a Capitalist South: Masters, Merchants, and Manufacturers in the Southern Interior, 1790–1860*. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 2006. Pp. xiii, 262. \$49.95.

In South Carolina over the half century that preceded the Civil War, two classes of capitalists—one invested in land and slaves, the other in commerce and manufacturing—continually contested each other for the favors of state government. By 1860 the holders of liquid capital were clearly on the rise. The result, argues Tom Downey, was nothing less than the transformation of South Carolina's political economy.

In making this argument, Downey pulls off a remarkable and valuable historiographical sleight of hand. To oversimplify, historians generally characterize the relationship between industry and agriculture in the slave South in one of two ways: as consensus between two likeminded groups of capitalists, or alternatively as conflict between urban, market-oriented, capitalist businessmen and rural, self-sufficient, precapitalist farmers and planters. Downey finds consensus and conflict, consensus among capitalists but conflict between forms of capital. No merchant or manufacturer ever challenged the proslavery ideology of the planter class, he argues, but the holders of liquid capital competed with the holders of fixed capital for economic and political advantage.

This book offers a case study of the Edgefield and Barnwell districts, in the interior of South Carolina along the Savannah River opposite Augusta, Georgia. The two districts participated in the first short-staple cotton boom of the nineteenth century. They also quickly attracted the attention of Charleston merchants and investors, initiating debate over the relationship between public responsibility and private entrepreneurship. For example, early in the nineteenth century the state legislature actively protected public access to waterways by regulating dams and millponds, so that farmers and planters could easily float timber cleared from their lands downriver to Savannah. The legislature set itself up as a watchdog for the public interest and an impartial arbiter between competing private interests. By midcentury, however, the legislature was no longer so impartial when it exempted the textile mills at Graniteville and Vacluse from earlier regulations, and effectively closed the rivers to traffic.

Initially, a shared agrarian outlook, what Downey repeatedly and without complication refers to as "the agrarian landscape," made for easy resolution of differences between millers and loggers. Consensus began to break down following the founding of the town of Hamburg, opposite Augusta in the Edgefield district. Built by merchants wishing to stem the flow of com-

merce into rival Georgia, the town had the strong support of the South Carolina legislature and of area planters. However, as Hamburg grew it attracted capitalists with more urban sensibilities, men interested in mercantile companies and incorporated railroads and textile factories. The very incorporation of Hamburg, by placing it outside the jurisdiction of rural authorities, challenged "the agrarian landscape."

Chapters on William Gregg and Graniteville are particularly interesting. Gregg envisioned a southern variation on the mills of Lowell, Massachusetts. He employed poor white laborers and, as at Lowell, provided for their education and moral uplift, thereby incorporating them into the southern rural community and cementing their loyalty to slavery. In this manner did Gregg insinuate into "the agrarian landscape" of the Edgefield and Barnwell districts the urban institution that would be its undoing: the modern corporation. Managed by men loyal to distant investors with interests that reached far beyond the borders of South Carolina, who curried favor in distant legislatures, who could and did pull their money out at the slightest drop in profits, Graniteville was in but not of the world of slaveholding cotton planters. Gregg's own distance from the world of gentlemen planters became clear when he embarked on a temperance crusade. He might as well have opposed gambling and dueling. True southern men of honor liked their whiskey.

Gregg lost in his effort to curtail drinking. He also failed in his foray into electoral politics. As a businessman he was tremendously successful, and he clearly transformed much of the Upcountry economy into an attractive place for the investment of liquid capital. But there is no evidence that Gregg made more than the slightest dent on the ideology of the planter class. To paraphrase Barnwell district resident Senator James Henry Hammond, cotton, not liquid capital, was king. Should the holders of liquid capital be considered dominant if they failed to overthrow a slaveholders' ideology based on fixed capital, indeed, if they embraced it, as many did? Did they plant the seeds of capitalist transformation in "the agrarian landscape" of South Carolina? Probably not. The conflict Downey uncovers was real enough, to be sure. On that he is convincing. But it appears to have been contained by a political economy over which planters remained hegemonic. Perhaps like the slaves, men such as Gregg found room within the planters' world to make worlds of their own.

This is a pathbreaking book, well grounded in the appropriate documentary record. Downey makes especially good use of the reports of the South Carolina Canal and Rail Road Company and of other corporations, which are so tedious to read, to offer an exciting and fresh perspective on an old problem of vital importance, the relationship between businessmen and planters in the Old South.

CHRISTOPHER MORRIS
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CYNTHIA M. KENNEDY. *Braided Relations, Entwined Lives: The Women of Charleston's Urban Slave Society*. (Blacks in the Diaspora.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 2005. Pp. xii, 311. \$49.95.

This is an excellent study of the lives of slaveholding women, slave women, and the working poor white women and free women of color in antebellum Charleston. Cynthia M. Kennedy's most important contribution is her juxtaposition of these various women, who lived in intimate proximity and were defined by each other, despite the vast differences and animosities separating them. Furthermore, the urban setting of Charleston comes alive in her beautifully written book.

Building on Kathleen Brown's work on how gender was used to define race and power relations, Kennedy argues that "women knew who they were precisely because they mingled daily in explosive intimacy and observed constantly who they were not" (p. 2). Her use of the metaphor of the braid to underscore how intertwined women's lives were, she cautions, does not take away from the unequal relations separating them as well.

Charleston appears as a teeming city, with white and black men and women jostling each other along its pathways. Using newspaper, census, and court records, Kennedy enumerates various occupations and business opportunities for slave and free women: they laundered and manufactured clothes, braided hair, cooked, taught, kept boarding houses, prostituted themselves, and sold whatever goods they could in Charleston's market. Women had enormous economic impact on the city, and the economic opportunities they seized had implications for themselves, including for slaves the possibility of purchasing their own freedom or that of a family member.

The American Revolution turned Charleston upside down. The city was invaded and held by the British for several years before the Americans recaptured it. Thousands of loyalists fled the city before and after the British evacuation, including as many as 7,000 slaves. Those slaves who remained at home took advantage of the opportunities to sell goods to civilians and soldiers and to disobey mistresses unable to control them. African American women consorted with British troops, displacing white women at social events. For example, on one occasion three free women of color presided over a cotillion that featured elaborately dressed slave women and white British officers.

Following the war, the master class worked hard to close ranks and establish its dominance over both working-class whites and blacks. In 1783 the state renewed in perpetuity the Negro Act of 1740 and enacted a collective slave hunt or dragnet law to stop the flow of runaway slaves. Members of the master class who had suffered economically during the war tried to raise cash by retrieving runaway slaves or selling slaves, literally rebuilding their wealth and freedom on the lack of freedom of others. Tens of thousands of slaves were also brought to the new republic through the port of

Charleston before the closing of international slave importation in 1808. Charleston enacted a two-dollar head tax on free people of color and enlarged the city patrol that enforced curfews and other limitations on the freedom of colored people.

The strongest chapters in the book deal with marriage and sexual relations. Kennedy points out that while South Carolina law prohibited divorce, it allowed men to legally compensate women they lived with in adultery and tolerated prostitution. This freed white men to consort with other women while their wives had little recourse. Furthermore, slave owners' wives were admired for their ability to run their households and graciously host the family's social life, making their worth dependent on their ability to control their slaves. When Kennedy turns to slaves and free laboring women, she notes that "A slave woman was the reverse image of her white mistress; one was forbidden by law to marry because of what she was, and the other was compelled to marry in order to fully realize who she was" (p. 95). The marriages of slave women and free women of color were fragile, and working women who went to court to protest desertion or other problems found themselves, their behavior, and their reputation subjects of inquiry. Kennedy also explores the complexities of coerced and consensual sex outside of marriage. Although unequal power relations made truly consensual sex impossible, she complicates the categories of prostitute and concubine by examining slave women who served as "housekeepers" to masters, ultimately gaining freedom for themselves or their children, or who prostituted themselves to earn more cash than was possible as a hired out slave in other trades.

Kennedy brilliantly contends that the lives that mistresses led were dependent on the work of slaves: that when they dressed and attended a ball, it was slave women who helped arrange their dresses and cooked their food. More fundamentally, it was the presence of the other, the unfree, that defined their freedom, since both women were dependent on masters. While this has been argued by other historians, Kennedy's detailed descriptions of daily life illustrate it beautifully. Her book pushes us to consider what defined women's lives most: their color, their sex, their work/leisure, or their status as slave or free?

JOAN MARIE JOHNSON
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AMY MURRELL TAYLOR. *The Divided Family in Civil War America*. (Civil War America.) Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2005. Pp. xiv, 319. \$39.95.

Leo Tolstoy's *Anna Karenina* opens with the famous observation that happy families are alike and unhappy families are each unhappy in their own way. Amy Murrell Taylor's book examines some very unhappy U.S. families during the Civil War and, Tolstoy's assertion to the contrary, discovers some commonalities that enable her to discuss familial disquietude during the fratricidal conflict to form a valid and fascinating hypothesis.

Border state families are the focus of Taylor's work. The border states were key to the survival of the Union; if they joined the Confederacy the geographic size and population of the rebellion would most likely have scored adequate victories to succeed in the attempted secession. Some areas of the border states held few slaves (particularly western Virginia and western Maryland); others resembled the plantation South in their way of life. When the call came to choose sides, it was inevitable that division would result in those states. But divisions also came in families within those states, as brothers, sisters, parents, children, uncles, aunts, and in-laws picked the side that they felt represented best the world in which they wanted to live.

Taylor sees the divided families in her study as metaphors for the divided nation, but also as representative of the divisions between the public and private spheres in which Americans lived. While the notion of separate spheres has declined in importance, particularly in women's history, nineteenth-century Americans often defined their world in just such a way. The war intruded on the private sphere of family relations and many saw the rebellion as that of a son against a father. Rebel sons, according to many Union fathers, were rebelling against parental authority and patriarchy. Such a definition allowed fathers to see their sons' defections as an act of tradition: a private "coming-of-age struggle" that played itself out in public "against the dramatic backdrop of the war" (p. 19). Not for fathers were the sons possessed of an individual sense of self and political will; rather they were reckless and careless, or even misled and deceived by Confederate "tricksters" (p. 22) in choosing secession over loyalty to father and Union. The sons, naturally, saw it quite differently, viewing service in the Confederacy as freedom from the tyranny of the Union, and sometimes, of the father. Sons, unlike their fathers, did not equate loyalty to the family with loyalty to the nation. Fathers, argues Taylor, viewed sons' rebellions as destroying the border between the domestic world and the political one; sons maintained their political choices should not affect family ties. Because of this, fathers thought sons should recast their Confederate loyalties after the war to reestablish their ties to their families, while sons generally considered the ties, since private, had never truly been broken.

Divisions between husbands and wives, or those affianced to each other, underwent a slightly different process. The politics that divided fathers and sons were muted in these relationships. Husbands, in particular, chose to dismiss their wives' independent political thoughts by denying their wives' abilities to be political creatures, and both husbands and wives viewed marriage as more important than political agreement. A marriage, by its nature, requires compromise to withstand the outside world. The training provided by that tradition made political disagreement within the family more bearable than many could understand, argues Taylor, citing a Nashville newspaper columnists puzzled

that a couple's political differences had "never caused any interruption in domestic harmony" (p. 49).

Taylor looks also at popular culture in her examination of the phenomenon of divided families—at the books, plays, serials, and stories that Americans used to cope with the war and its effects on their lives. Border states were often represented symbolically as women by Union authors, seduced by Confederates, for instance, or saved from certain destruction, personal or political, by Union soldiers. The language of kinship served as a common rhetoric for both sides and both races in popular culture. Taylor also examines the reconciliations that took place, both real and imaginary, from the very beginning, between divided families. She introduces (limited somewhat by her sources) reconciliations between former masters and former slaves, as well as family reunions among members divided by slavery. The latter topic deserves more attention, but that will have to wait for another book and cannot be viewed as a fault in this one.

Taylor provides us with a convincing interpretation of the ways in which Americans used familiar ideas, behaviors, and rhetoric to cope with the colossal failure of family that was one aspect of the Civil War. Her work adds considerably to studies of Civil War popular culture and family life, her sources are comprehensive and well-mined, and her writing is thoughtful and at times downright lyrical. Well done.

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MARK A. WEITZ. *The Confederacy on Trial: The Piracy and Sequestration Cases of 1861*. (Landmark Law Cases and American Society.) Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 2005. Pp. xi, 219. Cloth \$35.00, paper \$15.95.

This book by Mark A. Weitz examines subjects long neglected by students of the American Civil War: Confederate sequestration and privateering. In August 1861, the Confederate Congress enacted a harsh and somewhat confusing sequestration statute that among other provisions empowered Confederate court-appointed receivers to force southern creditors and their lawyers to reveal debts owed to northerners, which, upon discovery, would be payable to the Confederate government. In the same year the Confederate government began granting letters of marque to southern privateers, authorizing them to capture northern ships. In the fall of 1861 three trials took place, one testing the constitutionality of the sequestration statute and two determining the validity of the letters of marque. Much of this study focuses on these trials.

Lawyers for the defendants in the sequestration case of *Confederate States of America v. Petigru, McGrady, Mitchell, Whaley, Wilkinson* tried in the Confederate District Court sitting in Charleston, South Carolina, argued that the authorizing statute violated the rights of the states, which they contended had exclusive jurisdiction over sequestration. They further submitted that the law illegally required lawyers to violate their duty

to keep confidential their dealings with clients and that it threatened to undermine the Confederacy's diplomacy because its provisions were much harsher than those of the laws of foreign nations. Lawyers for the Confederate government defended the statute as essential for the prosecution of the war. Not only did the law strike a blow against the North by reducing its assets, but it also, according to its provisions, partially relieved Confederate citizens whose property had been destroyed or confiscated by the Union. Judge Andrew G. Mcgrath, one of secession's strongest advocates, upheld the statute save for its application to attorneys, whose client confidentiality he partially protected. He agreed with the argument of the plaintiff that the statute was an essential wartime measure. Buoyed by this decision, the Confederate government would continue to enforce the sequestration statute, despite its unpopularity.

What the Confederacy claimed was privateering, the Union asserted was piracy, arguing that secession was illegal and therefore the Confederacy was not a government or a nation that could lawfully issue letters of marque. This disagreement came to a head when Union ships captured two Confederate privateering vessels in the summer of 1861 and northern district attorneys prosecuted the captains and crew for piracy shortly thereafter. These trials, one in Philadelphia, the other in New York, implicitly presented one of the fundamental constitutional questions of the Civil War, the legal nature of the Confederacy. The prosecution argued that the letters of marque possessed by the defendants were invalid because the Confederacy was not an independent nation but rather an illegal insurrection. That being the case, the defendants were not privateers but rather pirates whose piracy was punishable by death according to federal law. That argument prevailed in Philadelphia where the defendants, having been convicted of piracy, were sentenced to death. The New York trial ended in a hung jury. Threats by the Confederacy to kill a like number of Union captives prompted the Lincoln administration eventually to release the convicted Philadelphia defendants. The presiding judges at these trials, Associate Justices Robert Grier and Samuel Nelson, would two years later participate in the United States Supreme Court's ruling in *The Prize Cases*. That decision would affirm the validity of the defense's arguments in the piracy cases that whether or not the United States recognized the Confederacy as a nation, it had to acknowledge belligerent rights, and thereby the captured sailors of the South operating under letters of marque became prisoners of war and not pirates. Grier wrote the majority opinion; Nelson authored the dissenting opinion.

Weitz rightly concludes that the oppressive nature of its sequestration policy undermined the South's claims that it had seceded in order to protect individual freedom. In many ways Confederate encroachments on that freedom equaled the draconian measures of the North. Weitz also writes that the harsh sequestration policy of the Confederacy represented a major assault on the doctrine of states' rights, which he asserts was the ideo-

logical foundation of Southern secession. In fact, the antebellum South embraced states rights when that doctrine supported slavery but condemned it when used to undermine the peculiar institution (e.g. northern personal liberty laws). Additionally, the South supported federal statutes enacted to protect slavery (e.g. the fugitive slave laws) and even demanded the enactment of other such laws to further bolster involuntary servitude (e.g. a federal slave code). Also, it should be noted that a desire to preserve slavery much more than a dedication to states rights caused the South to secede from the Union. These realities notwithstanding, Weitz has written an excellent account of the sequestration and piracy issues that significantly affected the Confederacy's pursuit of its failed rebellion.

ROBERT M. IRELAND
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CHAD MORGAN. *Planters' Progress: Modernizing Confederate Georgia*. (New Perspectives on the History of the South.) Gainesville: University Press of Florida. 2005. Pp. xi, 163. \$55.00.

In this book, Chad Morgan concludes that Georgia's wartime modernization, far from representing a break with its antebellum past, was instead a "remarkable industrial metamorphosis" that had been "a long-sought goal of the state's planter elite." Planter support for modernization was in part enlightened self-interest, for the South needed to industrialize rapidly to have a chance to defeat the North and preserve the institution of slavery. Morgan contends that Georgia's effort was unique and represented "a singular historical process a nonrevolutionary modernization overseen by a landed elite" (p. 1).

Wartime industrialization could not have taken place at such a rapid pace if antebellum barriers to manufacturing had not been lowered. These barriers included planter dependence on cotton's profitability, natural resources (such as coal and iron) that were almost inaccessible, and fall line manufacturing towns that were remote from coastal markets, particularly before railroad construction linked these interior cities to seaports. However, with the depression in cotton prices during the 1830s and 1840s and the arrival of railroads, late antebellum industrialization gained some momentum. The movement was symbolized by the rise of large textile mills, some of them employing 200–400 operatives in fall line cities like Augusta, and the construction of state-owned railroads.

According to Morgan, state-sponsored wartime industrialization was not a process forced upon planters; it was a continuation of antebellum economic trends supported by them. Considering the resources at hand in 1861, Georgia's munitions and supply network expanded at a "spectacular rate" (p. 32). Some boosters of industrialization saw the war as a cure for the state's anemic industries and a step toward economic independence, although the needs of Richmond and the national government generally prevailed over Georgia's

The state soon became the center of the Confederacy's wartime production and its industrial transformation outstripped any other in the new Confederate nation. The transformation was proportionately greatest in Atlanta, which, with a total population of about 10,000 in 1860, employed 9,000 people in state factories alone by 1863. The most important factory in the entire South, however, was the powder works at Augusta, which became the major source of Confederate gunpowder east of the Mississippi. It was, along with the same city's government foundry and quartermaster department, centrally located and remote from battlefields, and it possessed the necessary waterpower and railroad connections. Columbus and Macon, as well as smaller towns such as Athens and Rome, joined the complex of state production centers that would experience their most significant period of manufacturing growth in 1862 and 1863.

As Morgan points out, private manufacturing followed a course similar to that of Georgia's state-controlled industries, with increased production resulting from government incentives. Georgia's entrepreneurs, however, were forced to submit to Confederate control of rail transportation and industrial workers, thus diminishing states' rights. Morgan argues that wartime industrialization increased planter power rather than weakened it because the South developed its own manufacturing base rather than depending on the North's. At the same time, government control over manufacturing resulted in "reprehensible conditions" (p. 86) for a workforce comprised of white men and women, slaves, and children. The state's urban areas grew rapidly as persons displaced by the war sought refuge in cities. Such transients included enslaved African Americans, who traditionally had found a greater degree of freedom in urban areas. Because of the demand for white men in the Confederate army, it was impossible for city police forces to expand in order to control slaves, who ran away, broke curfew, and met illegally in black-only gatherings, to the consternation of white citizens.

Despite its success in wartime manufacturing, its state welfare, and the efforts of its elite to assist the growing number of indigents, Georgia by 1864 was "desperately poor." The system of state welfare designed by Georgia's leaders "broke new ground and fundamentally changed the role of government in a southern state" (p. 100). But the Union victory determined that Georgia would modernize without slavery rather than with it, as the state's wartime planter elite hoped. And desperate postwar Georgia embraced industrialization while rejecting the type of state welfare that had assisted its wartime indigents. The cities that formed the core of the state's war production center soon retooled for expansion as the industrial core of the New South.

This book makes an important contribution to our understanding of the transformation of Georgia's urban home front during the Civil War. Looking through the eyes of the planter elite, Morgan makes no apolo-

gies for history "from the top down" or limiting his study of Georgia's wartime modernization to its fall line towns and Atlanta. However, by doing so he may have understated the extent of social approval for such a transformation among Georgia's rural plain folk and lesser planters, who saw the value of state welfare, government contracts to private clothing and shoe makers, and exempt millers and blacksmiths as important means of sustaining the home front's economy and society. Nevertheless, this study provides valuable insight into urban Georgia's war production complex, one that, while eventually cut off from the Virginia front by Sherman's campaign, did not truly stop production until the war's end.

MARK V. WETHERINGTON
Filson Historical Society

MOON-HO JUNG. *Coolies and Cane: Race, Labor, and Sugar in the Age of Emancipation*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2006. Pp. x, 275. \$48.95.

In this important and well-researched work, Moon-Ho Jung argues that southern sugar planters looked to Asian "coolies" to solve their labor problems after the Civil War. Early reports from the Caribbean suggested that these Asians were docile and would not press for things like American citizenship. Many planters surmised that coolies could not be worse than slaves, those "impudent" and disloyal workers who went "on strike" soon after the Civil War began, and who would need new forms of discipline and competition after emancipation.

Americans ridiculed British use of Asian laborers on their newly "emancipated" colonial possessions as replacing one form of slavery with another. But were these coolies in fact slaves, or were they free migrants working as "apprentices" in the British West Indies or Cuba? There were stories of Chinese men who came freely to work, men who married white women and lived and mixed with white people; but there were also stories of kidnapping, deception, and corporal punishment swirling around "Caribbean coolieism." After 1860, Congressional representatives from the West would insist this was slavery. In 1862, President Abraham Lincoln signed "An Act to Prohibit the 'Coolie Trade,'" and Jung insists that this was "the last of America's slave trade laws, unambiguously framed as such by Republican legislators" (p. 37).

The 1862 law did not deter Louisiana planters from "[looking] abroad to cope with their postwar predicament because the world they knew and ruled was no more" (p. 62). Hawaiian and European competitors were benefiting from the recent havoc in Louisiana, and so planters throughout the South sought labor from India, Polynesia, and China. Some planters who had fled Louisiana for Cuba found coolies there. "As the politics of coolieism merged with the politics of Reconstruction in Louisiana and the rest of the South, Asian coolies kindled new dreams, anxieties, and antipathies that defined post-bellum America" (p. 76).

Several planters initially reported that coolies were a model minority: they were industrious and obedient, cheerful, and best of all, indifferent to politics. They were unencumbered by wives, children, or thoughts of a better life, or so it was rumored. It was not to be: "The patent discrepancy between the racial traits ascribed to coolies and Chinese workers' actual behavior in Louisiana was one of many factors that brought the Cuba-Louisiana shipments to an end" (p. 87). Some "ran away," others refused to work; these were not the docile laborers that had been promised.

Still, the dream would not die. Jung shows how several prominent whites, including Nathan Bedford Forrest, formed the Mississippi Valley Immigration Labor Company in the summer of 1869 for the express purpose of bringing Chinese labor from China or California for the plantations. The company dissolved within a few months, but individual planters spent small fortunes for Asian laborers. "What nearly everyone had predicted as the dawning of a new migration stream in the summer of 1869 turned out to be a trickle defined by, above all else, inexperience and ineptitude" (p. 123).

The ineptitude extended into labor relations. The planters expected "cheerful" but got "infuriated" and indignant instead. These Chinese protested being cheated. Edward Gay started with twenty-six Chinese workers, but almost all left within a few months. Gay did not know whether to "discipline" his workers (as he did with slaves) or sue them (as he did with free labor), so he did both. Nothing worked. Other planters fared no better: when a few tried corporal punishment, the Chinese became incensed. The planters eventually turned against the coolies, if only because "the Chinese . . . continued to deviate from the racial images preceding them" (p. 196). Perhaps they were too much like former slaves. Instead of keeping black laborers in check, "the bitter interracial rivalry imagined by coolie promoters never took root in Louisiana" (p. 205). By 1882, pressured by poorer whites demanding white supremacy, and faced with their own disenchantment with the Chinese, the planters joined their friends from the West to become exclusionists themselves. "The drive to expunge coolies from the United States not only united Louisiana Republicans and Democrats but also reunited a nation, a white nation of immigrants" (pp. 218–219).

Jung argues persuasively that Asian migrants in the nineteenth century occupied an odd and perhaps unfortunate position in American society, as laborers who "bridged the legal and cultural gap between the national exclusion of slaves and immigrants, liminal subjects that were neither yet both in the age of emancipation" (p. 38). Instead of arguing, as some historians have done, that the Chinese were definitely free labor or definitely slaves, Jung suggests that because of the substantial confusion about "free" and "slave" during this era, the Chinese were what the muddled Americans chose to see: "a conglomeration of racial imaginings that emerged worldwide in the era of slave emancipa-

tion, a product of the imaginers rather than the imagined" (p. 5). Restricting the migration of Asians was to some another bar against the importation of slaves, even when to others it was the prohibition of an "unassimilable" group of immigrants. And situating a significant part of the Chinese American experience in the South—in the one region where conceptions of "slave" and "free" were most explosive—is extremely helpful for understanding how Chinese Exclusion quickly became a national issue after the Civil War.

The best parts of Jung's work are where he presents detailed archival records from a relatively small but influential group of Louisiana sugar planters. Their own words and actions reveal the extent of their illusions about Asians, as well as their calculated willingness to substitute one form of slavery for another. Jung shows us both the depth of their moral failings and the height of their follies. What manner of idiot expresses genuine surprise when he contracts for coolies but gets human beings instead? Perhaps it was the same kind that worked slaves to death and expected them to be happy, too.

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THOMAS SUMMERHILL. *Harvest of Dissent: Agrarianism in Nineteenth-Century New York*. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 2005. Pp. xi, 287. \$38.00.

With the publication of this book, Thomas Summerhill adds to a growing body of scholarship that challenges the historiography of a static rural society by focusing on agrarian dissent from the perspective of New York farmers to argue that agrarian protest was neither episodic nor nostalgic. Indeed, farmers engaged in a century-long effort to maneuver within the existing political, economic, and social realms to protect their interests and advance their demands for a political economy that supported the agrarian foundations of the republic. By the end of the century, however, agrarians had gravitated toward organizations that eschewed political action as ineffective in defending their economic interests. Summerhill limits his geographical arena to three counties in Central New York but analyzes agrarianism over the span of the nineteenth century.

Until hops and dairy farming began to characterize production at midcentury, farmers in Delaware, Otsego, and Schoharie counties cultivated a variety of subsistence crops, harvested timber, and raised hogs and cattle on land they worked as landowners and tenants. Regardless of their status, farmers shared a commitment to an ideology of republicanism that valued individual liberty and political democracy, ideals that Summerhill recognizes as inherently radical. As the market intruded into customary economic and social relations, farmers fought to sustain traditional republican values as a bulwark against the "worst feature[s] of the capitalist system" and secure the family farm as

"the economic and social foundation of rural life" (p. 219).

Summerhill asserts that producer ideals of independence and mutual aid persisted across the century even as the economic and political circumstances under which the arguments were made shifted. Land tenure, crop mix, farm size, access to markets, and the role of capital and credit in farm production, in turn, shaped the dynamics of the rural debate and defined the participants. To his credit, Summerhill refuses to view farmers monolithically and carefully delineates the ebb and flow of country factionalism that, at times, pitted tenants against landlords, and, at other times, found the two groups united against the new middle class of merchants, bankers, and manufacturers.

Summerhill organizes his analysis around three periods of crisis: the 1840s Anti-Rent protests, the mid-century opposition to the construction of the Albany and Susquehanna Railroad (A&S), and the organization of the Grange in the 1880s. Each crisis exposed a fissure in rural communal life and produced an outcome that paradoxically led to new crises. The violence and political maneuvering associated with the efforts by tenants to abolish the corrupt manor system of tenancy and political abuses resulted in the 1846 constitution, a document that reformed the legislature and empowered the middle-class entrepreneurs of the emerging market economy. By midcentury, the commercialization of agriculture had transformed central New York into a leading producer of hops, and placed farms (and communities) at risk as growers eschewed the practices of subsistence to seek credit, hire immigrant labor, and ride the waves of rising and falling prices. In periods of low prices and tight credit, formerly paternalistic farmers squeezed their tenants for higher production and rents. In order to sustain the family farm, many turned to dairy farming, with outcomes that had far-reaching consequences for social and economic relations. In the long run, dairying proved a fragile shield against market intrusion. The development of oleomargarine threatened butter prices and forced farmers into the milk market, with its dependency on rail access to urban consumers.

Summerhill asserts that although the debate over the construction of the A&S railroad through central New York took place within the context of a broader conflict over the nature of the political economy, "no issue better illustrated the defeat of the agrarian ideal" (p. 114). Railroad interests controlled the political process at every level and secured public funding despite agrarian objections that local bonds imposed unfair taxation on agricultural producers. The success of the middle class in capturing the economic benefit of commercial agriculture translated into a new political agenda based on temperance, antislavery, and capitalist expansion—issues that ignored rural concepts of republicanism.

By the 1880s, New York farmers had eschewed political insurgency for membership in the Grange, an organization that "combined social activities with educational strategies that strove to inculcate agrarian

values" (p. 215). Focusing inward, men and women of the Grange confronted industrial capitalism by resolving to work harder and smarter. Through their rituals and educational efforts, they articulated a position that defended farming as not only a way to make a living, but a way of life.

This book is a rich history that elucidates the role farmers played in an ongoing discourse over the nature of democracy and capitalism in the American republic. Summerhill has made an important contribution to the scholarship in his balanced and well-researched articulation of the nineteenth-century political economy.

CONNIE L. LESTER

University of Central Florida

CONNIE L. LESTER. *Up from the Mudsills of Hell: The Farmers' Alliance, Populism, and Progressive Agriculture in Tennessee, 1870–1915*. Athens: University of Georgia Press. 2006. Pp. xii, 321. \$44.95.

This is a well-written, carefully researched, solidly documented, intellectually sophisticated study of Tennessee's agrarian communities (plural is quite appropriate here) during that crucial transition period in American history encompassing the so-called Gilded Age through the Populist and Progressive eras. In Connie L. Lester's words, the record "reveals a more complex history of rural transformation and intransigence and extends evolutionary cooperativism into the Progressive Era" (p. 5)—a finding that has, according to Lester, been obscured or overlooked in previous Tennessee histories.

The study's strong suit may lie in the thorough discussion of the geographical and economic divisions that characterized Tennessee agriculture and how these were complicated by historical and cultural features that dictated that the state's farmers increasingly found themselves serving as pawns and/or targets in a growing struggle between the predominant Old South Bourbons and the emerging New South elites. As the economic revolution proceeded, Lester concludes the state's farmers were torn "between the traditional view of agriculture as a way of life, with its attendant localism and communalism, and the modern view of agriculture as a livelihood with its increasing pressures to adopt business practices, incorporate scientific methods, and replace exchange networks with capital and technology" (p. 2).

As befits the state's special circumstances, the Grange, Agricultural Wheel, and the Farmers' Alliance receive extensive coverage. Indeed, it would appear that Tennessee's agrarian revolt was primarily a revolt of the Wheel and Alliance and not of Populism. Lester devotes only a portion of one of the book's chapters to the rise and fall of the People's Party. Even so, this reviewer could not help coming to the conclusion at the close of the chapter that Lester's effort might well serve as a model for what one can do with a state wherein the Populist movement was small and decidedly unsuccessful in winning elections. It is demonstrated that "Populism resonated strongest in counties where commer-

cial agriculture tied farmers to national and international markets" (p. 205). We can only wonder how different the situation might have been had marginal, poor, black and white Tennessee farmers not been disfranchised so early and so effectively.

Lester follows impressively in the footsteps of Sheldon Hackney, William Holmes, Robert McMath, Steven Hahn, and, most especially, her mentor, James C. Cobb. The trail-blazing studies of these and other southern historians have informed Lester's views in a productive manner. Missing, however, are other views that clearly deserve the attention they did not receive, especially the number of works that have dealt with the agrarian revolt beyond the South. That is somewhat surprising, since this book began as a dissertation and one usually encounters therein a more exhaustive bibliography.

Perhaps the title is also somewhat misleading: it derives from an 1892 anti-Populist harangue by Tennessee Democrat Edward Carmack, who attacked his Alliance opponent by saying, "If you dig down under the mudsill of Hell you would find Populists down there" (p. 1). The thrust of Lester's study, as I read it, might suggest that it was not "up from the mudsills of Hell" that characterized Progressive Era developments but rather an escape from those who resided below the mudsill of Hell, and this included a great many black and white Tennessee farmers, who were consigned to more decades of sub-mudsill existence before substantial relief would be at hand, if it were to arrive even then. Nevertheless, this is an excellent and welcome study of Tennessee agrarianism, which no doubt will earn for itself a prominent place on our list of sources.

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PAUL M. SEARLS. *Two Vermonts: Geography and Identity, 1865–1910*. Hanover, N.H.: University of New Hampshire Press. 2006. Pp. 256. Cloth \$65.00, paper \$26.00.

In recent years, Vermont has been embroiled in arguments about its relationship to modern life. Should Wal-Mart be allowed to operate in the state? Are civil unions acceptable, or should Vermont be "taken back"? Can an entire state really be put on a list of endangered places, as it was by the National Trust for Historic Preservation in both 1993 and 2004? As Paul M. Searls demonstrates these sorts of controversies are nothing new. From the end of the Civil War onward, to be an acknowledged "Vermont" has meant negotiating a carefully calibrated position between the forces of tradition and progress. The state's identity has stemmed fundamentally from its response to modernity.

The two Vermonts of Searls's title are what he calls the "uphill" and "downhill" populations of the state (a dichotomy that forecloses the possibility that there may have been additional Vermonts involved in the debate over the state's meaning and character). While those of

the uphill mindset tended to be farmers and downhillers tended to be village-dwelling professionals, the labels have much less to do with geographical location than with ideology. While both groups laid claim to a "Vermont" identity based in an idealized vision of the state's rural republican past, they used that past in the service of different objectives, and thus saw each other as wrong-headed antagonists rather than as fellow shapers of an agreed-upon future. Uphill Vermonters wanted to preserve their traditional ways of life and social organization as best they could, resenting interference from "downhill," claiming direct continuity with the past and attempting to keep that past alive in the present. Downhill Vermonters, by contrast, believed that the spirit of progress and innovation was entirely consistent with the state's earlier character, that they themselves were up-to-date avatars of Yankee inventiveness and initiative. They wanted to embrace modernity in order to stem emigration from the state; they also wanted to preserve uphill ways of life, but on specifically downhill terms.

Searls's basic uphill-vs.-downhill model does not develop significantly over the course of his study, and as a result the book sometimes seems a bit repetitive; its approach is to demonstrate successive instances of opposition over time rather than to suggest any deepening or alleviation of that opposition. The two Vermonts remain as implacably opposed in 1910 as they were in 1865. Still, they managed to find plenty to argue about. Downhillers wanted to attach the state agricultural college to the existing University of Vermont; uphillers wanted a separate college, the better to keep it under their ideological control. Since Vermont's one-town-one-vote political structure led to rural domination of the state legislature, agreement on an acceptable gubernatorial candidate (that the governor would be a Republican was a foregone conclusion) was often a problem. Downhill boosters enthusiastically promoted a tourism recognizable today, one based on the appeal of Vermont's rural premodern image; uphill farmers did not want to be told how to act in order to provide the proper rustic atmosphere for out-of-state visitors. Tourism supporters recognized that those visitors might want a drink in the evening; uphill towns uniformly opposed modifying the state's prohibition laws. In the Progressive era, downhill politicians and businessmen pushed for the advent of what they called a "New Vermont"; uphill farmers did not see anything wrong with the old one. While both sides agreed that a Vermonter was a white, Protestant practitioner of traditional Yankee virtue and could by no means be an industrial immigrant, they could agree on little else.

By focusing on Vermont primarily as an idea, a constructed country of the mind with a malleable and disputed identity rooted in an imagined premodern past Searls follows in the path of such recent books as Don Brown's *Inventing New England: Regional Tourism in the Nineteenth Century* (1995) and Joseph A. Conforti's *Imagining New England: Explorations of Regional Identity from the Pilgrims to the Mid-Twentieth Century*

(2001). Within this historiographical context, Searls's Vermont emerges as a detailed microcosm of the region as a whole; its residents grappled with modernity just as many other New Englanders did, and in similar ways. And Vermont is not the only New England state with an ongoing identity crisis; a similar book could be written about the "two Maines," coastal and inland. While the threat today may come from a homogenizing national culture rather than the onset of industrial capitalism, Searls helps us understand the background of today's debates over Vermont and New England identity in a region that, today as in the past, continues to seek a precarious balance between old and new, tradition and progress.

KENT C. RYDEN
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GLENN FELDMAN, editor. *Politics and Religion in the White South*. (Religion in the South.) Lexington: University Press of Kentucky. 2005. Pp. xiii, 386. \$55.00.

The necessity of understanding the correlation between politics and religion in the white (or for that matter, the entire) South now seems a commonplace—in fact, an urgency—on the national scene. True as that is, the topic has not long been an area of sophisticated inquiry. Emerging in recent years has been a large company of historians, political scientists, sociologists, and other scholars who are attuned to that urgency and have gone to work.

Glenn Feldman's edited collection of essays, a dozen in all (three have appeared earlier), reflects that fact and does so usefully by offering diverse pertinent perspectives. Feldman is more than editor; his own two essays, both richly referenced and boldly interpretive, constitute nearly a third of the material here. Nearly all of the twelve are directly historical or reflective of historical developments: for example, of the period 1890–1920 generally and of Jews in Atlanta in the New South period particularly. Three have to do with individual figures: Methodist activist Dorothy Rogers Tilly of the Progressive era and Donald Wildmon and Billy Graham, our contemporaries. Another focuses on political shifts and conflicts in a single state, Virginia, since the close of the Byrd machine days. Several others report on the fruits of survey research concerning voting patterns in recent elections. The South presented here is endlessly fascinating.

There are two permeating themes. One is the persistently conservative mind and heart set of the region's people. The editor summarizes this fact of society in a single passage of importance. He uses the status quo society (SQS) trope to genuine advantage in this way. "The SQS may be defined as an extremely conservative kind of society that, on a continuum of five American society types, occupies the furthestmost slot on the right," namely, "hard right (or status quo)" (p. 292). Many of the contributors, the editor included, acknowledge exceptions and deviations, but probably without alteration, this judgment is maintained. Each author

notes, significantly, that this is far from any kind of stated policy, having to do rather with temperament, some kind of regional mindset. Religion is a leading and consistent category of this way of seeing life in the region.

The second persistent theme, of course, is race. But its posture here is better described as the racial factor "keeps hanging around." Whether or not citizens make deliberate use of the black-white character of the southern demographical and ideological issue, it is there. Perhaps the book's chosen title makes that inevitable. But more telling is surely the impossibility of obliterating the South's history and biracial composition. It seems never to go away. As delicate as the claim may be to citizens' sensibilities, Feldman outlines in extensive detail the case he makes for the shift in white political registration over the past forty years as not a great deal more than a change of party labels.

In that vein, this reviewer finds his "comparative parameters thesis" fresh and suggestive. Feldman writes that "The use of such parameters shifts political possibilities a whole degree to the left. Thus, in the political continuum that exists in a SQS, the classic #2 (liberal or progressive) position becomes generally defined as a #1 (radical leftist) position. The #3 (moderate) position is understood as conventional 'liberalism,' although it is, in actuality, moderation. The #4 (conservative) position becomes defined as 'moderation,' or the median political position on the possible political continuum. And, in such a society the #5 (radical right) position morphs into mainstream 'conservatism'" (p. 326).

One can hope that a comparable study will tackle the same set of issues for the region's black population. Plenty of conventional wisdom greets the interested party but no extensive examination of how voters in the black community have shifted their registrations—to whatever degree they have done so, that is to say, since the basic fact of registering on a broad scale occurred from 1960 or so forward. Also, it would be instructive to learn with some precision how complex "liberal" and "conservative" positioning is among African American southerners.

We are in the early stages of Hispanic accommodations to or ensconcement within the still young residency of those people in the once black-white south. Already we know that the political behavior of southwestern Hispanics differs from that of Florida Caribbean peoples. Historians will be among those tracking their respective political allegiances.

For now, our thanks are due to Feldman and his colleagues for developing this set of perspectives on the political-religious culture of the white southern population. They have shed considerable light, mostly regarding the present and recent past, on the perennial question of what forms the storied history of "continuity and change" take in this arena of regional life.

SAMUEL S. HILL
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MICHAEL E. WILLIAMS, SR., *Isaac Taylor Tichenor: The Creation of the Baptist New South*. (Religion and American Culture.) Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press. 2005. Pp. 240. \$42.50.

Between 1882 and 1916, Christians associated with the Southern Baptist Convention surpassed Methodists as the dominant southern religious denomination. This expansion was prologue to later activity that would make the Convention guide to the largest Protestant body in the United States. Isaac Taylor Tichenor (1825–1902) was arguably one of the most influential architects of this transformation through the institution that he commanded like a revolutionary vanguard, the Home Missions Board (HMB) of the Southern Baptist Convention. With comrades who created convention organizations to spawn Sunday schools and write hundreds of thousands of tracts, papers, books, and lessons, Tichenor made his efficient, aggressive, and ubiquitous institution as southern as it was Baptist—or maybe more so. In this organizational history we see a former Confederate chaplain, planter, college president, and New South businessman combine a political and personal genius for winning men and women to a cause with the determination to establish the fact of being “Southern” and “Baptist” as a religious basis for social and civic solidarity.

Michael E. Williams’s book describes Tichenor’s development as a “denominational” leader in a religious confederation of like minded autonomous churches that sent messengers to an annual meeting (Convention) but which until after Reconstruction avoided centralization as if it were a disease. The churches associated with the Southern Baptist Convention were a denomination without denominational machinery until men like Tichenor took charge and, like the entrepreneurs and boosters of the New South, bound localities together with effective communication, mutual support, imaginative fund raising, wise spending, Southern chauvinism, racial purity, and ideological sleight of hand that combined pride of locality and religious self-consciousness with aggressive recruitment. They were truly remarkable people. Tichenor somehow—Williams does not let us in on his subject’s secret—got people who were justly proud of their local rootedness to think of themselves as part of a larger social movement of Baptists who could support expansion throughout the South and beyond into West Texas, New Mexico, California, and even Oregon. Methodists, Presbyterians, and Episcopalians with supposedly more centralized machinery and a more catholic view of the church simply could not compete.

Williams’s Tichenor is a man of action. He moves west and south with the frontier of the 1840s. He builds churches and hobnobs with powerful men in the raw new states of the old Southwest. He stands out as a “bright young man” of the coming generation and when war comes, easily assumes command of soldiers in battle contrary to the rubrics of traditional behavior among chaplains. He establishes his church as a leading insti-

tution in Montgomery and then becomes a planter and New South businessman only to change course and become the founding president of what will one day be Auburn University. If he did not quite establish a new model for higher education, he at least tried because Alabama and duty—that is, his civic consciousness—required it. Like other sons of the slave South, he found redemption in the New white supremacist South, which fused his religious, regional, and racial loyalties. His restlessness finally found its rest in establishing the hegemony of the Southern Baptist Convention through his expert management of the HMB. Tichenor drove assertive Yankee Baptists from the South and then made Convention Baptists the largest Southern denomination. He was hands on: instead of sending letters and memos, he went to areas where he thought the HMB could help establish new Baptist churches more loyal to the Convention than the locality, and through his personal connections cemented denominational loyalty. (Williams does not say so, but this way of acting was how Francis Asbury had fabricated American Episcopal Methodism by 1816.) Tichenor raised funds throughout the region and spent them in ways that would aid expansion and the Convention’s prestige. He transformed Baptist ministers and lay people into foot soldiers of Christ’s (Southern) Baptist armies and somehow avoided much internecine strife among coreligionists who knew how to fight better than almost any other Christian group. He demanded unified policies and programs. That he could do this among people who were suspicious of “policies and programs” is something of a miracle, and Williams would have served his readers better if he had shown more carefully and imaginatively how Tichenor did it and why he was so successful. That he was assertive, eloquent, and politically adept is obvious, but how he managed these attributes to the benefit of the Southern Baptist Convention requires more analysis. The theology, ideology, and values of Southern Baptists and Tichenor have to be inferred by the reader; but students of southern history and American religion will nonetheless benefit from confronting a man who did so much to establish the institutional base of a major American denomination.

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PAUL T. MCCARTNEY, *Power and Progress: American National Identity, the War of 1898, and the Rise of American Imperialism*. (Political Traditions in Foreign Policy Series.) Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 2006. Pp. x, 373. \$49.95.

Depending on time, place, and ideology, the War of 1898 has been called many different things. Because Paul T. McCartney is chiefly interested in contemporary U.S. perspectives, the “cultural milieu,” and the particular constructions it generated at the time, he chooses, after initial clarifications, to call the war by its traditional U.S. name: the Spanish-American War. Mc-

Cartney wants to understand, almost phenomenologically, how Americans actually viewed the conflict, what it was supposedly about, and how such ideas involved conceptions of national identity. His central point is that the war was not simply a humanitarian exercise that developed into an imperialist one but that it always mixed humanitarianism with racism and assorted other ills. He also says that the mixture was largely coherent and sincere.

McCartney rejects extant studies of ideology and culture whose focus is on any one thing, the usual suspects being market expansion, resource control, race, Social Darwinism, power, naval geopolitics, manifest destiny, and excitable public opinion. All have a place in McCartney's story, but in the end he insists that the sources of U.S. conduct, amid the specific historical contingencies, lay in more overarching notions of nationalism, identity, and mission. The War of 1898 is in fact an especially clear case when foreign policy and national identity became mutually constitutive: there is no way of thinking about the one without thinking about the other. McCartney is right, although he is perhaps a trifle extravagant in claiming that his book is the first intensive account along these lines.

Superficially, McCartney's work belongs to political science, which means here that he has to peddle it as a "case study" of something and offer some preliminaries about such matters as "policy preferences." He is, however, much more interested in history and what makes people tick than in predictive models and timeless methods. Theory, whatever the kind, is not featured here. Based on a thorough reading of the secondary literature and conscientious research in printed primary sources (far beyond the standards of political science as regards historical evidence), this is an empirically solid and well-written book. Historians in the field will find few surprises, but the survey is excellent and the synthetic approach analytically useful.

I myself did not need to be persuaded that "the idea of American mission can significantly influence American leaders as they formulate U.S. foreign policy" (p. 11) or that people actually thought what they said they thought and often acted accordingly; but I was impressed by McCartney's capacity, in demonstrating this point, to wade through and take eminently seriously the collected speeches of President William T. McKinley. McKinley's Methodist impulse (especially the thematic of "duty and obligation") and his ideological shrewdness emerge with clarity. Moreover, the two defining moments that McCartney has chosen to investigate—the initial debate on the decision to go to war and the subsequent one on annexation of the Philippines—are well covered in interesting detail.

The greatest value of the book lies in its extensive examination of arguments about what the United States (or "America") must or must not do in relation to Spain, the Philippines, imperialism, Europe, and the world. McCartney is also right to emphasize the effortless combination of humanitarianism and ethnocentrism in the translation of specific U.S. values into uni-

versal ones. I am less sure that there is a proper argument behind it all.

One problem is that McCartney does not probe deeply enough the conceptual aspects of the given inventory of positions and ideas. As it is inherently about difference, the identity issue, both for him and for his historical interlocutors, becomes part of that larger, altogether too familiar trope of "American exceptionalism." That McCartney dislikes a good number of these ideas (e.g. racial and ethnocentrist supremacism) and likes others, including the notion of a mission, is fair enough, but he falls excessively into the trap of normative adjudication rather than analysis of discursive effect. What stands out (to me at least) about 1898 is that it is one of the few moments when it was politically possible to speak approvingly of the United States as an integrated part of a general civilizational movement, to speak of it in terms of a line of continuity rather than absolute difference. To be sure, the United States is imagined confidently as the most vigorous, advanced, rational, enlightened, humanitarian, and selfless nation in Western civilization. Nonetheless, unlike for instance the 1840s, when expansion and identity were also at stake (or indeed now), there was no absolute line of Western demarcation in the middle of the Atlantic. By the time the Philippine question had come up, it was more natural for absolutists to be anti-imperialist. McCartney has surprisingly little to say about this, which is perhaps also why his conclusion turns out to be rather bland.

A second problem is that, as in many "culturalist" accounts, there is nothing much about the place of culture/norms in the larger system or structure. We can all agree (how could one disagree?) that "basic assumptions" (p. 274) about the project and mission called "America" affected the range of policy options at hand in 1898. Most of us would also agree that the actual choices were not a foregone conclusion, that the notion of mission, omnipresent across the cultural board, was open enough to have issued in a different solution. What happens, however, when "culture," norms and assumptions meet the system, the political system, the military system, the economic system? McCartney brings these into play at times but not in any sustained way because he restricts himself to charting ideas. Successful ideas in politics, however, are attached to power, and power is not equal. What allowed McKinley to play the defining role he did (to name but one aspect) was his position as head of state, chief executive in a politically divided structure, and, not least, commander in chief. McCartney's ideas, by contrast, seem not to be joined to any particular form of power or interests. Meanwhile, the empire acquired in 1898 and immediately afterward remains to a surprising degree intact but politically forgotten, outside the normal purview of the U.S. public and contemporary debates about national identity.

ANDERS STEPHANSON
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JAMES R. HOLMES. *Theodore Roosevelt and World Order: Police Power in International Relations*. Dulles, Va.: Potomac Books, Inc. 2006. Pp. 327. \$29.95.

The widely accepted notion of Theodore Roosevelt as the embodiment of the "realist" tradition in U.S. foreign relations constitutes a serious oversimplification. True, Roosevelt possessed a sophisticated strategic outlook, upon which he acted adroitly in the interests of the United States and of a peaceful, stable world. But TR always combined realism with a large measure of idealism. He believed strongly that American statesmen should seek international justice and the betterment of the human condition. This altruistic thrust was especially apparent in Roosevelt's dealings with the Philippines and with a couple of Caribbean countries.

James R. Holmes, while acknowledging Roosevelt's pursuit of the national interest, grasps and emphasizes Roosevelt's foreign policy idealism. At the core of TR's diplomacy, Holmes contends, was the concept of "international police power," a concept that heretofore has received little scholarly attention. The police power idea was rooted in Roosevelt's progressive domestic policy, which, like his foreign policy, blended "humanitarian idealism and enlightened self-interest" (p. 108). The "two pillars" of the international police power—which was "at once defensive and preemptive in nature"—were "maintaining order and promoting the welfare of the people . . . who found themselves under U.S. stewardship" (pp. 137, 186, 146).

Despite the soundness of its central premise and of various specific arguments, this is a flawed work of history. Both its structure and its content are problematic. Holmes's book falls far short of Theodore Roosevelt's own standard for "history as literature" (the title of TR's address as president of the American Historical Association in 1912). It lacks narrative flow and chronological development; it is highly repetitive, very poorly organized (both as a whole and within chapters and sections), and occasionally incoherent. The approximately 230 pages of text could easily be reduced, with salutary effect, to 130 or less. And citations are often mishandled.

There are numerous ill-informed statements, including an implication that John Quincy Adams acquired Alaska from Russia (p. 92); a claim that William Jennings Bryan aimed at "eliminating imperialism as an issue in the 1900 presidential election" (p. 142); and multiple assertions that Elihu Root was secretary of state in 1904. Of greater consequence is the frequent interchangeable use of the terms "great power" and "civilized power," resulting in a misleading portrayal of the Rooseveltian worldview (and conception of a multilateral police power). For in reality TR perceived Great Britain as a valuable, indeed essential, U.S. partner while looking upon Germany, Russia, and (more uncertainly) Japan as markedly less civilized and as potential enemies of the United States.

In his longest chapter, Holmes puts forward "case studies" of the Philippines (whose "pacification and ad-

ministration . . . represented the fullest extension of the U.S. police power in the early twentieth century" and "laid the groundwork for [Roosevelt's] doctrine of international constabulary duty" [pp. 139, 143]), Cuba, Venezuela, Panama, the Dominican Republic (which was directly connected to the Roosevelt Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine and which "rounded out the conceptual development of the international police power and gave the police power its self-limiting character" [p. 176]), and Morocco. The account of Venezuela during 1902–1903 does not identify the two phases of the crisis, is unrevealing on the pivotal role of the U.S. Navy, and is only barely cognizant of the president's crucial private ultimatum to Germany. Roosevelt is aptly praised for "his circumspect handling" of the Dominican intervention, only to be faulted, contradictorily and oddly, for a "breach of self-restraint" in Holmes's concluding summary of the episode (pp. 119, 228). The section on the Moroccan crisis is so lacking in understanding (of Roosevelt's perspective on the confrontation, his determination to sustain the French position against Germany, and the strategy he successfully employed to attain his objective) that it is entirely valueless.

Much of the difficulty with the case studies is a factor of neglected modern sources. (Holmes's Latin American case studies rely heavily—in places almost exclusively—on a book published in 1927.) And this problem carries beyond the case studies to a fundamental misconception about the historiography of Roosevelt's foreign policy. Apparently Holmes is nearly completely unaware of the highly favorable trend since the 1950s regarding TR's diplomacy. This astonishing unfamiliarity is evident in several places, as when Holmes declares: "Making inroads against the orthodox view of Rooseveltian diplomacy would be a slow, uncertain process" (p. 232). It is as if the books and essays authored by (among others) Howard Beale, William Harbaugh, Charles Neu, David Burton, Raymond Esthus, Frederick Marks, John Cooper, Richard Collin, Serge Ricard, Kathleen Dalton, this reviewer, H. W. Brands, and Edmund Morris (even if most of these names appear in the bibliography) had never been written. This is a thoughtful and sometimes insightful study based on a substantial quantity of research, but the failure to draw effectively on any of the modern literature on Roosevelt's foreign policy diminishes the book considerably.

Finally, Holmes endeavors to assess the applicability of Roosevelt's police power idea to twenty-first-century international relations without even mentioning Islamic extremism and the severe and complex challenges it poses for the United States and its friends. This is not a fruitful exercise.

WILLIAM N. TILCHIN
Boston University

DAN MOOS. *Outside America: Race, Ethnicity, and the Role of the American West in National Belonging*. (Re-encounters with Colonialism: New Perspectives on the Americas.) Hanover, N.H.: University Press of New Eng-

land, for Dartmouth College Press. 2006. Pp. xii, 260. Cloth \$65.00, paper \$24.95.

Dan Moos's excellent first book examines the ways in which western Americans who were excluded from the national mythology in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries nonetheless attempted to turn that mythology to their own account. Moos's work is positioned as a corrective to the New Western History, which seeks to debunk the heroic narrative of westward expansion by recovering the diversity of western Americans' experiences. By contrast, Moos argues that the very Americans whom New Western Historians have seen as challenging the hegemonic narrative of the West were themselves intent on tapping the power of that narrative. Moos's complex reading, by illustrating that "certain culturally segregated Americans embraced the terms of a national narrative that was fundamentally oppressive to them" (p. 5), should deepen our understanding of western ideology, which, Moos demonstrates, was at once more compulsory and more capacious than has previously been assumed.

After an opening chapter that calls on the emblematic figures of Theodore Roosevelt, William F. Cody, and Frederick Jackson Turner to map the frontier ideology of progressive individualism and imperialist expansion, Moos reveals the ways in which western mythology was simultaneously belied and fortified by those ostensibly outside its purview. Thus the following chapter on African American novelist and filmmaker Oscar Micheaux, who accepted Turner's frontier hypothesis in order to claim the West as a place that "offers unique opportunities for African Americans" (p. 53), demonstrates how cultural outsiders sought empowerment through the very narrative that disempowered them.

Moos's next chapter, which considers the writings of a number of African Americans including Micheaux, Thomas Detter, and Nat Love, tests the extent to which their embrace of western mythology could be achieved in fact; exploring not only "the content of their narratives" but "the mechanisms and social realities confronting these authors in terms of their publishing" (p. 81), Moos measures the ideal against the reality, the fictionalized construction of the West as a place for African American opportunity versus the actual limitations African Americans faced in realizing the West's supposed promise. Ironically, as Moos shows, though these writers were often forced to pursue self-publication due to their lack of opportunity in the white-dominated publishing world, their narratives—including their stories of heroic struggle against the publishing industry—reinforced the tenets of boundless opportunity and self-invention most central to western mythology.

In the following chapters, Moos shifts focus to two groups of cultural outsiders who were often united in popular depictions of the West: Mormons and Native Americans. Remarking how sharply present-day images of the Mormons diverge from their past reputation as anti-American deviants, Moos charts how Mormon au-

thors sought to write their movement into American history, to transform the Latter-day Saints "from persecuted outsiders to a people who most embody an American pioneer sensibility" (p. 107). In contrast to this case of relatively successful assimilation, Moos next turns to the Native American performers of Buffalo Bill's Wild West. Noting that whereas other groups could "locate their Americanness through their attachment to pioneer ideals," Native Americans "by definition could not seek these ideals" (p. 149), Moos explores the ways in which the performers Sitting Bull, Luther Standing Bear, and Black Elk used the Wild West "to empower themselves as potential Americans—specifically of the qualified type, that is, *Indian-Americans*" (p. 150). Given Moos's insistence that cultural outsiders necessarily owed elements of their self-construction to dominant narratives, it is somewhat surprising that he considers it a liability that "one cannot clearly distinguish between Black Elk's self-representation and the constructions of his white editor, the American poet John G. Neihardt" (p. 195); at the least, one wishes that his examination of Black Elk paid greater attention to the complexities of bicultural Indian autobiography. That aside, Moos's reading of Buffalo Bill's "show Indians" forms a fitting conclusion to the book, as it demonstrates both the appeal and the peril of these ultimate outsiders' entrance into the American national narrative.

Written in an accessible style suited not only for scholars and graduate students but for advanced undergraduates, Moos's book is particularly significant in that it demonstrates the fallacy of limiting cultural "outsiders" to any one subject position. A fully historicized reading of the West, Moos makes clear, will have to account not only for "resistant" voices but for those that endorsed dominant paradigms. In this respect, my only quibble with Moos's book is his tendency to position cultural "outsiders" as principally responding to a pre-existent, hegemonic narrative; for what the book itself illustrates is that this narrative was never a monolith but was from the start the complex cocreation of persons from a variety of racial, religious, and ethnic backgrounds. Paradoxically, as Moos's book demonstrates, those "outside America" were in fact, and not just in fantasy, cultural *insiders*, who played an active role in forging and fostering the very mythologies that sought to keep them out.

JOSHUA DAVID BELLIN
La Roche College

MATTHEW F. BOKOVY. *The San Diego World's Fairs and Southwestern Memory, 1880–1940*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press in cooperation with the San Diego Historical Society. 2005. Pp. xx, 316. \$29.95.

Memory and promotion are intrinsically tied to the fair experience, be it the dusty fairgrounds of a western agricultural community or the stately buildings of a world's fair site. Dripping ice cream on scorching pavement, the rush of crowds, and fantastic architecture res-

onant of nationalistic “progress” connect people to places they visited as children or as adults. These memories, Matthew F. Bokovoy argues, help to create regional—and contrived—identities. Much has been written about the role of memory and the construction of what historians call “the modern Spanish heritage” of California and the American Southwest. Bokovoy’s revisionist analysis finds that modern Spanish heritage represented more than “a tradition of ‘false consciousness’” propagated by “Anglos to denigrate and erase the contemporary presence of ethnic Mexicans and American Indians” (p. xvii). While the composite portrait of southern California envisioned and reinforced by the San Diego expositions of 1915–1916 and 1935–1936 was “insensitive” and “untrue” for Native Americans and ethnic Mexicans, it was also a sympathetic “set of political understandings” that celebrated cultural pluralism and ultimately, if inadvertently, “contributed to the realization of legal, civil rights” (p. xviii).

At the turn of the twentieth century, San Diego may have been, in the words of D. C. Collier (director-general of the Panama Exposition), the “gamest city in the United States and probably the world” (p. 17). It was also a city of 40,000 diverse residents and a place beset with a violent colonial past and a host of racial, economic, and ethnic troubles. Preparations for the 1915 Panama Exposition were hampered at various times by International Workers of the World-sponsored labor strife; border violence associated with the Mexican Revolution; and the arrival of preemptive gambling institutions and scores of prostitutes. Anglicized respectability, San Diego’s leaders believed, would not come easy and would require federal funding. After they beat out New Orleans for the Panama event, San Diego leaders hired Boston city beautiful advocate John Nolen to create a “fantasy land of Spanish colonial and mission-style architecture” (p. 50) and architect Bertram Goodhue to create a singularly North American architecture through the fusion of Indian and Spanish heritage. Landscape architect Samuel Parsons was paid to transform the formerly pueblo common lands of Balboa Park from a rocky, scrubby landscape dotted with wildflowers and cacti to a sea of “verdant foliage and ample greensward” (p. 50).

The strength of Bokovoy’s book lies in its exhaustive research—conducted at the San Diego Historical Society, Smithsonian Institution, Bancroft Library, and Laboratory of Anthropology—and in its outline of the evolution and meanings of the Panama Exposition and its successor, the 1935 San Diego Fair. Fairgoers in 1915 entered grounds transformed by Spanish Renaissance and mission-style architecture, enormous blooming flowers, and plateaus graced with views of San Diego Bay and the Pacific Ocean. The California Building and its exhibits simultaneously represented the region’s fusion of cultures and the “progress” of humankind. If visitors tired of Spanish architecture, they could venture out onto the Painted Desert, a land of pseudo-pueblos and Indian peoples engaged in sedentary, artistic tasks. Anglo visitors could embrace the contrived

primitism of the Painted Desert—peopled with natives from all over the country enduring bad housing, degrading comments, and uncomfortable “Indian” clothes—to assuage their anxieties about modernity” (p. 43).

If the 1915 fair solidified San Diego as the capital of an heroic Spanish-Indian past, the 1935 California-Pacific International Exposition positioned the city at the center of the California dream of the future. Like other national events during the 1930s, this San Diego fair concerned itself with promotion of a brighter economic future and sold southern California’s unique combination of weather, resources, and diversity (including a modern nudist colony). The boulevard leading to Ford Motor Company’s massive circular art deco building was weirdly reminiscent of Mayan cities. The layout of the fair reflected architect Richard Requa’s effort to mix modernism with Meso-American elements. Fairgoers could visit Modeltown, a pseudo-suburb that anticipated what would become the tract housing developments of ensuing decades. The fair’s Roads of the Pacific placed visitors in a new Ford and whisked them along a progression of “great roads of antiquity,” from the Old Santa Fe Trail to the Inca Highway in South America (p. 192).

The legacies of both of these expositions remain. Balboa Park today bills itself as “the nation’s largest urban cultural park” (<http://www.balboapark.org/>). Bokovoy’s research shows that San Diego’s fairs were as much reflections of national culture as they were of local developments. Bokovoy does little with gender at the fairs, and his thesis meanders through the book’s detailed treatment of fair landscapes. Still, this trip to San Diego’s fairs should not be missed by cultural U.S. historians, western historians, borderlands historians, or fans of Erik Larson’s *The Devil in the White City* (2003). Like any good fair, it offers an enjoyable ride, along with some cultural discomfort.

LAURA WOODWORTH-NEY
Idaho State University

NATALIA MOLINA. *Fit to Be Citizens? Public Health and Race in Los Angeles, 1879–1939*. (American Crossroads, number 2.) Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 2006. Pp. xiv, 279. Cloth \$50.00, paper \$19.95.

Natalia Molina offers an insightful, clearly written and well researched work that analyzes how public health campaigns in Los Angeles over the course of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries institutionalized racial and citizenship inequality. She builds on previous scholarship that challenges the “objectivity” of medical science, arguing instead that efforts to protect the public’s health were premised on and also promoted certain beliefs about which individuals constituted the citizenry of the public worthy of protection. Inevitably, such beliefs also entailed identifying other individuals and groups as undeserving of medical care and even the source of public health endangerment. Molina’s study offers new insights into this literature through three as-

pects of her analysis of race, specifically her historically grounded and comparative study of race, her focus on the significance of a "regional racial lexicon," and her illumination of the gendering of race through public health (p. 17).

Although Molina claims to focus "primarily on Mexicans" in her book because they constituted "the largest immigrant group in Los Angeles" by 1930, she also offers a comparative analysis of how public health campaigns alternatively targeted Chinese and Japanese, as well as Mexicans in the region as sources of medical contagion over the course of the late nineteenth through the early twentieth centuries (p. 8). Her approach is crucial for understanding how conceptions of racial difference, inevitably conflated with alienness, transferred over time from one group of perceived "foreigners" to another. Molina's careful examination of differences among groups, however, also reveals how various factors (including population size, class status, and gender composition) could result in differential depictions and treatment of these groups at particular historical moments.

Molina's decision to focus on Asians and Mexicans in Los Angeles underscores her argument concerning the regional significance of race. Southern California, which lacked a sizable black population prior to World War II, understood race in ways that differed from the white-black binary that tended to dominate the national consciousness. Molina's comparative analysis offers a historically contextualized and nuanced account of the gradations of "nonwhiteness" in the region (p. 6). In addition, she emphasizes the role that the medical establishment played in "naturalizing" these racial categories by giving them the aura of scientific objectivity. In fact, public health officials helped to "racialize space" by enforcing geographical and social boundaries between racial groups by denying publicly funded health care facilities for some groups and neighborhoods or by designating segregated clinics for communities that were racially mixed. Furthermore, Molina argues that these local understandings of race ultimately transcended the region through the circulation of Los Angeles-based medical studies that were subsequently cited in state and national legislative debates, medical journals, and media.

Molina offers not only comparative and regional interpretations of race but also a gendered analysis as well. As she points out, medical personnel were particularly interested in the fertility rates and childrearing practices of racialized women. The striking focus on biological and social reproduction reflected broader anxieties concerning the population increase among immigrant groups who were perceived as having questionable capacities for producing physically and culturally "fit" citizens. Public health officials fueled these concerns by selectively utilizing exaggerated statistics of fertility and infant mortality rates, thereby promoting depictions of racialized women as overly fertile and bad mothers.

While Molina offers a careful and contextualized ac-

count of how public health campaigns in southern California promoted racial stratification, she also is interested in how Chinese, Japanese, and Mexican Angelinos resisted their treatment with varying degrees of success. She documents both organized and informal ways in which immigrant communities and their American-born children sought better and more culturally sensitive healthcare as well as improved living conditions. Ironically, the denigrated communities increasingly used the scientific knowledge produced by health officials to argue for their right to be included and treated as members of the public deserving of equal protection. It would have been interesting, if Molina had extended her gender analysis to this topic. For example, in Nayan Shah's study of public health and race in San Francisco *Contagious Divides: Epidemics and Race in San Francisco's Chinatown* (2001), he notes how Chinese Americans reinforced heteronormativity within their community as part of their strategy to demand citizenship rights. Did a similar dynamic occur among Mexican Americans in Southern California as they asserted their right for better housing and medical care?

This book is an important and accessibly written work that should be of interest to scholars and students of race, gender, urbanization, public health, and immigration. Molina's comparative racial analysis is especially significant given the overall tendency in ethnic studies scholarship to focus on single-group analyses. Her emphasis on regional racialization serves as an important reminder for more contextualized and nuanced studies that nevertheless make the connections between the local and the national. Finally, her interest in gendered racialization highlights the symbolic importance of racialized women as biological and social reproducers of the American citizenry.

JUDY TZU-CHUN WU
Ohio State University

NOAH PICKUS. *True Faith and Allegiance: Immigration and American Civic Nationalism*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2005. Pp. xiii, 257. \$35.00.

For most historians, the term "Americanization" conjures up unpleasant images of early twentieth-century xenophobia, coercion, and intolerance. The effort to make Americans out of aliens in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was born of intense anxiety among the native born about the perils immigrants supposedly posed to the nation. Proponents of Americanization began the twentieth century by trying to eradicate ethnic identities and ended by barring the door to immigrants.

This book is a serious, sustained effort to rehabilitate the discredited idea of Americanization. Noah Pickus does not whitewash the excesses of the early twentieth-century Americanizers, but he does sympathetically reconstruct their efforts to integrate newcomers into society and to teach immigrants about the meaning of democratic citizenship. The book's outstanding chap-

ter, titled "Nationalism in the Progressive Era," draws on archival research to resurrect the Americanizing efforts of key figures within the Bureau of Naturalization and the Bureau of Education. Many of the forgotten voices that Pickus uncovers are worth listening to.

For instance, Pickus introduces Fred Butler, director of the Americanization Division within the Bureau of Education. Butler pressed for "citizenship training" that would teach "basic American principles" while also stressing that these principles had evolved since the founding and would continue to evolve in the future. Indifference toward immigrants was unacceptable, but so, too, was Americanization that taught rigid conformity. Such an approach to Americanizing immigrants, Butler insisted, was "the essence of Prussianism" (p. 104) and as such was antithetical to the principles of American freedom. Those charged with Americanizing newcomers, Butler cautioned, needed to undergo "a thorough schooling . . . in humility" so as to avoid patronizing or demeaning newcomers. Ultimately, Butler concluded, Americanization meant drawing newcomers and the native born into common enterprises so that "we may all feel ourselves parts of the same people and not parts of separate groups" (p. 105). Who says bureaucrats can't be idealists?

Pickus contrasts the contemporary debate over naturalization and citizenship (the subject of chapters seven and eight) with the debates that characterized earlier periods in American history, specifically the early twentieth century (chapters four through six) and late eighteenth century (chapters one through three). Pickus argues that whereas the contemporary debate is polarized and characterized by positions that are one-sided and lacking in nuance, participants in the earlier debates grappled creatively with the need to balance protecting the interests and rights of immigrants with the fostering of national unity and citizenship. Pickus turns to the past in hopes of enriching the contemporary debate and of bolstering the case for what he describes as a "moderate civic nationalism."

Moderation is undoubtedly a virtue, and much of the contemporary rhetoric about immigration is undeniably overheated and even combustible. But Pickus's didactic aims are often at cross purposes with his history. Pickus's account of the Alien, Sedition, and Naturalization Acts of 1798 and the Free White Clause of 1790 as well as the "turn to coercion" during World War I suggest that the debates over naturalization and immigration in the early twentieth and the late eighteenth centuries were not any more clear-eyed or subtle than the debates today. And if many of the participants in those earlier debates were well-intentioned and deeply thoughtful—as Pickus persuasively shows they were—that is arguably all the more reason to beware the Americanizing impulse today.

Although this is a book of (very good) history, there is also a strangely ahistorical quality to some of its contemporary judgments. The closing chapters repeatedly sound an alarm about declining American citizenship, weakening institutional capacities, and a fraying na-

tional unity (p. 161). Pickus insists that today "the challenge of forging unity out of diversity [is] even more difficult than at the Founding or in the Progressive Era" (p. 164). However, no evidence is produced to support the claim that the nation is in greater danger from immigration than it was at the beginning of the twentieth century or at the end of the eighteenth century.

More plausible and better supported is Pickus's argument that the contemporary ideological "standoff" has produced a "policy of neglect" in which the nation invests little in immigrants—no government financed adult education classes to teach English, for instance—and expects little in return. For example, "America does not expect that newcomers will learn much about the history and values of their new county or actively engage in its public life." This policy of "don't invest, don't expect" has allegedly left the nation "incapable of responding to real needs among newcomers and real stresses in the social fabric" (p. 170).

There are two problems with this argument. First, it understates both the nation's investment and its expectations. Public education is a massive investment in the Americanizing of immigrants, or at least the children of immigrants. And even if the investment in adult immigrants is small, the expectations regarding their behavior are not trivial. For instance, the nation expects immigrants to follow the laws, find employment, and pay taxes. Second, the argument rests on the validity of Pickus's jeremiad about the decline of American citizenship and national unity. If things are as bad as Pickus claims, then extraordinary Americanization measures may be warranted. But if things are not so dire, then a less ambitious policy of treating immigrants the same as everybody else does not look so unwise or short-sighted. Singling immigrants out for special treatment might bring them special benefits, but American history suggests it may be at least as likely to invite invidious discrimination. The "benign tolerance" (p. 170) that Pickus scorns might not be so bad after all. A policy of neglect may reflect an ideological standoff, but it may also reflect a healthy skepticism about inserting the federal government more aggressively into the business of making Americans and deciding what citizens must know or believe.

Even if this book does not always persuade, it succeeds in provoking us to think harder about the appropriate role of government in the process of making Americans out of immigrants. And for that, scholars and citizens are in Pickus's debt.

RICHARD J. ELLIS
Willamette University

DOUGLAS J. SLAWSON. *The Department of Education Battle, 1918–1932: Public Schools, Catholic Schools, and the Social Order*. (Notre Dame Studies in American Catholicism.) Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press. 2005. Pp. xvi, 332. \$43.00.

If the Progressive era seemed to wane with the bloody cataclysm of the Great War and the failed efforts of

Woodrow Wilson at Versailles, how should we understand the 1920s, when Americans experimented with the reformers' legacies of prohibition and woman suffrage? Instead of the Jazz Age of Scott Fitzgerald and Josephine Baker, or the divided America of H. L. Mencken and William Jennings Bryan, Douglas J. Slawson provides readers a close examination of an important, if not so glamorous, 1920s conflict over federal education policy that stretched out into the sometimes contradictory cultural and political currents of hyper-patriotism, nativism, antistatism, and anti-Catholicism.

As the title suggests, Slawson's book is most concerned with the Smith-Towner Act of 1918 and successor bills that, depending on one's perspective, promised or threatened federal funding, centralization, and control of education throughout the country. The federal government had been involved in collecting statistics on education since the 1860s through a small Bureau of Education within the Department of the Interior, but the legislative battles of the postwar and early Depression years envisioned a much more robust federal role, complete with a cabinet-level secretary, expanded and coercive federal funding, and an extensive federal bureaucracy. Slawson promises to bring more light to a polarized period, when supporters and opponents of various plans to improve the education of the American public tended to paint simplistic caricatures of each other. The battles over establishing a department of education—a goal that promoters would not realize until 1980—pitted progressive educational administrators like Columbia University's George D. Strayer against defenders of Catholic parochial schools like *America* editor Father Richard Tierney, S.J.

Slawson describes some of the divisions among educational reformers and within Congress that only widened throughout the 1920s and prevented any unified support for a federal education department. While some Catholic progressives welcomed the idea of greater aid to education, most Catholic leaders worried such a federal department would force feed students an Americanization curriculum and destroy the network of parish schools they were so heavily investing in at the time. Slawson is at his best complicating the 1920s caricature of a Catholic conspiracy against American public education; drawing on his extensive previous research into the National Catholic Welfare Council, he is able to detail the differences of theology and tactics among American Catholic leaders, who dealt with their own internal divisions while also fending off complaints from Rome and Washington. This strength does not so evenly extend to the many voices opposing the Catholics or at least supporting increased federal oversight of schools. Slawson labels much of the support for an enhanced federal role in education as "agrarian" and "southern," led by virulently anti-Catholic groups like the Ku Klux Klan and the Southern Jurisdiction of Scottish Rite Masonry. Southerners' anti-Catholicism or desire for federal largesse was not new in the 1920s, but neither was it simple nor universal. Many white southerners tempered their support for expanded public ed-

ucation with memories of recent battles over antilynching legislation and the 1880s Blair Bill, which would have enhanced federal funding for education but might, many whites feared, mandate racially equal and maybe even integrated public schools. Slawson notes the indirect opposition of Philander Priestly Claxton, a Tennessee native and U.S. Commissioner of Education from 1911 to 1921, to the Smith-Towner bill, but he fails to recognize the many southerners who agreed with Claxton's stance.

Slawson's detailed examination of battles over education in the 1920s is likely to enjoy only a small audience of specialists interested in the travails of the Catholic leadership or educational politics in the aftermath of the Progressive heyday of the prewar years. It is a book heavy with accounts of political maneuvering and policy particulars that provides too little sense of what the people likely to be most effected by those policies—America's parents and children—might have thought or desired. Those are difficult voices to recover, and Slawson should nonetheless be commended for attempting to provide some cultural context for the debates of high politics. The question of what role, if any, the federal government should play in education proved so volatile because, Slawson notes, "each side vested its school system with the preservation of its religious and cultural identity" (p. 244). Remembering the crescendo of anti-Catholicism that met Democrat Al Smith's unsuccessful bid for the presidency in 1928, it may seem surprising that American Catholics prevailed in the battles over federal education policy in the interwar years. But the Catholic leadership's favored vision of Americanism, one based on local control and parental rights to determine what was best for their children, was not as discredited as many Progressive activists had hoped, and was in fact widely shared among non-Catholics both in the 1920s and even today.

CHARLES A. ISRAEL
Auburn University

NORIKO ASATO. *Teaching Mikadoism: The Attack on Japanese Language Schools in Hawaii, California, and Washington, 1919–1927*. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press. 2006. Pp. xvii, 176. \$40.00.

Noriko Asato pursues an ambitious agenda in this book, employing a comparative approach to analyze Japanese language school controversies in Hawaii, California, and Washington between 1919 and 1927. She argues that various groups used debates over these schools in an attempt to impose control over Japanese Americans (or Nikkei). Seeking to improve on the unsystematic scholarly treatment of this topic, Asato wants to create a synthetic overview situated in a broad historical context that studies both why the controversy developed and how Japanese Americans reacted to it.

Asato begins with a brief survey of Japanese American immigration as well as the creation and proliferation of Japanese language schools in Hawaii and on the West Coast. From the start, supporters of the

schools had varied motives. Planters initially funded schools hoping to convince Nikkei laborers to stay longer, while many of the initial settlers saw the institutions as a means to ease the future transition of their children into Japanese society. As time passed, divisions within the Nikkei community emerged as Christian and Buddhist schools competed and as the community debated the mission of the schools, with more favoring the goal of educating students to be better American—and not Japanese—citizens. When immigrants appealed to the Japanese government for support and advice, its officials in the United States emphasized raising children loyal to the United States, in part to avoid American ill will toward Japan.

Moving to a comparative analysis, Asato then devotes one chapter each to the attacks on Japanese language schools in Hawaii, California, and Washington. While the emphasis varied in different locales, all three movements transformed educational issues into political issues, playing to white fears that Nikkei could not assimilate and emphasizing the alleged economic threat they posed, especially to union members and farmers. While some of the material included in these middle chapters has been examined before in the work of Eileen H. Tamura, Yuji Ichioka, and others, Asato's approach allows for a fuller understanding of the Japanese language school controversy as an issue that transcended state lines. Importantly, Nikkei responded differently based on local circumstances, moving to compromise in the face of powerful and popular anti-Japanese movements in Hawaii and California while mounting a more immediately successful defense in Washington, where whites were less fearful of economic competition and where both Nikkei and progressive white educators provided more effective leadership.

Asato concludes with a brief overview of the results of Nikkei legal challenges to government control over Japanese language schools in Hawaii. When the Supreme Court ruled Hawaii's regulation of these schools unconstitutional in 1927, California had to nullify its efforts as well. The ruling and its wider results represented an important victory for Nikkei, and Asato argues that the court's decision "vindicated their social position as an ethnic group in the United States, as unhyphenated Americans" (p. 106). Stressing the significant diversity within the ethnic community as well as the complicated relationships between the various groups involved, Asato warns against drawing broad conclusions about Chinese American and Korean American language schools based on the Nikkei experience.

Asato's conclusions highlight both the strengths and shortcomings of her ambitious book. Perhaps most importantly, Asato's broad comparative framework sketches a more comprehensive view of the subject than previous scholarship has provided. The emphasis on prewar Nikkei history also places the book in a growing and important movement among scholars to study Japanese American history prior to 1941, an era too often

slighted by the field's preoccupation with World War II and incarceration. Asato's emphasis on diversity within the Nikkei community is also important, and her work enhances our understanding of it in important ways. The shortcomings of the book also, however, result from its ambitions. The book's organization and occasional awkwardness at times obscure its content, and Asato could expand the range of voices she examines on all sides of the debate. Perhaps more importantly, Asato misses several opportunities to further enhance the importance of her book. First, a deeper exploration of the larger context of the Americanization and exclusion movements as national phenomena would help to draw meaningful connections between Japanese American history and U.S. history. Second, while Asato notes that her work raises the issue of education in a multicultural society, she draws few conclusions about this contemporary issue. Finally, Asato acknowledges that her book does not attempt to explain the relationship between Japanese language schools and Nisei (second generation) identity, a much discussed topic today. Despite these missed opportunities, there is much to recommend the work. As Asato acknowledges, her book represents an attempt to begin to forge a more inclusive history of her topic, not a conclusion to the study of it. Given this goal and the book's brevity, Asato has made an important contribution to our understanding of prewar Nikkei history that offers provocative possibilities for future research.

ALLAN W. AUSTIN
College Misericordia

CARLOS KEVIN BLANTON, *The Strange Career of Bilingual Education in Texas, 1836–1981*. (Fronteras Series, number 2.) College Station: Texas A&M University Press 2004. Pp. 204. \$29.95.

Inspired, as his book's title suggests, by C. Vann Woodward's seminal work on southern segregation (*The Strange Career of Jim Crow*, first published in 1955), Carlos Kevin Blanton seeks to illuminate present controversies concerning bilingual education through a careful examination of the phenomenon's history in Texas. What is revealed, contrary perhaps to the assumptions of today's "English Only" advocates, is a tradition of bilingual education that was interrupted for much of the twentieth century before its restoration in 1981.

This bilingual tradition originated with the work of Spanish missionaries and continued with the ambivalent policies of Mexican authorities in the 1820s and 1830s. Beginning with the establishment of the Republic of Texas, which followed the successful revolt by American Texans against Mexican control, bilingual education under American government remained the rule rather than the exception in both parochial and private schools. Blanton characterizes the bilingual tradition of the nineteenth century as "often informal and muddled" (p. 35) but also "rich and vibrant" (p. 153), affecting and, to a large extent, directed by Tejanos

German Americans, and Czech Americans. Particularly insightful is the use made by the author of a series of mostly handwritten reports by county judges and school superintendents that document the daily struggles with language issues in late nineteenth-century Texas communities. For local ethnic communities, instruction for their children in two languages provided the surest path to academic achievement and assimilation. For many local and some state authorities, bilingual education was, for a time, a necessary prerequisite to sustain public schooling.

Beginning in the late nineteenth century, however, a growing number of educational leaders sought to eliminate bilingual education in Texas. Progressive reformers recast bilingual education as the fundamental barrier to Americanization, "a lingering anachronism of unsettled pioneer society" (p. 55). In conjunction with Progressive efforts to centralize educational policy making and administration, a series of increasingly focused and better enforced English Only statutes removed control over language issues from the local school officials who had previously protected bilingual traditions. The steady pressure on behalf of English Only schooling and an increasingly racist brand of Americanization climaxed during World War I and the early 1920s, leading to a transformation in Texan educational policy and practice that, not coincidentally, facilitated the segregation of Mexican American school children.

Many of the Progressive educators in Texas who implemented English Only during the first half of the twentieth century were unwavering in the belief that allowing even one peep of native language in the classroom hindered the learning of English and thus thwarted assimilation. To his credit, Blanton does not consign English Only theory to the margins but acknowledges its serious basis in research and the frequently sophisticated pedagogy. However, the impact of direct methods of applying the theory, especially on Mexican American children, was disastrous. Thousands spent years mired in the lower grades, doomed to failure even when Texan educational leaders had realized the tragic ineffectiveness of English Only.

In the years immediately following World War II, Mexican American activists and scholars labored to undermine the justifications for English Only pedagogy. By the 1960s, English Only was largely discredited in Texas and elsewhere, paving the way for a rejuvenation of the Texas bilingual tradition. In 1968, thanks in part to federal support under President Lyndon B. Johnson (himself a former practitioner of English Only pedagogy), bilingual education was decriminalized in Texas. Bolstered by antisegregation court cases, support for bilingual programs expanded throughout the 1970s and the link to the state's bilingual past was officially forged in 1981.

That is certainly not the end of the story. English Only campaigns have had political success in California and other sections of the nation in recent years, and the current climate regarding immigration and national se-

curity guarantees that Americans will be debating bilingual education indefinitely. Focused as it is on one state, Blanton's study may not enjoy the historiographical impact of Woodward's classic. Still, his fine book is a necessary corrective to the fallacious idea, still tenaciously held in certain quarters, that bilingual education is some kind of un-American aberration born of twentieth-century ethnic activism. Indeed, as he concludes, it is "thoroughly American education" (p. 151) with a long, though complex, history.

FRANK VAN NUYS

South Dakota School of Mines and Technology

ZARAGOSA VARGAS. *Labor Rights Are Civil Rights: Mexican American Workers in Twentieth-Century America*. (Politics and Society in Twentieth-Century America.) Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2004. Pp. xvi, 375. \$29.95.

In this comprehensive study of Mexican American labor history from 1930 to 1950, Zaragosa Vargas depicts the steady stream of injustices born by Mexican American workers, the pervasiveness of protest by those workers, and the complex landscape of organized labor. Building on the substantial work of fellow historians and adding to it his own extensive original research, Vargas has for the first time brought into a single frame the multitude of 1930s strikes in which Mexican American women and men played a central role. Doing so also allows him to illuminate the substantial differences among southwestern states, where the track record of Texas proved so abysmal that it was excluded from the World War II contract labor agreement with Mexico.

Vargas argues convincingly that the evisceration of Mexican American associations by the Great Depression and the lack of a national Mexican American organization, coupled with the centrality of workplace discrimination, made labor organizations, in particular the Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO), the major civil rights vehicle for Mexican Americans. Because workplace discrimination included the ever-present threat of deportation for Mexican nationals and even for U.S. citizens who could not provide birth certificates on the spot, workers' rights were inextricably tied to rights of citizenship. In strike after strike, local, state, and federal agents jailed and deported leaders. Yet workers and labor leaders also knew that unrestricted immigration gave the upper hand to employers, allowing them to undercut wages and draw on a seemingly limitless supply of strikebreakers. Vargas highlights the myriad cross-border collaborations with Mexican unions that struggled to mitigate threats from both undocumented and legal immigrants without demonizing Mexican workers.

Vargas clarifies the importance of the Communist Party's labor organizers, tying the chronology of Mexican American protest to the shifts in Communist Party strategy—from the dual unionism to the Popular Front (the high tide of worker success) to the pulling back from civil rights battles in favor of a focus on the war

effort and saving the Soviet Union, and, finally, the lost battle to the forces of anticommunism in the late 1940s. The breadth of the Popular Front vision meant that antidiscrimination fights at work made clear the need for neighborhood organizing and addressing the pervasiveness of police brutality and housing discrimination. In these moments, too, came intermittent collaborations with African Americans. While many of the gains of the 1930s and 1940s evaporated (including the only partially successful Fair Employment Practices Commission), Vargas argues that organizing in those decades provided the foundation of experiences and expectations that undergirded the renewed struggles of the 1960s.

While Vargas succeeds in highlighting the fluorescence of labor organizing in the 1930s and making a case for its impact, he is perhaps too dismissive of earlier organizations that also fought for civil rights. The League of United Latin American Citizens comes in for harsh criticism as a bastion of middle-class caution, although Ben Johnson's recent book on the Plan de San Diego reveals it was more divided on issues of class struggle than has been portrayed, and included labor organizers among its influential members. The plethora of 1920s Mexican American associations, many of which launched protests against discrimination, that could be seen as providing an important experiential base for 1930s leaders and actions, is absent. So, too, is the substantial 1930s radical labor upheaval in Texas that Neil Foley's work chronicles.

Vargas does describe a vast number of disparate strikes, some in great detail. Not all the challenges of this scope have been successfully met. Compelling storytelling alternates with mind-numbing detail, multiplied examples, and occasionally confusing chronology as the story backtracks to take in another episode, or dates are left out. Nonetheless, the benefits far outweigh the drawbacks. The role of Mexican American labor leaders in the CIO has never been so clearly depicted, nor has the importance of Mexican American workers to the organization and to the labor force in the 1930s. Similarly, the 1942 Sleepy Lagoon case and the 1943 zoot suit riots look different when set in the context of increasing labor militance by Mexican American workers. So, too, does the laying of postwar blue-collar financial security on the foundation of racial exclusiveness. Moreover, there are many other resonances with current debates about immigration policy. Repatriation, for example, did not save money, as it left behind destitute citizen children and their unemployed citizen mothers. Nor did the scapegoating of Mexican workers for the economic problems of the day succeed in ameliorating those problems, though it did ease the way for stereotyping Mexican Americans and casting them as permanently foreign no matter for how many generations their families had been citizens.

SARAH DEUTSCH
Duke University

ROBERT R. TREVIÑO. *The Church in the Barrio: Mexican American Ethno-Catholicism in Houston*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2006. Pp. xiv, 308. Cloth \$59.95, paper \$22.50.

This is, quite simply, one of the best books that I have read on the Catholic experience in America, and I recommend it highly. Even so, I must start with a mild complaint: the author and the publisher should have cooperated a little more creatively in trying to convey just what the book is about. Judging from its title, for example, you might suspect that this book was about Mexican American Catholic participation in the institutional church, or maybe about the interaction between popular religious traditions and practices associated with the Mexican American community in Houston and the religion of the official church. Reading the introduction, you would more likely come to the conclusion that the book is more about the use of religion in the construction of identity than about religion per se (which is what Robert R. Treviño seems to say in several places). So what is the book really about? In the end, all this and more.

Treviño's analysis covers the period 1911–1972, and certainly he provides succinct descriptive accounts of a number of practices that were religious or pervaded with religious elements (like the *posadas* and *pastorelas* staged during the Christmas season; the *altarcitos* maintained in private homes; the *quinceañera*, an elaborate ceremony which took place when a young woman turned fifteen) and that were central to the lived experience of Mexican-American ethno-Catholicism (his term) during this period. As well, Treviño tells us how church officials responded (or did not respond) to the Mexican American community, and the ways in which Mexican Americans chose to interact (or not interact) with the official church. More generally, he also considers a variety of political and economic issues (and struggles) that confronted Houston's Mexican American community during this period.

What I consistently found impressive about the analysis presented in this book is that Treviño refuses to succumb to the temptation to think in terms of simple dichotomies. For example, did Mexican-American ethno-Catholicism promote or hinder assimilation? Wrong question, he suggests. A better question: in what ways did the same devotion (notably, devotion to Our Lady of Guadalupe) sometimes promote both a distinct ethnic identity and sometimes accommodation to the surrounding culture? Another example: although Treviño does contrast "Hispanic/Latino Catholicism" with the "official Catholicism" promoted by the American hierarchy (something done in many other books) he also discusses the ways in which Mexican American ethno-Catholicism is both similar to and different from the ethno-Catholicism(s) of Puerto Rican American and Cuban Americans. A final example: as with other studies of religion in America, Treviño finds that on average women are more religious than men. Certainly, he argues, we need to explain this, but we also need to

recognize that under certain conditions men participate more in religious activities than women, and that this, too, needs to be explained. True, Treviño's own answer here (men are attracted to religious practices that reinforce the imagery associated with traditional male gender roles) could be expanded a bit. But at least he asks the question in a way that gets us beyond the usual "women are more religious than men" rhetoric.

At several points throughout the book, Treviño draws a comparison between the ethno-Catholicism of Mexican Americans and the ethno-Catholicism of Italian American immigrants. This is one of those "it's obvious once someone points it out" things, but the fact remains that although I have read much of the literature on both Hispanic Catholicism and Italian American Catholicism, I can not recall anyone making this point as precisely as Treviño. One quibble: Treviño attributes the similarities between these two variants of ethno-Catholicism to the fact that both variants are "pre-Tridentine." My own view is that this presumes too much stability between the sixteenth and the twentieth centuries in both cases. Treviño is on firmer ground in arguing, as he does, that other American Catholic groups (Irish Americans and Polish Americans in particular) bought into the "devotional revolution" being promoted by church leaders both in America and Europe during the late nineteenth century in a way that Mexican Americans and Italian Americans did not.

Treviño includes a brief epilogue at the end that assesses what has happened since the 1970s, and here he does not yield to wishful thinking. Basically, what he suggests is that although Mexican American ethno-Catholicism itself remains vibrant, the church has increasingly subsumed Mexican Americans under a more general "Hispanic" category and Mexican American social and pastoral concerns have been tied to a more general (and vague) concern with multiculturalism. The net result is that Mexican American influence in the church has declined relative to the high water mark reached in the 1960s and early 1970s.

MICHAEL P. CARROLL
University of Western Ontario

MATTHEW A. REDINGER. *American Catholics and the Mexican Revolution, 1924–1936*. Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press. 2005. Pp. xii, 260. \$22.00.

This study asks important questions about the intentions of and roles played by American Catholics and the American Catholic Church during what might be termed the official anticlerical phase of the Mexican Revolution, 1924–1936: the period during which Mexican authorities sought to invoke more fully hitherto neglected provisions of the 1917 constitution. Two of the key policies promoted by American Catholics were lifting the arms embargo, which effectively limited the sale of arms to the Mexican government, and severing diplomatic ties with Mexico. Both were intended to pro-

vide leverage to Mexican Catholics in their efforts to maintain a status quo that the constitution, fully implemented, directly threatened.

Matthew A. Redinger usefully engages these topics through a series of chapters that address the actions of specific Catholic entities ranging from the upper echelons of the American church hierarchy and selected key religious figures, through lay organizations and the Knights of Columbus. Additionally, the author wisely and carefully attempts to assess the successes of such actors in influencing American policy on Mexico. Redinger makes excellent use of primary sources, especially U.S. diplomatic materials.

The book vigorously presents the diverse views and approaches taken by American Catholics and the American Catholic Church. For example, the third chapter, which explores the efforts of "leading" American Catholic voices, including two cardinals, a bishop, and two archbishops, is especially well conceived and organized. On the whole the book shows that while these and other characters sought by and large to achieve common aims, they employed a multiplicity of means from prayer to publishing, from charged public iterations to personal diplomacy at the highest levels. Redinger proceeds cautiously and with nuance to analyze the fruits of actions taken to attempt to influence U.S. policy. Equally effective is his sketch of American lay efforts to influence U.S. policy.

The author argues at different points that if a common goal among American Catholic actors was to direct or abruptly change American policy vis-à-vis Mexico (e.g. lifting the arms embargo), then such efforts clearly failed. Yet these various attempts may be deemed successful if one embraces a broader view in which influence is measured by "the power to mold consciousness" (p. 183). Here the text demonstrates that the American Catholic project met with considerable success in raising awareness of and increasing sensitivity to American Catholic concerns about perceived injustices visited upon Mexican Catholics.

The book suffers from two weaknesses. First, and glaringly, it does not provide background sufficient to explain the anticlerical provisions of the Mexican constitution, hence undercutting the thrust of the text's arguments. It tends to gloss over crucial religious-political issues in the long half century predating the beginning of the Mexican Revolution in 1910. Such an omission is lamentable because it makes the text less approachable to those not otherwise well versed in Mexican history. This leads to the second weakness, which stems from the absence of a comparative rendering of the respective religious institutions in Mexico and the United States. Such a lacuna may well mislead non-Mexicanists to assume that greater consonance existed between and among the manifestations of Catholicism in the United States and Mexico than was the case. It would be helpful to discuss, for example, commonalities and differences (if any) in church land ownership patterns; political roles; ideas about gender, birth, and death; church lay organizations; architecture; consciousness: in short, the

church, comparatively, in Mexican and American society and culture. If nothing else, it is important for the reader to know or be reminded that Mexican revolutionaries had valid reasons to oppose the Catholic Church, which differed sharply from its American cousin.

Overall, the book is well written, the prose in the main clear and precise, with a mild tendency toward passive construction. It is cogently organized and each chapter is effectively introduced, summarized, and concluded. Redinger's study should be welcomed by scholars interested in U.S.-Mexican relations and inter-American relations more generally. It is likely to be of limited value to undergraduates.

MARK CRONLUND ANDERSON
University of Regina

RICHARD M. FRIED. *The Man Everybody Knew: Bruce Barton and the Making of Modern America*. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee. 2005. Pp. xv, 286. \$27.50.

Bruce Barton at last has not only a biography, but a solid one that carefully explains him in several important contexts. Although best known in American history survey texts and lectures as the author of the 1920s best-seller, *The Man Nobody Knows* (1925), Barton achieved distinction in business, politics, and religion, as well as writing. He should be placed in the front ranks of American modernists. Though not an intellectual, Barton influenced minds with his advertising skill. As Richard M. Fried notes, the British observer of America Alistair Cooke said it best when he called Barton the "Moses of advertising" (p. 224). The description would have delighted Barton.

Barton did not invent modern advertising, but he was perhaps its best practitioner. He built on the already established promotion of brand names and institutional advertising to include full-service features for clients from producing motion pictures to designing delivery trucks. Through his powerhouse Madison Avenue firm he made clients like General Motors and General Electric household names. He helped transform advertising from nineteenth-century patent medicine hucksterism into a sophisticated profession that promised happiness to consumers. He aided in the transition from a puritanical producer ethic to a more therapeutic consumer one by linking advertising, which increasingly relied on psychological manipulation, with traditional values. Barton insisted that advertising provided a service, and he lived long enough to practice his craft successfully in print, radio, and television. Fried concludes that while Barton improved the image of advertising, his work still had a connection with "illusion, suggestion, and magic" (p. 86). Borrowing from Jackson Lears, he suggests that consumerism perhaps replaced some of the mystery and magic lost in the transition from medieval culture to the modern age.

Barton's most famous work, *The Man Nobody Knows*, welded business and religion, although he had earlier linked the two in ads and writing. At the height of

Coolidge prosperity when advertisers enjoyed preeminence, this minister's son presented Jesus as the consummate businessperson. Christ was the founder of modern business, the able and sociable executive, an outdoorsman (muscular, not the effeminate one of Sunday School pictures), and even a clever advertiser with his catchy parables. Barton's Christ was unmistakably modernist. *The Man Nobody Knows* emphasizes his humanity and ends with the crucifixion, not the resurrection. Fried concludes that with this book, along with other writings, Barton both commercialized religion and sacralized business and advertising; in the end, however, the book was more about updating religion than defending business. Barton sought to blend religion and traditional virtues with the realities of the modern age: urbanization and mass consumption. His message remains a popular one; the book is still in print in the early twenty-first century.

Fried misses the mark, I believe, on the reaction of fundamentalists. Citing three examples, he describes it as "savage" (p. 99). Logically fundamentalists and other believers should have protested a book that countered the teachings of Christ about materialism and the apostle Paul's admonition to be content with one's circumstances. In the book and in his advertising, Barton celebrated the opposite. Many readers at the time and later perceived the work to be blasphemous.

Broader research in fundamentalist sources yields a more complex reaction. William Jennings Bryan (whom Fried does not cite) and a few others denounced the book, but their complaints centered on theological issues, not the association with business. Religious periodicals reveal significant fundamentalist praise for the book. But most remarkable was the silence of many fundamentalists about the book, in an era when they were extremely vocal about other issues. Barton had deliberately tried to provoke them and was disappointed that he did not. Writing a book connecting Christ and business, Barton perhaps disarmed those conservative evangelicals who by the 1920s had appropriated many of the consumerist strategies that his book celebrated.

Barton also left his mark on politics as an early spin doctor (p. 114). Fried detailed his journey from being a reformer, a conservative, and even a liberal Republican while representing a Manhattan district in Congress. Barton, however, is most remembered for his work with Republican candidates for president. He offered them innovative strategy, public relations work, and fodder for their speeches. His list of clients is impressive: Calvin Coolidge (beginning in 1920), Herbert Hoover, Alfred Landon, and Wendell Willkie. Barton lost in a U. S. Senate bid. His isolationist tendencies also failed to keep America out of World War II but led to Franklin D. Roosevelt's famous putdown of "Congressmen Martin, Barton, and Fish" (p. 190). The president had beaten Barton at sloganeering.

Based on Fried's strong analysis of Barton, I would place him in the rather unusual category of a "conservative modernist": one who had modernist sensibilities, particularly in advertising, but linked them to tradi-

tional images, not unlike T. S. Eliot or William Faulkner.

DOUGLAS CARL ABRAMS
Bob Jones University

KATHLEEN DROWNE. *Spirits of Defiance: National Prohibition and Jazz Age Literature, 1920–1933*. Columbus: Ohio State University Press. 2005. Pp. xii, 189. Cloth \$59.95, paper \$21.95, CD \$9.95.

Historians will find much that is enlightening and entertaining in Kathleen Drowne's book. Drawing on Prohibition-era fiction by F. Scott Fitzgerald, Langston Hughes, Dorothy Parker, and a host of others, Drowne compares the authors' portrayals of drink culture to those that appeared in newspapers, magazines, and scholarly analyses during and after the "dry decade" (1920–1933). "Collectively," she argues, "the works of fiction addressed in this book offer a realistic, historically accurate picture of how different kinds of Americans responded to the legal, social, and cultural changes wrought by the passage of National Prohibition" (p. 5). Historians may be more skeptical about the reliability of such literary evidence than Drowne, whose training is in literary, not historical, analysis. Nevertheless, her study provides a gold mine of contemporary references to Jazz Age free spirits who gleefully drank spirits in open defiance of the Eighteenth Amendment.

Drowne focuses on what she terms the "culture of National Prohibition" (p. 13), in which a sense of rebellious playfulness found expression in the period's language, music, movies, and literature. She devotes chapters to the principal actors and settings of this national rebellion, including liquor providers, youthful consumers, drinking establishments, and house parties. The chapter on drinking in private homes is particularly informative. In the chapter's first section, "Cocktail Parties," Drowne examines fictional portrayals of upper and middle-class drinkers, nicely complementing Catherine Gilbert Murdock's study, *Domesticating Drink: Women, Men, and Alcohol in America, 1870 to 1920* (1998). Even more intriguing are the sections featuring Harlem Renaissance writers such as Wallace Thurman and Langston Hughes on "Rent Parties," and Claude McKay and Zora Neale Hurston on "Good-Time Flats." Drowne selects vivid passages from their earthy accounts of Harlem's flamboyant social scene and brings to light many overlooked aspects of African American drink culture in the 1920s.

Using fiction as historical evidence is, of course, a notoriously perilous process. Fortunately, many of the authors in Drowne's study strove for realism in their stories, and many were themselves prodigious drinkers who could write from firsthand experience. Yet these authors were also likely to be more bohemian in their lifestyles and more avant-garde in their opinions than the average American in the 1920s. In addition, they sometimes injected unusual elements into their stories for dramatic effect. How many bootleggers, for instance, were really as elegant as Jay Gatsby in F. Scott

Fitzgerald's *The Great Gatsby* (1925) or as dastardly as Popeye in William Faulkner's *Sanctuary* (1931)?

Drowne sometimes seems to trust her literary informants a little more than is warranted. For example, in Dorothy Parker's humorous short story, "Just a Little One" (1928), the female protagonist and her friend Fred go into a clandestine bar in New York, where she proceeds to order multiple drinks for herself until she becomes unabashedly inebriated. Drowne concludes that Parker's "lack of authorial censure" of this character's drinking "suggests that this scene portrays relatively typical behavior" for the time (p. 7). Perhaps this was typical behavior for Parker, or even for the 1920s "new woman" in New York, but would this have played in Peoria? A historian would likely begin with factual evidence about female drinkers nationwide, and then cite Parker's vignette as an illustration. But Drowne begins with the literature, using historical evidence to amplify the literary record, and not the other way around. To be fair, she does make good use of several historical studies of the period. Still, her literary orientation might be disconcerting to some historians.

Another problem arises when Drowne compares the speakeasy of literature to the pre-Prohibition saloon of history. A speakeasy was an illegal bar where customers were expected to "speak easy" (softly) when requesting alcohol. Drowne asserts that "many speakeasies were practically indistinguishable from the saloons that preceded them" (p. 98). She also maintains that old-time saloons "offered venues for working men to organize and discuss politics; Prohibition-era speakeasies sustained this role" (p. 105). While both institutions were drink dispensaries that shared many physical traits, their roles in the neighborhood were very different indeed. The saloon was a wide-open, male-oriented public space that often served as a community center for all manner of workers' organizations. The speakeasy, in contrast, was a secretive underground hideaway with many interesting traits, as Drowne ably demonstrates, but not "practically indistinguishable" from the pre-Prohibition saloon.

Drowne does an excellent job of compiling literary references to Prohibition-era drink culture, something no one has previously done in comparable detail. She provides insightful and colorful commentary on her sources, particularly regarding how class, race, and gender figured into the drinking experiences described in contemporary fiction. It is now up to historians to assess in even greater depth how accurately the Jazz Age writers recorded the social history of alcohol in their era.

MADELON POWERS
University of New Orleans

KENNETH H. MARCUS. *Musical Metropolis: Los Angeles and the Creation of a Music Culture*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2005. Pp. xiii, 274. Cloth \$75.00, paper \$22.95.

"If Hollywood is a dream factory," writes Kenneth H. Marcus, "then Los Angeles musicians played an essen-

tial role in the production of those dreams" (p. 6). As the American century unfolded California played a greater role in defining the United States and music played a central role in this modern movement. The advent and proliferation of musical recording and transmission technology changed both the scale and scope of music within the country and with it broadened the cultural imperialism that came as a result. American music, primarily popular, became (arguably) world music. Los Angeles was at the center of this movement, argues Marcus, but unlike New York, Chicago, or even Atlanta and Nashville, the urban demographics of Los Angeles made the idea of a unified musical culture a misnomer; how could something so spread out be unified? This book argues that from the late nineteenth century until the 1940s the diverse nature of the city informed and identified its musical culture and in the process helped to define modern American musical culture.

Marcus begins in the latter part of the nineteenth century by outlining the proliferation of theater music in the Los Angeles area and showing how this foundation helped cultivate increased musical opportunities in the next century. With the completion of the Sante Fe railroad in 1885, Los Angeles began to attract a greater number of migrants and with them a demand for entertainment. A number of theater halls catered to this burgeoning market, featuring a wide variety of music that reflected both the city's ethnic makeup and, just as significant to Marcus's analysis, its spatial diversity. Each district held its own entertainment area. Burlesque, vaudeville, and light opera gained acceptance, as did a "fledgling symphony orchestra" (p. 29). After establishing the foundation of musical culture in this emerging modern city, some people began advocating for greater musical education, leading both to the establishment of private academies like the Von Stein Academy of Music and to the more Progressive-minded Neighborhood Music Settlement. These institutions sought to make music more available to the city's youth, both for its educational benefits and to foster a generation of Angelinos who might appreciate better music.

Marcus documents the continued growth and development of music in the Los Angeles area, especially as it related to cultivated music. The founding of the Hollywood Bowl is recounted in great detail and even the repertoire is presented, but as with many other parts of the book, analysis of the larger meaning is either absent or brief. For example, when Marcus describes the creation of a permanent Bowl with modern seating and marketing, the opportunity to use this episode to introduce the larger musical and social debate of cultivated versus vernacular music is missed. Marcus does mention the democratizing effect of the Bowl and other cultivated musical endeavors, suggesting that the music appealed to a large and diverse population, but his analysis favors institutional and organized cultivated music. When discussing the success of several pageants in the first third of the last century, one of which featured

Mexican players, the presentation is very straightforward with little analysis. This book is about Los Angeles and music, yet what happened there had a larger historical and social context, and at times this context is absent. This is faulting Marcus for a book he did not write, however, and given the relative lack of research on the topic, most of what he has mined and presented is valuable.

The last half of the book explores the more traditional view of Los Angeles and music: namely, the modern era of records, radio, and film. When dealing with radio and its role in the spread of musical culture, Marcus focuses exclusively on the broadcast of classical music, arguing that the radio became "the most powerful medium in the popularization of classical music" (p. 159) in Los Angeles. Yet, examining audience surveys of those who listened to classical music on the radio, it becomes clear that the majority were middle-aged, middle to upper-class white native-born professionals with a smattering of students and others. To focus only on this one aspect of musical Los Angeles seems to leave quite a gap. A similar approach is taken with film music, arguably the most identified with Los Angeles' musical culture at that time, as it employed hundreds of musicians, arrangers, and composers. Marcus focuses on the careers of Max Steiner (who wrote music for over 300 films), Erich Korngold, and Alfred Newman and points out how each used classical music composition and technique in his scores. He then examines how Walt Disney and Warner Brothers utilized classical music in the popularization of their cartoons and characters. He suggests that "with the creation of Bugs Bunny, Warner Brothers had found the perfect personality with which to blend classical music and humor" (p. 187), even though the rabbit seemed to poke fun at the pretension of both the music and those who favored it. Other than the fact that the films and music were created in Los Angeles, nothing links their creation with the larger development of a Los Angeles sound; or, perhaps Marcus is suggesting that, by the end of the 1930s, the Los Angeles sound was linked to the larger American sound.

This book is very informative, and many scholars and others interested in musical culture will find much of it valuable. Included is a CD with appropriate musical selections, and the book is dotted with interesting photos. One comes away with a question, however: what is the musical culture of Los Angeles? Is there a distinctive sound? Marcus suggests early on that the intersection of different ethnic groups helped define the area's music, yet when covering the record, radio, and movie industries, these diverse sounds are silenced. After reading this book, one can only conclude that classical standards defined Los Angeles musical culture; except for the initial phase and a brief mention of Jazz in chapter five, vernacular musical contributions are absent.

KENNETH J. BINDAS

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BETSY KLIMASMITH. *At Home in the City: Urban Domesticity in American Literature and Culture, 1850-1930*

(*Becoming Modern: New Nineteenth-Century Studies*.) Hanover, N.H.: University of New Hampshire Press. 2005. Pp. xii, 293. Cloth \$65.00, paper \$26.00.

Betsy Klimasmith's book explores literary representations of the American family home in novels, magazine articles, domestic advice guides, and reform tracts during the second half of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries. This study contends that modern urban domestic spaces—the apartments, tenements, boarding houses and hotels that alarmed reformers while sheltering thousands of migrants to American cities—undercut long-standing notions of what counted as home and family order in the rapidly industrializing urban north. “Neither unique nor self-contained, these spaces threatened to foster an urban subjectivity that compromised the distinct family unit theoretically produced by contained homes that were occupied by their owners,” she writes (p. 4). Klimasmith claims to “do more here than bring historical contexts to bear on fictional urban homes.” Rather, her method involves reading reformers' critiques alongside of the novelists' visions of the family home to “make visible the conceptions of subject formation in relation to environment that are at work in the period and that are less accessible through other approaches” (p. 9). A new, flexible, and “porous”—a term Klimasmith applies to fiction and architecture—social identity emerged in urban literature during the nineteenth century. Klimasmith contends that this subjectivity was shaped by the chaotic urban scene and, at the same time, was capable of resisting and remaking urban spaces. Yet, it is never clear from her study who read these novels and reform tracts, nor is it clear whether or how urban literature effected the daily lives and self-conceptions of urban residents. Klimasmith's contribution is to show that many widely read authors—from Nathaniel Hawthorne to Henry James to Nella Larson—presented complex and often contradictory visions of domesticity and of the American family home.

Klimasmith begins with an analysis of Hawthorne's *The Blithedale Romance* and Fanny Fern's *Ruth Hall*, both published in the early 1850s. The novels, she claims, “narrate the permeable, transformable architecture of the industrial landscape” (p. 18). Perhaps more significantly, as Klimasmith notes, the novels demonstrate that the separate spheres ideology widely articulated in nineteenth-century advice manuals was effectively undermined by some of the era's most popular literature. Both Hawthorne and Fern suggest that the home, even the rural home, was integrated into a market economy, hardly a refuge from the sphere of work and competition. Even more, in the urban boardinghouses described in each novel, public spaces seem to merge with the private home, creating new spaces for social interactions and “fictively reconfiguring ‘private’ and ‘public’ spaces.” Here, Hawthorne shows “how an urban setting characterized by connection and open to a reader's gaze marks its inhabitants as urban and re-

wards them for taking on the architectural qualities—the permeability and mutability—of the built spaces they inhabit” (p. 50). These themes—the emergence of new housing forms and their impact on identity as well as on gender, family, and labor systems—are threaded through much of mid-nineteenth-century fiction.

Klimasmith is most concerned with the ways these new housing forms, and urban spaces in general, were interpreted by the authors she discusses. Although Hawthorne chipped away at literary distinctions between public and private spaces, he affirmed what became the modernist notion that environment, in particular architecture, shaped individual identity. Not surprisingly, Klimasmith finds architectural determinism in the writings of many of the leading reformers of the late nineteenth century, from Calvert Vaux to Jacob Riis. It was the novelists, Klimasmith argues, who confounded the formula, unearthing the active self-creation of urban residents, revealing the liberating possibilities of city streets, and fashioning new networks of “connectivity” or new types of social relationships in urban dwellings. Writers like Edith Warton, Theodore Dreiser, and later Larson depicted urban characters who might be constrained by their settings but often were able to remake urban spaces and, as they moved through hotels and apartments, to erase the past or the roots that tied them to a single family home.

This book is burdened by jargon and, all too frequently, confuses broadly held interpretation with new insight. It is not a study of history. It is, however, a stimulating literary study that draws a sharp trajectory from Hawthorne to Larson, effectively linking the romantic critique of the urban to the modernist depiction of the simultaneously liberating and alienating twentieth-century city. Klimasmith provides intriguing insights into urban literature, but she reveals little about cities themselves.

MARGARET GARB

Washington University in St. Louis

ROBERT M. FOGELSON. *Bourgeois Nightmares: Suburbia, 1870–1930*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2005. Pp. 264. \$30.00.

Many American suburbs have cherished their reputation as exclusive retreats, exemplars of good taste and good breeding. Robert M. Fogelson's book explores how Americans created these restricted havens. Examining the years 1870 to 1930, Fogelson traces the gradual acceptance of restrictive covenants as a tool to protect homeowners from undesirable people and activities. Others have discussed racial restrictions, but Fogelson goes further, considering covenants that also limited the use of property and the nature and design of the structures to be built. As such he presents an authoritative and thorough account of this phenomenon in American suburban history.

Fogelson finds that Americans were slow to accept restrictive covenants. Both prospective homeowners

and the courts at first viewed restrictions on the rights of property holders as offensive to notions of American liberty. By the beginning of the twentieth century, however, fears of eroding property values and perceived threats to the quality of life outweighed concerns about infringement on the right to use one's property as one wished. Consequently, the list of restrictions grew longer. Not only did subdivisions exclude African Americans, East Asians, and sometimes Jews, they prohibited the operation of any business and the keeping of farm animals including chickens. Restrictive covenants also regulated fences, fixed setback lines, established the minimum price for houses, and in some cases provided for architecture juries to pass judgment on proposed structures. The idea was to insure against ugly structures, undesirable uses, and unwanted neighbors.

In examining this phenomenon, Fogelson discusses many of the nation's leading subdividers and community designers. Among the leading advocates of restrictive covenants were the nation's most distinguished landscape architects, the Olmsted Brothers. For example, they applied their vision of a highly restricted community to the development of upscale Palos Verdes Estates in southern California. Another pioneer in the movement for restricted subdivisions was J. C. Nichols, whose Country Club District in Kansas City was among the most admired developments in the nation.

Underlying the efforts of Nichols and his colleagues was the realization that certain restrictions promoted sales. Yet Fogelson finds that developers had to balance prospective buyers' fears of too little restriction against their misgivings about too many rules and regulations. Excessive restrictions regarding household pets, for example, might repel more buyers than they attracted. Thus subdividers tried to discover the correct formula for restrictions, with working-class subdivisions remaining the least restricted and the highest-priced developments offering the longest list of protective rules and regulations.

All this, according to Fogelson, reflected the fears of suburban Americans. They did not trust persons of other races or social classes, but they did not even have much confidence in the good taste of people wealthy enough to buy the lot next door. Subdividers had to safeguard against an invasion of the poor and blacks, but they also had to erect barriers to exclude those with more money than aesthetic sense.

The subdividers, moreover, proved successful. Many of the restricted subdivisions have appreciated with age and have retained their appeal for well-heeled buyers. Nichols's Country Club District, Baltimore's Roland Park, and southern California's Palos Verdes Estates are just a few of the highly restricted areas that have aged well and retained their value.

Overall, Fogelson offers a masterful account of the topic. In his relatively short but comprehensive study, he answers the requisite questions and provides the reader with a thorough, well-documented history of restrictive covenants. Anyone interested in the develop-

ment of America's built environment will find this book indispensable. It is a useful work that should prove a valuable source for all urban scholars.

JON C. TEAFORD
Purdue University

JAMES N. GREGORY. *The Southern Diaspora: How the Great Migrations of Black and White Southerners Transformed America*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2005. Pp. xiv, 446. Cloth \$59.95, paper \$19.95.

Migrations have consequences. Just ask the American Indians. Until now, historians have told only part of the story of the greatest migration in twentieth-century America: the movement of 28 million black and white southerners to the North and West—primarily midwestern and northeastern cities, and California—from the early 1900s to the 1970s. One million Latinos (mainly Tejanos) also migrated during this period. By relating this story partially, historians have underestimated the migrations' transformative impact on America, its politics, religions, popular culture, and the configuration of its cities and suburbs.

As James M. Gregory demonstrates from a broad interdisciplinary array of sources, this massive transfer of population included many more southern whites (20 million) than blacks, and only by including white southerners as part of the Great Migrations can we begin to understand how this movement changed America for all time. Heretofore, the story known as the Great Migration was primarily a phenomenon of African Americans, mostly poor, rural, and downtrodden, moving to the cities of the North and West, where they remained, for the most part, poor and downtrodden. Including southern whites in the process, uncovering some new statistical data (the *Integrated Public Use Microdata Series*, for example), and mining the sociological literature, Gregory has altered the perspective and interpretation of what now must be called the Great Migrations.

The migrations proceeded in two phases, one from the early 1900s through the 1920s, and a greater stream during and after World War II until the 1970s. As with all migrations, some of the migrants returned south, then went north again, making the migration a circular rather than a linear move. Whites more often than blacks entered the reverse migration stream. Both whites and blacks tended to migrate in family units, and both groups were drawn to the North by greater economic opportunities, although obviously African Americans had additional motivations to leave the region of their birth.

These migrations occurred in parallel, not complementary streams, although interactions occurred between southern white liberals and literary figures and their black counterparts. Also, the national media, novelists, and scholars tended to attach an array of negative stereotypes to both sets of migrants, rendering both undesirable in the eyes of many northerners. But, gener-

ally, southern African Americans went their way, and southern whites went theirs, especially in politics, religion, sports, and residence. In many respects, they experienced the migration process differently, with whites faring much better in the labor market, home ownership, and education, primarily because they were white. The image of ignorant hillbillies descending on northern cities is an exaggeration to the point of distortion, as Gregory convincingly proves. Southern white migrants did quite well. And, so did southern blacks, not in comparison with southern whites but with northern-born African Americans. Both groups benefited from the bonanza in blue-collar employment, especially during and after World War II.

Gregory resurrects the concept of the "Black Metropolis" initially put forward by sociologist St. Clair Drake and Horace R. Cayton in 1945. As opposed to the ghetto concept, a largely negative construction of black life in the North, Gregory depicts a community that was dynamic and supportive of the newcomers with churches, media, and organizations such as the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People, the Urban League, and the Congress of Racial Equality that proved essential for fomenting the civil rights movement in the North beginning in the early 1940s and influencing the movement's emergence in the South.

Southern whites had less impact on northern and western cities, despite their greater numbers, because they tended not to concentrate in inner-city areas. Many found their way to the suburbs. There, they established a beachhead for the evangelical explosion after World War II, the rise of conservative politics, and the nationalization of country music. But this should not be viewed as the southernization of America. Working-class ethnics, especially in the Midwest, led the exodus to the Republican Party and the suburbs after World War II. They did not follow the initiative of southerners. The dynamic working here was race and class, not region.

While Gregory's thematic approach permits in-depth discussions of community formation, religion, politics, and culture (especially music and literature), it occasionally flattens out the story, so the reader does not quite grasp change over time, and especially change from one generation of migrants to another. More critical, however, is the need for a more thorough discussion of how the migration changed the migrants. Gregory is excellent in demonstrating how black and white newcomers altered northern and western cities and suburbs, but is less detailed on how the migrants themselves changed. In this context, Gregory's assertion that the migrations collapsed the distinctions between North and South remains speculative.

Written in an engaging style, with numerous personal vignettes to enliven the narrative, Gregory's prose is thankfully free of the theoretical jargon that often clogs works on migration. The writing, the comprehensive

treatment, and the paperback edition make the book ideal for classroom use.

DAVID GOLDFIELD
University of North Carolina,
Charlotte

DAVISON M. DOUGLAS. *Jim Crow Moves North: The Battle over Northern School Desegregation, 1865–1954*. (Cambridge Historical Studies in American Law and Society.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 2006. Pp. x, 334. \$23.99.

I have frequently informed my students that where school segregation existed in the northern states in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries it was strictly *de facto*, caused by residential patterns and individual choices, and not *de jure*, caused by official laws and policies. "Jim Crow," the deliberate practice of establishing and enforcing a color line by law, was an exclusively southern practice, developed as Reconstruction withered away.

I was wrong. Davison M. Douglas shows, in great detail, how state and local officials in many northern states found ways to keep black and white children apart in separate schools. While the various state laws that permitted segregated schooling were repealed within a few years of the Civil War, and most northern states went on to forbid the practice, segregation continued and in fact intensified with the migration of hundreds of thousands of blacks from South to North during and after the two world wars. "Government-sponsored school segregation—such as the assignment of black children to separate colored schools or classrooms—persisted in open defiance of state laws in many northern communities until the late 1940s and early 1950s" (p. 8).

Douglas reminds us that, during the crucial decades before and after 1900, much scholarly opinion supported such practices, on the grounds that, as pioneer psychological researcher (and first president of Clark University) G. Stanley Hall argued, it was a mistake to offer blacks the same sort of education that was provided to whites; industrial training rather than mental development was what they needed. Economist Frederick Hoffman warned that religion and education had proved powerless "to raise the race from a low and anti-social condition." In an 1897 essay on "The Degeneracy of the American Negro" a professor of anthropology at the University of Chicago insisted "conditions of life and bad social opportunities cannot be urged in excuse . . . The difference is *racial*" (pp. 126–127).

The increasing popularity, among educators, of intelligence testing seemed to give objective support to such conclusions, despite the fact that black army recruits from some northern states scored higher than white recruits from much of the South (p. 161).

With so much expert advice against expecting much of the education of blacks, in North or South, it was not surprising that school officials thought it appropriate to school them separately. In many cases, indeed, this may well have been with the best of intentions. As residen-

tial segregation grew as a result of the Great Migration from southern cotton fields to northern cities, increased school segregation was an inevitable result, quite apart from the policies and practices of school systems; here was the origin of *de facto* segregation. "In 1910, only 30 percent of Chicago's African Americans lived in predominantly black neighborhoods; by 1920, a majority did so" (p. 137).

Douglas shows that northern blacks were of two minds about eliminating separate public schools, since these provided a large proportion of the government-funded jobs available to educated blacks. "In 1910, over half of all black college graduates were school teachers; by 1930, that figure was still over 40 percent" (p. 181). Because local school districts were unwilling to appoint them to teach white children, desegregation threatened the careers of many of the most articulate members of local black communities. Hundreds of black teachers lost their jobs when Ohio adopted legislation forbidding school segregation and, ironically, many had to move south to find employment in segregated schools. "Similarly, after Pittsburgh closed its one black school in 1875, no black teacher would teach in Pittsburgh again until the 1930s" (p. 111). The same unintended consequence of antidiscrimination efforts, we might note, occurred in the South during the 1960s and 1970s, when many black principals and teachers lost their jobs. It was not surprising that, in the early twentieth century, "African Americans petitioned local school authorities for the establishment of separate black schools throughout the North," wanting their children to "be learning under the nurturing care of a black teacher, as opposed to what was frequently the indifference or even hostility of a white teacher" (pp. 171–172).

While northern blacks were divided on the desirability of desegregated education, whites in the same region were clearly opposed, as revealed in a survey in 1942. By the postwar years, however, opinions began to change; "the war against Nazi racism brought home the fundamental conflict between the American creed of equal treatment and the country's harsh treatment of African Americans." Blacks grew increasingly unwilling to accept second-class status. National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) Executive Secretary Walter White would observe that "Negro militancy and implacable determination to wipe out segregation grew more proportionately during the years 1940 to 1943 than during any other period of the Negro's history in America." NAACP membership rose tenfold between 1940 and 1946 (pp. 220–221, 225). The stage was set for *Brown v. Board of Education*.

Unfortunately, northern school segregation actually grew in the decades after *Brown*, as a result of continuing residential segregation. Racial separation is rooted in social and economic patterns that are beyond the reach of the courts, and we have not mustered the will—or the wisdom—to overcome it. Douglas provides a useful background to the continuing effort to bring African American children and youth into the main-

stream of American education and thus of our society.

CHARLES L. GLENN
Boston University

AMANDA I. SELIGMAN. *Block by Block: Neighborhoods and Public Policy on Chicago's West Side*. (Historical Studies of Urban America.) Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2005. Pp. xiii, 301. \$25.00.

The racial transformation of the urban environment is a major theme in late twentieth-century U.S. social and political history. The Great Migration not only helped to transform previously all-white neighborhoods into predominantly black communities but also fueled the white exodus to outlying suburbs. In the burgeoning popular and scholarly literature on this subject, the notion of "white flight" occupies a central place. In this book, Amanda I. Seligman reminds us that the rise of a predominantly black neighborhood on Chicago's West Side was the product of contingent historical forces. She argues that a primary focus on "white flight" underplays the complexity of white motivations and responses to neighborhood change. In her view, with the arrival of African Americans, white West Siders added race to an already existing spectrum of discontents with their postwar neighborhoods.

Seligman documents the transformation of the West Side from an area with three relatively distinct communities—North Lawndale, West Garfield, and Austin—at the outset of the century into a more decidedly West Side identity by the mid-twentieth century. Long before the arrival of large numbers of black people on the city's West Side, area residents had identified poor housing, schools, and recreational facilities for young people as problems requiring immediate and urgent attention. As a result of the Great Depression and the economic pressures of World War II on the housing stock, homeowners expressed increasing concern for the maintenance of their property, citing evidence of overcrowding and physical deterioration. As the number of African American residents increased during the 1950s and early 1960s, however, the need for improvements in neighborhood infrastructure received increasing support in racial terms, as measures that would also help to keep neighborhoods both white and free of "blight" at the same time.

During the early postwar years, white West Siders crafted a series of strategies designed to stem the physical decay of their neighborhoods and keep African Americans at bay. In addition to the use of harassment and violent tactics against prospective black homeowners, white residents formed organizations like the United Property Group and employed a variety of legal means to block African American access to housing in the area. Tactics included opposition to strong fair housing legislation; support for a new housing code; proposals for urban renewal and neighborhood conservation projects; and a relentless campaign to locate the new campus of the University of Illinois in the Garfield Park area. While the Chicago Public Schools enabled

white West Siders to maintain racially segregated schools by adopting mobile units and placing students on double shifts, the West Side lost out to other, more influential constituents in each of its bids for urban renewal projects. According to Seligman, a triumvirate of successive South Side or "Bridgeport" neighborhood mayors—including Edward J. Kelly, Martin H. Kennelly, and Richard J. Daly—channeled federal money into projects in and near downtown, particularly the Hyde Park community around the University of Chicago.

Under the impact of the modern civil rights movement, Vatican II, and escalating growth of the area's black population, West Side residents formed new groups to counteract the most extreme forms of white hostility toward black settlement and encouraged interracial cooperation. These groups included the Garfield Park Good Neighborhood Council, the Austin Tenants and Owners Association, the Neighborhood Conservation Council, and the Austin Community Organization, to name a few. Although these groups adopted the language of interracial cooperation, they nonetheless accented a need to "manage" rather than foster a fully integrated community or one in which whites might eventually become a numerical minority.

Despite the West Side's many strategies for maintaining a racially homogenous community, such efforts ultimately failed. By the 1980s, Chicago's West Side had become a predominantly African American neighborhood. According to Seligman, the area's white residents reluctantly chose "flight" to the suburbs as a final option in their multiple responses to residential change. Thus, in her view, when they finally made their trek to the suburbs, it represented a sense of defeat or loss rather than a feeling of triumph and the accomplishment of a life-long dream. For their part, African Americans perceived their increasing settlement in the area as a partial victory, but the outbreak of race riots in the 1960s underscored their bitter dissatisfaction with the terms by which they were forced to occupy deteriorating housing stock.

This book represents a significant contribution to the literature on U.S. urban history, race, and policy in the years after World War II. Scholars, policy makers, and activists seeking a more nuanced portrait of white reactions to neighborhood change will find this study quite compelling. It convincingly challenges existing interpretations of "white flight."

JOE WILLIAM TROTTER, JR.
Carnegie Mellon University

RICHARD B. PIERCE. *Polite Protest: The Political Economy of Race in Indianapolis, 1920–1970*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 2005. Pp. x, 155. \$39.95.

This book focuses on three spheres of African American life in Indianapolis: schools, housing, and jobs. In five essays, Richard B. Pierce explores why Indianapolis' black community adopted a politics of negotiation and incrementalism, and why the city's substantial Af-

rican American community could never translate its numbers and institutional development into success in the political arena. Some readers will find his answers less than convincing because of the book's narrow focus, but most will recognize that Pierce poses important questions, provides careful research, and approaches his sources with an open mind.

Each essay inquires into a particular aspect of education, housing, or employment, with an emphasis on the impact of segregation and discrimination on the one hand, and political response on the other. The essays, well grounded in local primary sources, are consistently interesting, informative, and a welcome departure from the conventional insistence on reading just about any sort of behavior as transgressive and oppositional. Pierce carefully parses verbs that have become keys to African American political history: the black leadership in Indianapolis did not "resist"; it did not "accept." But it did "cope" and even "push." It seldom "challenged." Pierce observes that the glare of the customary spotlight on confrontation, on "the dramatic and the explosive," too often relegates to the shadows the larger pattern of negotiation—both at the leadership level and in the everyday. The subtleties of politics emerge clearly from these essays because Pierce strikes a careful balance between accepting and interrogating the understandings and perceptions that his subjects bring to their struggles.

What we miss, however, is a stronger sense of contextualization. At the level of local history, this is a difficult task, because Indianapolis has received limited attention from historians. But much of this book exists also within larger, well-studied contexts. Consider, for example, Pierce's observation that success at high school basketball—a serious matter given the civic culture of Indiana in general and Indianapolis in particular—did not win for African Americans the legitimacy they expected (or among the less optimistic, hoped for). "Rather than elevate African Americans to a social and political strata of equality, whites changed the cultural meaning of sport" (p. 126). Surely the literature in the history of sports, especially sports and race, would offer him opportunities to take this further.

In general Pierce offers insightful hints rather than opting for greater analytical depth. The ineffectiveness of "polite protest" in Indianapolis offers a compelling rebuttal to whites who claimed that "African Americans were too impatient" (p. 124) when they went into the courts or took to the streets. Patience and diplomacy clearly generated only limited rewards in Indianapolis. Pierce appropriately takes President Dwight D. Eisenhower and his contemporaries to task for their "simplistic and fallacious" arguments that confrontation "only worked to harden opposition to integration" (p. 124). But he misses an opportunity to directly confront a massive and influential literature on "white backlash," whose critique of black militance fails to account for the failure of patience and gradualism in places like Indianapolis. In this northern city a largely defensive strategy rooted in a fear of losing ground generated as much

opposition to black political participation as could be found in cities characterized by more insistent voices of protest.

Despite its subtitle, Pierce's book is less about political economy than about political culture and community building. Considered in this broad context, and with its focus on particular issues that stand at the center of much urban political history in general, and African American urban history in particular, the book represents a useful contribution. Standing on the broad shoulders of such scholars as Elsa Barkley Brown and Earl Lewis, Pierce admirably defines community less by who constitutes it than by what those people and institutions do. Like Brown, who looks at community as an ongoing process of work, Pierce thinks about history through verbs. He also thinks about history as a challenge to explain not only what happened, but also what did not happen. Pierce can do this because he has read his sources with an open mind, has listened to the people about whom he is writing, and has generated narratives that suggest an appreciation of the nuances of time and place. In the end he is critical of the strategies adopted by the Indianapolis black leadership; but he is also respectful.

JAMES GROSSMAN
The Newberry Library

KRISTE LINDENMEYER. *The Greatest Generation Grows Up: American Childhood in the 1930s*. Chicago: Ivan R. Dee. 2005. Pp. xiii, 304. \$27.50.

In this book, Kriste Lindenmeyer surveys a broader cohort of Depression youth than any previous historian. Probing the Depression's impact on infants, toddlers, children in the primary and secondary grades, dropouts, transients, the ill, youth on the farm, in school, and in work ranging from the street trades to the mills, she then turns the question around and asks how the responses of young people helped recast their social identities and roles. Writing with exceptional clarity, she maintains that government and children together in "the 1930s established the legal and cultural infrastructure for the ideal of American childhood that proliferated in the postwar years" (p. 5). Decorated with individual stories and dramatic anecdotes, hers is the most accessible survey yet of a sprawling generation conventionally studied only in its constituent parts.

The definitions of 1930s social activists and political leaders and the methodologies of historians were responsible for the analytical partitioning of children and youth from which Lindenmeyer deviates. When reformers spoke or wrote of "the youth problem," they meant the quandaries of Americans aged eighteen to twenty-five. When they targeted children in the primary and secondary grades, they looked to the Children's Bureau or state legislatures. They hoped that the New Deal for the adult unemployed would somehow provide unintended benefits for children and youth. It did, Lindenmeyer shows, in passages that become a major subtext of the book. Historians, respectful of their own profes-

sional obligation to understand the perspectives of the past and accustomed to writing separate monographs about the Civil Conservation Corps, National Youth Agency, Children's Bureau and the like, generally adopted the same tact of studying children and youth in isolation from one another. Taking down the partitions, Lindenmeyer convincingly argues that our age's definition of the entire group of young people (from birth to young adulthood) as a protected class whose most appropriate place was in school originated during the Depression. If Lindenmeyer's modern holistic approach occasionally also leads her to somewhat unfairly measure the New Deal against such values of the present as full gender equality, the benefits seem to substantially outweigh the costs.

The author discusses a plethora of government agencies not normally associated with children or youth that nevertheless revolutionized the lives of the young people they reached. With the advent of the U.S. Public Health Service, the Federal Emergency Relief Administration, the Resettlement Administration, and the building of schools, hospitals, and sewers by the Public Works Administration, the health and schooling of children was improved along with the lives of the adults for whom these services were intended. The perennial American scourge of child labor was first attacked by the labor codes of the National Recovery Administration (another example of a fringe benefit for youth from an effort to release jobs for adults) and then substantially eliminated (in the nonagricultural trades) by the Fair Labor Standards Act.

Lindenmeyer widens the lens further to encompass children and youth as "players and consumers" of popular culture. She observes that access to the electronic media, the declining numbers of the young as a percentage of the population, and the increasing time spent in a segregated setting of school, created the first mass-produced "youth culture": that is, a culture that was "by" as well as "for" the young. The lesson to be imparted, drummed in by Shirley Temple, the Little Rascals, and many similar cultural models, was that an American's early years were ideally to be spent freed from the concerns of adulthood and laboring only in school work.

Lindenmeyer concludes that the decade's many accidental, incidental, and peripheral improvements for young people, though real enough, were limited in impact by their very provenance. The New Deal did much but not enough. Franklin D. Roosevelt's sometimes apologetic defense of the New Deal as an emergency response suggested that youths' needs were new and temporary, devaluing their importance while producing a memory of Depression youth at odds with the facts. Forgotten was the fact "that inequities highlighted by the 1930s crisis continued to exist for many young people."

Like the Tom Brokaw book that it references, Lindenmeyer's book is replete with anecdotes of actual children and young people who battled the Depression and who speak for themselves in these pages. If "an

ecdotal evidence" is regarded as a contradiction in terms, these vivid stories may not help advance the author's argument. Nor is her exceptionally lean and clear writing style a prerequisite to acceptance of her many provocative claims. But readers unprepared for these styles and devices in a scholarly book will doubtless appreciate them. The book informs us of much we did not know about the changing history of twentieth-century children and youth, and the way it informs us is an added delight.

RICHARD A. REIMAN
South Georgia College

PAMELA RINEY-KEHRBERG. *Childhood on the Farm: Work, Play, and Coming of Age in the Midwest*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 2005. Pp. xi, 300. \$34.95.

Pamela Riney-Kehrberg's book is a valuable contribution to the history of the Midwest generally, and the history of childhood in the United States specifically. The book is based on a thorough examination of diaries, memoirs, and school records from a number of midwestern states, primarily Iowa, Wisconsin, Illinois, Minnesota, and Nebraska. Riney-Kehrberg's work confirms the thesis established by others (e.g. Elizabeth Hampsten in *Settlers' Children: Growing Up on the Great Plains* [1991]) that rural midwestern childhood was dominated by work, school, and play—in that order. More than other accounts dealing with the lives of children in the rural Midwest, however, Riney-Kehrberg's work includes sophisticated contrasts to larger (that is to say urban) cultural developments related to childhood. The result is that the reader has a better sense of what was lost and what was gained in the great agricultural transitions of the twentieth century. The book makes several important contributions, including insights into differing ethnic beliefs and practices related to work (women of German and Scandinavian descent, for example, were far more likely to work in the fields than women of English ancestry); a thorough examination of Wisconsin State Public School records that sheds light on the circumstances faced by the very poorest children in rural Midwest society; and two longitudinal accounts that provide a glimpse of how the lives of rural teachers unfolded over time.

The book is not without shortcomings, however. For instance, there is much discussion of the Country Life Movement of the Progressive era, given its focus on rural youth, but the movement is not well contextualized. To be sure, Country Life reformers wanted to keep rural kids in the country, but the motives for this desire are not explored. The creation of the Country Life Commission in 1907, for example, precisely coincided with the heaviest Southern and Eastern European immigration through Ellis Island. Rural sociologists feared "racial degeneracy," "folk depletion," and "race suicide" that would inevitably occur if America's rural youth mixed with the "lower orders" who were crowding into the nation's cities. Keeping rural youth in the

countryside, according to the elites who created the Country Life movement, was a way to maintain racial purity and prevent the gradual diminution of American intelligence. Ignoring these connections handicaps our understanding of Midwest history, rural and urban.

In fact, only scant attention is paid to what rural midwestern children learned about immigrants, poor tenant farmers, or members of different religious denominations. Although chapter three (p. 61) begins with an epigraph from a child's diary that mentions playing "Blackman" on the school playground, Riney-Kehrberg fails to expose such a game as a piece of the school's hidden curriculum. The reference is repeated later (p. 85), but there is no analysis related to how such games, or how "catching a nigger by the toe," taught generations of rural youth about African Americans.

Educational historians might quibble with some of Riney-Kehrberg's analysis. As an example, she maintains that "Nebraska's school laws were perhaps the most lenient of any in the Midwest" (p. 70). This statement is based on her reading of the state's compulsory attendance laws, which were relatively weak, and on the fact that Nebraska's urban schools were required to stay in session longer than its rural schools. But the reality is that in other areas of school law Nebraska was an educational leader, not just in the Midwest but nationally. For example, it trailed only Massachusetts in passing legislation that forced school districts to provide free textbooks for all students. It was one of the first states to allow women and tenant farmers to vote at local school elections, well before the end of the nineteenth century. Far from being the "most lenient," Nebraska's school laws betray a steadily increasing commitment to democracy as the first measure of fit with respect to its educational policy. Riney-Kehrberg's dismissal of Nebraska's school laws on the basis of compulsory attendance alone may mislead readers.

These shortcomings need to be weighed against the book's considerable strengths, however. As far as providing a glimpse into the work lives of twentieth-century rural youth, the book is very likely the best that is available. As the percentage of the U.S. population engaged in agriculture declined to a mere two percent before the twentieth century closed, the history of childhood on the farm all but disappeared with it. Riney-Kehrberg's work, however, which includes excellent photographs, preserves our understanding of what rural lives were like in an era long since gone.

PAUL THEOBALD
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ALICE BOARDMAN SMUTS. *Science in the Service of Children, 1893–1935*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2006. Pp. xiv, 381. \$55.00.

During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, human science and social reform discovered the child. The result was the creation of a reform-oriented child science devoted to researching the cognitive, psychological, emotional, and social development of chil-

dren with the aim of applying the knowledge gained to improving children's lives and thus improving society. Alice Boardman Smuts attempts to illuminate the origin and institutionalization of this child science in the United States by exploring how human scientists, female reformers, and philanthropists acted independently and jointly to establish government agencies and to fund private organizations devoted to researching American children and their lives. In particular, Smuts examines the origins and evolution of what she sees as the three major models of child research that developed during the first decades of the century. The first of these was clinical research into children with emotional and behavioral problems, research that was at the center of the child guidance movement and provided a wellspring for child psychology. The second was the sociological and aggregate statistical research of children's social condition that was pursued by the U.S. Children's Bureau. And the third was the research into the physical, mental, and emotional development of normal children that had its origins in the late nineteenth-century child study of G. Stanley Hall and his followers but achieved institutional and scientific maturity in the founding of child development institutes like the Yale Clinic of Child Development (1911) and the Iowa Child Research Station (1917).

Smuts's individual research models have already received considerable scholarly scrutiny, most notably by Kathleen W. Jones in *Taming the Troublesome Child: American Families, Child Guidance, and the Limits of Psychiatric Authority* (1999), Kriste Lindenmeyer in *A Right to Childhood: The U.S. Children's Bureau and Child Welfare, 1912–1946* (1997), and Hamilton Cravens in *Before Head Start: The Iowa Station and American Children* (1983). Smuts's aim, however, is to be more comprehensive than these focused studies and to show how the models developed in consort with each other and had similar philanthropic, theoretical, and sociopolitical foundations.

Smuts divides her study chronologically into three sections. In the first, "Preparing the Way," she traces the transformation of nineteenth-century domestic ideology into a maternalist reform ethos that found support and expression in the corresponding emergence of social science, child study, and parent education and an arena for action in Progressive-era child welfare reform. In the second section, she outlines the creation during the second decade of the century of the three models of research, describing the development of the Children Bureau under Julia Lathrop, the emergence of child guidance clinics in response to changing theories of juvenile delinquency, and the founding and early work of the Iowa Child Welfare Research Station. In the third section, Smuts illustrates her thesis that while other Progressive reforms faltered after World War I, science in the service of children gained momentum, as child guidance gave birth to child psychology, as the early experimental child development research evolved into a well-funded and institutionalized science, and as the Children's Bureau, although faced with

mounting political opposition, helped design, implement, and manage pioneering infant, maternal, and child hygiene programs and succeeded in institutionalizing those programs. Indeed, in Smuts's opinion, the 1920s truly deserves the appellation "the decade of the child."

As Smuts intended, the strength of her book is the grand sweep of its focus and its broad inclusivity in describing the origin and development during the early years of the twentieth century of a reform-minded child science. Yet that strength is also its weakness. In order to cover so much, Smuts sacrifices narrative and thematic development in favor of content. Her chapters are organized into a series of informative individual entries, often no longer than a page and a half, that are set off by subtitles. As a consequence, the book reads less as a tightly argued monograph than as an encyclopedic resource, capable of being consulted on almost any facet of early twentieth-century child science. While one might wish for more, this represents no mean feat. And in producing such a resource, Smuts has guaranteed that her book will have a long and useful life.

RICHARD A. MECKEL
Brown University

DAVID B. WOLCOTT. *Cops and Kids: Policing Juvenile Delinquency in Urban America, 1890–1940*. (History of Crime and Criminal Justice.) Columbus: Ohio State University Press. 2006. Pp. x, 264. Cloth \$44.95, CD \$9.95.

Over several decades, historians have moved the study of juvenile justice from theory to institutional formation to actual practice. Class and race have loomed large in analysis; some of the best recent work has explored the influence of gender, particularly on the treatment of girls. But one organization, the juvenile court, has remained central to all such studies. David B. Wolcott takes a major step toward forming a more complete model of how juvenile justice developed and changed over time. Since many more youths had encounters with police—warnings, even arrests—than ever appeared in juvenile court, the police records that Wolcott has used offer a much broader perspective of both juvenile delinquency and government responses to it than do court records. This book is, however, not an exercise in "gotcha" revisionism but an expansion that builds on recent scholarship.

A partial exception to this statement is Wolcott's first case study. Observing shrewdly that Chicago's much-discussed juvenile court experience was "perhaps more archetypal than typical" (p. 15), he starts with a long discussion of Detroit, a rapidly growing city that lacked an official juvenile court until 1907. Contrary to the claims of scholars who had taken Progressive-era juvenile court proponents at their word, Wolcott concludes that the earlier system had not been limited to excessive harshness (imprisonment) or undue leniency (unsupervised release) when dealing with juveniles. Petty theft, for example, entailed a sobering visit to the

station house, an apology, and return of property if possible, but no court appearance unless the complainant insisted or the thief was a flagrant repeater. From 1898 to 1907, police ran a "truant court" that did much of what juvenile courts did. Police assigned thirty-six percent of girls arrested to custodial institutions, often at their parents' insistence; but that was the kind of "protective" treatment that juvenile court enthusiasts advocated. Ironically, police reform and the establishment of an ostensibly protective juvenile court—rather than an increase in the frequency or seriousness of juvenile crime—boosted the number of Detroit's young people consigned to institutions in the 1910s, overcrowded the system by the 1920s, and left African American youths feeling victimized.

With just one judge, few trained probation workers, and overcrowded detention facilities, Chicago's underfunded juvenile court relied on police probation officers to screen out the small fraction of youngsters investigated (perhaps one in seven in the years around 1920) whom the court could actually handle. Chicago's unreformed police often dispensed summary justice, sometimes cuffing or threatening youngsters or locking them up for a day or two and then dismissing them without charges. Despite its fame, Chicago's juvenile court could not transcend police discretion.

As the juvenile courts and their social work methods lost prestige in the 1920s, alternatives emerged that restored the central role of police in managing juvenile delinquency. This is an important conclusion, as many studies of juvenile justice have turned thin after focusing on Progressive-era courts. Psychological clinics enjoyed a brief vogue but proved expensive and ineffective against recidivism. More common was an atheoretical, two-pronged approach that drew upon growing fear of crime in the 1920s and 1930s. First, police sponsored recreation programs—police athletic leagues, Scout troops, and junior police clubs—to divert potential delinquents' energies. Second, they emphasized aggressive crime fighting that would deliver more serious offenders to the juvenile courts, thereby changing those courts into crime-control as well as youth-reform agencies. The notorious Los Angeles Police Department serves as the main example of these new emphases. Wolcott argues that boys' crimes remained mainly nonviolent and impulsive, but that widespread availability of expensive, easy to steal automobiles in Los Angeles turned casual thieving into a felony. He also concedes that police faced an increasingly violent Latino youth subculture. The LAPD targeted grand theft auto and harassed gatherings of Mexican American youths, stoking hostility that erupted in the 1940s.

Shifting emphasis from one city to another as the discussion moves from 1890 to 1940 may slightly skew the evidence, although Wolcott sketches developments in other cities besides Detroit, Chicago, and Los Angeles. But the shifting focus helps to highlight patterns in complex and detailed data. The discussion is enlivened with many brief accounts of boys and girls misbehaving

and police responding, sometimes roughly but often with good sense and sympathy. Still, the main arguments depend on summaries of police politics and policy and on numerical trends and comparisons that rest in turn on reports of numbers and percentages—arrest rates, types of status or offense, disposition of cases—subdivided when possible by sex, age, ethnicity, and year. Because Wolcott can use only what the police recorded, categories and time spans are not always fully comparable. Wolcott writes well, but the level of detail is daunting. The reward for close reading is a much expanded understanding of the messy complexities, cross-currents, and changing patterns of what we call juvenile justice.

DAVID I. MACLEOD
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DANIEL THOMAS COOK. *The Commodification of Childhood: The Children's Clothing Industry and the Rise of the Child Consumer*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 2004. Pp. x, 211. \$21.95.

This brief but important book exemplifies how historians and other social scientists can learn from each other. Sociologist Daniel Thomas Cook situates his study of children and consumerism in the period between 1917 and the 1950s, when, he believes, the children's wear industry helped to "commodify" childhood and thereby form the foundation of modern consumer society. In crafting his analysis around children, Cook squeezes his way between two current theoretical models: the vulnerable child, exploited by adults, especially commercially minded adults, on one hand, and the agentive child, exerting her or his desires and will to create an independent culture, on the other. Cook asserts that the creation of the child consumer has its own special history (he purposely uses the pronoun "it" to distinguish the child consumer as a "discursive construct") with age-defined stages that take on economic exchange value. Thus, Cook sees a dynamic, not binary, "interplay between constructions of childhood, expressions of children's desire as reported by merchants and others, and the interests and problems of those creating an industry through time" (p. 6).

Cook shows acute sensitivity to the historical contexts of compulsory schooling, peer socialization, mass production of goods, and changes in the roles of women. His source base combines published studies in the history of American childhood with primary research into marketing journals of the children's clothing industry and of department stores. The trade journal *Infants' Department*, which originated in 1917 and became known as *Eamshaw's Review*, plays the most pivotal role because its publisher, George F. Earnshaw, articulated the double strategy of convincing mothers that they would enhance their babies' well-being by continually purchasing (lots of) ready-made clothing and of advising department store managers to attract shopping mothers by creating separate infants' sections manned by specially trained saleswomen. Beginning with infants

in the 1920s, merchants and advertisers, cognizant of psychological theories about age segmentation, began to market ready wear to different age-related size groupings of children: “toddlers,” “children,” “pre-teens,” and “teens.” Girls comprised the main focus of the latter two groups because their fashion styles, needs, and desires proved to be more complex than those of boys. At the same time, once merchants understood the value of marketing clothing to special segments of the young population, they also began to adopt what Cook calls “pediocularity,” or seeing the child’s perspective on tastes and desires. This factor was critical in the influence that children came to have, both in encouraging merchants to stock clothing that satisfied children’s developing self-consciousness and in the cultivation of the “nag” factor by which they cajoled adults, mainly mothers, to purchase what they, the children, wanted.

In operationalizing their pediocularity, retailers applied icons of the expanding popular culture for children to make their goods more appealing, both to children and to adults. Thus Cook quotes an advertisement in *Earnshaw’s* as urging merchants to “cash-in” on the popularity of Shirley Temple, the endearing curly-headed movie star of the 1930s, by attaching her name to various items of attire. Five years old when she began making films, Temple, according to Cook, was especially important in helping to define the new stage of “toddlerhood” because the clothing associated with her included short skirts, bows, and lace, plus a style that displayed the “round belly” characteristic of the age group between three and six. More important is the increasing influence of peer consciousness that arose as a consequence of graded schools and was recognized by marketers and psychologists alike. This awareness became an important instrument for merchants to encourage children, especially teenagers and preteens, to circumvent parental control over clothing choices and elevate the children themselves as arbiters of their own fashions.

One of the fascinating yet seemingly undeveloped aspects of the book is the way in which merchants and marketers created their own brand of child psychology. Cook notes how certain individuals, such as E. Evalyn Grumbine (a business consultant, not a psychologist), applied psychological theories about age grading in childhood to the consumer market. And, in his fascinating discussion of how merchants carefully designed their displays so as to separate and attract different age groups, Cook quotes a trade journal article that authoritatively explains the psychological behavior of children in department store areas. He mentions that new ideas in developmental psychology aided those involved in marketing goods for and to children, but he really does not explain how the influence operated. There is passing reference to “Freud, Hall, Gesell, Piaget, and Erikson” (p. 91), but that is all.

Cook is quick to point out that the clothing industry neither invented nor copied age and gender designations in American society. But importantly, that indus-

try did create a “template” (p. 149) for treating children as customers whose perspective became both critical to marketing practices and to habits of consumerism that were carried into adulthood.

HOWARD P. CHUDACOFF
Brown University

ARLEEN MARCIA TUCHMAN. *Science Has No Sex: The Life of Marie Zakrzewska, M.D.* (Studies in Social Medicine.) Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2006. Pp. xiii, 336. \$34.95.

This thoughtful, informed, and highly readable biography describes an important figure in U.S. women’s history and the history of medicine. Marie Elizabeth Zakrzewska (1829–1902) emigrated to the United States in 1853, having practiced as an accredited hospital midwife in her home city of Berlin, Germany. She sought the M.D.—available to women at this time only in the United States—and a clinical practice. But despite the degree’s theoretical availability, few medical schools accepted women. Zakrzewska’s personal desire for opportunities identical to men’s quickly became a larger quest for female equality. Emily and Elizabeth Blackwell, practicing physicians, helped her enter the Cleveland Medical College. After graduation in 1856, she worked in the Blackwells’ New York Infirmary for Women and Children. Moving to Boston in 1859, she practiced first at the New England Female College and then, in 1862, at the New England Hospital for Women and Children—only the third woman-run hospital in the country—where she was both chief physician and chief administrator for many years. By the time she retired, in 1899, the medical profession had changed so much that her mid-century radical ideas seemed deeply conservative.

With admirable adroitness, Arleen Marcia Tuchman knits together Zakrzewska’s lives as a woman and a doctor, while explaining the developments in medicine that kept Zakrzewska somewhat off balance. Women entering medicine at this time justified themselves by claiming that female sympathy gave them a special purchase in the sickroom. Zakrzewska, however, found the ideal of female sympathy deleterious to women’s professional advancement. She rejected sentimentalism for what she called “science,” although her actual knowledge of science even in her own day—not to mention later on—was meager. She found the laboratory and original research counterproductive if they took doctors away from the bedside. Ultimately, as medicine “advanced,” Zakrzewska came to look much like the caring, patient-centered, undereducated sentimentalist she had long insisted she was not. She “found herself growing increasingly estranged from the world she had helped to create but had not anticipated” (p. 229).

Zakrzewska was always less interested in curing patients than in founding an institution in which women could be trained as doctors by other women; she cared more for educated, able women than the needy, not to mention the unworthy, poor. She could be harsh and

demanding on women interns and students. In short, she was an amalgam of contradictory drives and behaviors, a woman whose manner of being ahead of her era had been shaped by, and responded to, that very era. Her anomalies are explained by Tuchman—who has written on women and medicine in Germany—as the outcome of her German training and immersion in German émigré intellectual life.

In Boston she established a household in which she was the chief breadwinner, and which included her lifelong friend and mentor, the radical immigrant thinker Karl Heinzen, and his wife, as well as her “Boston marriage” partner, Julia A. Sprague. Thus her living arrangements differed from the supposed middle-class norm of a nuclear home with a male breadwinner. These unconventionalities, like her departures from female domestic ideology and from emergent female professional norms, seem to have caused her little psychological distress; although as a very private person, Zakrzewska left little record of her inner life, and some of that record may have been subsequently destroyed by Sprague. It is worth noting, however, that her unconventionalities caused little or no distress among her friends and acquaintances. To be sure, these were mainly Boston progressives dedicated to self-directed idiosyncrasy. Nevertheless, as Tuchman analyzes Zakrzewska’s divergences from cultural norms, it occurs to me that perhaps the norms were never so well installed as historians have supposed. Middle-class women, targets of the so-called “cult of true womanhood,” were active everywhere in proscribed ways. It is impossible that so many would have been so transgressive if their actions had been understood as offenses. Tuchman suggests as much herself when she writes that standpoint and performative theories of gender may work better for Zakrzewska than binary thinking.

But normative theory carries the day, in part because some problems in Zakrzewska’s professional life really were the result of clashes with stereotype—but not, I think, a strictly gendered stereotype. Simply put, it is good to be altruistic, bad to be selfish. Zakrzewska’s published writings, which Tuchman analyzes at length, suggest that she felt a contradiction between her desire to do good for womankind and do well for herself. And gender is relevant because nineteenth-century middle-class women, as subordinate members of any partnership, understood altruism (rather than sentimentalism, perhaps) as their special contribution to society. Women often masked personal ambition behind a veneer of benevolence. But Zakrzewska’s motives matter less than her achievements, which furthered sexual equality, helping women as professionals and as patients.

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KIRSTEN E. GARDNER. *Early Detection: Women, Cancer, and Awareness Campaigns in the Twentieth-Century*

United States. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2006. Pp. xii, 283. Cloth \$55.00, paper 21.95.

In 1974, when the First Lady Betty Ford announced her mastectomy, activists heralded a new day, with breast cancer “out of the closet” and its victims no longer shamed into avoiding early treatment. In this book, historian Kirsten E. Gardner demonstrates just how short memories can be. Throughout the twentieth century, such prominent groups as the American Association of University Women, the Women’s Field Army of the American Society for the Control of Cancer, the General Federation of Women’s Clubs, and the American Cancer Society had conducted vigorous public health campaigns, trafficking in the discourse of early detection and early treatment as guarantees of cure. In doing so they had frankly discussed topics that might have been taboo in the nineteenth century, such as diseases of the breast, ovaries, uterus, and cervix. They placed articles in women’s magazines, distributed pamphlets in doctors’ offices, sponsored lectures, and held public meetings, always trumpeting the virtues of early detection. By the time of Betty Ford’s surgery, few topics in women’s health had been more discussed than cancer, and Gardner’s book dispassionately describes the crusade with keen insight.

Such frank, widespread discussions of cancer and women’s bodies had a dark side. Implied in the rhetoric of early diagnosis was the expectation of cure if surgeons had a timely opportunity to diagnose and to operate, and the accompanying assumption that patients, not doctors, therefore bore the responsibility if treatment failed. The women simply had not heeded the warning signs or had postponed seeking medical attention. Gardner sensibly avoids the temptation to see such attitudes exclusively in gender terms. Americans have a habit of blaming the victims, whether AIDS patients for their sexual preferences, lung cancer and head and neck cancer victims for tobacco use, or melanoma patients for enjoying too much sunshine. That they blamed women for breast cancer should come as no surprise.

Gardner also demonstrates an understanding of cancer medicine. For a time, especially after it became abundantly clear that simple lumpectomy combined with radiation treatment achieved survival rates comparable to those of radical surgery, some critics pilloried William Stewart Halsted, the Johns Hopkins surgeon who in the 1890s developed the radical mastectomy. He became the whipping boy for breast cancer activists engaged in the rhetoric of mutilation and accusing surgeons of butchering women, as if the doctors had sadistic streaks. Some activists ignored the fact that the Halsted radical mastectomy constituted the first demonstrable cure for breast cancer. Because of Halsted, roughly half of women with early stage breast cancer survived the disease, a figure that astonished physicians in the 1890s and gave birth to notions that cancer was not necessarily a death sentence. The establishment of the American College of Surgeons

(1912), the American Association for Cancer Research (1907), and the American Society for the Control of Cancer (1913) all emerged in the wake of Halsted's key surgical accomplishment.

He approached the disease, however, with fixed notions that did not survive the twentieth century. Halsted assumed that all cancers arising in similar tissues behaved similarly. Breast cancer cells divided rapidly and then, at some point, broke away from the primary tumor site and spread almost mechanically along tissue lines and then into the lymphatic system, where they collected in the regional lymph nodes. After a fixed period of time, they escaped the lymph nodes and, via the lymphatic system, colonized distant sites, erupted into multiple tumors, and killed the patient. Hence early detection and radical surgery. Successful treatment, Halsted and soon the vast majority of his medical descendants believed, required surgical intervention before malignant cells became deadly vagabonds. The radical mastectomy involved the surgical removal of the breast, the chest muscles, and the regional lymph nodes, all in a single, sweeping resection. The longer the delay in treatment, so his logic went, the more likely that malignant cells would exit the local tumor site and commence a deadly march. Breast cancer was, therefore, at first a local disease until procrastination on the part of the patient allowed it to become systemic.

Later in the twentieth century, oncologists upset Halsted's fundamental logic. They learned that the biology of a tumor, rather than its size or the timing of its discovery, has more to do with a patient's long-term survival and that the mantra of early detection, though hardly a pipe dream, has sometimes promised more than it can deliver. Some tumors are more aggressive than others and more likely to spread—to be systemic—from their very beginning, rendering surgery and radiation therapy ineffectual in achieving cure. Gardner again resists setting up physicians as straw men who for decades sold women a scientific bill of goods. Like everything else, science evolves, and blaming people in the past for not behaving according to the standards of the present is to kidnap them from their own time. Gardner is thoughtful, fair, and convincing. This book is the place to start for an understanding of the origins of the modern women's health advocacy movement.

JAMES S. OLSON

Sam Houston State University

BERNADETTE McCauley. *Who Shall Take Care of Our Sick? Roman Catholic Sisters and the Development of Catholic Hospitals in New York City.* (Medicine, Science, and Religion in Historical Context.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2005. Pp. xiii, 146. \$45.00.

This is a focused study of the role of Roman Catholic nuns in the founding and running of Catholic hospitals in late nineteenth and early twentieth-century New York City. Bernadette McCauley seeks to challenge stereotypical depictions of Catholic nuns as "menacing psychotics and passive church mice" (p. 96) by attend-

ing to their formative role as nurses and hospital administrators. She depends primarily on the archives of religious orders and hospitals to argue for the centrality of nursing sisters to the success of nineteenth-century Catholic hospitals, despite the later marginalization of these sisters in the mid-twentieth century.

McCauley's book is a short analysis of less than 100 pages (plus notes) that largely remains within the context of the history of hospitals in New York City. The book is organized in five chapters that consider the beginnings of Catholic hospitals in New York, the motivation and mission of nursing sisters, the styles of care and treatment given by nursing sisters, the finances structuring Catholic hospitals, and the challenges that the modernization of both medical care and medical administration brought to nursing orders.

McCauley makes a compelling case for seeing Roman Catholic nuns as a driving force behind the nineteenth-century Catholic embrace of medicalization, at a time when hospitals were often places that primarily housed the poor and marginalized. She demonstrates how the care offered by nuns slowly transformed Catholic hospitals into attractive, even prestigious, options for late nineteenth-century Catholic New Yorkers settling into U.S. society. In a related vein, she shows how the rising class status of many Catholic immigrants and their children shifted the identities of hospitals, as laypeople sought out Catholic hospitals not only for their medical care but also as places where they could adopt the role of volunteer with the hospital auxiliary or fundraising committee. McCauley also demonstrates that many of the Catholic nuns who led the way in establishing hospitals made use of their class positions and familial networks to secure property and state support, and that they were dogged and very effective fundraisers. She extends her narrative to show how forces of modernization and professionalization transformed the identities of hospitals and the nursing orders that founded them, as medical specializations supplanted parish locations as dominant markers of a hospital's identity.

Despite her goal to tell this particular story of Catholic sisters, the sisters are often puzzlingly obscured in McCauley's narrative. Perhaps due to a paucity of relevant sources, there is little discussion of the motivations or biographical details of individual sisters, and little attention given to the sisters' interactions with the sick. McCauley illustrates the text with some intriguing photographs suggesting that the hospitals were rich sites of religious, gendered, and medical symbolism, but she offers little analysis of the significance of material culture for the making of Catholic hospitals or for the construction of sisters' identities as representatives of both medicine and religion. McCauley takes care to argue against a simplistic view that the prominence of sisters in hospitals declined only because of a more general decline in vocations, and she gives some indication of how nursing sisters and hospital administrators grappled with their changing sense of identity, as they were often effectively forced to leave the hospitals they

founded under the pressures of professionalization and increasing medicalization.

McCauley's attention to the significance of Catholic sisters for the Catholic embrace and forwarding of medicalization could be profitably read in conjunction with other histories of the intersection of Catholicism and medicalization, such as Robert A. Orsi's *Thank You St. Jude: Women's Devotion to the Patron Saint of Hopeless Causes* (1996), and Barbra Mann Wall's *Unlikely Entrepreneurs: Catholic Sisters and the Hospital Marketplace, 1865–1925* (2005). In order to gain a more comparative sense of the distinctiveness of New York Catholic hospitals and their nursing sisters, it would also be helpful to read studies of Episcopalian nursing sisterhoods and other Protestant nursing deaconesses who were at work in New York and elsewhere in the United States and Canada at the same time as Catholic sisters, although in smaller numbers.

McCauley's work is a helpful contribution to the growing body of scholarship in the history of religion and medicine in North America, and its focus on nursing sisters will make it particularly of interest to scholars of nursing history and of women in religious professions more broadly.

PAMELA E. KLASSEN
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MELISSA R. KLAPPER. *Jewish Girls Coming of Age in America, 1860–1920*. New York: New York University Press. 2005. Pp. x, 310. \$45.00.

In 1898, Bernard M. Kaplan wrote that "One may be a perfect Jew and a perfect American at the same time. Judaism and Americanism as two lofty and independent ideals, are not only in full harmony with each other . . . both stand for what is lofty, true, and just" (p. 147). Kaplan's idealized view of American Jewish identity undergirds the yearnings and aspirations of the girls who are the subject of Melissa R. Klapper's fascinating study of American Jewish female adolescence. Masterfully weaving together stories of adolescent girls based on an analysis of their diaries, personal letters, and memoirs, Klapper illuminates the ways these young women grappled with contradictory feelings about their friends, family, and future. Klapper enhances her analysis of these private sources by introducing relevant periodical literature, textbooks, and institutional records. Looking at the upbringing and education of girls and young women from the Civil War to World War I, she traces the many ways in which American Jewish girls forged identities that strengthened their Americanism while fostering their Jewishness. Thanks to Klapper's excellent study, we no longer have to surmise the history of American Jewish girlhood based on information about American Jewish boys or American Protestant children.

Yet Klapper's study does more than this. Even as she focuses the spotlight on how education influenced the acculturation process for American Jewish girls, the author helps us better understand the broader topic of

American female education. We learn about the many venues in which girls gained their education, and the way gender, class, and religion affected the educational experiences of American girls.

First and foremost, Klapper demonstrates yet again the extent to which gender lies at the center of any exploration of education. She also illustrates how gendered expectations helped as well as hindered girls in getting an education. For example, Klapper notes the extent to which an increasing number of girls continued their education through high school during this period. Yet, she explains that this advance was tempered by the concurrent introduction of gendered vocational courses. Though girls stayed in school longer than in previous eras, they were more likely to study bookkeeping, stenography, and sewing rather than the liberal arts. With respect to Jewish education, gender biases worked in girls' favor. Parents were more likely to send their daughters to innovative Jewish schools since they felt more comfortable taking a chance on their daughters' education than on their sons'. This enabled girls to obtain a richer, English-language education, while their brothers were more likely to receive a rudimentary Yiddish *heder* education.

Second, looking at the experiences of American Jewish girls through the lens of class, Klapper focuses our attention on educational settings other than the classroom. Young women who could not afford to stay in school often took advantage of evening courses in institutions such as the Young Women's Hebrew Association, which offered classes in English, civics, and stenography. Other institutions, like Philadelphia's Young Women's Union, offered immigrant Jewish girls courses in household management, nutrition, and millinery, all the while subtly teaching Americanization. On the other end of the class spectrum, Klapper demonstrates the significant role of leisure culture in educating adolescent girls. Even more so than formal schooling, activities such as piano lessons, gymnastics, and reading for pleasure profoundly socialized Jewish girls into American culture.

Third, in terms of religion, Klapper correctly notes that religious differences played little part in differentiating the experiences of American Jewish girls of different religious denominations. Reform and traditional Jewish girls shared similar aspirations, anxieties, and questions. Many expressed a deep religious identity, but one that was not necessarily defined by the markers that we imagine—observance of the Sabbath or dietary laws, or regular attendance at services. For these girls, intense religiosity had more to do with inner feelings, group cohesion, and family allegiance than with specific rituals.

Ultimately, as Klapper demonstrates, the pervasive desire for acceptance as Americans outweighed differences in gender, class, and religion. Her research provides us with a more sophisticated understanding of the ways in which all American Jews—teenagers as well as adults—worked constantly to forge a balanced identity that took into account their fierce sense of belonging to

the United States along with their deep pride in their Jewishness. Ethnic group leaders today continue to struggle with the challenge of fostering and maintaining group cohesion for adolescents coming of age in the United States. They would learn much from revisiting the path taken by nineteenth-century Jewish girls as seen through Klapper's eyes. This compelling narrative deeply enriches our understanding of the intertwined roles played by gender, ethnicity, religion, and education in fostering American identity at the turn of the twentieth century.

SHULY RUBIN SCHWARTZ
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MARY McCUNE, *"The Whole Wide World Without Limits": International Relief, Gender Politics, and American Jewish Women, 1893–1930*. (American Jewish Civilization Series.) Detroit, Mich.: Wayne State University Press. 2005. Pp xv. 280. \$49.95.

The title of this intriguing volume quotes Hannah G. Solomon, famous for founding the National Council of Jewish Women (NCJW), the first national organization for American Jewish women. Ironically, although charitable women like Solomon may have viewed their horizons as limitless, gender politics placed innumerable hurdles in their paths. As they sought to provide assistance to beleaguered Jews in Europe, the United States, and the Middle East, gender roles, international politics, and Jewish identity shaped their routes to effective aid, their relationships with other Jewish groups, and ultimately, their own organizations.

Mary McCune selects three organizations that together reveal the ways in which gender politics impacted Jewish women from very different backgrounds who set themselves different goals. The NCJW began as an independent women's organization in the late nineteenth century. Hadassah originated as a women's chapter of a men's Zionist organization. Women of the Arbiter Ring, or Workmen's Circle, worked within an organization whose ideology presumed all gender-related social problems had been solved when Socialism declared women and men to be equal as workers, yet that ideology ignored domestic labor. By 1930, women in each of these organizations entered the gender politics fray to maintain agency over their own projects.

The Americanized, middle-to-upper-class women who led the NCJW understood their assistance to impoverished women in ways comparable to that of Christian women's organizations. Like certain Christian/Gentile groups, NCJW members believed that their concern for the weak and helpless arose from their own female natures, an essential trait they believed they shared with all other civilized (i.e. middle-upper-class, modest, pious) women. In their literature and organizational records they justified their political efforts to aid women by using these ideas. They succeeded because they turned existing gender roles to their benefit.

During World War I, the Joint Distribution Committee (JDC) utilized that imagery to raise funds for ref-

ugees abroad. Its "publications frequently presented (European Jews) as bedraggled women with starving children at their sides . . . effectively . . . feminizing (Jews) to . . . underscore their helplessness" (p. 56). NCJW members, experienced with actually assisting women, repeatedly asked the JDC to address the problem of rape, which it refused to do. Rather, "distress about Jewish prostitution, rather than rape, became the central element in the larger appeal to the international Jewish family" (p. 57), a focus that reflected traditional concerns for family purity. While the NCJW, Hadassah, and Arbiter Ring all raised money for the JDC's general fund, they conceptualized "family" differently than did the JDC.

Hadassah's "uneasy collaboration with male counterparts led (it) to articulate more forthrightly (its) belief in (its) own abilities" (p. 9). Proving itself to be far better at fund raising than were male Zionist groups, Hadassah emerged from its wartime submergence to male leadership with a deepened commitment to breaking free of male dominance. Least concerned with class politics and devoted to the notion that Zionism could both build a Jewish homeland and renew Jewish life in America, it grew more committed to gender equality as it fought to control its message, its fund raising, and its medical projects in Palestine.

The Arbiter Ring, or Workmen's Circle, "considered itself the 'Red Cross' of the labor movement" (p. 13). Begun in 1892 largely by Yiddish-speaking immigrants from Eastern Europe, the Ring "required that members join a union if possible and that they pledge to vote for working-class parties, which in practice meant the socialists." Instead of Zionism, it promoted secular Yiddish culture within a multiethnic state. By 1925 it reached its peak of 85,000 members (p. 13). By the late 1920s, its women had organized a Social Service Department whose assistance to needy families made it possible to address what had previously been considered "women's issues," and so of little relevance to men.

The NCJW emerged from its wartime experiences determined to reclaim control over its own work and especially over its funds. It built alliances with other women's groups, Jewish and Gentile, nationally and internationally. NCJW and Hadassah "moved closer in rhetorical and organizational style" (p. 113), yet NCJW continued to see itself as an American institution, while Hadassah renewed its commitment to Zionist goals. In both organizations in the 1920s, leaders aged and efforts to attract younger women brought new ideas about gender and sidelined old conflicts over the use of Yiddish in meetings or the desire to acculturate to American ways at all costs.

The period covered by this volume has been explored by other scholars who have assessed its various trends, conflicts, and cultural expressions. But McCune reminds us that gender politics stamped its visage on the era. By examining three organizations by which American Jewish women influenced the roiling and transformative events of their day, McCune has helped us to

understand women's lives, their work, and their effect on their world.

DIANNE ASHTON
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JUDITH TYDOR BAUMEL. *The "Bergson Boys" and the Origins of Contemporary Zionist Militancy*. Translated by DENA ORDAN. Foreword by MOSHE ARENS. (Modern Jewish History.) Syracuse, N.Y.: Syracuse University Press. 2005. Pp. xxx, 331. \$45.00.

Public participation in ethnic causes has become a standard part of the American social landscape. One does not have to be Jewish, Italian, Irish, Polish, Native American, Black, Asian, or Latino to join hands. According to Judith Tydor Baumel, the practice of making mass appeals, deeply human, interdenominational, and interethnic, welcoming diplomats, ministers, and non-Jewish public officials to the podium, was popularized more than six decades ago by a tiny delegation of media-sensitive, politically savvy Jews named the "Bergson Boys." For Baumel, the issue is not whether they won or lost during the Holocaust: their legacy for the United States was how they played the media game.

Baumel's monograph is a translation of her previously published (1999) work. It should have a wider readership now as a study of how a marginal political lobbying group shaped its environment to suit its needs. Historiographically speaking, scholars have acknowledged this process but minimize its impact or are negatively disposed to its ultimate contribution, with the exceptions of David Wyman and Rafael Medoff. Baumel's approach relies on an examination of the group's dynamic and psychology, which are analytic rather than judgmental categories.

Starting in the summer of 1939 the coterie, shortly to be known as the "Bergson Boys," arrived in America. All were young, between twenty-four and thirty, and, with regard to Palestinian Jewry, bore a nationalist outlook. They were distanced from mainstream Zionism, both European and American, which cooperated, sometimes reluctantly, with the British Mandate. Interestingly and perhaps bearing psychological ramifications the Irgun Delegation, only loosely associated with the parent Zionist Revisionists, was cut off from its own anti-British leadership in Europe and Palestine once Nazi Germany invaded Poland. If feelings of isolation engender creativity, the six "Boys," with tenuous if any group backing and few financial resources, emerged as motivational geniuses.

Taking as their central concern the dignity of stateless and refugee Jews rather than the creation of a Jewish polity in Palestine, they saw their work as socially and idealistically, rather than ideologically driven. To interest uncommitted Americans, Jews and high-profile Christians alike, they favored a nontheoretical, non-threatening approach to the American soul and psyche. Leader Hillel Kook, (Peter Bergson), secular himself but with important spiritual roots in Palestine, was an unabashed activist who made an imaginative appeal to

American humanitarianism. In staging pageants, using newspapers for bold displays, approaching clergymen and congressmen, and generally maintaining visibility for emergency Jewish causes and priorities, he undercut the Zionist Organization of America and the non-Zionist American Jewish Committee and was, therefore, unsuccessful in making inroads with notable Jewish leaders and the U.S. State Department. Nevertheless, he could count among his powerful public advocates and acquaintances anti-New Deal Senator Guy Gillette, New York Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia, writer Ben Hecht, publisher William Randolph Hearst, and the *New York Post*.

Tangible achievement, which was and still is the "bottom line" of advocacy, is a "slippery slope" for Baumel, though she has successive chapters on the Bergsons' efforts in forming the Committee for a Jewish Army, the Emergency Committee to Save the Jews of Europe, the Hebrew Committee of National Liberation, and the League for a Free Palestine. The delegation's lasting achievements might be in contributing to the formation of the War Refugee Board and, in the postwar period, becoming a paradigm for ethnic advocacy groups employing some but not all of its techniques, such as the Jewish Defense League.

The strength of this monograph is its extended analysis of a topic peripheral to Jewish scholarly concerns at least until Wyman assigned the Irgun delegation some significance in *The Abandonment of the Jews* (1984). While this is an absorbing and worthwhile contribution to American Zionist and American social history, there are two caveats. Baumel has not updated her bibliography to include Medoff's *Militant Zionism in America: The Rise and Impact of the Jobotinsky Movement in the United States, 1926–1948* (2002) and a collaborative work of Wyman and Medoff called *A Race Against Death: Peter Bergson, America and the Holocaust* (2002). She notes that Hillel Kook was born in 1915 but not that he died in 2001. Also the narrative flow is interrupted—sometimes needfully but often intrusively—by the author's directional "signals" on group psychology or group motivation. Indeed, she should trust readers to find their own way.

STUART E. KNEE
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ERIC L. GOLDSTEIN. *The Price of Whiteness: Jews, Race, and American Identity*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2006. Pp. xi, 292. \$29.95.

This is a field well-trodden in recent years, but Eric L. Goldstein adds both earnest research and close interpretation to the inherently limitless question of Jewish-American "identity." Matthew Frye Jacobson and Michael Staub, together with a lengthy list of essayists, have teased out the complications of Jewishness and whiteness from the 1890s to the crisis moments of the 1940s, 1960s, and 1970s. Their conclusion, to be brief, has been that "White" identification brought such great rewards that it could not logically be resisted. Upward

mobility edged a large portion of the Jewish American population in a rightward direction (especially important intellectuals setting the neoconservative pace), but never without contention and disappointment. A considerably larger section of Jewish Americans simply refused to go along.

Goldstein takes us further back to some basics, and then forward again in rather different terms. Jewishness, he insists most familiarly, does not fit into the black/white dichotomy, but neither could (or can) it remain wholly outside that dichotomy. During the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Jewish spokesmen sought to navigate racial and ethnic boundaries. It would have been more helpful here to deepen the contrast between the German-American Jewish establishment and the newer, considerably poorer Eastern Europeans. But Goldstein's research deepens the conversation usefully in its own quasi-scientific terms. The Progressive era was "race time" in a new key, and significant Jewish identification with (as opposed to mere sympathy for) African Americans signaled left-leaning commitments for generations to come. Goldstein's use of socialist and communist sources, Yiddish and English alike, cannot be exhaustive but is certainly illuminating.

The trauma of modern antisemitism and the reactive struggle to advance a Jewishness either ethnic or racial, weigh heavily and are treated with great care. Henry Ford's taunts, the return of the Ku Klux Klan, and the sentiments that prompted immigration restriction would inevitably have caused Jews to ask themselves whether they were to continue best as a race, a religion, or something else.

Religion itself poses such a series of complex issues that just rescuing a narrative seems problematic. Socialistic Jews were secular, almost without exception. But with the Holocaust, the Cold War, and the founding of Israel, powerful secular Jewish institutions such as unions lost their influence and their edge. Here, the problem of demonstrating racial sympathy through the use of quotation of Jewish notables becomes more doubtful, and even casts the doubt backward chronologically, to some degree. Too often, deeds had steadily less relation to idealistic rhetoric. Among the powerful, meritocracy always possessed more appeal than social democracy, and the reality of upward mobility was bound to undercut past commitments to a New Deal-style, egalitarian vision. Religion renewed important ethical issues but simultaneously walled off Jewish experience, Jewish reality, as special and incomparable to nonwhite experience.

Goldstein ends with the observation that the investment in whiteness makes transracialism difficult even for a people who in large numbers support the concept of racial intermarriage. Like the common sense conclusion that a consciousness of "being part of the Jewish people" coincides poorly with actual religious observance, it presents a puzzle not destined to be solved

soon. But this book makes a good scholarly contribution to the vital issues at hand.

PAUL BUHLE
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NORMAN E. SAUL. *Friends or Foes? The United States and Soviet Russia, 1921–1941*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 2006. Pp. xviii, 434. \$40.00.

Norman E. Saul spins a fascinating story, stretching from President Woodrow Wilson's nonrecognition of Soviet Russia to President Franklin D. Roosevelt's extension of Lend-Lease aid. Between these two points, America passed through phases, including A. Mitchell Palmer's Red Scare; Charles Evans Hughes's "business at your own risk"; Herbert Hoover's famine aid by the American Relief Administration; Soviet-American cultural "melding" led by luminaries Vladimir Mayakovsky and Theodore Dreiser; recognition long championed by Senator William Borah; attempts at accommodation by Ambassador Joseph E. Davies; and Lend-Lease shaped by W. Averell Harriman.

Saul narrates the story with grace, humor, and attention to detail. His archival research is shaped into a battle between proponents of recognition against their nonrecognition foes. He sides with the former because recognition was sensible, realistic, and not based on, as he writes, "Wilsonian theo-political dogma" (p. 5). His eight chapters move through a period already well researched, the exception being his longest and most interesting fourth chapter on "Culture." This offers Saul a chance to highlight the best side of U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations, without dwelling on its eventual Stalinist downside. Pre-1917 Russian and American culture "melded" by "symbiosis" (p. 136). One product was joint discovery of new cultural directions symbolized by Isadora Duncan, who was active on both sides of the 1917 divide. She returned to Moscow in 1921, telling Commissar Anatoly Lunacharsky that she was "sick of bourgeois, commercial art" (p. 139). Her romance with peasant-poet Sergei Esenin stirred controversy; they married in 1922 and divorced in 1923. Whether or not they symbolized melding, others did.

Nikita Balieff and his *Chauve-Souris* relocated to Paris and New York, becoming a "dominant feature" of nightlife (p. 145). Konstantin Stanislavsky brought his Moscow Art Theater to New York City in 1922, and when in Boston, he signed a contract to publish his autobiography. On Stanislavsky's second tour, President Calvin Coolidge received him at the White House. These kinds of exchanges were promoted by Boris Skvirsky, representing the Russian Information Bureau, and Olga Kameneva, head of Moscow's All-Russian Society for Cultural Relations with Foreign Countries. They became official sponsors of *amerikanizm*, the Soviet cultural offensive to gain diplomatic recognition. A supporter of their efforts was Sherwood Eddy, a YMCA secretary whose yearly study seminars to the USSR began in 1926. Philosopher John Dewey, vice president of the American Society for Cultural Rela-

tions with Russia, participated. (Nothing is mentioned about Dewey's efforts in the 1930s to defend Leon Trotsky.) Dewey met and promoted Joseph Schillinger, the talented Russian jazz musician and composer. Many black jazz musicians went to the USSR, including Sam Wooding and the "Chocolate Kiddies." Dmitri Shostakovich was taken with this Afro-American idiom, composing *Tahiti Trot* and the *Golden Age*.

America's curiosity about Russia peaked in the 1930s with the professionalization of Slavic studies and a growing number of U.S. journalists in Moscow, notably Walter Duranty and Eugene Lyons. The most famous incidents of "melding" were Mayakovsky's visit to the U.S. in 1922–1923 and the American novelist Dreiser's journey to Russia in 1927–1928. Even the Afro-American writer Langston Hughes went to Moscow, although his projects came to nothing. Others journeyed to Russia until socialist realism and the purges cooled American ardor.

The book's remaining chapters, five through eight, pursue the positive aspects of Russo-American relations. Saul's accounting notes the stresses of those persons favoring recognition. A lesser-known story, nicely recounted, is how FDR maneuvered two major opponents of recognition, Father Edmund Walsh and his supporter in the State Department, Robert F. Kelley, into a compromise based on securing religious freedom for Americans who resided in Russia. Kelley had decided recognition was inevitable and subsequently fought a guerrilla war until Sumner Welles purged the department's diehards in 1937.

All of this had much preparatory ground work, as talented technical elites and depression-era job seekers went to the Soviet Union to help build an industrial society. They were led by such experts as Hugh Cooper and John Calder. Saul correctly points out that the "American model" of industrialization dominated. Its major Russian proponent was Nikolai Ossinsky, chair of the All-Union Automobile and Tractor Industries Corporation.

It is difficult to accept Saul's revisionism on America's second ambassador to the USSR, Davies, who followed the disillusioned William C. Bullitt. Instead of the well-accepted judgment stated early on by embassy officials George F. Kennan and Charles Bohlen that Davies was unsuited and incompetent, Saul makes him out as a shrewd observer of the Soviet scene. It is not enough for Saul to excuse the ambassador of being "unfairly criticized by Kennan and others as too gullible and overly sympathetic [with the notion that] life was far from normal in Moscow" (p. 350). Notwithstanding these concerns, I await Saul's remaining volumes with anticipation.

DONALD E. DAVIS,
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ELLIOTT A. ROSEN. *Roosevelt, the Great Depression, and the Economics of Recovery*. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press. 2005. Pp. x, 308. \$39.50.

The policies pursued by Franklin Delano Roosevelt in response to the economic crisis of the 1930s were hardly a model of consistency. In this sequel to *Hoover, Roosevelt and the Brains Trust: From Depression to New Deal* (1977), Elliot A. Rosen describes how these seemingly haphazard responses came about. The new president is portrayed as surrounded by experts beholden to traditional images of the economy that were poorly adapted to circumstances of the 1930s, and by others whose ideas were innovative but not always realistic politically. Roosevelt is shown as responsive to special interests and altering policy with an eye toward reelection, virtually from the start.

The canvas for this portrait is a detailed narrative of contemporary policy debates. Rosen uses documents from the Roosevelt Library in Hyde Park, New York, and scores of other manuscript collections to reconstruct contemporary discussions. For the scholar and the student, the resulting volume is valuable simply for illustrating the richness of the available archival materials and what can be done with them.

Ultimately, FDR's personality is invoked to explain his administration's new departures, ongoing adaptations, and periodic policy reversals. The president is portrayed as a committed experimentalist, as inclined to split the difference when confronted with diametrically opposing views, and as overly influenced by whoever had happened to visit him most recently.

All this has a ring of truth. That said, it is not really possible to understand economic policy in Roosevelt's first two terms in office independent of its effects. It was the fact that the economic impact of the gold-buying policy of 1933 was disappointing, for example, that pushed the president toward alternative measures, such as the industry boards and price maintenance schemes of 1934. Rosen is reluctant to evaluate the economic effects of the administration's initiatives. (There are a few jarring exceptions; for instance, the author concludes that monetary and fiscal measures alone were incapable of sustaining recovery—hence the administration was forced to contemplate structural policies—and that we know this because macroeconomic policies alone did not enable Japan to recover from its depression in the 1990s. This is not a view with which many—dare one say, most—economists would agree, the consensus explanation of the impotence of Japanese policy being rather that monetary and fiscal stimulus were applied inconsistently.) Absent an assessment of their effects, it is not really possible to understand why FDR chose to stick with some policies while abandoning others.

This reticence may be related to another limitation of the book: namely, that it does not offer an account of the causes of the Great Depression. It is not possible to analyze satisfactorily the effects of policy responses absent a view of what brought on the slump in the first place. At various junctures the author points to financial instability and perverse monetary policies, both home grown and imported through the operation of the international gold standard. But it is not always clear

whether these passages represent the author's own view of the causes of the Depression or those of the individuals featuring in his account. In the end, the weight to be attached to different factors remains unclear.

A strength of the volume is that it encompasses the entire Roosevelt presidency. Indeed, the analysis extends further, into speculations of how experiments with planning in the 1930s affected American economic policy in the aftermath of World War II. Its weakness is that Rosen's treatment of the economics of recovery is less than comprehensive. Little is said, for instance, about the reconstruction of the U.S. banking system. The banking crisis and policies toward it are shunted aside on the grounds that "the loss of depositors and investors in failed banks amounted to [only] \$2.5 billion as opposed to a decline of \$30 billion in real Gross National Product in the early depression years" (p. 6). But modern scholars regard the direct losses of depositors and investors as only part of the costs to the economy of the banking panics. Indeed, in historical accounts like that of Federal Reserve chairman Ben Bernanke, the banking crisis is the key factor explaining why the Depression was more severe in the United States than in other countries.

Rosen characterizes his book as an effort to bridge the gap between economists and historians. But economists will want to know more than how politics, personalities, and predispositions shaped opinions and affected their reception. They will want to know how views were altered in response to developments in the economy, developments that in turn were not independent of earlier views and of the policies to which they gave rise. For these aspects of the story, the reader will have to go elsewhere.

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SUSAN CURRELL. *The March of Spare Time: The Problem and Promise of Leisure in the Great Depression*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press. 2005. Pp. 235. \$39.95.

Susan Currell has written a worthy book that focuses our attention on Depression-era debates among New Deal policy makers over what she identifies as "the problem of leisure." With the increase in unemployment that was both symptom and cause of the Great Depression, the question of what Americans would do with their increased free time loomed larger and larger among sociologists, economists, social reformers, and government officials. How could Americans be persuaded to spend their leisure time on wholesome recreational activities that would fortify body, mind, and spirit instead of on the mindless and debilitating products of commercial, mass culture?

The leisure problem was deemed of such importance that New Deal officials established the New York Committee on the Use of Leisure Time, in 1933, and, in succeeding years, designed and funded a wide variety of

recreation programs through the Federal Emergency Relief Administration and the Works Progress Administration. Though puny in comparison with European programs of subsidized recreation and travel, U.S. government spending on recreation programs increased significantly during the 1930s.

Enhanced federal interest and involvement in Americans' leisure-time activities raised new questions about the proper role of government in a democracy. Did government have an obligation to regulate unwholesome amusements and fund wholesome ones? The debate was sharpened by reference to European fascist programs whose deliberate intent was to colonize and control leisure time. (Currell's discussions of leisure-time policy and programs in 1930s Italy, Germany, Britain, and the Soviet Union are especially valuable.) The solution arrived at by New Deal officials and applauded by social scientists and recreation professionals was to establish a variety of government-funded, wholesome programs for children, "out-of-school" youth, and unemployed adults: folk dancing, wood carving, handicrafts, archery, sewing, and community singing. The clear intent behind these programs was to provide an alternate leisure-time universe of agencies and activities to compete with the new world of commercial amusements.

Currell's argument for the centrality and vitality of the Depression-era debate over the proper use of leisure time is built, piece by piece, by assembling citations from self-appointed experts in the leisure field and a few writers. Her focus throughout is on the experts' discourse, not the effectiveness of the programs or the response of those for whom they were created.

After her discussion of New Deal recreation programs, she segues, a bit awkwardly, into a chapter-length survey of "the ways in which many writers of the thirties perceived the threat of the new leisure." Like the experts and officials who articulated the need for wholesome recreation programs to compete with and hopefully displace debased commercial amusements, Depression-era writers, she tells us, feared that new leisure-time activities were lowering educational and literacy standards and placing culture itself, as Waldo Frank put it, under "threat of extinction" (p. 86).

The critique of Americans' leisure-time proclivities extended, Currell asserts, to encompass an accelerated and highly gendered attack on shopping as another degraded mode of recreation. Depression-era women, the new leisure experts contended, had to be taught how to shop less often and more wisely.

As Currell shifts her focus from New Deal recreation programs to writers' anxieties about mass culture and social scientists' attacks on women as wasteful impulse shoppers, the breadth of her analysis overwhelms its cogency. Movie-going, dancing, woodworking, reading, and shopping can only loosely be conjoined in the same category. The conceptual glue that holds the study together is Currell's protagonists' critique of mass culture. All of them—government officials, writers, recreation professionals, and the social scientists—agreed

that Americans were spending far too much time, energy, and money going to movies, dance halls, and other sites of mass cultural amusements. Although Currell privileges the 1930s as a site of accelerated debate over the "problem of leisure," there was nothing particularly new or distinctive about the scope or intensity of the critique of mass culture articulated and acted upon during the Depression and in the decades preceding. Jane Addams and others had articulated the same concerns and attempted to design alternatives in the 1890s.

Though Currell may, like many of us, claim more than she can substantiate for the historical significance of her particular subject, she has nonetheless contributed in her new book to our understanding of the long-simmering debate over Americans' use and misuse of their leisure time.

DAVID NASAW

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RICHARD E. HOLL. *From the Boardroom to the War Room: America's Corporate Liberals and FDR's Preparedness Program*. Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press. 2005. Pp. x, 191. \$75.00.

Just before World War II began, the U.S. spent barely a billion dollars a year on its military. In the year after Pearl Harbor, however, it allocated \$3 billion for airplanes alone. Two years on, U.S. military spending reached seventy times prewar levels.

How this military-industrial transformation began is the chief concern of this thesis-derived monograph. Richard E. Holl emphasizes the 1939–1941 period of partial and voluntaristic mobilization before Pearl Harbor, which sought to build a secure foundation for later "emergency state" elaborations. Key to all these efforts was corporate expertise. The U.S. military was unready for modern war in 1939. The American state was also unready, lacking the "administrative resources of information, analysis, and expertise" that high technology global conflict required (p. 50). Political leaders faced stark choices. They could seek permanent state programs run by civil servants, let the marketplace rule, or create temporary cooperative wartime agencies filled with businesspeople which avoided permanent expansions of government authority.

Given "divided, fragmented civil government" and shortages of in-house military plant, equipment, and expertise, the choice was inevitable. "Bureaucratic incapacity," not conspiracy, Holl argues, kept corporate managers in Washington (p. 46). The halting and reactive aspects of mobilization, likewise, occurred because of a "corporate liberal inclination to play it safe, on economic and ideological grounds" and FDR's complementary set of gradualist "political sensibilities when confronted with isolationism" (p. 128).

A score of books have discussed World War II's military-industrial mobilizations as a decisive period in the development of the modern U.S. state. Some of these are conceptually elaborate but tend to make distinctions without differences or selectively characterize

others' arguments. Holl avoids such ideological vanity or academic self-advertisement. His view of "corporate liberalism" is based on the work of "organizational synthesis" historians like the late Ellis W. Hawley. He explains basic mobilization problems clearly and as clearly admires the job done by the businessmen who made the arsenal of democracy a reality, not an expression. Students will like this book for its clarification of the essentials of power and authority. Specialists will wish for more details about more complex wholes; in terms, for example, of strains between corporate sectors. Others will note that Holl's focus on the industrial production side of prewar mobilization is not joined to closely related prewar and wartime labor, financial, or trade policies. Many businessmen found wartime labor rules a grim reality indeed after Pearl Harbor ended the period of gradualism. Overall, this monograph helps clarify how activist businessmen began accommodating themselves to proliferating networks of public-private planning centered in Washington, D.C. It should be used in conjunction with broader treatments, both new and old.

KIM MCQUAID

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ROBERT D. PARMET. *The Master of Seventh Avenue: David Dubinsky and the American Labor Movement*. New York: New York University Press. 2005. Pp. xi, 436. \$45.00.

Robert D. Parmet's superb biography of David Dubinsky provides the first scholarly book on one of the central players in twentieth-century American labor history. Parmet details Dubinsky's tenure as president of the International Ladies Garment Workers Union (ILGWU) from 1932 to 1966 and places Dubinsky at the center of the key shifts and controversies involving organized labor in these years. Well written and exhaustively researched, this study is destined to be the authoritative work on Dubinsky's career. It fills a void in the scholarly record, since the standard previous account was a 1977 co-authored autobiography, entitled *A Life With Labor*, which Dubinsky produced in conjunction with *New York Times* labor reporter A. H. Raskin (1977). Compared to the laudatory nature of that study, Parmet's book offers a balanced assessment of Dubinsky's career. The president of the ILGWU, as he appears in this work, was made up of equal parts of idealism, pragmatism, and ambition for power. Summing up Dubinsky's influence on the union, Parmet writes, "pragmatism would outweigh ideology, but personality would often overwhelm both" (p. 80). Dubinsky was, Parmet explains, "Active, aggressive, but non-doctrinaire, he was a fighter who preferred to bargain with management rather than walk the picket line" (p. 82).

Over the course of his career Dubinsky went from being a teenage radical in Russian-occupied Poland to a dedicated anticommunist, a union president, and a perennial power on the executive board of the Amer-

ican Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO). Born David Isaac Dobniewski in Brest-Litovsk in 1892, he demonstrated his idealistic streak while still in his adolescence, joining a Jewish socialist party, the General Jewish Labor Bund, and suffering arrest at the hands of tsarist police by the age of fourteen. A second arrest led to his exile to Siberia. Fleeing Russia he arrived in the U.S. in 1911, where he eventually became involved in the ILGWU. Parmet describes Dubinsky's torturous path through the internecine conflicts that divided the union's leadership, particularly a long, bitter struggle in the 1920s over the role of communists in the union. The struggle helped transform Dubinsky into a fervent anticommunist. Assuming the presidency of a union on the verge of dissolution in 1932, Dubinsky demonstrated his pragmatism, especially a willingness to work with employers in the garment industry. "The capitalist was not his enemy during the Great Depression," Parmet writes of Dubinsky, "and never would be afterward." Under his leadership the union bounced back, going from 40,000 members in 1932 to a quarter of a million members by the early 1940s. Dubinsky soon took his place among the top leadership of organized labor. In 1934 he won a spot on the executive board of the AFL, and he continued to wield influence as one of the vice presidents of the AFL-CIO until his retirement from that position in 1969.

Parmet describes how during these years Dubinsky played a wide ranging, dynamic role in labor history. By sponsoring the creation of the American Labor Party and later New York's Liberal Party, Dubinsky promoted the active political alliance between unions, the New Deal administration, and its liberal heirs. In 1935, he was among the founding members of the Committee for Industrial Organization. Turning against John L. Lewis, by 1939 Dubinsky led the ILGWU back into the AFL where he prodded the leadership into adopting a more proactive response to the growing issue of union corruption. In the post-World War II years, Dubinsky took part in Central Intelligence Agency-assisted efforts to curtail communist influence in the labor movements of Western Europe. All the while he oversaw the impressive fortunes of the ILGWU, which continued to grow in membership through the 1950s and served as a model for progressive unionism.

In detailing Dubinsky's many achievements, Parmet does not overlook his subject's faults. For instance, the ILGWU leader was a vocal supporter of civil rights, but bias shaped the administration of his own union. Under Dubinsky's leadership the demographics of the ILGWU's membership changed dramatically as more women, African Americans, and Hispanics came into the organization. Skeptical of the leadership abilities of individuals from those groups, Dubinsky did little to bring them into the ranks of officialdom. Instead he recruited officers from outside the union, even briefly setting up a training academy for that purpose. He spoke in favor on union democracy and denounced corruption. But while the garment workers president de-

nounced other AFL officials for their failure to confront the problem of racketeering in their unions, Parmet demonstrates that Dubinsky "too, avoided confrontation" in his own union on this matter (p. 118). Parmet's balanced assessment of his subject, combined with the breadth of his research and the skillful writing, make this an exemplary biography.

DAVID WITWER
Lycoming College

JOHN E. MOSER. *Right Turn: John T. Flynn and the Transformation of American Liberalism*. New York: New York University Press. 2005. Pp. ix, 277. \$45.00.

A celebrated and widely read journalist of his day, John T. Flynn was the author of a *New Republic* column during the 1930s on economics, in which he both praised the New Deal's goals and criticized some of its policies from the Left as insufficiently ambitious. But Flynn soon shifted toward a conservative critique of New Deal liberalism. His book, *The Road Ahead: America's Creeping Revolution* (1949), popularized the term "creeping socialism" to capture what he saw as the Democratic party's dangerous ideological drift; the Republican National Committee widely circulated the work in support of its "liberty-versus-socialism" theme in the 1950 midterm election campaigns. Flynn insisted that his ideas remained consistent over time and that changing conditions explained what others interpreted as an ideological journey. Contemporaries usually viewed Flynn's claim with skepticism, as have most scholars. In this persuasive, well-researched, and engagingly written study, John E. Moser argues instead that a brand of middle-class progressivism dependably informed Flynn's analyses of current developments.

This progressivism involved a confidence in the institutions of democratic capitalism, a belief in government's capacity to remedy failings that developed within those institutions, and a faith in expertise to inform such government activity. It was a perspective that led Flynn to welcome Franklin D. Roosevelt's election to the presidency as likely to tackle underlying economic ills that he identified, such as ethics shortcomings within the financial sector. Flynn soon concluded, however, that an excessively business-friendly conservatism undermined pursuit of the New Deal's ambition to regulate and reform the economy. By the late 1930s, the administration's failure to restore prosperity consolidated his criticisms in ways that started to distance Flynn from many liberals. Revising his earlier acceptance of bigness as stabilizing force within the economy, he came to view the New Deal as "a partnership among large corporations, labor unions, and the federal government that had been sold to Americans under the brand name of 'liberalism,'" which, with worrying parallels to fascist regimes, catered to group interests and neglected the public interest (p. 101).

The bitterness of the debate surrounding American entry into World War II encouraged Flynn to reassess liberalism's nature. One of the nation's leading anti-

interventionists as the chair of America First's New York City chapter, Flynn struggled, ultimately without success, to contain the influence of extremism within the organization in order to mobilize support against what he saw as administration efforts to justify military spending in order to stabilize the economy in the face of the New Deal's failings. The consequences of this activity, Flynn concluded, was calamitous for his career, including the loss of his *New Republic* column and difficulties in finding other outlets for his work, although more conservative options soon emerged. Flynn's perception that he fell victim to a media conspiracy to silence his voice was part of a general readiness to believe in conspiracy. Moser identifies the muckraking tradition in his early journalism that exposed businesspeople's and bankers' neglect of the public interest in pursuit of private gain, and similar concerns about the arms industry informed his anti-interventionism. Among his last crusades was one in support of Senator Joseph McCarthy's anticommunist witchhunt, even though Flynn saw liberalism, not communism, as the key national threat. His enthusiasm for McCarthy marked an exception to Flynn's suspicion of politicians as dismissive of principle, an attitude that usually kept him aloof from political activity, although he supplemented his journalistic career with episodes of public service. Notably, Flynn served a term (1935–1944) as member of New York City's Board of Higher Education, during which he offered a steadfast defense of academic freedom. His conspiracy-minded worldview undermined his relevance to the 1950s upsurge in conservatism associated with the *National Review*, despite the influence of *The Road Ahead* and other works. Instead, the similarly conspiracy-minded John Birch Society claimed him as a hero.

The 1940s was a significant decade in conservatism's development, Moser argues, because this was when "anti-New Deal sentiment intersected with traditionalism and anticommunism to form a powerful ideological coalition" (p. 202). His study of Flynn creates a compelling case that this intersection is unjustifiably underexplored terrain for historians of the United States, who in recent years have enterprisingly investigated political conservatism's emergence since the era of Barry Goldwater. Moser's careful focus on an individual's intellectual odyssey does not permit a wider exploration of disillusionment with New Deal liberalism among its former supporters, whether at an elite or a grass-roots level. But *The Road Ahead*'s enormous popular and political success suggests a powerful appetite for Flynn's ideas (although other of his later works enjoyed rather less success), which, as Moser contends, deserve more scholarly attention in order to achieve a better understanding of modern conservatism's origins.

ROBERT MASON
University of Edinburgh

JOHN S. WHITEHEAD. *Completing the Union: Alaska, Hawai'i, and the Battle for Statehood*. (Histories of the American Frontier.) Albuquerque: University of New

Mexico Press. 2005. Pp. xvii, 438. Cloth \$45.00, paper \$22.95.

It is a truth perhaps not universally acknowledged that in the years after the Civil War the statehood question lost a good deal of its urgency. Before 1865 statehood was nearly always shadowed by the specters of slavery, violence, and disunion. After the war, attaching more stars to the flag became a far less dangerous and bloody business, and as a result histories of statehood became far less compelling. This is not to say that they were insignificant stories, but what could compare to the Missouri crisis of 1820, the Texas controversy, or Bleeding Kansas? Not Alaska and Hawaii, certainly; not even with the Cold War and the looming Soviet threat pressing the initiative onto the nation.

The importance of the story that John S. Whitehead tells about the last two states to join the union is revealed in local rather than global struggles. Alaska came to the U.S. in 1867, mocked at first as a frozen wasteland almost empty of people but thickly populated with ice and polar bears. Gold, mineral, and coal mining helped the territory somewhat escape its reputation as "Seward's Folly," but it was not until 1941, with the raising of defense installations and the start of World War II, that its ultimate worth as a defense outpost would be appreciated. Whitehead argues what emerged from the other side of the war was not Old Alaska "merely transformed" (p. 126) but an entirely new Alaska. For the first time the territory had a true city: Anchorage. Also, many of those who came to Alaska during the war, both civilians and servicemen and women, stayed afterward to join in the statehood struggle. Whitehead tells us, unsurprisingly, that the war was the pivotal moment in the story for both territories, particularly for the islands that were bombed on December 7, 1941. The chapters on Alaska, in particular the later ones, quickly become formulaic and predictable. Hesitation over the territory's political and economic immaturity and questions over its readiness to become a state were, in the final account, overwhelmed by the facts of geography: Alaska stood between the Soviet Union and North America.

The chapters on Hawaii are by far the more interesting ones: first, because the islands were taken by the U.S. under highly controversial circumstances following the war of 1898; second, because Hawaii was more fully formed in the consciousness of Americans; and third, because by the time of the war (and unlike Alaska), it had the requisite population for statehood, but whites made up a minority of the islands' multiracial citizenry. The last point provides the context for one of the more thought-provoking and previously unfamiliar moments in the entire book, as the author relates how, during World War II, local authorities resisted forcing Hawaii's Japanese citizens into internment camps. By the end of the book, Hawaii's place in the nation, well-established politically, seems ambiguous symbolically. To most Americans, it remains more the object of the tourists' exotic fantasy than a co-equal state with very

real problems. "We're so tired of mainland sociologists coming over and proclaiming Hawai'i a racial paradise," said one citizen. "We have real racial and ethnic tensions as well as social and economic problems here" (p. 352).

Whitehead has given us a fair book, simple and direct in its approach to a potentially complex and wide-ranging subject, but with nothing particularly original to say. While the archives figure prominently in the research, much of the more compelling material was drawn from oral histories and interviews with the last living participants of both statehood movements. Some of the best moments of the book come out of Whitehead's interviews. This material rescues the narrative from becoming just a rather dull legislative history. As interesting as the oral histories are at times, some readers might find other elements of it lacking. Colonialism and imperialism act more as a background to Whitehead's narrative than as vital analytical categories. Much more would have been revealed about the political and cultural dynamics of statehood in both cases had gender been applied more aggressively, particularly in the chapters dealing with Alaska, where the military presence figured so prominently. Race, also, is handled in a somewhat matter-of-fact way. Hawaii's racial mix, we are told, was not an obstacle to statehood, as it had been to annexation at the end of the nineteenth century. Opposition from southerners in Congress, who were already hostile to civil rights, never materialized to the degree that supporters of Hawaiian statehood expected, and Asian American representatives, we are told, found more support than racist hostility when they came to Washington, D.C. While this book probably will not reshape any subfield (even those focused on the histories of Alaska and Hawaii specifically), it deserves some attention from historians of U.S. foreign relations interested in the Pacific, western historians, and others interested in the links that connect this country's domestic politics to the wider world.

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ROBERT J. SCHNELLER, JR. *Breaking the Color Barrier: The U.S. Naval Academy's First Black Midshipmen and the Struggle for Racial Equality*. New York: New York University Press. 2005. Pp. xii, 330. \$34.00.

For African Americans, getting into and then graduating from the United States Naval Academy was something that, for many years, seemed almost impossible. Despite strenuous efforts by many individuals, it was not until 1949 that the barrier was broken. The story of this effort and the reasons for the failures and ultimate success is the focus of this discursive and overly detailed study by Robert J. Schneller, Jr.

The book is divided into three chronological sections, recounting the efforts by African Americans to enter and then graduate from Annapolis. Each section includes descriptions of the racial politics of the era, brief

biographies of those individuals who were nominated, and accounts of their trials and tribulations at the academy. In the Reconstruction era, the navy was not as racially conscious as it would become later and no policy of segregation had been implemented. The prospective black midshipmen all faced a variety of academic and personal problems. They found their treatment by their fellow plebes as the most difficult hurdle. There was a feeling among almost all of the white cadets that the officer corps was a gentleman's club and that blacks did not belong in the club. By the early twentieth century the situation in the Navy had worsened; blacks were relegated to the steward's branch and then began to be replaced by Filipinos. The situation did not change in the first years of the New Deal. Black Congressmen continuously appointed African Americans to the academy but the candidates all failed. Schneller describes in detail how James Johnson, Jr., one such appointee, was chosen and then recounts the harrowing experiences he faced during his months at Annapolis. The author makes it clear that naval authorities made no effort to stop the midshipmen in their efforts to harass Johnson and force him to resign. They succeeded. In the last section of the book, Schneller describes how World War II changed the political and racial landscape. While the navy began the war trying to maintain the status quo, this failed because of pressure from the African American community and the efforts of the new Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal. Change became significant in late 1945 when Congressman Adam Clayton Powell appointed Wesley Brown to the U.S. Naval Academy. In the new climate, the officials at the Academy made an effort to stop some of the harassment. In addition, a few cadets went out of their way to be friendly or to help Brown. Finally, Brown himself made every effort to comply with the rules and regulations and survive the harsh treatment accorded him. For these reasons, Brown graduated. Schneller concludes the study with a brief account of Brown's subsequent military and civilian career.

Schneller's study is based on a great deal of research in primary and secondary sources, including numerous interviews with those officials and cadets involved in the integration efforts of the 1930s and 1940s. This research provided the details that really made it clear how difficult it was for any black midshipman to survive both the academic and social rigors of cadet life, basically unsupported or actively opposed by almost everyone at the academy. This perspective is one of the strengths of the book. Schneller also tried to tie these events to those of the larger political scene, both in the African American and white worlds, but he is only partially successful in this effort. There is almost nothing on the postwar era. The events that led President Harry S. Truman to issue Executive Order 9981, desegregating the armed forces, are completely absent from the narrative; apparently saved for the author's forthcoming book on the racial integration of the Naval Academy. It is almost certain that the changed political climate and Truman's interest in African Americans must have had some in-

fluence on the Department of the Navy and helped to convince some officers and cadets that they should give Midshipman Brown a fair chance. More significantly, the book is so full of details that bear no real relevance to the central theme that they become immensely distracting. For example, Schneller describes in great detail the career of Charles Young. Young is an African American army officer and West Point graduate who is only tangentially involved in the narrative on the Navy. The lives of prospective cadets, even those who washed out before they even got to the Academy, are presented with a great deal of background data, including information on their parents and families. This book would have been much better if the extraneous material had been deleted and there were more of a discussion of the post-World War II era. Nevertheless, Schneller makes the reader really appreciate the meaning of Brown's accomplishment when he graduated from Annapolis in June 1949.

MARVIN FLETCHER
Ohio University

TERRY H. ANDERSON. *The Pursuit of Fairness: A History of Affirmative Action*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2004. Pp. xiv, 320. \$35.00.

Affirmative action, in its many shapes and forms, has become a hot topic for U.S. historians of late. A product of the "new political history" that melds social and cultural change with the force of legal and institutional transformation to reveal the sources of social change, these studies have breathed life into such social policy arenas as health care, old age pensions, and welfare. In the realm of affirmative action, books by Ira Katznelson and Nancy MacLean are the most recent additions to a list long dominated by traditional social scientists.

Terry H. Anderson's book is an important addition to this literature. Based largely on secondary sources, it traces the development and demise of one of the twentieth century's most important efforts to achieve a fair, or just, society. The idea of affirmative action first appeared on the political stage in the 1930s, when African Americans sought participation in New Deal work and welfare programs. It continued into the Fair Employment Practices movement of World War II and after; and it emerged full blown, in the 1960s, in the hands of democratic leaders John Fitzgerald Kennedy and Lyndon Baines Johnson. Finally in the 1970s, the idea of affirmative action achieved a series of legislative and judicial victories. Ultimately, Anderson tells us, it was defeated by its own success. It provoked every imaginable ethnic, racial, and gendered subgroup to demand its own program for preferential treatment. The resulting backlash promoted white males as objects of discrimination and made a mockery of a path-breaking innovation.

Throughout the latter half of the twentieth century he aims of what came to be called affirmative action remained consistent: to provide a more rapid mechanism for introducing underrepresented minorities into

privileged sectors of education and the labor force than market mechanisms would allow. But their achievement remained subject to changing popular conceptions of "fairness." At first, advocates of a shift in labor market policy asked only that vocational training and jobs be opened on an equal basis to African Americans. As it became an artifact of the 1960s Civil Rights Movement, affirmative action changed its shape and form, producing a new language with which we are all now familiar, but whose meanings remain politically charged. These include "preferential treatment," "set-asides," "sexual harassment," and "reverse discrimination," as well as "goals and timetables" and the dreaded "quotas." The effort to achieve affirmative action produced a panoply of state laws, federal executive orders, Cabinet-level directives, and a range of judicial decisions that still prevail. With what utility remains the question of this book.

Anderson presents affirmative action as primarily a policy promoted by African American civil rights leaders. He demonstrates how effectively they helped to create a black middle class and to produce remarkable headway into the closed systems of professional education and skilled, unionized, jobs, even as he debates the validity of the negative reaction within a small segment of the African American community that argued that preferential treatment imposed a stigma on all blacks. His analysis of the benefits to women are less satisfying. Indeed, although women are generously included, they are clearly not central to his analysis. As a group, he tells us, "women" made powerful claims on affirmative action programs. Arguably they benefited as much or more from them as African American men. And yet, aside from the political pressures emanating from the mostly white women's liberation movement of the 1960s, Anderson provides little explanation or analysis of how and why this happened. It is especially a problem that he often does not disaggregate the numbers in ways that reveal the consequences for latinas and black women in particular.

I agree with Anderson that as the program formally called "affirmative action" comes to an end, the time for historical assessment has arrived. This book begins that process by providing crucial historical context. Serious students of the subject will find it lacking, not only because it repeats (rather than builds on) earlier evaluations but because the citations are designed for a more general public. The vaunted general intelligent reader, however, will find that Anderson has achieved his objective beautifully: he has written a balanced account of how affirmative action was conceived, spread, and then became anathema to those who had benefited from it as well as to those who never trusted it.

ALICE KESSLER-HARRIS
Columbia University

WILLIAM E. LEUCHTENBURG. *The White House Looks South: Franklin D. Roosevelt, Harry S. Truman, Lyndon B. Johnson*. (Walter Lynwood Fleming Lectures in

Southern History.) Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press. 2005. Pp. xi, 668. \$45.00.

When William E. Leuchtenburg gave the fifty-third annual Walter Lynwood Fleming Lectures in Southern History at Louisiana State University in 1991, he joined a notable group of scholars who over the years have created an exceptionally distinguished and enduring American history lecture series. Louisiana State University Press has published many of the Fleming lectures; some, such as Frank Lawrence Owsley's *Plain Folk of the Old South* (1949) and Dan Carter's *From George Wallace to Newt Gingrich: Race in the Conservative Counterrevolution, 1963–1994* (1996), immediately influenced thinking about southern history. Leuchtenburg, as is his wont, spent more than a dozen years expanding and refining the lectures he originally delivered. With his trademark exhaustive archival and secondary research, shrewd analysis, and felicitous prose studded with apt quotations, he crafted a far more substantial analysis than that possible to provide through three lectures given in two days. The result is a fully realized study of the importance of place in politics as well as the significant role of the state and individual presidents as agents of change, all bedrock Leuchtenburg convictions at odds with much current historiography but persuasively put forth here.

Leuchtenburg examines three presidents who had one foot planted elsewhere but one foot firmly in the Confederacy: Franklin Delano Roosevelt as a New Yorker with a second home in Warm Springs, Georgia; Harry S. Truman as a Missourian with strong southern family ties; and Lyndon B. Johnson as a Texan aspiring to national office and seeking to escape a debilitating southern label. Each of the three had a complicated relationship with the South that nurtured the region and brought its economy more into the national mainstream while unsettling its traditional race relations. As a result, Leuchtenburg demonstrates, they transformed the role of the South in American politics.

Roosevelt's 1924 venture to Warm Springs, Georgia, for physical rehabilitation is as well known as his death there in 1945. Leuchtenburg, however, calls attention to his thirty-seven intervening trips to Georgia and consequential aspects of FDR's complicated relationship with the South. His southern exposure strengthened FDR politically in gaining the presidency, helped him in 1936 get the South to abandon the two-thirds rule for Democratic presidential nominations, and spurred his extended campaign to liberalize his party in the South. FDR's sensitivity to the region's poverty informed the New Deal, stirred profound southern social and racial upheavals, and won him widespread grass-roots support while alienating Dixie elites. Ironically, his success initiated his party's decline in the South by turning southern Democrats from the majority in a minority party to a minority in the majority party.

Truman's Confederate roots shaped his views of race, made him an appealing 1944 vice presidential candidate to southern voters, and caused white southerners to feel

particularly betrayed when, as a matter of constitutional principle more than politics, he took up the cause of civil rights. Truman's advocacy of a Fair Employment Practices Commission and his steps to desegregate the military drove a deep wedge into his party in 1948. Leuchtenburg nicely balances Truman's adherence to enlightened public principles and his benighted personal views on race in the shortest of the book's three portraits.

The exceptionally complex Johnson brought to fruition the process set in motion by his two southern-connected presidential predecessors: racial emancipation and partisan reversal. Vividly portraying the racism of mid-twentieth-century southern society and politics, Leuchtenburg provides context for Johnson's often overlooked courage in achieving passage of the 1957 Civil Rights Act and his transformation in 1960 from a regional to a national figure. He conveys extremely well the remarkable will and skill LBJ displayed in winning adoption of the 1964 Civil Rights Act in the face of the longest southern filibuster ever seen in the U.S. Senate, as well as the equally influential Voting Rights Act a year later. Leuchtenburg effectively evokes the intense emotions of both racists and reformers in the course of the civil rights battle and illuminates the political price Johnson proved willing to pay to achieve his goal of transforming American race relations. No historian has more tellingly presented the shattering of southern white male loyalty to the Democratic party or more forthrightly set forth the consequences of the disruption.

By examining the racial tensions and partisan strains with which FDR, Truman, and LBJ wrestled, Leuchtenburg adroitly reminds readers of the dominating role of race in American politics, not to mention the extraordinary steps taken by the three liberal presidents, especially Johnson, to surmount the power of prejudice. In an epilogue, Leuchtenburg underscores the achievements of the three by contrasting them with the pallid presidents who followed, two Democrats who retreated on race and a series of Republicans who bowed to the very voters Roosevelt, Truman, and Johnson willingly offended to pursue American racial equality.

DAVID E. KYVIG
Northern Illinois University

NICK BRYANT. *The Bystander: John F. Kennedy and the Struggle for Black Equality*. New York: Basic Books. 2006. Pp. vi, 529. \$29.95.

In early 1963, Martin Luther King, Jr. griped that President John F. Kennedy exhibited a "schizophrenic tendency" with respect to pursuing civil rights (p. 376). The civil rights leader meant that while Kennedy voiced stirring words in favor of racial equality, he vacillated in taking strong action to achieve it. In contrast, by the time of Kennedy's assassination later that year, another prominent black leader, A. Philip Randolph, envisioned the slain president's "place in history . . . next to Abraham Lincoln" (p. 459). Indeed, Kennedy has

grown in his understanding of and commitment to the civil rights struggle, but his conversion came too late. "For far too long," Nick Bryant argues, "Kennedy had remained a bystander" (p. 473).

Bryant's book is not the first to spotlight Kennedy and civil rights. Carl M. Brauer's *John F. Kennedy and the Second Reconstruction* (1977) covered much the same ground and used many of the same sources, but, unlike Bryant, found more to commend than to condemn in Kennedy's civil rights leadership. Building on the work of revisionist scholars such as Taylor Branch, David Garrow, Bruce Miroff, and Mark Stem, Bryant provides the most comprehensive criticism of the Kennedy administration's handling of civil rights.

Bryant devotes nearly half the book to Kennedy's congressional record on civil rights and finds it foreshadows his presidency. An upper-class Bostonian with strong ties to an Irish Catholic working-class constituency, Kennedy had little contact with African Americans and understood even less about the depth of their problems in the segregated South. Although strongly supporting key civil rights measures in the postwar period, he also believed that the federal government should play a limited role in reconstructing race relations in the South. Without a powerful moral lodestar to guide him, Kennedy navigated through the stormy legislative seas of civil rights in the mid-1950s concerned more with political ambition than racial justice. Seeking the presidency, Senator Kennedy steered a middle course between support for civil rights legislation and not offending powerful southern lawmakers.

Elected in 1960, President Kennedy followed the pattern of his legislative years. Rhetorically committed to civil rights, he temporized in proposing legislation or issuing executive decrees for fear of upsetting the southern-led conservative coalition in the Senate. In his most provocative argument, however, Bryant contends the president overestimated the strength of southern legislative reactionaries and could have overcome their opposition. In fact, he argues that the southern bloc was beginning to crumble, political moderation was rising throughout the South, and if Kennedy had wished to challenge Jim Crow forcefully he would have had public opinion solidly behind him. Besides timidity on the legislative front in addition to appointing segregationist judges, Bryant points out, the most egregious error Kennedy made early in his administration was to shy away from dealing resolutely with recalcitrant southern governors in Alabama and Mississippi. As a result, southern politicians stalled with impunity in carrying out federal court orders and refused to live up to agreements negotiated with the administration, thereby exposing the Kennedy administration's weakness and encouraging racial violence.

Nevertheless, Bryant recognizes Kennedy's contributions. The president appointed a greater number of African Americans to public office and chose as attorney general his brother Robert, who had a deeper feeling for and commitment to civil rights. The high water mark of his administration came when the president deliv-

ered an inspiring televised address in June 1963, throwing both his political and moral support behind legislation to end segregation in public accommodations and schools. Yet by temperament and persuasion, Kennedy disliked confrontation and responded vigorously only when black demonstrators created a crisis that produced violent clashes, as happened throughout the South and North during the summer of 1963. Had Kennedy displayed as much enthusiasm in fighting for racial equality as he did in waging the Cold War, he might have accomplished much more sooner.

Bryant provides a readable and largely convincing revisionist account of the Kennedy administration and civil rights. If Kennedy had desired to engineer a genuine Second Reconstruction, he would have had to exploit the political capital available to him and reimagine the Constitution as a document providing the national government with opportunities, not roadblocks, to guarantee protection for African Americans and their allies in the civil rights struggle. Still, despite differences in interpretation, Bryant implicitly accepts Brauer's assumption that the president could have led a successful social revolution. Although a president possesses considerable power and influence, this shared supposition exaggerates the importance of the chief executive in originating and sustaining a social revolution like the civil rights movement. Furthermore, Bryant cannot fully account for the president's overwhelming popularity among rank-and-file blacks. While acknowledging Kennedy's shortcomings, ordinary African Americans applauded his accomplishments and did not see Kennedy as a bystander. Rather than standing on the sidelines in the contest for racial equality, Kennedy served as an umpire whose civil rights rulings were insufficient to transform the nation.

STEVEN F. LAWSON
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MITCHELL B. LERNER, editor. *Looking Back at LBJ: White House Politics in a New Light*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 2005. Pp. viii, 303. \$35.00.

In the 1990s, a collection of Lyndon B. Johnson's taped telephone conversations were opened to public scrutiny. This potential treasure trove into the president's personality and policy making encouraged new explorations into the Johnson administration, including this collection of essays edited by Mitchell B. Lerner. The collection is a follow-up to three earlier volumes of essays entitled *The Johnson Years* (1987, 1990, 1994), edited by Robert Divine, and, like these earlier volumes, it is intended to bring fresh perspective to scholarly understanding of the Johnson years through the extensive use of newly available primary source evidence.

The essays are notable in two important respects. The subject matter of each chapter has clearly been chosen to avoid rehashing old ground and to engage with the latest scholarship wherever possible. Moreover, each chapter is based on exhaustive primary source research, including liberal use of the telephone tapes. The result

is a volume that in many ways achieves the difficult objective of breathing life into a broad field of enquiry about which we already know a great deal. Four essays deal with foreign affairs and diplomatic history, and a further five discuss domestic policy and the social context to the Johnson years. The varied and important subjects range from diplomatic wranglings over the Panama Canal to the Six Day War, and from economic and agricultural policy to the place of women and Native Americans in national politics. Although arguably some are more conceptually interesting and demanding than others, all the contributions are painstakingly researched and provide useful insights into both Johnson and the political world in which he operated.

All the contributors are keen to place the president at the center of their stories. Robert David Johnson argues in his essay on the 1964 farm bill that LBJ was a crucial player in the legislative debates over the future of the country's New Deal-inspired subsidy program, and that he brokered the settlement that ended the congressional stalemate over agricultural policy. David Shreve's important and well-argued chapter contends that President Johnson "grasped the insights of John Maynard Keynes's *General Theory* . . . and maintained an allegiance to this set of ideas throughout his administration" (p. 182). Julia Kirk Blackwater's exploration of the "gendered world" of American politics is set firmly in the context of Johnson's appointments of women to political office and his views of the place of women in national life. Mark Atwood Lawrence's chapter on the Panama Canal is intended to demonstrate Johnson's awareness of the domestic political fallout of his foreign policy and his keenness to take advantage of changed political circumstances to renegotiate relationships with Latin American states. The one chapter in the book that deals expressly with Vietnam, by David L. Anderson, discusses President Johnson as war leader. Historians interested in the intricate details of State Department maneuvering or the social impact of Great Society policy making may find the emphasis on presidential leadership slightly wearing after a while, but all the contributors make their points clearly and there is always interesting material on display.

Some of the chapters are extracts from larger book projects. In the case of Michael Flamm's essay on the Johnson administration's response to the growing "law and order" crisis in the mid-1960s, extracting material from the larger book works well, showcasing the broader thesis and engaging in a stimulating manner with the wider historiography. In the case of Jeremi Suri's essay, an intriguing thesis that places Johnson's diplomatic overtures to Beijing and Moscow in the context of the "global disruption" of 1968 remains undeveloped, dealing only with the Washington riots before launching into a narrative of the Beijing and Moscow negotiations. The "global" nature of the 1968 uprisings and their impact on U.S. foreign policy do not come through clearly, and yet one suspects these issues are central to the larger monograph. Thomas Clarkin's essay on Native Americans draws on his monograph on

the subject, and while he cannot manage to make LBJ a central figure in his discussion of federal policy, he neatly demonstrates how wider Great Society policies related to the War on Poverty had particular consequences for different social and ethnic groups.

I learned a great deal from these essays, although I did not find my views on the Johnson years gained from existing scholarship and research were hugely changed after reading them. The essays are nuanced and learned but not always designed fundamentally to reshape our conceptual understanding of the politics of the 1960s. They succeed admirably in demonstrating how much valuable primary material there still is to investigate and evaluate on the Johnson years, and how important the subjects of political change and foreign policy in those years remain.

JONATHAN BELL
University of Reading

MELVIN SMALL. *At the Water's Edge: American Politics and the Vietnam War.* (The American Ways Series.) Chicago: Ivan R. Dee. 2005. Pp. xi, 241. \$26.00.

Thirty years after its conclusion, the Vietnam War remains of great interest to the American public. In his latest book, Melvin Small reminds us again why the enthusiasm persists. This concise and well-written account provides an updated summary of the Vietnam War's domestic impact. Most of the material is available elsewhere, but this is the first work to assemble the scattered pieces into an illuminating analysis of American politics.

Small argues that, in addition to issues of national security, political concerns significantly influenced presidential decisions regarding the war. His thesis reinforces the scholarly consensus that American actions in Vietnam profoundly influenced domestic as well as international affairs. The war helped to transform the home front by destroying the foreign policy consensus and ending the Democratic New Deal coalition, initiating a severe economic recession, and escalating an attack on the news media that had long-term consequences. The book is organized chronologically, with all but the introductory chapter detailing between one and three years. Small considers it unusual, though no unique, that during the Vietnam War, presidents considered domestic events when weighing diplomatic and military strategies. In fact, he calls domestic politics the key "to understanding American policy in the Vietnam War" (p. x).

President John F. Kennedy avoided dramatic escalation to appease the political left but made significant increases in military and economic aid to Vietnam to ease pressure from the right, believing that withdrawal would bring "another Joe McCarthy red scare" (p. 13). When Lyndon B. Johnson finally escalated, he hoped that his gradual military buildup would both reassure congressional doves and lessen conservative pressure for a major war that might invite Chinese and Soviet intervention. Even though Congress allowed the pres-

ident great leeway in Vietnam, Johnson refused to call up the reserves or ask for a wartime tax increase to avoid the predictably divisive debates that would have ensued. Rather than stir up the politically potent middle class by calling up their sons in the reserves, Johnson implemented programs that facilitated enlistment of the poor.

The war contributed greatly to the breakup of the Democrats' New Deal coalition. Public distaste for countercultural protesters allowed Richard M. Nixon and George Wallace to attract conservative Democratic voters. Wartime spending undercut Great Society programs and loosened the party loyalty of civil rights activists. Democratic liberals, bitterly disappointed that Hubert Humphrey won the party's 1968 nomination despite the primary dominance of antiwar candidates Eugene McCarthy and Robert Kennedy, implemented significant party reforms for future primaries and delegate selection. George McGovern's 1972 candidacy cost the Democrats many of their traditional supporters because of differences over cultural issues.

Nixon shared Kennedy and Johnson's need to appear victorious in Vietnam until reelection. Small calls Nixon's manipulation to keep the South Vietnamese from actively pursuing peace in 1968 "close to treason" (p. 121), but he is far more neutral on McGovern's violation of the Logan Act (p. 180). Nixon played politics with the war again in 1972, timing troop withdrawals and revealing secret peace talks to undermine McGovern's candidacy. He also used unenforceable promises to get North and South Vietnam to sign an agreement. His administration attacked dissenters as anti-American, and he cynically manipulated the MIA issue for political gain. Nixon's Watergate troubles were directly related to his conduct of the war.

Small concludes by perceptively analyzing the war's legacies. Nixon rationalized his secrecy on claims of national security and presidential power that were so outlandish that even a deferential Congress and the courts had to respond. Congress reasserted its authority through the War Powers Act, which muddled rather than resolved the issues of committing America's armed forces. The all-volunteer military has theoretically allowed presidents greater freedom in using combat troops overseas because it lacks the potential for middle-class backlash that existed during the draft, but the memory of Vietnam inhibited presidential commitments abroad for decades. For liberals, the Vietnam era reinforced an image of U.S. support for authoritarian regimes and called for stronger oversight to preserve both foreign and domestic liberties. For conservatives, congressional limitations on intelligence agencies weakened national defense. Nixon's wartime criticism of the news media, although effectively refuted by several historians, became an embedded antipress bias that has eroded public faith in independent sources of information. Unfortunately, the aftermath of Vietnam brought public cynicism about their government as well, summarized by Senator J. William Fulbright's claim

that, "the biggest lesson I learned from Vietnam is not to trust government statements" (p. 4).

The social fractures of the Vietnam era certainly created disturbing trends. Despite accusations otherwise, however, Americans did not give away victory. Small argues that only the resumption of full-scale combat could have possibly saved South Vietnam. More than that, this fine book points to the origins of the American political system's current morass.

MITCHELL K. HALL
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STANLEY CORKIN. *Cowboys as Cold Warriors: The Western and U.S. History*. (Culture and the Moving Image.) Philadelphia: Temple University Press. 2005. Pp. vii, 273. Cloth \$69.50, paper \$23.95.

The movie Western in post-World War II America was a central element in a discourse of imperialism, argues Stanley Corkin in this book. Corkin has read broadly in the history of American foreign relations, Cold War culture, and politics. He analyzes sixteen films produced during the big-budget heyday of the Western, 1946–1962, asserting that "the repressed dimension of Westerns is their relationship to imperialism—and it is their indirect means of considering such activity that makes them *the genre of the period after World War II*" (p. 5).

The notion that frontier mythology helped shape American politics and foreign policy is not new. Richard Slotkin's trilogy on frontier myth springs to mind as the preeminent cultural history of this sort. What is new about Corkin's argument is his effort to map a specific ideological and doctrinal history of the postwar American empire onto a series of big-budget films dating from 1946–1962. Using a template drawn from critiques of American empire by historians and political theorists such as Immanuel Wallerstein, Walter LaFeber, Lloyd Gardener, and Thomas McCormick, as well as practitioners of the recent "cultural turn" in diplomatic history, Corkin argues that cowboy movies reflected the "core belief[s] of an important group of business and political leaders in the post-war era" (p. 4). The Western was, in effect, a mythic screen upon which Hollywood projected a finely tuned apologetics for international empire. As the ideology of the imperial elite shifted with the exigencies of open-door economic policy, the war in Korea, the evolution of containment policy, and looming trouble in Southeast Asia, "these popular film narratives helped audiences assimilate major events and both predict and react to ideological orientations" (p. 2).

Each of the six chapters relates particular films to evolving Cold War concerns. Corkin argues that *Red River* (1948) and *My Darling Clementine* (1946) were allegories representing the creation of the postwar economic order of expansionist, "open-door" corporate capitalism. *Duel in the Sun* (1946), *Pursued* (1947), and *Fort Apache* (1948) reflect a gendered vision of empire,

serving as cautionary tales warning against a utopian and feminized foreign policy. *Broken Arrow* (1950) and *The Gunfighter* (1950) were parables expressing anxiety and ambivalence about the consequences of violence and the perils of disarmament. *High Noon* (1952), *Shane* (1953), and *The Searchers* (1956) reflect imperial ambition chastened by the frustrations of the Korean War, and a nationalism encumbered by the constraints of "containment." Modernization theory and counter-insurgency make their appearance in *Gunfight at the OK Corral* (1957), *The Magnificent Seven* (1960), and *The Alamo* (1960), films which "take us from the defensive but belligerent postures of the late fifties to the paradoxes of the Vietnam era." Finally, *Ride the High Country* (1962), *Lonely are the Brave* (1962), and *The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance* (1962) express imperialist nostalgia, depicting "glory more compellingly as a matter of the U.S. past and not of its future" (p. 206).

Corkin's exegesis of the Cold War movie Western is thoughtfully grounded in a critique of empire based upon broad scholarship in culture, gender, and foreign policy. Nonetheless, many historians may find its usefulness compromised by its evasion of questions of cause and effect. This is primarily a work of textual interpretation that demonstrates a correspondence between the film narratives and the course of Cold War history as Corkin assembles it from the books of the above-mentioned historians. His interpretation is plausible; the meanings he asserts can be drawn from the narratives he describes. But the actual role that these movies played in the consciousness of statesmen or the general public, or the role that the events of the Cold War played in the minds of the filmmakers, is left to conjecture.

Corkin never uses historical evidence drawn from manuscript or other sources to demonstrate the influence of a film on political actors or its audience, or the influence of political actions on filmmakers. He occasionally does suggest that such influence was possible, even likely. In a discussion of *Gunfight at the OK Corral*, he argues that the film's alliance between a heroic Wyatt Earp and a "maniacal" Doc Holliday was analogous to the Cold War imperative for the United States to make pragmatic accommodation with morally compromised regimes. "Viewers would need to think back only to the Suez crisis of 1956 to find an occasion when U.S. diplomatic interests were opposed to the actions of their traditional allies England and France and in agreement with the views of the Soviet Union" (p. 170). Without evidence to the contrary, it is hard to imagine that filmgoers, sitting in a darkened theater watching Burt Lancaster and Kirk Douglas, would ponder the similarities between their on-screen relationship and America's role in the Suez crisis. Corkin asserts that *The Alamo* and *The Magnificent Seven* demonstrate "how post-Korea mainstream political leaders defined U.S. power as a force of good" (p. 179), but it is not clear exactly how the beliefs of political leaders were

shaped by the films, or vice versa. This rhetorical strategy mars an otherwise thoughtful endeavor.

ROBERT DEAN

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ROBERT L. TIGNOR. *W. Arthur Lewis and the Birth of Development Economics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2006. Pp. xi, 315. \$35.00.

Robert L. Tignor's book is the biography of a famous scholar, economist, and Nobel laureate W. Arthur Lewis, who died at the age of seventy-six on June 15, 1991. A talented historian has written about a talented economist, giving us an important work that is dense, accurate in details, and sensitive to people and places. Tignor is not shy in presenting some of the controversies generated by Lewis, and to admit to inadequacies where they occurred in Lewis's life. While he acknowledges the friendship between him and Lewis, and the support of Gladys, Lewis's wife, he never writes in a condescending manner nor exaggerates his praise for the man. Thus, Tignor gives us a book that is balanced in its judgment, mature in its conclusions, and concise in its language. We have a comprehensive reading of Lewis's life that illuminates his professional and intellectual contributions.

Tignor's fifth major book in a productive career, this stands apart from previous ones while providing evidence of connections with his long-lasting passions. It is his first attempt at biography, made possible by the deposit of Lewis's papers at Princeton by his wife. Rather than boring us with the minutiae of Lewis's life, Tignor offers us detailed accounts of his contributions to the discipline of economics, to public life, and to teaching. As the details of Lewis's life unfold, the key issues are those that had previously interested Tignor: European rule in Africa, African nationalism and decolonization, underdevelopment, and the legacy of empire.

Lewis's rise to fame owed very much to his essays on development economics written in the 1940s and 1950s all based on a vision that Africa and other developing countries could transform their economies and develop based on the theory of "unlimited supply of labor." The core of his idea is that poverty is not due to the inability to work hard, or to inadequate land or capital, but "due to inadequate knowledge and primitive techniques which keep output per head low" (p. 266). *The Theory of Economic Growth* (1955), his most cited book, which receives prominent attention in this biography, was one of the best read economic texts in mid-twentieth-century Africa. Lewis worked as an economic planner in the Gold Coast (later Ghana) in 1952, advising the Kwame Nkrumah-led Convention People's Party on how to attain industrial transformation. In addition, he played a prominent role in the West Indies. Some have called Lewis the "father of development economics," although it is necessary to mention in passing that his ideas and work did not lead to the creation of developed economies. The failure cannot be attributed to Lewis.

and his ideas, as conservative as some might find them, but to a set of economic and political circumstances beyond the control of any one person. Tignor is generous in analyzing the essentials of development economics, explaining some of the complications in an easy-to-read manner. He is also careful to present the vigorous criticisms of Lewis's ideas by other economists, especially those expressed by members of the free market school based at the University of Chicago.

In 1963, Lewis became the first black faculty member at Princeton University, an appointment that was much talked about at the time. He was productive at Princeton till his retirement in 1982–1983 at the age of sixty-eight, writing many essays and four major books in addition to training students, serving as the president of a major academic organization, serving on the Pearson Commission set up by the United Nations in 1969 to examine diminishing economic assistance to poor countries, and undertaking a one-year stint as head of the Caribbean Development Bank. Lewis was not active in the civil rights movement, and his views, such as the opposition to the creation of an African American studies department or even a major in black studies, caused him unpopularity in many African American circles. Lewis insisted that it is white students who should do black studies, while black students should focus on engineering, medicine, chemistry, law, agriculture, and other subjects “which are going to be of value to him and his people” (p. 247). Universities, he argued, “were civilization’s most liberal institution since here commitment to excellence superceded concerns about class, race, and language” (p. 267).

The vision and passion of Lewis remain as infectious today as when they were expressed half a century ago as the necessity of liberating blacks from the bondage of poverty and domination. What he represented at his time was noble: a leading intellectual and economist, a development planner, a public figure. His achievements were monumental: the first black professor in a British university and at Princeton, the first to provide a comprehensive view of development economics, and the first person of African descent to win the Nobel Prize in Economics. A new generation has to transcend his views, but it is certainly clear that they cannot ignore the intellectual foundation that he supplied, most notably his search for answers to underdevelopment.

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JONATHAN ENGEL. *Poor People's Medicine: Medicaid and American Charity Care since 1965*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 2006. Pp. xx, 318. \$22.95.

This book is a follow-up to Jonathan Engel's *Doctors and Reformers: Discussion and Debate over Health Policy, 1925–1950* (2002), which discussed American debates over compulsory health insurance from 1925 to 1950. Engel argues that Medicaid is part of a broader ‘story of ambivalence’ in which the American public

has been unwilling wholly to abandon the poor while also “unwilling to provide full access to the private health system through a fully funded state insurance program” (p. ix). This ambivalence, Engel argues, has led to Medicaid, a program that “further locked America’s poor into a separate and inferior tier of medical care, even as it aimed to obviate entirely such a tier” (p. x). A more appropriate title for the book might be “better than nothing,” since Engel’s main claim is that despite its numerous flaws, Medicaid has improved the health of the poor.

Engel begins the story by describing precursors to Medicaid in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Engel correctly observes that early attempts at “poor people’s medicine” were shaped by notions of “deserving” and “undeserving” poor, which placed blame for poverty on the behavior of the poor themselves, and which used welfare programs as “opportunities to impart moral teachings to their beneficiaries” (p. 20). A key turning point came in the 1960s, when welfare advocates rejected notions of the morally worthy poor in favor a direct attack on the structural barriers such as lack of education, inadequate facilities, and above all racism.

The tone of Engel’s writing suggests that he believes this shift from individual to the structural causes of poverty was a critical wrong turn in the history of charity care. In his discussions of the “War on Poverty,” Engel attributes the bad health of urban poor to the “insular culture of the ghetto” (p. 58), while the “local cultural norms” of impoverished rural residents prevented them from adopting modern hygienic habits (p. 75). Engel claims that blacks in particular “were at least partly responsible for their own plight” because of high rates of “out-of-wedlock births and juvenile crime” and the black community’s distrust of white physicians (p. 79). The centerpieces of the book are the “New Federalism” of the Nixon administration and even newer federalism of the Reagan and Bush administrations, which emphasized personal responsibility and self-sufficiency. Presidents Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton are criticized for being too ambitious in their attempts to initiate national health service. Engel attributes the tremendous increase in the number of uninsured individuals, especially children and adolescents in the 1980s and 1990s to the “explosion in out-of-wedlock births” (p. 211), giving no attention to rising unemployment rates and declining wages and benefits during this period. He does briefly mention the AIDS crisis as a factor in rising health care costs, but mainly as a vehicle for erroneously attributing the spread of the epidemic to intravenous drug users. As a historian of child and adolescent health, I was disappointed by Engel’s neglect of the explosion in pediatric AIDS cases during this period, as well as his failure to consider that concern about pediatric patients was a key factor in the passage of the Ryan White AIDS Care Act in 1990. Indeed, Engel could have considered the extent to which popular support for Medicaid and charity care was shaped by sen-

timental appeals to the needs of innocent suffering children.

Like his first book, the main thesis of this one is that national health insurance has failed because the American public "simply was not ready for it" (p. 232). Yet Engel never supports this sweeping generalization with concrete evidence, such as poll data, nor does he consider the extent to which powerful lobbying groups have affected the defeat of health care reform. Engel ends the book with the conclusion that the present state of affairs will continue, but "this may not be altogether bad." Despite its flaws, says Engel, the current Medicaid preserves federalism and local control while providing a modicum of health care to the nation's poorest citizens. "The United States never promised its citizens equity in most of life's prizes," Engel observes, and "health care, it seems, is no exception" (p. 251).

HEATHER MUNRO PRESCOTT
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PHILIP J. FUNIGIELLO. *Chronic Politics: Health Care Security from FDR to George W. Bush*. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas. 2005. Pp. xii, 395. \$39.95.

Philip J. Funigiello, like the authors of many books and articles on this subject, assumes that controversies about universal health coverage in Congress and the federal executive branch since the 1930s have been the most important events affecting the health sector. Like most scholars of this subject, moreover, he deplores the failure to enact universal coverage, which he ascribes to the self-interest of its opponents. These opponents succeeded, he writes, because of the "institutional structure of the American government," the "American political party structure," the "fragmented structure of Congress," and the short-sighted, uninformed behavior of persons in the "middle class" who had health insurance as a result of their employment or entitlement to Medicare (pp. 300–304).

This book summarizes publications by historians, journalists, political scientists, and sociologists. Funigiello augments his reading of secondary sources with helpful assessments of the political context of debates about universal coverage and with anecdotes from his research in unpublished papers of federal agencies and former members of Congress.

His most original contribution is a brief history of the National Health Inventory, a household survey conducted by the federal government in 1935–1936 (pp. 23–28). This survey revealed a growing burden of chronic disease and disability. Because of his exclusive focus on universal coverage, Funigiello ignores the influence of this survey in making health care more accessible and effective; for instance, on policy to plan and construct hospitals, fund biomedical research, and expand education for the health professions.

These new policies were the result of a powerful consensus that has supported expanded access to health services. Since the 1940s, many policy makers, leaders of business and labor, and ordinary voters have agreed

that subsidies for research, professional education, and hospital construction would contribute to improving the health of Americans. Such subsidies would be effective, they believed, for two reasons: as the economy expanded, more people would have access to voluntary health insurance; and new public programs could provide coverage for children, unemployed adults, the aged, and persons with disabilities.

The consensus on policy to expand the supply of health services and technology, access to voluntary insurance, and targeted rather than universal public programs has been a major impediment to the enactment of universal coverage. But Funigiello, like most scholars of universal coverage, writes the history of health policy as a heroic struggle of reformers against groups defending their economic self-interest.

Such morality tales about what did not happen are silent or disparaging about what did. For instance, Funigiello ignores the Hill-Burton Act of 1946, a massive multiyear program of hospital construction. The Congressional sponsors of this legislation justified it on the grounds that increased access to hospital care, especially for people in rural areas, would improve health and reduce suffering. Similarly, he accords less space to the huge expansion of coverage for children as a result of federal legislation of 1997 than he does to a contemporaneous federal commission on Medicare that displayed the traditional conflict between reformers and interest groups.

Funigiello is also silent about a substantial literature on the history of the health sector that describes why many people opposed universal coverage for reasons other than economic self-interest. Most proposals for universal coverage, for instance, have threatened to disrupt relationships with which most physicians and their patients were comfortable.

This book also contains numerous errors. Some examples: assuming that Michael Davis and John A. Kingsbury, pioneer lay advocates of universal coverage, were physicians (pp. 10, 23); putting Claude Pepper in the House of Representatives rather than the Senate during the last years of his career (p. 202) and John Heinz in state government instead of the U.S. Senate (p. 203); calling Congressman Jim Cooper John twice (p. 249–250), and misnaming the National Governors' Association (p. 290); introducing Edgar Sydenstricker and I.S. Falk a generation before they were prominent (p. 8) and then having Sydenstricker twice endorse a bill for universal coverage eight years after his death (pp. 55, 61); claiming that staff of the Social Security Board were experts on universal coverage in Britain and Canada three years before its enactment in the former and two decades before it began in the latter (p. 52); misstating the legislative history of the pre-emption clause of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 and subsequent litigation about it (p. 278); missing Medicaid expansion and cost containment innovation in Medicare during the 1980s (p. 196); and disparaging the capacity of state government to manage complex programs in the late 1990s on the basis of evidence

about subtle political choices by officials in a few states (p. 278).

Anyone seeking a one-volume introduction to the recent history of policy for access to health care in the United States has many choices. Other books are more reliable.

DANIEL M. FOX
Milbank Memorial Fund

ROBERT W. RIGHTER. *The Battle Over Hetch Hetchy: America's Most Controversial Dam and the Birth of Modern Environmentalism*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2005. Pp. xxii, 303. \$30.00.

At the beginning of the twentieth century, San Francisco sought to secure an adequate, reliable, and reasonably priced water supply by damming the Hetch Hetchy Valley, a little-known part of Yosemite National Park. Their initial application had been rejected, but city officials expected little opposition following the 1906 earthquake. They were in for a big surprise. Construction did not begin until 1915.

The established view is that the famous battle to prevent the flooding of Hetch Hetchy was an effort to preserve it as wilderness. In his classic account of the controversy in *Wilderness and the American Mind* (1967), Roderick Nash concluded that "The extent and vigor of the resistance to San Francisco's plans for Hetch Hetchy constituted tangible evidence for the existence of a wilderness cult [in the United States]. Equally revealing was the fact that very few favored the dam because they opposed wilderness" (p. 181). Although the battle was lost, it marked a key event in the growth of the wilderness preservation movement and the first national debate over wilderness protection.

Robert W. Righter expected to come to a similar conclusion when he set out to do the research for this book. To his surprise, he found that preserving wilderness was a minor theme in a larger story. The real battle, he argued, was over public versus private ownership of municipal water and hydroelectric power sources. Those who supported the dam were advocates of public ownership of these utilities. He also shows that, sadly, San Francisco's single-minded determination to gain control of Hetch Hetchy blinded it to alternative and more easily secured ways to satisfy its thirst.

John Muir, founder of the Sierra Club, was a vocal advocate of wilderness preservation. "Dam Hetch Hetchy!" he wrote, "As well dam for water-tanks the people's cathedrals and churches, for no holier temple has ever been consecrated by the heart of man." His words captured the imagination of the public and historians. Righter, however, argues that most other opponents of the dam did not express, either publicly or privately, views similar to Muir's pleas to preserve the valley in pristine wilderness condition. The Sierra Club was divided on the issue, with many of its San Francisco members supporting the dam. The opponents founded a separate organization, the Society for the Preservation of National Parks, which mounted a national effort

to protect the valley. But they did not advocate wilderness preservation. Instead, while they appreciated the wild beauty of the valley, they proposed the development of a system of roads, hotels, restaurants, campgrounds, and recreational amenities to attract and serve tourism in the valley.

Furthermore, Righter contends that, "Nash's chapter on Hetch Hetchy was 'thesis driven' in the sense that he transposed nature-related words into *wilderness*—which was not necessarily the intent of his primary sources" (p. 273, n. 43). It is not surprising that Nash came to the conclusion he did; it was the accepted wisdom at the time. Nash published *Wilderness and the American Mind* eight years after Samuel P. Hays published *Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The Progressive Conservation Movement, 1890–1920* (1959), a very influential book that presented the controversy as a conflict between wilderness preservationists and conservationists who wanted to make sustainable economic use of natural resources.

The progressive conservation movement also wanted the American public, through its government, to have control of these resources. As Gifford Pinchot wrote in *The Fight for Conservation* (1910), conservation "holds that the people have not only the right, but the duty to control the use of the natural resources, which are the great sources of prosperity. And it regards the absorption of these resources by the special interests, unless their operations are under effective public control, as a moral wrong" (p. 81). Indeed, some proponents of damming Hetch Hetchy viewed those who wanted to protect the valley as dupes of the Spring Valley Water Company, private owners of the city's water system. A key thread in Righter's book is the debate over public and private control of natural resources and municipal utilities. However, another thread is how power and wealth, even when wielded by municipal government, can shape the democratic process. "The valley was lost," he wrote, "to money, lobbying, and political pressure that only one side could muster" (p. 244).

This is a well told and richly textured story, based on detailed research, that extends far beyond the point at which most environmental histories end: the flooding of the valley. Righter examines the history of subsequent controversies over the distribution and sale of hydroelectric power and more recent proposals to decommission the dam, drain the reservoir, and restore the valley.

RALPH H. LUTTS
Goddard College

FINIS DUNAWAY. *Natural Visions: The Power of Images in American Environmental Reform*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2005. Pp. xxi, 246. \$37.00.

A quick glance at a map of the U.S. National Parks system will reveal that Kansas does not have a National Park. While nature abounded in the small Kansas community where I was raised, wilderness (and other delights) came to me initially via my second grade teacher's complete collection of *National Geographic*

magazines and through my absorption of the "coffee table" books my aunt from Colorado sent us flatlanders for Christmas.

Americans have always had a visual connection to their landscape and their physical environment, and the importance of nature has been central to American painting, photography, and film. Finis Dunaway's book attempts to detail the importance of the visual arts in promoting the cause of environmentalism in the United States. Dunaway presents an interesting yet incomplete review of how images have been an omnipresent tool for conservationists, ecologists, and environmentalists during the Progressive era, the New Deal, and the post-war period.

While the book effectively relates how visual artists stirred an emotional reaction among Americans, especially urban elites, it fails to establish how these visual inspirations translated into actual legislative or behavior changes in the electorate that would signify true reform. We learn much about David Brower's soul connection to Ansel Adams; but we learn little about how the Adams's work swayed legislators from Poughkeepsie or Peoria to vote for the Wilderness Act of 1964.

This book will be useful to students of environmental history, historians of film and photography, and for scholars of the FDR period. Central concepts discussed include the idea of the "sublime" and the spiritual foundations of environmentalism; New Deal notions of ecological permanence; and the centrality of "wilderness" to urban progressives and environmental reformers in the twentieth century. Major individuals discussed include such luminaries as Adams, Brower, and Rachel Carson. The book also treats lesser-known thinkers and artists such as photographer-theologian Herbert Gleason and film maker Pare Lorentz.

Dunaway's work is uncritical and fawning in regard to major environmental thinkers and ideas. The study has no room for established critiques of environmentalism. Instead it offers platitudes that assert how environmental thinkers and ecologists were engaged in a didactic experience with an apostate society, a society always in need of their vision to "rejoin beauty and sublimity, to turn the ordinary into the astonishing, to find awe in the diminutive [and] wonder in the everyday" (p. 212).

The author mentions a countercurrent—our national devotion to urbanism and the technological mastery of nature—but fails to develop the use of modernist images that stood in opposition to the visual artists that glorified nature. Dunaway exerts great effort to explain New Deal documentary films such as *The Plow That Broke the Plains* (1936) but does not mention the superior Resettlement Administration film *The City* (1939) (written by Lorentz), which presents Rexford Tugwell's ecological, collectivist dream of reforming the American urban environment.

Most frustrating with is the author's inexplicable failure to link the visual images produced by artists with many of the actual environmental reforms in the periods covered in the book. For example, the importance

of Stephen J. Mather and Robert Sterling Yard's *National Parks Portfolio* (1916) is mentioned only in passing, and not by name. Mather, the first director of the National Parks Service (NPS) and a wealthy businessman, used his connections with the railroads to fund a photo album that he personally distributed to members of Congress in the months leading up to the creation of the NPS in 1916. This use of images to spark a major and tangible environmental reform should rate more discussion in a book devoted to the subject. While Dunaway does provide some evidence that images helped foster and perpetuate conservation programs in the 1930s, the intellectual justification for these programs, and their history, have been treated in numerous other monographs.

The book reveals an elitist sensibility in the environmental movement that disdains or ignores the viewpoint of ordinary people and popular culture in the rise of environmentalism. Robert Flaherty's virtually inaccessible 1948 film *Louisiana Story* (the movie used amateur actors and has almost no dialogue) may be of interest to scholars of ecological imagery; yet surely John Ford's epic westerns created a more enduring interest in the natural landscape among the electoral masses. In a study devoted to the impact of images on the American environmental consciousness, there is no discernible discussion of Hollywood's presentation of nature over the decades, unlike Charles J. Shindo's excellent work *Dust Bowl Migrants in the American Imagination* (1997). The book is strong in the area of photo journalism; yet it slights both popular film and the role of painters and graphic artists in the rise of the environmental ethic.

The text contains an excellent series of photos, including some color images. There is no bibliography. This book provides some additional understanding of the rise of the environmental ethic in the United States but could have easily been updated to discuss the ongoing uses of visual art in the environmental movement since the 1960s.

RANDAL BEEMAN
Bakersfield College

PETE DANIEL. *Toxic Drift: Pesticides and Health in the Post-World War II South*. (Walter Lynwood Fleming Lectures in Southern History.) Baton rouge: Louisiana State University Press in association with Smithsonian National Museum of American History, Washington, D.C. 2005. Pp. xii, 209. \$26.95.

In 1962, Rachel Carson's *Silent Spring* alerted the American people to problems attendant with the misuse and overuse of pesticides in the post-World War II era. Noted southern agricultural historian Pete Daniel has added yet another significant chapter to that story in an elaboration of the Walter Lynwood Fleming Lectures he delivered at Louisiana State University. The author readily acknowledges that increased insecticide use grew out of actual felt needs, such as the desire to eradicate the infamous fire ant. But what Daniel seeks

to understand are the reasons why insecticides were the chosen course of action to control pests and boost agricultural productivity. His in-depth research shows that expansive insecticide use in the postwar South was driven by overlapping collusion among the USDA Agricultural Research Service's Pesticide Regulation Division, southern congressional officials, influential corporate chemical companies, and industrial agribusiness constituents. Although highly critical of the pesticide industry and politicians such as Mississippi's Jamie Whitten, Daniel's harshest words are directed at the Pesticide Regulation Division within the Agricultural Research Service. Encouraged by industrial agriculture and chemical manufacturers, the USDA neglected its statutory mandate to regulate pesticides in order to promote expanded pesticide use. The result was a transformed social, political, economic, and environmental landscape, for the toxicity Daniel traces drifted not just across agricultural fields to poison the land, injure or kill actual persons, or aid in displacing farming as a way of life for agribusiness, but contaminated the political process as well.

To establish his argument, Daniel made thorough use of federal agency and court records. Although this might have uncovered important factual evidence, it could have also resulted in a rather dry history. Thanks to Daniel's engaging writing style, such is not the case. But it is more than the author's prose that accounts for this readable history. Daniel uses archival material to individualize and personalize the interactive processes that frame his history. The result is an engaging use of individual stories to exemplify the author's larger points that actual victims and skeptics of pesticide use were not able to pinpoint the source of contamination in order to win court cases, and generally found themselves overwhelmed by those in positions of political, scientific, or economic power.

Daniel is to be commended for both the explanatory power of his narrative and wedding his story to the World War II and postwar era. Nonetheless, he might have used an even wider American cultural interpretive lens to interpret his prodigious research materials. For example, much of what Daniel narrates might have been more explicitly tied into Americans' optimistic belief in the ability of science to surmount nature's apparent limitations, as Paul Hirt did so effectively in *A Conspiracy of Optimism: Management of the National Forests Since World War Two* (1994). Similarly, the author might have drawn more tightly the interaction between pesticides and the larger social, economic, political, and racial changes going on in the South at this time. Moreover, while doing a solid job of conjoining social with environmental history, Daniel could have strengthened his outlook by making the southern landscape an actor in the story. Finally, the author might have been more direct in showing how environmental exploitation and human exploitation go hand-in-hand, and that the effects of environmental harm invariably are passed on not just to the land but to the most vulnerable and powerless within society.

Aside from these minor points, there is little to criticize. Daniel's research is solid, and his arguments are sound. The result is a well-written, compact book of broad significance for those interested in not only environmental but political and social history.

ROBERT BUNTING
Fort Lewis College

WILLIAM R. CHILDS. *The Texas Railroad Commission: Understanding Regulation in America to the Mid-Twentieth Century*. (Kenneth E. Montague Series in Oil and Business History, number 17.) College Station: Texas A&M University Press. 2005. Pp. x, 323. \$35.00.

William R. Childs's history of the Texas Railroad Commission is a much more complex, ambitious, and significant work, covering broader ground and more important subjects, than might be inferred from its title. This, of course, results from the misleadingly narrow name of the agency it depicts. As was true in other states, the railroad commission (TRC) took its name from the industry it aspired to regulate upon its founding in 1891. As time and economy moved on, however, state railroad commissions assumed additional, more complicated regulatory duties with regard to emerging "utilities": motor carriers (buses and trucks), electricity, natural gas, and, particularly in Texas's case, petroleum production, refining, and distribution. As the TRC struggled to manage these often-chaotic industries while simultaneously promoting the industries and general economic growth, it and its state developed laws, rules, procedures, and even ideologies of great import to the evolution of economic regulation in other states and the nation.

This book is based on deep and wide documentation in secondary works and manuscripts, especially the records of the TRC, important commissioners, other agencies, and influential political leaders in the state archives and other libraries. Childs traces the history of the agency and its interaction with numerous industrial, consumer, and political interests in Texas, other states, and the nation at large. Although it examines multiple industries, the book particularly focuses on, and makes its major contributions concerning, the regulation of railroads (generally the period from 1891 to 1920) and petroleum (1920–1960). While initially engaging the railroads, the commission by trial and error settled on what Childs terms the "dual management" approach, by which both regulators and industry leaders worked together to gather information, adjust conflicts, stabilize rates, improve transportation service, and promote the industry (and the state's recovery from the Civil War's effects). Moreover, Texas pioneered in the practice of setting transportation rates according to the valuation of the carriers being regulated. Both techniques were borrowed by other states, and eventually by the federal government when it got involved in regulation. Because of the prior successes of Texas and other states—aided by their nationwide professional organization, the National Association of Railroad and Util-

ities Commissioners, which Texans had been instrumental in founding—when the federal government did begin regulating railroads (especially after the U.S. Supreme Court's famous *Shreveport* rate case in 1914), the Interstate Commerce Commission generally confined itself to interstate traffic. Grounded in the nation's federalist constitutional framework, this shared, cooperative regulation, which Childs terms "pragmatic federalism," became the hallmark of general American economic regulation in the twentieth century.

In the early decades of the twentieth century, the spectacular rise of the petroleum industry presented immediate challenges to nascent pragmatic federalism. Struggling with structural problems inherent in Texas crude oil production, refining, and transportation, including explosive overproduction, contradictory laws, price declines, inequities and conflicts among small and large ("big oil") producers, and especially resultant waste of the natural resource, the TRC developed techniques such as "proration," or allocation of production rights according to the size of the producers' share of production, to enhance stability. The commission, however, was less successful in conserving crude oil resources. When World War I petroleum mobilization problems and the ideology of federal economic control favored by some New Dealers in Washington threatened the state's control of its oil industry, Texas and other oil states fought to protect their autonomy, creating the Interstate Oil Compact Commission (IOCC) to manage oil production and prices. Ultimately, the federal government acceded to management by this consortium of states, with Texas, the major producer, playing a dominant role. The system functioned adequately, though not without significant inefficiencies and contradictions, to assure a consistent flow of petroleum during World War II and into the postwar period.

In tracing the emergence of economic regulation from the perspective of Texas, Childs has produced a major book of institutional and policy history relevant to the larger study of economic development in the United States, the rise of governmental management of the economy between the 1880s and the 1950s, and the movement toward deregulation since the 1970s. Childs eschews the limiting, ahistorical, theoretical analysis of strictly economic and technological factors favored by many students of economic regulation (and deregulation). Instead, he demonstrates that economic change and resultant public policy evolved under the influence of many forces. Also shaping the rise and character of industries and governmental regulation were complex competition within and among interest groups, interest-group power, socioeconomic inequality, leadership and personality, law and constitutions, interagency tensions, politics, and especially regional and national cultures (such as southern and western states' rights ideologies, Texas's own brand of state chauvinism, and what Childs calls the "civil religion of Texas oil"). In

short, Childs has put some of the history back into "economic history."

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STEPHEN PIMPARE. *The New Victorians: Poverty, Politics, and Propaganda in Two Gilded Ages*. New York: New Press. 2004. Pp. vii, 304. \$25.95.

This book addresses two important periods in American history where government was persuaded to withdraw hard-won social benefits from the poor in the name of reform. Mark Twain referenced the late nineteenth-century interval of withdrawal as the "Gilded Age," while Stephen Pimpare designates the second period—the late twentieth century—as the second Gilded Age. Both were periods of stark economic inequality. In 1890 twelve percent of the population controlled eighty-six percent of the wealth while the top two percent earned fifty percent of all income. Similarly, in 1999 ten percent of the population controlled 71.8 percent of all wealth, while the richest one percent earned 50.4 percent of all income. In these two climates of widespread and growing income disparity, corporate-sponsored "reform" traditions emerged and succeeded in withdrawing significant public benefits from the poor. According to Pimpare, "reformers" in both periods did the bidding of the wealthy, who were intent on maintaining low-wage jobs for their workers by removing public welfare as an alternative mode of subsistence. As servants of power, these reformers ran Charitable Organization Societies during the late nineteenth century. Their late twentieth-century reformer counterparts often operated within corporate-sponsored Neo-Conservative think tanks like the Heritage Foundation and the Manhattan Institute. During the first Gilded Age, Pimpare maintains, misery and impoverishment reached the point where most cities that had adopted the draconian welfare cuts at the recommendation of the reformers ended up restoring them. He ventures no prediction on whether a similar restoration will occur whenever the second Gilded Age runs its course.

According to the Pimpare narrative, reformers of the first Gilded Age responded to the substantial increase in public relief that came during the middle nineteenth century with the advent of an urban industrial manufacturing order. Consequent to the Panic of 1873, large northern cities furnished grants of cash, food, and coal (i.e. "outdoor relief") to ease the lives of the working poor. Charitable Organization Societies sponsored by large corporations emerged in most of these cities and consisted largely of reform-minded social activists who felt that such direct relief was counterproductive—that it created a culture of dependence wherein recipients became lazy, intemperant, vice prone, and incapable of earning their keep. The "scientific" solution was to inspire moral virtue in the poor through "loving" withdrawal of public assistance so that they would be induced to work hard for low wages, they would become

honest and virtuous, and they would support their families. For Pimpare, the wealthy captain of industry was the principal beneficiary of this withdrawal policy; he was able to enhance profits by keeping labor costs low. Correspondingly, the poor were the principle losers. Only if the poor were fortunate enough to live in cities like Cleveland, Chicago, Buffalo, and especially Boston, where the traditional administrators of poor relief (often assisted by the poor themselves) mobilized effectively, were the Charitable Organization Societies reformers and their corporate funders turned back. In these few locations, ample public assistance allowed lower-class workers the option of pursuing employment only if it assured their freedom, dignity, and independence. Where viable welfare measures survived, employers could only recruit workers by offering them decent wages and working conditions.

Progressive period crusades and legislation, the New Deal tradition of social welfare, and a strong union movement restored welfare to a conspicuous place in the lives of the needy during the early and mid-twentieth century, Pimpare maintains. But by the 1970s and 1980s, the corporate affluent began to effectively remobilize around the National Association of Manufacturers, the Chamber of Commerce, and a large number of nonprofit conservative think tanks. Sometimes these agencies coordinated with a growing "Christian coalition" or right-wing evangelicals. They succeeded in turning a large segment of the electorate against welfare by attributing poverty and unemployment to insufficient efforts by the poor themselves. Beginning in the Carter administration and more actively under the Reagan presidency, they succeeded in reducing social spending traditions of the New Deal and the Great Society by cutting federal outlays for food stamps, child nutrition, and job retraining. Although Ronald Reagan explicitly targeted federal relief programs, repudiated the 1960s War on Poverty, and railed against Cadillac-driving welfare queens, Bill Clinton ran for the White House in 1992 as a "New Democrat" determined to 'end welfare as we know it.' By 1996 he teamed up with the Republican House leadership and a significant bloc within his own party to put through Congress the monumental Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRA). It repealed the Aid to Families with Dependent Children provision within the Social Security Act, imposed stringent work requirements on welfare recipients, made it much more difficult to secure public assistance, and imposed strict time limits on those who qualified for assistance. Under PRA, there ceased to be a federal standard for determining need. After no more than two years of public assistance, a recipient had to work to receive any further benefits and these were limited to five years of a person's life. Medicaid benefits could be terminated if a recipient refused to work. States were appropriated fixed amount "block grants" regardless of how many of their residents qualified for benefits. To operate within these limited grants, states were allowed to reduce their welfare rolls by discouraging applications and were

given wide latitude to cut benefits. Overall, one third to one half of those on the welfare rolls were forced off. For a few years after PRA became law, official poverty rates declined by 3.3%. But, according to Pimpare, this was owing to temporarily higher wages at the low end of the labor market and the Earned Income Tax Credit. By 2001–2002, poverty rates were again increasing and the average poor person was poorer than he or she had been a decade earlier.

These are the main lines of Pimpare's narrative on the two Gilded Ages of welfare withdrawal, which enhanced already substantial disparities between rich and poor and harmed the lives of the impoverished. As relief benefits in both periods declined, he notes, prison and jail populations enlarged; incarceration became a way to dispose of the "disobedient" poor. From the standpoint of a stridently progressive view of public policy, Pimpare is on the "side of the angels." From the standpoint of scholarship, however, the book is not trouble free.

Pimpare's characterization of "two Gilded Ages" is rather reductionist. Public benefits were "withdrawn" in both periods as purported moral reforms to serve the poor, but the differences between the two periods were substantial: First, welfare was still largely a local matter during the first Gilded Age when most people lived in rural areas or small towns, and in most localities amounts of money involved were never substantial. (Pimpare builds his case for heavy welfare cuts entirely on the largest cities.) In contrast to the late nineteenth century, welfare fell under federal and state jurisdiction a century later when the U.S. was much more decidedly a nation concentrated in large cities. Second, whereas corporations emerged as powerful national entities after the Civil War, they had not yet developed a managerial class to dispense funds to or coordinate with Charitable Organization Societies on welfare withdrawal or any other policy imperatives. Indeed, for Pimpare to argue that reformers in the movement were tools of corporate power defies what we know of them. Some leading figures like Mary Richmond were outspoken in their criticisms of the corporations and the captains of industry. Inspired by the Social Gospel movement, many saw themselves creating a social work profession that could aid the poor in caring for their families and procuring work and social services; precious few championed a stark policy of benefit withdrawal to enhance personal initiative. It is a mistake, therefore, for Pimpare to equate these forerunners of Progressive period social policy with late twentieth century neo-conservative policy advocates at the Heritage Foundation or the Manhattan Institute. The antiwelfare polemics and lobbying of the latter have directly commanded corporate funding and the periodic partnership with elements in the evangelical Right. Finally, in recent decades problems of welfare and work have been heavily contoured by a complex global economy absent in the age of Andrew Carnegie and John D. Rockefeller. Pimpare makes very little reference to this new context.

More generally, this book offers too constrictive a framework to understand the complex motives of public assistance reformers in both the late nineteenth and late twentieth centuries. Pimpare dwells on reform almost entirely as a form of social control: a quest to manage the lower classes in ways that assured that they provided a cheap labor source for corporate capitalist expansion. Welfare was to be reduced or abolished because it had allowed workers to hold out on jobs until their wages and labor conditions reached appropriate levels. What Pimpare discounts is that many reformers (especially in the earlier period) also had strong benevolent intentions. They sincerely believed that public assistance was not in the interests of the lower orders because it perpetuated poverty and misery. As recent students of American philanthropy have amply demonstrated, benevolence and social control are not antithetical motivations. They can and usually do coexist in complex and varied combinations within those intent on promoting their visions of the "good society."

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CARIBBEAN AND LATIN AMERICA

CLAUDIO LOMNITZ. *Death and the Idea of Mexico*. New York: Zone Books. 2005. Pp. 581. \$34.00.

Nothing says Mexico like death. Claudio Lomnitz nimbly traverses five centuries of the country's history to explain the twentieth-century emergence of this curious national totem. This is not, however, a book detailing shifts in death customs over time from the point of view of the dying or the bereaved. Indeed, Lomnitz deliberately eschews Pierre Chaunu's classic deathways approach to embrace a different set of questions centering on the state and popular culture's political uses of mortality. In early chapters, Lomnitz exhumes the political uses of purgatory during New Spain's early centuries; the explosion of concern over corpses during the Enlightenment; battles over the relics of dead independence-era caudillos; and the satirical use of death as the great social leveler in the post-independence period, to name just a few of the topics covered. The myriad relationships among death, the state, and popular and elite culture over four centuries reveal the deep historical roots of the death imagery and practices that twentieth-century Mexicans used to create their national symbol. The second part of the book then turns to this unlikely tutelary sign's storied career during the past century.

The author is at his erudite best when charting the shifting meanings and political uses of the now-iconic skeleton and skull over time. For early modern Spaniards, death imagery spurred reflection on the fleeting vanity of this world. For the conquistadors' Mesoamerican contemporaries, however, skulls and skeletons represented not life's illusions—the afterlife was not a place for payback for earthly actions—but the intercon-

nection between death and birth. From this early clash of cosmologies emerged an array of political uses for death images, including the Enlightenment penchant for satirizing baroque burial customs and the post-independence liberal trope of death as a distinctly political sign of the equality of men on earth—the latter made famous by José Guadalupe Posada's engravings that savaged the pretensions of the Porfirian *haut monde*. Death truly rose to totemic national status, however, only after the Mexican Revolution. Modernists like Diego Rivera, whose house was well stocked with Aztec-era stone skulls, transformed Posada's satirical images into embodiments of popular art with decidedly pre-Columbian roots, national symbols of Mexico's unique comfort and familiarity with death. In the 1960s and 1970s, cartoonist Abel Quezada again reconfigured the skeleton to lampoon a corporatist state that paid lip service to social justice but systematically trampled individual rights. His highly individual characters, flat and hollowed out, are propped up by state prosthetics. After the 1982 debt crisis, the skeleton lost even these props: the cartoonist Rogelio Naranjo's unsupported figures embody the poor in their battle with a technocratic elite who have seized the state for their own purposes, leaving them to languish and die.

To this thorough genealogy of the politics of death imagery, Lomnitz adds an equally impressive historical treatment of the Day of the Dead. His analysis encompasses early church battles against indigenous attempts to domesticate the ritual; the festival's status as a nationalist antidote to the perceived consumerism and imperialism of Halloween; gringos' fetishization of the ritual as a healing balm, as a critique of their culture's denial of death; and, finally, the rise of Day of the Dead tourist hot spots, places like Mixquic and Oaxaca. By the time the historically minded Lomnitz is ready to get into the ring with his erstwhile interpretive competitors the battle over the why of the national totem is no contest. Carlos Monsiváis and Roger Bartra, for example suspect that Mexicans' famed jocular indifference to death sprang not from popular culture but from the machinations of tourist promoters and the intellectual toadies of the authoritarian twentieth-century state—that state that naturalized and justified its own death dealing with the old colonialist trope of a population indifferent to suffering and death. Lomnitz's deep historical genealogy of the political uses of death, however, renders this recent-invention theory implausible.

Throughout the book the author's wide-ranging erudition impresses. Within his five hundred pages of text, the early church fathers and theorists of the United States' dinosaur totem rub elbows with Mexican intellectual luminaries like Octavio Paz and Juan Rulfo. Fray Servando de Teresa Mier and Domingo Francisco de San Antón Muñón Chimalpahin Cuauhtlehuanitzin. The vast evidentiary base necessary to a study spanning six centuries also provokes admiration, even awe. Comic books, lithographs, funeral sermons, the Florentine Codex, television and radio characters, edicts, poems, novels, Day of the Dead events in Chicago, local

national, and transnational religious cults: these are just a few of the work's key sources.

Despite the impressive evidence and the death-defying theoretical maneuvers, however, the historian may part ways with the enthusiastic general reader of this crossover press book. Lomnitz is wont to use evidence from the recent past to support claims about earlier centuries, and several times he asserts rather than demonstrates causal relationships. That young men dance as *huehues* (dead ancestors) in the present day Huasteca Hidalguense, for example, tells us little about attitudes toward purgatory and the ancestors in the eighteenth century; that forensic scientists opined on a 1949 *caudillo* relic possession battle tells us even less about the authentication process of secular relics one hundred years earlier. But if the book is blowsy, it is also brilliant, and easily ranks as the most sophisticated, well-documented, and thought-provoking treatment of Mexico's unique national totem.

PAMELA VOEKEL
University of Georgia

MICHAEL J. GONZÁLEZ. *This Small City Will Be a Mexican Paradise: Exploring the Origins of Mexican Culture in Los Angeles, 1821–1846*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press. 2005. Pp. x, 254. \$22.95.

Michael J. González transcends the romanticized notion of tranquil Californio ranching communities with a fresh analysis of Los Angeles before the U.S. takeover of the region. He bases his study on an extensive examination of twelve lines from an 1846 petition that twenty-six *angeleños* presented to California governor Pio Pico, requesting that he curb alleged misconduct among Native American residents. The document and list of signatories is reprinted at the beginning of each of the book's five chapters, with select words and phrases highlighted to form the various chapter titles and subjects. Through his exploration of this and other extant primary sources, González posits that a fundamental dynamic in *angeleño* life during the Mexican period was the strong desire of the *gente de razón* (literally "people of reason") Californio settlers to emulate and identify with the liberals of central Mexico while simultaneously dissociating themselves from the native peoples of California. He examines a wide array of topics to support his thesis: leisure, work, racial attitudes, politics, social life, concepts of time, religious practices, sexual relations, violence, the Californios' and natives' enslavement of captives, and the formation of men, women, and children in *angeleño* society.

González adopts Giambattista Vico's concept of "fantasia" and contends from the outset that in reading primary sources "with the imagination the veil drops, bringing into sight all that is hidden . . . Once before us the document in our hands, and the others in whose place it stands, overflows with meaning" (p. 18). Instances of his efforts to engage his sources with this approach abound, in a number of cases leading to rather tentative conclusions. For example, González cites a

single 1840 document with a vague reference to an entertainment in Los Angeles which "could have been a play" (p. 158), proceeds to suggest that dramas performed in central Mexico possibly made their way northward where *angeleños* "may have witnessed" them (p. 159), and then assesses the influence of the classical themes in these dramas on the *angeleño* audiences who purportedly "watched" them (p. 160). Similarly, finding no explicit documentation about prostitution in Los Angeles, he hypothesizes that women who bore children from multiple fathers may have been prostitutes. He then speculates that one such woman, Dolores Valenzuela, "if indeed a prostitute," chose the name María de los Nieves (Mary of the Snows) for her daughter as a means to bestow on the girl a reputation of purity which Valenzuela herself lacked. González then concludes: "Here in a name, Valenzuela spoke for her peers and showed what prostitutes wanted; they wanted respect and dignity, everything that 'Nieves' implied" (p. 171). The sheer number of times qualifying words such as "if," "perhaps," "could be," "might have," and "possibly" appear in the book indicates that such conclusions are tenable but by no means incontrovertible given the available evidence.

In other cases González fails to interpret primary sources in arguably plausible ways. He portrays convincingly the *angeleños'* fear of Anglo-American encroachment, particularly after the 1836 independence of Texas (pp. 12–13), but he defines *angeleño* struggles in terms of a Mexican-Indian binary opposition in which the role Anglo-American interlopers played is not extensively examined. He notes "there is some mystery" (p. 137) concerning why *angeleños* tended to prefer Indian captives from more remote locales for their household servants, but in his attempt to resolve this question he does not mention the strong possibility that geographic isolation diminished the captives' opportunities for escape and made them easier to control. He postulates that *angeleños* had good reason to fear criminal acts of the native population, but as evidence only cites the fourteen extant court cases of Indian offenses against *gente de razón* in a twenty-year period, twelve for the nonviolent infraction of stealing cattle (p. 139). It would seem just as reasonable to wonder why the evidence of such offenses is so low, given that on average there was well less than one recorded incident per year.

Still, this book is recommended reading for the history of the nineteenth-century Southwest. The attention to Mexico City's role as a style center for the *angeleños* challenges the typical view of frequently antagonistic relations between national leadership and residents of the northern frontier. González's intermingling of the many facets of *angeleño* life—sacred and profane, extraordinary and mundane—provides a model that other historians of the Southwest (and elsewhere) would do well to emulate. As he states in the final sentence of the book, his accentuation of the influence of native Californians and central Mexicans on the *angeleño* psyche is not the final word on Los Angeles during the Mexican period. Nonetheless, it is a contri-

bution that future researchers will need to consider as they explore other elements of *angeleño* life.

TIMOTHY MATOVINA
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FERNANDO ROCCHI. *Chimneys in the Desert: Industrialization in Argentina during the Export Boom Years, 1870–1930*. (Social Science History.) Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press. 2006. Pp. xviii, 394. \$70.00.

The economic history of Argentina and the rest of Latin America has been dominated by the concern to explore, extol, or excoriate (depending on one's view) how dependence on world markets shaped or distorted local economies. Few historians have been concerned with the role played by the internal market, and sectors geared to it, especially industry. This is paradoxical, because the advocates of "dependency" argued that it was the failure to create and sustain native industries that crippled domestic growth, while at the other end neo-classical historians frequently argued it was the effort to force industrialization that sapped long-term growth. Yet, despite the importance of the domestic market and industry for explaining "what went wrong," few historians have taken a close look at their own claims.

Fernando Rocchi has written a very important, carefully researched, and persuasive account of the missing link in Argentina, the country in which the historiographic debate over external dependency was especially ferocious. Rocchi's book is bound to recast the way we think about the country's long-term development. Rocchi slices right through dependency claims that the country's focus on exports meant there was little or no economic activity devoted to the internal market that could sustain capital growth. He shows, effectively, that the export boom occasioned a boom in industrial growth, a growth that by 1930 was increasingly independent from the export sector's cyclical movements. There was no basic contradiction between export orientation and import substitution of manufactured goods.

At the same time, Rocchi is not so persuaded by some neo-classical economic historians who have argued that weak property rights, habits of tradition, or the politicization of credit and tariff policies, created a hostile environment to risk-taking entrepreneurship outside the rentier landed economy. Rocchi shows in convincing ways how industrialists faced factor markets that presented them with unique opportunities, thanks in part to state involvement. In labor and capital markets, he shows, the state was hardly a retardant agent for investment in industry. To be sure, there were problems getting credit and raising funds in the stock market, but Rocchi does not find that this was a result of state biases toward the rural sector. Indeed, very often industrialists themselves preferred to rely on multiple, personal, sources of capital as part of their strategy of managing risk in a fairly turbulent market.

One of Rocchi's most suggestive chapters is his study of tariff policies, in which he shows that there was no

consistent effort to promote free trade and diminish protections to local industries by keeping tariffs on industrial imports low. Instead, the debate over tariffs was shaped by conflicts of sectoral, regional, and provincial lobbies working in the capital to persuade presidents and congressmen of their needs. In some cases, as with Mendoza's wineries, the lobby was fairly effective. In other cases, politicians were persuaded to take a closer look at protections on a case-by-case basis, as with the revised tariff schedules in the 1920s, hiking specific duties on cigarettes, beer, pins, hats, candles, pasta, and other goods. Moreover, Rocchi shows that the executive and legislative branches responded very differently to pro or anti-tariff lobbies, and so state policy depended very much on which branch had the upper hand. The point is, there were important ideological positions staked out: some in favor of *holus bolus* *laissez-faire* (especially in the earlier period), and some ultra-protectionists (especially in the later years). But for the most part, what dominated tariff policy was more a concern to balance interests (including fiscal concerns) than to uphold an ideology, a mood which Rocchi calls "pragmatic protectionism." So in the heyday of the export bonanza it is simply wrong to depict trade policy as driven by agrarian exporters and consumers seeking lower prices for imported goods. If anything, tariff policy was incoherent (albeit not random), a consequence of the multiple forces that bore on state policy. We have few serious studies of the history of public policy making in Latin America. This study stands out.

The compound effects of state policy, private property rights, and the behavior of industrialists was "a country with industries but without an industrialization project" (p. 236). Rocchi illustrates well how the export boom sired complementary and alternative ventures in urban settings without yielding a model of development that could stand as its successor when the boom began to fade. This book is a milestone on Argentine history, and Latin American historical political economy.

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EUROPE: ANCIENT AND MEDIEVAL

CELIA E. SCHULTZ. *Women's Religious Activity in the Roman Republic*. (Studies in the History of Greece and Rome.) Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2006. Pp. xiii, 234. \$39.95.

This book lays out a straightforward and convincing argument: women in the Roman Republic participated more broadly in religious life, public and private, than previously thought. Past scholarship on Roman religion has suggested that women were limited to cults of those few deities with particularly feminine interests such as fertility and were excluded from male-dominated cults of male gods. Celia E. Schultz demonstrates that Roman religion was less rigid in its gender categories and more inclusive of women.

Schultz's approach is based on several valuable meth-

odological points. First, she issues the standard lament that our literary sources, on which most previous scholarship has been based, were written predominantly by elite men whose views “distort” the description of religious practices that comes down to us (p. 8). Second and less standard, she points out the hazards of composing a diachronic, developmental narrative out of the relatively few literary reports of religious cult practices from the early and middle republic. These scattered episodes do not add up to a reliable time-series upon which to generalize about broad change in the gendered patterns of Roman ritual.

As a result, Schultz argues for the importance of supplementing literary reports with the evidence of inscriptions (chapter two) and of votive deposits (chapter three). The epigraphic record encompasses 600 religious inscriptions from the republic, of which seventy reveal the participation of women. These dedications display gendered preferences but no sharp gender boundaries. Women most often dedicate to the expected goddesses—Diana of Nemi, Juno Lucina, and Mater Matuta—but also to Jupiter, Apollo, and Hercules. And Schultz finds men dedicating to the goddesses Juno Lucina, Diana, and the Bona Dea. The conclusion is that “the predominance of one gender or the other among devotees of a certain god was more often due to personal preferences rather than official cult restrictions on who might attend the god’s rites” (p. 51). The conclusion is warranted with regard to official restrictions, but the patterns of personal preferences would be worth further exploration for sociocultural explanations, since they are surely not random.

To my eye, one of the most interesting generalizations in this chapter is that Roman men’s dedications were more likely to be related to official duties or business interests, whereas women’s dedications were likely to be on behalf of the health and welfare of their “loved ones” (p. 52). This pattern adds a dimension to the representational dichotomy, found in Roman and Greek authors, between male public and female domestic. In some contemporary societies women are found expending a higher proportion of their resources on their family members than are men. Is the pattern of dedications suggestive of a similar gender difference in Roman society?

The votive deposits analyzed in chapter three are ceramic representations of body parts presented to the god either in the hope that she or he will heal it or in gratitude for the healing. Again, no sharp gender distinctions are evident: about half of the body parts are gender specific (a womb or breast or phallus), and sanctuaries and temples with a mixture of female and male body parts are at least as common as those restricted to one or the other (p. 119).

The final two chapters address “Household Ritual” and “Social Status and Religious Participation.” The former depicts domestic religious practices in which women were “well integrated” but played a role subordinate to the paterfamilias (p. 136). They were chiefly responsible for providing the ritual supplies, such as in-

cense, wine, and grain. Here and a few other places in the book I wished for a more nuanced view of family life than the ideal complete family of husband, wife, and children. How should we imagine the religious lives of those many Roman women who were divorced or widows and had no authoritative male in the household? Or when Schultz discusses the contributions of gold from women in the early republic (p. 43), what property rights in marriage served as the legal basis for women to make the gifts?

The discussion of religion and social status points to “impeccable reputation and noble descent” as the criteria for award of religious honors to women (p. 144). Chastity as a standard for judging reputation was relevant to women but not men—an example of how religion was used by elite males to enforce their expectations on women. This observation seems to me to be in the right direction and to open up the broader and deeper question of how religious rituals and beliefs contributed to the construction and naturalization of gender differences in Roman culture. This useful book will serve as a good point of departure for further work in this area.

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MELISSA BARDEN DOWLING. *Clemency and Cruelty in the Roman World*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 2006. Pp. 366. \$80.00.

This book by Melissa Barden Dowling does not fall easily into the category of political or social history. It is part of a larger trend of recent scholarship that attempts to explicate the less tangible aspects of Roman life: what might be called Roman values or emotions. At the same time, however, the book has much to say about the nature of the emperor’s power, his relationship with his subjects, and, more generally, the ethical basis on which Roman social and political relations came to be built in the empire. Dowling amasses an impressive array of literary and artistic evidence to trace the evolution of the concept of clemency throughout Roman history. Ultimately, she argues, clemency came to be viewed as an essential component of a well-ordered social and political world.

The Roman civil wars of the late republic, which forged the character of the first emperor, Augustus, provide the historical context for the origin of clemency as a politically charged symbol. Dowling’s analysis begins in earnest with a discussion of Octavian’s rise to power (omitting a lengthy discussion of Julius Caesar’s use of the concept). As avenger of his father’s murder, Octavian at first needed to display *severitas* (sternness) rather than clemency in his dealings with his opponents. The relationship between clemency and *severitas* continues to be a theme throughout the book. As victor in the civil wars, Augustus could afford to be more clement, and indeed, *clementia* appears as one of the imperial virtues on a shield (a gift of the senate) that adorned Augustus’s house. This shield is but one piece

of evidence to show that some elements of imperial propaganda were developed in response to pleas from the emperor's elite and nonelite subjects. This dynamic further shows how the emperor responded to his subjects and how his subjects attempted to set limits to the arbitrary use of his power. The allusions to clemency in the Augustan poets as well as scenes of clemency on Roman coins and in public and private art demonstrate further how clemency became part of a vocabulary of power.

The appearance of clemency scenes in private art was the first step in a longer and more significant process whereby clemency was transformed from primarily a public and political virtue to a private ethical value. A second step in this process took place in the Julio-Claudian period when a philosophy of clemency developed, spurred most notably by Seneca in his treatise on the subject. In Roman law just as the power to inflict punishment was understood to be a necessity, so, too, was clemency, in order to prevent punishment from becoming too cruel. Later literary sources (Pliny and Fronto, Apuleius and Heliodorus) complete the process and show that clemency was thought to be a necessary social value that all good men must possess; even the gods show mercy in a well-ordered cosmos. Finally, the appearance of clemency scenes on Roman sarcophagi shows that *clementia* was thought to represent the good life of the deceased.

One issue that Dowling does not entirely clarify is the precise relationship between the Latin word *clementia* and others with similar meanings, such as *moderatio*, *miseriordia*, and *indulgentia*. In certain contexts, the latter words are precise synonyms, in others, it is less clear. For instance, Dowling argues that the senatorial decree outlining the punishment of Germanicus's murderer, Gnaeus Calpurnius Piso, purposefully showcased the emperor Tiberius's *clementia* (pp. 170–177). Piso's wife, Plancina, who was also subject to punishment, "placed confidence in the mercy of Tiberius and the senate" (p. 173). In this passage, "mercy" is *miseriordia*, more commonly rendered "pity," which Stoics believed was a "weak emotion" (p. 12). As we have noted, *clementia* was clearly a politically charged term, having served as a slogan for Caesar after the civil war and an imperial virtue on Augustus's shield. Is the use of *miseriordia* instead of *clementia* in this context significant? Did Tiberius, for instance, intend to display *clementia* toward men and *miseriordia* toward women? A couple of other gaps in the author's discussion are noteworthy: first, the letters of Cicero are well mined for evidence of Cicero's rhetoric of *clementia* after Caesar's assassination but not the *Philippics*. Admittedly, *clementia* appears only four times in the *Philippics*, but in two instances Cicero sneers at the use of *clementia* as a specious symbol (*Philippics* 2.116 and 6.16). Second, there is no substantive discussion of *clementia* in Tacitus's works, although Velleius Paterculus and Valerius Maximus merit inclusion.

These are hardly fatal flaws. Dowling has produced a thorough analysis of a quintessentially Roman virtue.

One can hope that other such studies might follow, for which this one can serve as a model.

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KARINE UGÉ. *Creating the Monastic Past in Medieval Flanders*. York: York Medieval Press. 2005. Pp. xv, 196. \$90.00.

This study should be of interest to specialists in Flemish history and medieval historiography. Karine Ugé's central contention is that monastic communities in medieval Flanders (specifically St. Bertin, St. Rictude, and St. Amé) produced historical narratives for specific purposes. For instance, in his 907 biography of Rictude, Hucbald of St. Amand created a foundation legend for the neighboring community of Marchiennes, at a time when "important parts of its tradition were already forgotten," "the location of the shrines of its major saints . . . was probably lost," "all written documents pertaining to its history had disappeared," and "the oral transmission of the house's tradition was flawed" (p. 126). Hucbald's narrative set the foundation of Marchiennes in approximately 640, and associated its patron saint, Rictude, who had retired as a widow to Marchiennes, with famous figures such as Amand, said to have founded Marchiennes. Ugé thus shows how "the community answered its need for identity and recognition by producing a narrative re-asserting its antiquity and the prestigious connection of its patron saints" (p. 126). The author similarly contextualizes various tenth-century narratives inspired by Hucbald's *Vita Rictudis* (e.g. biographies of Rictude's children Eusebia and Maurontus) to show how "new prestigious lay and holy characters were added" (p. 140). By the twelfth century, Rictude's husband had become a relative of the Merovingian king Dagobert; their son Maurontus's correspondingly improved genealogy helped raise the prestige, and thereby secure the property, of the canons of St. Amé, who possessed Maurontus's relics. Based on her discussion of the Rictude cycle, Ugé concludes: "the writing of history is never gratuitous, neither in its form nor in its timing" (p. 161).

This book might also interest those in search of research topics. The author has drawn attention to some fascinating material, that would repay deeper probing in directions ignored by Ugé. Even for the St. Rictude materials, many important questions of discursive function are left unasked. For instance, one might consider whether Hucbald's origin myth for his own narrative according to which he had never heard of Rictude until the monks and nuns of Marchiennes provided him with scattered fragments of old documents, was an authorial strategy. Or one might ponder Hucbald's story of how St. Amand founded the monastery for men, but the abbot introduced women as well—as if defiance of the intentions of a famous saint over matters of gender segregation were an unproblematic action. Far more could be done with the St. Bertin materials. The first desideratum would be a coherent survey of the state and

nature of the relevant sources, which should also be approached more critically than in Ugé's study. For instance, crucial evidence for narrative production at St. Bertin comes from Folcuin's *Gesta Abbatum Sithiensium* (Deeds of the Abbots of St. Bertin), dated to 962, into which Folcuin is said to have inserted a number of charters. Ugé never doubts that a manuscript "which may have been Folcuin's autograph, survived in St. Bertin's archives until the French Revolution" (p. 62). Her suspicions are not aroused by the fact that, during centuries of struggle over precedence and property with their arch rivals, the canons of St. Omer, the monks of St. Bertin adamantly refused to produce the old manuscript, or to permit any outsiders (above all, Jean Mabillon) to examine their archives (p. 93). Yet the oldest extant witness of Folcuin's text is a twelfth-century copy made by Simon of St. Bertin, as a preface to his continuation of Folcuin's narrative and his programmatic series of forged charters. The charter portion of Folcuin's text appears to be witnessed only through a copy made just before the French Revolution destroyed the abbey's archives, by the archivist Joseph Dewitte, whose "objectivity is doubtful" (p. 94). Yet Ugé confidently discusses the manuscripts we now possess (or rather, the printed editions based on them) as reliable evidence of what Folcuin wrote in 962. I would not immediately agree with the canon of St. Omer who, in 1754, declared that the *Gesta* was a forgery and Folcuin an invention (p. 93), but I would certainly explore the possibility. Only a critical, manuscript-based study can provide a definitive picture of historical writing at St. Bertin. This book is a step in that direction.

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SUSAN BOYNTON. *Shaping a Monastic Identity: Liturgy and History at the Imperial Abbey of Farfa, 1000–1125*. (Conjunctions of Religion and Power in the Medieval Past.) Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 2006. Pp. xii, 289. \$45.00.

To understand the history of the imperial abbey of Farfa in the eleventh and early twelfth centuries, Susan Boynton examines property records; narratives of political affiliations and internal intrigues; evidence preserved in material culture, architecture, and music; and liturgy as recorded in the prodigious number of manuscripts produced at the abbey. As a musicologist, she emphasizes how music and liturgy shed light on the daily and yearly ritual cycles of Farfa, and how these media reflect the abbey's network of power and its nodes of expressing and consolidating its multiple identities.

Boynton notes that recent studies tend to interpret liturgy as a tool for displaying and maintaining power, and thus overlook its central importance as a cultural practice. Those who emphasize power focus chiefly on hagiographic texts, she observes, not on the full range of evidence. She claims that liturgical manuscripts, particularly their musical contents, are fundamental to the

abbey's cultural history. Her main thesis is that the manifold forms of corporate identity that existed within the monastic community at Farfa in the eleventh and early twelfth centuries can be adequately perceived only by taking into consideration the centrality of liturgical performance in reflecting and shaping these identities.

Boynton includes a map (more would have been helpful), three tables, many figures, including ten in glorious color, and four useful appendixes. She prints the Latin of the musical texts on one side and English translations on the other. To illustrate the approximate graphic system of melodic representation known as neumes, she reproduces several manuscripts. Subsequently she transcribes the neumes into modern notation with plain noteheads. She also presents a clear and concise history of Farfa, mainly in her designated period, based primarily on the texts of Gregory of Catino; an analysis of the effects of patronage on Farfa's liturgy and visual culture; and an exposition of Greek and Italian patronage in southern Italy.

Boynton concludes by dealing broadly with liturgy, politics, and the construction of history. In her introduction she paints a positive picture of the abbey, emphasizing its prosperity assisted by imperial patronage and the stability achieved through several lengthy abbacies. This situation fostered significant renewal in the arts and letters. But when Boynton analyzes the abbacies at the end of her study she conveys a more complex picture. She contrasts the constructive abbacies of Bernard I and Bernard III with the troubled reigns of Rainald, Bernard II and Oddo, and concludes with the reign of the infamous Guido, who claimed the office in 1119 and was ultimately elected in 1121. Guido sought support from Calixtus II rather than from the emperor, Henry V, and as a result of these overtures and the Concordat of Worms in 1122, Farfa lost its imperial patronage and relative independence. In 1124 Guido abdicated to Honorius II.

Gregory of Catino describes the daily rituals in the abbey church of Santa Maria during Guido's reign as a form of humiliation, where monks were forced to appear daily in black garments with jagged hoods, and to sing or recite psalms looking ravaged and undignified. Influenced by actors rather than moved by a deep sense of spirituality, the younger brothers introduced popular and silly songs from the outside. Rather than observing the customs of Farfa, they imported frivolities and ostentatious practices from places they had visited. These new practices saddened the older and more serious monks.

Boynton believes that this passage exemplifies a tradition of polemical criticism in which detractors of certain kinds of musical performance describe it pejoratively as histrionic or theatrical. She reasons that "the ditties and foreign songs" stand in opposition to the customary chant and polyphony of the liturgical repertory, and are accordingly rejected by the older, more traditional monks. She also situates Gregory's text within another rhetorical tradition of the twelfth and

thirteenth centuries that reacted to music associated with youth and the expression of levity and modernity. She interprets the hymn *Splendor patris*, added to a manuscript at Farfa in the early twelfth century, in this tradition, suggesting that it illustrates the process of musico-liturgical innovation during the abbacy of Guido. The text of *Splendor patris* is based on the liturgical versicle *Benedicamus Domino; Deo gratias*, which was traditionally sung as a dismissal at or near the conclusion of the divine office.

But looking at the larger picture of enmity and decadence engulfing the abbey during Guido's reign, I suggest that it is more probable that Gregory was describing the songs and their presentation as expressing that degeneracy rather than merely reacting to youth and innovation. *Splendor patris* may have seemed foreign to the monks at Farfa, but it is improbable that it represented the deep cleavages ravaging the abbey. Others may agree with Boynton, and this is only one caveat regarding a book that is innovative and profound, and which I unreservedly recommend to all readers.

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JUDITH BRONSTEIN. *The Hospitallers and the Holy Land: Financing the Latin East, 1187–1274*. Rochester, N.Y.: Boydell Press. 2005. Pp. x, 190. \$90.00.

The Order of the Hospital of St. John, created in the early twelfth century, played a major role in the maintenance of the Crusader or Latin states established in the Levant until their collapse in 1291. This institution, whose original aim was to care for pilgrims and the poor, upheld a standing army, engaged in the exploitation of rural and urban resources, intervened in political struggles in the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem, and occasionally conducted military campaigns on its own in the Latin East. Its policies and actions, especially in that region, have been the subject of numerous studies. However, little attention has been paid so far to the reactions of the order's Western priories to events in the Levant or to their contribution to the economic and military resources of the Hospitallers in that region.

Judith Bronstein partly fills that gap by focusing on the fairly well-documented priories of France, St. Giles and Auvergne (all within present-day France and Belgium), the largest and wealthiest in the West, and their response to the order's needs in the East in the years 1187–1274. After explaining the choice of period in the introduction, Bronstein briefly surveys the administrative structure and financial operation of the order prior to 1187.

Chapter one follows the impact of the evolving political, military, and territorial conditions in the Levant on the financial and military capabilities of the order in that region. Bronstein rightly stresses that the Hospitallers in the Latin East had financial resources of their own deriving from their plantations of sugar cane and other land exploitation and, therefore, were not en-

tirely dependent on assistance from the West. From 1250 to 1263, they took advantage of the impoverishment of lay lords and ecclesiastical institutions in the Holy Land to expand their property.

Chapter two examines the reaction of the order's "French" priories to the Franks' crushing defeat suffered in 1187 at the battle of Hattin. This is the most original section of the book, largely based upon unpublished or untapped archival sources. The loss of rural estates, castles, and urban property, and natural disasters in the East, required a thorough restructuring of the order, including its finances and military forces. Bronstein distinguishes three phases in the development of the priories' economic strategies. They limited their investments in land, sold some of their property, and emphasized the dispatch of money and goods to the East in the years 1188–1200. From 1200 to 1250 they consistently and significantly expanded their landed property and rights, yet much of the order's income in France was never destined for the Holy Land. The failure of St. Louis's crusade by 1254 and the worsening conditions in the Latin East in the second half of the thirteenth century put a heavy strain on the "French" priories, which enjoyed fewer donations as a result of economic developments in the West. The years 1262–1274 were a period of financial and political crisis for the order, compounded by the diversion of financial means and manpower intended for the Holy Land to support the consolidation of the rule of Charles of Anjou in the Kingdom of Sicily. Bronstein devotes a brief section, drawing largely on secondary sources, to the finances of the priories in Sicily, England, and the Iberian peninsula from 1262 to 1274. In these years the European priories were compelled to take loans and alienate property to support the order in the East.

Chapter three examines the contribution of the papacy to the operation of the order and to the latter's assistance to the Latin East. On the whole the popes protected the Hospitallers' rights, privileges, and property from encroachment by secular and ecclesiastical lords, apparently exempted them from church taxation designated for the Holy Land until the 1260s, defended them from accusations that they misused or wasted donations, and encouraged the increase of the latter to the order. However, there were fluctuations in papal attitudes. In the 1230s and 1240s, Gregory IX and his successor Innocent IV resented the Hospitallers' support of Frederick II's policies in the East; Urban IV (1261–1264) distrusted the Hospitallers and favored the Templars; while the deep involvement of Clement IV (1265–1268) in the struggle for the Kingdom of Sicily partly diverted his attention and large resources from support to the Latin East. By 1274, when the Second Church Council of Lyons convened, a substantial gap existed between the contemporary image of the Hospitallers and the Templars and the true financial and military capabilities of the two orders.

In chapter four Bronstein remarks that most of the brothers serving in local commanderies in Europe were never sent to the East. That conclusion is supported in

the book's appendix by a dated list of members of the order and their respective careers and locations in the "French" priories and in the Latin East from 1187 to 1274, which documents the heavy losses in manpower suffered in the latter region.

Bronstein's study calls for several remarks. The crisis faced by the order after the battle of Hattin in 1187 provides a convincing starting point for her investigation, yet the latter's limitation to 1274 is hardly justified. The extension of the study to the fall of the Latin East in 1291 would have yielded a more complete overview of the interplay between the order's "French" priories and the Latin East and of its members' careers. Bronstein clearly underrates the Hospitallers' resources in the Latin East by her insistence on the recurrent financial crises besetting them in that region. The commercialization of the order's agricultural produce in the Levant was not limited to sugar. The existence of a grain measure in the Hospitallers compound in Acre, in addition to those of the royal custom station, the Templars, Pisa, and Venice (see Francesco Balducci Pegolotti, *La pratica della mercatura*, ed. Allan Evans [1936], p. 64), implies the marketing of grain and possibly of other commodities produced by the order's estates. More generally, Bronstein fails to perceive the dynamic, market-oriented nature of the order's investments and estate management, similar to those of lay lords in the Latin East. She ignores the leasing of urban assets, for instance in Acre, an important source of income. The order's substantial financial resources in the East are also illustrated by its heavy investments in building activity in Acre in the 1220s and 1230s and later in the city's suburb of Montmusard, overlooked by Bronstein, as well as by its acquisition and accumulation of property in the Holy Land in the 1250s and 1260s. The conveyance of goods, manpower, and money from the "French" priories to the East would have warranted a separate treatment. Bronstein's scattered observations about the order's ships and its shipping privileges in Marseilles are insufficient and partly incorrect, and her contention that the order had a sizeable fleet by the beginning of the thirteenth century is contradicted by her sources.

Despite the above reservations, it is clear that Bronstein has made an original and important contribution to our understanding of the structure and operation of the Hospitaller Order and to its share in the defense of the Latin East from 1187 to 1274. It is to be hoped that her investigation of the "French" priories of the order will be followed by similar studies bearing on other Western priories.

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ELAINE GRAHAM-LEIGH. *The Southern French Nobility and the Albigensian Crusade*. Rochester, N.Y.: Boydell Press. 2005. Pp. 187. \$90.00.

Until quite recently the Trencavel family, one of the major dynasties of twelfth-century Occitania (now

southern France), was virtually unknown to scholars outside of a narrow circle of specialists in regional history. Now, after Hélène Débax's recent thesis, *La féodalité languedocienne XI^e-XII^e siècles: Serments, hommages et fiefs dans le Languedoc des Trencavel* (2003), Elaine Graham-Leigh's book focuses on the family's destruction in the first months of the Albigensian Crusades.

Chapter one surveys the historiography of the Albigensian Crusades, beginning in the sixteenth century, but for some reason ending with the state of the field about a generation ago. (In the interest of full disclosure, my own *Ermengard of Narbonne and the World of the Troubadors* [2001] covers many of the issues raised by Graham-Leigh; it appears in her bibliography, but she either has not read it or did not think it had anything to contribute to her work.) Chapter two considers the principal narrative sources for the Crusades: Pierre des Vaux-de-Cernay, Guillaume de Tudela and his anonymous Continuator, and Guillaume de Puylaurens. Graham-Leigh's principal concern is whether the authors were sympathetic to the Crusades and favorable to Pope Innocent III. Given the focus of the book on the regional political context of the Crusades, this lengthy discussion is perplexing, first because she does not consider how her sources' biases shaped what little they have to recount about Occitan society before and during the Crusades, but above all because these narratives do not figure in a major way in the core of Graham-Leigh's book (chapters four through seven). In contrast, the so-called Trencavel Cartulary is an important source for the book, as indeed it must be, but on this she has little to say beyond describing the manuscript and its contents. She misidentifies it as a collection of "land transactions," when it is a *liber feudorum*, a collection of oaths of fidelity and security for castles, and these she misidentifies as "recognitions . . . that [lords] held their land from the Trencavel" (p. 15). This is the consequence of her attempting to apply a traditional image of a "feudal pyramid" to twelfth-century Occitan society. Since this one manuscript is all that remains of the Trencavel archives, one would have liked some discussion of its possible limitations as a window onto their political power.

Chapter three, a narrative of the first phase of the Crusades, sets the questions to be answered in the remainder of the book: why was the most immediate result of the Crusades the destruction of the Trencavels (rather than the Count of Toulouse, against whom they were initially launched) and why was that destruction so easy? In chapter four, the author points to the central position of the Cistercians in both initiating and carrying through the Crusades. To answer why their animosity may have been directed particularly toward the Trencavels, she points to the absence of evidence that the family patronized the Cistercian abbeys in their lands. Follow the money? It is an interesting proposition, but I am doubtful. Very few documents remain from Fontfroide. Here surely absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. And the Trencavels were longtime

patrons of Valmagne (whose manuscript cartulary Graham-Leigh did not consult). The question about the Cistercians is pertinent, however, and part of a large and important issue that deserves an extensive monograph: the Cistercians' role as agents of Innocent III.

Chapters five through seven concern the secular politics of Occitania in the decades prior to the Crusades. Graham-Leigh rightly points to the importance of the Catalan/Aragonese connection, although that is hardly the news she makes it out to be. In chapter seven she makes a close study of the entourage of the Trencavels in the later twelfth century, showing the narrowing of their closest courtiers to a group centered on Carcassonne. This is the most interesting and novel discussion in the book, absent from Débax's thesis and well worth having. The footnotes here have especially valuable information about familial connections among this Trencavel elite. The entire account, however, is vitiated by two assumptions the author makes, neither of them ever examined. The first is that political/social relations were determined by who "held land of" whom (an assumption derived, one would guess, from a textbook image of English medieval government), when most land in Occitania was allodial (i.e. held of no one). The second is that political power requires the ability to coerce one's followers, an idea quite foreign to the medieval military elite. As a result, Graham-Leigh constantly misreads the fundamentals of Occitan political/social relationships, especially in the one other place she might have made a contribution: her discussion of Pere of Aragon's activities prior to the battle of Muret, when in the chaos brought on by the Crusade the king is clearly trying to construct a "feudal monarchy" much like that of Philip Augustus in France.

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LYDWINE SCORDIA. *"Le roi doit vivre du sien": La théorie de l'impôt en France (XIII^e-XV^e siècles)*. (Collection des Études Augustiniennes; Série Moyen Âge et Temps Modernes, number 40.) Paris: Institute des Études Augustiniennes, 2005. Pp. 539. €56.00.

In this book, Lydwine Scordia reflects on various theories concerning taxation and its legitimacy that circulated in France (and throughout Christendom) from the late thirteenth century to ca. 1500. Her title suggests that she will focus on the notion that the king should make do with the lands and income that he had and refrain from asking his subjects for more. In fact, she spreads her net far wider and in the end devotes just a short section to the adage, concentrating not on its first flourishing under Philip the Fair but rather on the reign of Charles V (pp. 411–421). Throughout Scordia privileges the ruminations of intellectuals over the justifications advanced by rulers who taxed and the protests of subjects who resisted paying. She discusses as well the canonical texts dear to schoolmen—the Bible, Aristotle, canon and civil law—considering not only the passages they cited but also others she deems relevant.

Scordia divides her book into four sections. In the first (pp. 41–166) she explores her notion of a tax "as an extraordinary financial charge linked to a precise event" (p. 39). She pays special attention (pp. 103–153) to quodlibetic debates of 1282–1286, and particularly to a question analyzed by Richard de Mediavilla (which she edits from just one of the many surviving manuscripts, adding an initial rubric I have never encountered). The question is whether lay subjects are held to pay new taxes to their temporal lords when the taxes merely benefit the lords. The answer as regards free subjects is "No" (as might be expected). The question's importance lies in Richard's incisive summary of the classic justifications for the legitimate levy of taxes. He began by emphasizing that his analysis of novel taxes applied only to princes and kings, since lesser lords, he said, required the consent of their overlords to levy such taxes. As to other taxes, Richard pronounced free subjects obligated to pay impositions instituted long ago (*antiquitus*), and new impositions (for a reasonable cause) to which they consented. Any other novel tax must advance the common welfare and must be imposed only when the ruler's treasury would be exhausted without his subjects' support. Under such conditions, Richard judged that free subjects should pay, arguing that the members of the body politic were bound to help the head, just as the head was obliged to aid the members. Curiously, Scordia suggests that Richard's chief aim in the quodlibet was "to establish the fiscal monopoly of the king" (p. 93). Because she commences her study with Philip the Fair, Scordia concludes that "the theory of taxation was established before the practical implementation of taxation" (p. 443). Closer study of what are now generally termed "customary aids" might have convinced her that Saint Louis (and Alphonse of Poitiers) deserve more attention than she gives them (p. 273).

In the book's second section (pp. 167–258), Scordia turns to arguments justifying the imposition of taxes in peacetime, primarily focusing on the contention that kings deserved pay for their services, especially in foreseeing the realm's future needs. Again Scordia privileges intellectuals over rulers, who (to the best of my knowledge) did not employ such justifications. The efforts of Philip V (and his successors) to levy taxes in time of peace for quite specific purposes were resoundingly unsuccessful, whereas the aid to pay John II's ransom was generally accepted.

Scordia's third section (pp. 259–328) treats the opposition to taxation expressed in descriptions of ideal (and idealized) princes and past times, and also in vituperative attacks on particular rulers. Demonstrating that kings themselves questioned the legitimacy of the taxes they levied, Scordia considers (pp. 314–328) Charles V's abolition of the *fouage* as he was dying. Such an act was less novel than might appear. Particularly relevant is Philip the Fair's deathbed nullification of a tax decried by leagues of his subjects, a topic to which Scordia tangentially alludes in discussing the principle *cessante causa* (pp. 157–161).

The final section of the book (pp. 329–437) deals with what Scordia terms “acceptance of taxation.” Here she argues that the French came to be willing to pay “for the majesty of the state of the royal person” (pp. 39, 334–346) or, as she also puts it, “*l’État spectacle*” (pp. 354–362). She contends that the French were “proud of their obedience” and “fidelity,” and that such sentiments led them to support their kings financially (pp. 390, 363–398). Finally, Scordia treats the principle “The king must live of his own” as one aspect of “Paradoxes of Taxation” (pp. 411–421, 399–437). In this fourth section she admits that “theorization of regular taxation in France” was “delicate” (pp. 399–411), and she finally acknowledges that taxation “was a constant problem during the Ancien Régime and the prime cause of the Revolution” (p. 449), suggesting that “the fundamental financial weakness of French royalty” goes far to explain its long survival (p. 452).

The book is written with great verve and clarity, qualities that perhaps contribute to Scordia’s presenting a far simpler account of the theories and development of French taxation than I believe the evidence warrants. She provides indexes to her own references to biblical and legal texts, as well as to people and primary sources, but not to the plethora of topics she discusses. The sexpartite bibliography makes locating any particular publication an often frustrating challenge.

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HOLLY S. HURLBURT. *The Dogaresse of Venice, 1200–1500: Wife and Icon*. (The New Middle Ages.) New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2006. Pp. vii, 304. \$69.95.

Holly S. Hurlburt has set herself a very difficult assignment. Between 1200 and 1500, thirty-three women held the position of dogaresse (wife of the doge, elected head of the Venetian government). Information about them is so thin that writing a collective biography would be impossible. Hurlburt has opted for a different approach. Using the few extant tesserae and a great deal of interpretive cement, she has created a mosaic, a study of what she calls the office of dogaresse over three late medieval centuries. She aims to extend consideration of gender in Venice beyond social and economic perspectives—areas in which historians during the past two decades have made important contributions—into the realm of politics. “The dogaresse,” she asserts in the introduction, “were amongst a small handful of Venetian women with proximity and regular access to the spheres of Venetian power, who may have had opportunities to exercise direct political influence and whose public appearances resonated with civic and social symbolism, complicating the masculine spaces of the medieval polity” (pp. 4–5).

Regrettably, Hurlburt has chosen an unstable wall—the anachronistic distinction between public and private spheres—on which to lay her tiles. Mentioning briefly that some scholars question the relevance of the

“two spheres” concept to the history of gender in Europe before the eighteenth century, she does not choose to engage them in debate. A single prescriptive work, the Venetian patrician Francesco Barbaro’s *De re uxoria libri duo* (1416)—well known to modern scholars, but how widely circulated during the fifteenth century she does not say—supplies epigraphs for her chapters. It provides inadequate warrant not only for repeating the received assumption that most patrician women in Venice were confined to the “private” space of households but also for claiming that dogaresse were an exception to the rule.

In chapter one, “Legislating the Dogaresse,” Hurlburt draws primarily on the archival series *Liber promissionum*, a collection of ceremonial protocols regulating the election, installation, and comportment of the doge. Some of these contain provisions bearing upon his wife. A dogaresse who took the oath (*iuramentum*) promised to observe “what pertains to her.” This generic phrase presumably alluded to proscriptions—similar to those imposed upon her husband and eventually on all their close kin—of “princely” behaviors deemed inappropriate for an elected head of a republican government. Chapter two, “Introducing the Dogaresse,” is also based mostly on the *Liber promissionum*. It concerns the ceremonial entry (*adventus*) of some dogaresse into Palazzo Ducale, which occurred on average four months later than that of the doge; an unspecified number of dogaresse never made an entry. Although Appendix II includes two passages from the *Liber promissionum* (1348, 1472) regarding dogaresse oaths and entries, nowhere does Hurlburt make clear whether these are examples taken from a larger body of evidence, or all the evidence that survives. Readers alert to problems of historical method will wonder whether she is trying to describe a routinized process, or to construct one by setting in place a few old tesserae and surrounding them with newly minted speculations.

The way Hurlburt handles a piece of sartorial evidence reveals that she is in the construction business. The first reference to the dogaresse’s outer garment (*manto*) comes in 1457: “if it happens that the lord doge has a consort, let it be held that whenever that lady dogaresse leaves the palace, she must wear a worthy and honorable cloak” (34, 214 n. 71). Legislators in the Great Council did not specify its cut, color, or material. Relying on noncontemporary evidence, the *Vite dei dogi* of Marin Sanuto (1466–1536), Hurlburt assumes that the cloak was gold. She immediately jumps to the conclusion that it was the uniform prescribed for women who held “office.” Her rendering of the Latin noun *officia* (plural) as “office” (singular) in the modern political sense—“duties” would be a more accurate translation—produces major problems in the central third chapter, “The Dogaresse’s Office.” Sources attest that some dogaresse showed themselves in public. Chronicles reveal that they escorted elite female visitors around the city. They regularly attended religious services in San Marco, or at least were expected to do so. That these public appearances were incumbent upon

holders of an "office"—that is, part of a job description—seems extremely dubious. It is difficult, furthermore, to see the usefulness of calling the doge's wife an "icon." Dogaresse moved about the city mainly in boats rather than on foot, a point obscured by the absence of a map. Their portraits were never painted. Hence I doubt that they were sufficiently visible to their contemporaries either to serve as or to problematize models of gendered behavior.

In chapter four, "Death and the Dogaresse," Hurlburt steps onto *terra firma*. Using wills and other materials, she persuasively examines the efforts of some widowed dogaresse to provide tombs suitable for memorializing their spouses and themselves. The concluding chapter, "Recalling the Dogaresse," surveys selected literary and artistic treatments of dogaresse during the Romantic era, primarily those of Byron.

Technical flaws as well as shortcomings in the argument make reading this book a tough slog. Errors in grammar, punctuation, and spelling abound; missing and extra words are legion. Clearly, Hurlburt did not benefit from the assistance of a competent copyeditor, nor did anyone run the manuscript through a spell-check and then proofread it carefully. *O tempora, o mores!*

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EUROPE: EARLY MODERN AND MODERN

PATRICIA PHILLIPPY. *Painting Women: Cosmetics, Canvases, and Early Modern Culture*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2006. Pp. xii, 258. \$52.00.

This erudite, imaginative book examines the remarkable homogeneity of denunciations of women's use of cosmetics in early modern culture, from the Reformation through the late seventeenth century, in Catholic and Protestant cultures, in popular polemics and learned treatises, across England and Europe. As Patricia Phillippy shows, anti-cosmetics discourse and a thriving "cosmetic culture" coexisted and, together, shaped the conceptual and material world of possibility within which women artists had to operate. Phillippy seeks "to demonstrate how the dynamics of the cosmetic debate illuminate women artists' self-representations and, beyond this, to align these visual works with texts by women writers that engage the cosmetic debate in similar ways and deploy similar strategies for authorial self-fashioning" (pp. 17–18).

As Phillippy shows, there were material connections between painting faces and painting canvasses, as well as discursive and conceptual ones. Ceruse, or white lead, was the key ingredient in face paint and in the white pigments painters used; canvases and faces were rendered blank slates with this same (corrosive) ingredient. Furthermore, "colors for both arts of painting were sold at apothecaries' shops" (p. 31). Whereas women's creativity was sometimes denigrated through

association with the deceptive, vain, and ephemeral practice of cosmetics, women might also achieve self-determination and sensual pleasure through their use of cosmetics. Nor was this the limit of their creativity.

Phillippy is particularly interested in the agency available to women artists. I cannot think of another book that so thoroughly and thoughtfully explores the connections between women's writing and painting. Phillippy offers extended interpretations of works by writers including Marguerite de Navarre, Elizabeth Tudor, Amelia Lanyer, and Elizabeth Cary and her filial biographer, and painters including Artemisia Gentileschi, Lavinia Fontana, and Elisabetta Sirani. Despite male writers' essentialist intentions, she argues, their discussions of female face-painting revealed the constructedness of gender and thereby created opportunities for women writers and painters to make art and to assert their own gendered identities as performative—and therefore manipulable—rather than essential. Phillippy emphasizes, for instance, "women's agency in negotiating the cosmetic culture's controlling assumptions and iconoclasm's paralyzing implications for women's creativity" (p. 101). While the book's formulations regarding gender and agency are not particularly innovative, Phillippy applies them in new ways to a terrain of evidence that she has crafted with skill and flair. Any reader will find new materials and illuminating conjunctions here.

In addition to the texts and paintings that are her main concern, Phillippy assesses objects as various as a traveling toilet set, mirrors, and a casting bottle. No one interpretation of a text or painting stands out as especially ground-breaking. What makes this study interesting and useful is the cumulative effect of its evidence and arguments. Each chapter can be read on its own. As a result, the whole text can seem repetitive. Despite this, the book is most compelling, and Phillippy's achievement is most impressive, when the chapters are allowed to build on one another. Each chapter posits provocative relationships. Some of these work better than others. For instance, I sometimes lost the thread of the argument connecting the transcript of Agostino Tassi's trial for raping Artemisia Gentileschi (1612) Gentileschi's paintings of Judith, and William Shakespeare's *Measure for Measure*. But Phillippy uses this clever grouping of texts to draw our attention to an unexpected structural similarity; in each the presence of a third female figure helps to interrupt and complicate the familiar dichotomy between good woman and bad virgin and whore.

Phillippy's attention to religious change and debate is especially subtle and suggestive. Throughout the book, she considers confessional identities, how they are gendered, and how religious concerns saturate everything in this period. For instance, she connects iconoclasm and the distrust of idolatry with attitudes toward women, their essential identities, and their creative efforts. In an especially strong chapter, she examines the implications of post-Reformation descriptions of conscience as involving an "active, dialogic interaction be

tween the individual and internalized authorities." As she argues, feminist writers and artists, Catholic and Protestant, were then able to exploit this emergent notion of feminine subjectivity as "the product of an inaudible conversation between the individual and God's deputy within" (p. 164). It is still too often the case that religion is addressed only in books on or chapters about "religion," which are then often subdivided by confessional group. In accord with her comparative approach more generally, Phillippy attends to connections across confessional differences. She also approaches religion as pervasive and impossible to separate out from other concerns. In this, as in her ability and willingness to move confidently and elegantly across language traditions, disciplines, genres, oceans, and centuries, her work is exemplary and inspiring.

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LUCIA BIANCHIN. *Dove non arriva la legge: Dottrine della censura nella prima età moderna*. (Annali dell'Istituto storico italo-germanico in Trento; Monografie, number 41.) Bologna: Il Mulino. 2005. Pp. 389 €25.50.

This is a study of the theory of civil censorship. Lucia Bianchin analyzes political treatises written by Jean Bodin (1529/30–1596), French professor of law Pierre Grégoire (1540–1597), Dutch humanist Justus Lipsius (1547–1606), Calvinist magistrate Johannes Althusius (1557–1638), and German Lutheran Johann Angelius Werdenhagen (1581–1652). Beginning with Bodin's *Six livres de la République* of 1576 and ending with Werdenhagen's work of 1635, Bianchin focuses on what these authors had to say about censorship by civil authorities. Each began with an account of the office of censor in ancient Republican Rome. Bodin argued that censorship had its origins in the census in ancient Rome, which began by counting and gathering information about subjects but became a means of regulating and disciplining them. Bodin argued that the role of state censorship in contemporary Europe was to correct abuses in the population, such as drunkenness, gambling, laziness, obscenity, and vagabondage, that were not prosecuted through laws and justice. This form of censorship was a remedy for corruption that might spread in the state.

All the other thinkers studied by Bianchin followed Bodin to greater or lesser degree. Grégoire saw censorship as vital for checking license, vice, and disrespect or the laws, and offered a legal argument based on Roman history for the state to exercise control over the private behavior of its subjects. For Lipsius censorship was an important instrument for the person in power, and its goal was to correct. Without censorship, the state might perish. Lipsius also engaged in a dialogue with Niccolò Machiavelli. Althusius, an administrator in the Calvinist town of Emden, combined the previous arguments for censorship with a Calvinist emphasis on discipline and ephors (i.e. magistrates). The function of

civil administration was to maintain internal peace and public order; discipline included matters of faith, whose unity was essential for internal order. For Althusius censorship embraced everything in the public sphere including religion, morality, and public order. Werdenhagen laid greater emphasis on the religious conscience than did the others, as he combined Bodin with the Lutheran emphasis on teaching the Word of God and family responsibility. Every responsible father, not just the clergy, had the duty of teaching the Word; if fulfilled, this would produce moral and social discipline. These political theorists had almost nothing to say about the censorship of books; everything was social and moral discipline. They were state absolutists in one way or another and saw censorship as a key support of the state. The book finishes with some thoughts about Thomas Hobbes, Samuel Pufendorf, and Jean-Jacques Rousseau.

Bianchin presents good summaries of the works of these thinkers and supports her arguments with copious quotations from their works. There is considerable repetition, largely because these political philosophers often echoed each other. Early in the book, she notes the differences between the theory of civil censorship and Catholic Church censorship, which focused on books and ideas. Bianchin has done much reading, especially in German secondary scholarship.

There are irritations. While the documentation is extensive, the citations are often infuriatingly incomplete, because Bianchin frequently cites an entire book instead of the handful of pages with the necessary information. A stronger chronological framework would have helped. The book began as a dissertation and possibly relies a little too much on the scholarship of the supervisor. Finally, the author's historiographical ideology produces some baffling passages. It is well known that Renaissance humanists looked to ancient Roman institutions and authors for inspiration and models, and the political philosophers studied in this book did exactly that. This was a major part of Renaissance intellectual endeavor, and Lipsius was the most celebrated humanist in Europe. Although the author recognizes the contributions of humanists, she cannot bring herself to use the word "Renaissance," or to pay much attention to this context. Instead, she cites "early modernness" and "the doctrine of early modernity" (pp. 103, 125, 136), without definitions, as substantive historical forces. In summary, the book is good but could have been better.

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VOLKER REMMERT. *Widmung, Welterkärung und Wissenschaftslegitimierung: Titelbilder und ihre Funktionen in der Wissenschaftlichen Revolution*. (Wolfenbütteler Forschungen, number 110.) Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz. 2005. Pp. 267.

In this handsomely produced book, Volker Remmert impresses, fascinates, and delights the reader with his vast knowledge of the way mathematics evolved into a leading scientific enterprise over the course of the seventeenth century. His careful analysis of the frontispieces of mathematical (astronomical, optical, and treatises about the art of war and garden architecture) books presents an expose of the early modern symbiosis between mathematics and art. It is a model of an interdisciplinary investigation in which history, art history, and the history of science join in an act of mutual enlightenment. Remmert explicates in minute and instructive detail the surprisingly subtle interactions of word and image implicit in the *iconotexts* (Peter Wagner) of the title pages, revealing mathematics' iconographic connections to mythology, art, theology, and philosophy and demonstrating how they were employed to communicate changing scientific assumption while holding on to theological orthodoxy.

Starting with a detailed review of the controversy over the Copernican cosmology and Galilei's role in it, Remmert outlines mathematics' move from the periphery, as a handmaiden to astronomy, to the center of scientific teaching. Moving back and forth between mathematics as theory and mathematics as a science of practical application, Remmert reviews the struggle for supremacy between science and technology, war and peace, and mathematics' contributions to the structure and design of war machines and fortifications. Remmert also devotes a detailed exposition to its importance in the design and building of the formal gardens of typical of absolutist Europe.

The study directs a number of queries to the title images: how were they used? What was their function? And what role did they play in the evolving intellectual mindscape that we have come to know as the Scientific Revolution? Remmert reviews their influence on the founding myths of seventeenth-century mathematics that began with Galileo's trial and conviction in June 1633 and ended with Francesco Eschinardi's cautious but unmistakably supportive reference to Galileo. Eschinardi placed the moons of Jupiter and the valleys and mountains on the surface of the moon into the title image of his *Centuria opticae* (1668). Galileo had claimed both as his discoveries. Remmert closes his learned study with a review of the use of mathematics with frontispieces that present playful and formal images of gardens, fountains, and fanciful machines designed and built for the glorification of powerful patrons.

Remmert's investigation spans the century of the scientific revolution and the unfolding struggle between competing world views, between theology and the emerging of what has become known as the natural sciences. Before us unfolds a panorama of Western European science that knows few borders and communicates freely about the mythologies of the past and the controversies of the present. Remmert's analysis puts into words how carefully the "revolution" was ushered in spite of many of its truly revolutionary implications.

Owing much to the scientific achievements of the Jesuits, whose unified worldview produced a unity of knowing, and whose teaching mission extended all across Europe, this "revolution" did, indeed, revolve, not burst upon the scene with the intellectual violence that studies of this period often have suggested.

Remmert's meticulous analysis communicates the delicate line that could be moved but that was not to be deliberately and defiantly crossed as astronomers and mathematicians negotiated their approach to a new cosmology and cosmography that eventually would compel them to abandon the geocentric in favor of heliocentric universe. We note how carefully new intellectual and scientific evolutions were plotted and how consciously defenders of traditions and propagators of the new reflected on how far they might go and how openly they might express their allegiances. Forty years after the condemnation of Galileo's Copernican theories, during a period when mathematics assumed the leadership position at universities and at court, heliocentrism finally was accepted as a scientifically proven theory.

Lest we remain in the rarified realm of scientific controversies, Remmert devotes several entertaining sections of his book to the practical and economic applications that helped advance the changing ideas about the cosmos. Throughout the seventeenth century, mathematics, trade, and the arts and science of war formed a strong mutual attraction. The frontispieces of practical mathematics often are illustrated with images of military officers and war machinery. Just as often they combine mathematics with the art of building formal gardens. The importance of mathematics for navigation and thus for trade, here the tobacco trade with Virginia, is amusingly brought home in the image of the pipe-smoking Zeus that decorates the title page of the English tract, *New Systems of Mathematicks* (1681).

This book is beautifully produced. It is filled with a plethora of newly unearthed frontispieces that testify to the author's talents as a collector and a scientific sleuth while foregrounding his ability to make text and image speak to the reader knowledgeably and convincingly about the evolution and presentation of seventeenth century scientific thought.

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WILLIAM R. NEWMAN. *Atoms and Alchemy: Chymistry and the Experimental Origins of the Scientific Revolution*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2006. Pp. xiii+250. Cloth \$75.00, paper \$30.00.

The Scientific Revolution is a core element of most grand narratives of the emergence of modern science from medieval scholasticism. Despite attempts to create a more nuanced picture of the remarkable transformation of knowledge of nature in this period, many introductory textbooks maintain the basic plot lines established fifty years ago by what has been termed the "whig" interpretation of history. This positivist and in

ternalist approach prioritized changes in the exact sciences and identified the roots of modern science in the development of experimental methods, the quantification of physics, and a new way of conceptualizing matter and change that Robert Boyle called "mechanical philosophy." Boyle, in this view, took a necessary and decisive step away from scholastic Aristotelian natural philosophy, with its sterile metaphysics and reputed reluctance to value laboratory experience. Isaac Newton then joined Boyle's experimental philosophy and corpuscular theory to Galilean and Cartesian mathematics and mechanics and created a mathematical approach to physics that reoriented the study of nature away from the world of common sense observation and made it rigorously hypothetical, measurable, and testable.

Boyle's pivotal role in the mechanization of chemistry was laid out in whig fashion by Marie Boas Hall in the 1950s: Boyle wrested matter theory away from medieval alchemy and reshaped it into the forebear of modern chemistry by demanding a new account of the observable world in terms of mechanical actions of hard particles of matter (corpuscles). The importance of this version is evident from Richard S. Westfall's *The Construction of Modern Science: Mechanisms and Mechanics* (1977), which along with Boas Hall's *The Scientific Renaissance 1450–1630* (1962) brought the Scientific Revolution into the undergraduate curriculum. Following Boas Hall, Westfall charted the intellectual development of Boyle's mechanical philosophy from Cartesian dualism and Pierre Gassendi's revision of classical atomism. This basic story of the mechanization of matter theory and its importance to experimental science has endured in introductory textbooks, for example in Steven Shapin's *The Scientific Revolution* (1996). According to this narrative, the new science was fundamentally physical science, upon which chemistry, medicine, and the other sciences were to be modeled. Indeed, the traditional view is that chemistry emerged as a scientific discipline at the hands of Boyle, Antoine Lavoisier, and a few intermediate luminaries in large part because they abandoned its alchemical heritage and made it into a physical science.

Imagine, then, the importance of William R. Newman's claim that Boyle's matter theory, which lay at the core of his mechanical philosophy, did not derive from his contemplation of continental physics but rather emerged from his early and focused study of the laboratory methods and theories of medieval alchemy and the seventeenth-century medical sequelae of Theophrastus Paracelsus's chemical philosophy. As evidence, Newman presents a compelling distillation of recent findings that scholastic Aristotelian natural philosophy was not entirely dominated by Thomas Aquinas's synthesis—long regarded as the kernel of the medieval paradigm to be overthrown in the Scientific Revolution—but that a corpuscular theory and experimental methodology based on Aristotle's *Meteorology* was elaborated already by a thirteenth-century scholastic alchemist and contributed to the reevaluation of matter and change in sixteenth and seventeenth-cen-

tury alchemy and medicine. Moreover, this medieval alchemical tradition can be clearly traced through the works of specific natural philosophers and iatrochemists, chiefly Andreas Libavius and Daniel Sennert, to Boyle. Boyle did not credit these sources, but Newman reveals Sennert's legacies in Boyle's formation of theory and in the very laboratory experiments he adduced as evidence of his "new" mechanical and corpuscular hypothesis. Boyle's true innovation, therefore, was not in theory or in methods but in finally abandoning Aristotelian "form" as an explanation for the qualities that characterize substances and replacing it with Sennertian explanations for how mixed bodies are built up of various corpuscles that possess various native affinities, an idea that lies at the basis of Newton's ideas about matter. Newman does not denigrate the importance of Boyle's changed discourse, but rather documents that it did not derive mainly from his pondering of classical atomism revived by Gassendi or the mechanical ideas of René Descartes and Galileo Galilei but was a reconceptualization of the chemical studies that so absorbed Boyle in his youth.

What Newman offers here is an important correction to the foundation story of the Scientific Revolution as it has been retold to history of science graduate students since the middle of the twentieth century. His study reveals the fundamental error in the positivist neglect of alchemy in the development of science and faults recent attempts to recreate the grand narrative for failing to reexamine the primary sources on which it is founded or even to take into account scholars' recent studies of these sources. Worse, some accounts offer fashionable reinterpretations of the old narrative that obscure its triumphalist nature in the jargon and methodologies of sociology, anthropology, discourse analysis, and other importations to the history of science without questioning the validity of the historical details. Shapin, whose *Leviathan and the Air Pump: Hobbes, Boyle, and the Experimental Life* (1985, coauthored by Simon Schaffer), *A Social History of Truth: Civility and Science in Seventeenth-Century England* (1994), and *The Scientific Revolution* (1996) have been widely read by graduate students, bears the brunt of Newman's criticism, but Peter Dear and a few others who have followed Shapin's program are also in Newman's sights. Newman's critical insight is that such historiography has not stimulated the careful research and review of the historical records by which our understanding of the past improves but rather has tended to reify the modernist assumptions and stereotypes laid down over a half century ago, thus inviting stagnation in the field.

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HERBERT H. KAPLAN. *Nathan Mayer Rothschild and the Creation of a Dynasty: The Critical Years, 1806–1816*. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press. 2006. Pp. xxiv, 194. \$45.00.

Commenting on the first volume of Niall Ferguson's three-volume biography of the Rothschild dynasty, *The House of Rothschild: Money's Prophets, 1798–1848* (1998), an economics colleague remarked to me that after reading it he still did not know how Nathan Rothschild managed to accumulate, during the Napoleonic Wars, the fortune that created his storied and much-maligned financial dynasty. Herbert H. Kaplan, retracing Ferguson's use of the Rothschild archives in London and supplementing them with an impressive array of additional archival sources of the correspondence and accounts of Rothschild's business associates and government patrons, explains at last how Rothschild did it. One by one Kaplan dismisses previous speculations: that Nathan's success was due to his marriage into the wealthy London Jewish family of Levi Barent Cohen; or that he used the elector of Hesse's vast holdings of British national debt to his own advantage while the Elector was in exile; or that he received early news of Napoleon's defeat at Waterloo and bought into the funds before they rose when the public received the news.

If the real source of Rothschild's wealth was due to a combination of incredibly hard work and not a little bit of luck, which turns out to be the case, this does not mean that Kaplan is enamored of his hero's qualities. He states that "The most important quality for a merchant to possess in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries was 'character.' It meant that he was honest, punctual, responsible, and ethical . . . The evidence is both explicit and implicit that Nathan was not a merchant of character" (p. 4). Nathan was not the favored son of Meyer Rothschild when he was sent from Frankfurt to Manchester to oversee the family's source of British cotton textiles. By all evidence, he botched the family's affairs incredibly, much to the annoyance of his father, whose angry letters, perhaps, set the model for Nathan's own vituperative correspondence with his brothers when they were helping him finance British and allied armed forces against Napoleon.

How did Rothschild do it, then? Mainly by persisting in his smuggling operations, which attracted him from the beginning of his career in Manchester but became increasingly lucrative thanks to the combination of Napoleon's continental blockade (1806) and British Orders in Council (1807), both of which sought to keep gold and silver out of the hands of the enemy. Kaplan sums up: "[Nathan] seized the opportunity presented by the rapidly rising market price of gold and silver in England and on the Continent to create for himself a niche in the international specie and bullion trade . . . [It] was his role as a specie trader that would lead the British government to turn to him in 1814 to find and deliver French specie to pay Wellington's troops. And it was that relationship, based though it was on illegality and smuggling, that established Nathan as a dependable international banker, which became the basis for the creation of the Rothschild dynasty" (p. 48).

Many of Nathan's smuggling attempts ran afoul of the law or into other difficulties, but these provided the

archival evidence that enable Kaplan to describe the trading network eventually created by the Rothschilds, especially thanks to James in Amsterdam and Solomon in Paris. Although not a merchant of "character," Nathan was effective in bullying his brothers and his network of agents into delivering the goods when the occasion warranted. The occasion arose with the pressing needs of the Duke of Wellington for funds to continue his successes in the peninsular campaigns against French forces in Portugal and Spain. John Charles Herries, commissar-general for the British army, frustrated by the failure of the Bank of England to provide the kind of specie Wellington required to pay his Spanish troops, turned to Rothschild. Handling enormous sums of coins and distributing them throughout continental Europe to provision both British forces and subsidize the Austrian, Prussian, and Russian forces, the Rothschilds did very well, supplementing their modest commissions of one to two percent with arbitrage profits from the differences in prices of coins depending on the location of the troops to be paid or supplied. Best of all, of course, Wellington continued to win his battles with the golden sinews of war that Herries provided him, thanks to the efforts of Nathan, and James, and Solomon, and the patriarch Meyer Amschel Rothschild in Frankfurt.

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MATTHEW REYNOLDS. *Godly Reformers and Their Opponents in Early Modern England: Religion in Norwich c. 1560–1643*. (Studies in Modern British Religious History, number 10.) Rochester, N.Y.: Boydell Press. 2005. Pp. xvi, 310. \$90.00.

In the last two decades or so, early modern historians have wrangled over the extent to which ideology motivated the people they study. Did pragmatic considerations or ideas guide people's actions more? Was debate and contention the norm, or consensus and acceptance? In this detailed and vigorously argued monograph, Matthew Reynolds comes down firmly on the side of ideological (specifically religious) debate. Using Norwich as his case study, the author argues that the "wars of religion" consumed the townsmen, both clerical and lay, across the near-century of his study. Debate over deeply held religious beliefs formed part of local culture in Norwich from the start of the Reformation and continued through the civil war. In Reynolds's view, the aggressively Protestant beliefs typically associated with Norwich generated their own opposition, creating confessional discord that reached a peak in the 1630s.

A main feature of Reynolds's analysis is his attempt to overturn previous interpretations of Norwich's history, which painted a far more pacific picture of the city's experience of Reformation. Taking issue in particular with Muriel McClendon's characterization of "quiet Reformation" in the city, Reynolds draws atten-

tion to the sometimes bitter arguments among Norwich clergy as the more forward reformers pushed for change, to the point of separatism in some cases. These debates, argues Reynolds, were not restricted to the clergy but involved important members of the city government as well. Through—among other things—reconstruction of family and parish connections, Reynolds links clerical and lay proponents of the multiplicity of views that flourished in the intense religious atmosphere of Norwich.

Norwich had its share of godly ministers and magistrates, whom Reynolds thoroughly documents. But he also argues that the Puritan excesses of the city generated a conservative opposition. Beginning much earlier but associated particularly with the activities of the Arminian Bishop Matthew Wren in the 1630s, a modest-sized but important group of clergy and laity rejected the calls of the godly and promoted instead a Laudian (or in Reynolds's view Wrenian) vision of church discipline. These "pro-Wrenians" supported ceremonialism, the traditional liturgy, and the Caroline altar policy. Their presence made for sometimes bitter divisions in parish and civic politics in Norwich.

Reynolds's book makes a good case for the vigor of religious debate in Norwich during the long Reformation. He details a wide variety of views being propounded by the clergy, who through their lay followers had the potential to affect the politics and culture of the city. He shows that Norwich was not the monolithic godly city that has sometimes been portrayed, exposing both active separatist communities and a conformist, pro-Arminian group in the city. But while the experience of Reformation may not have been as quiet as others have argued, some aspects of Reynolds's analysis remain open to question. The diversity of clerical ideas and preaching seems apparent. What is less firm is the extent to which this can be tied to specific actions on the part of lay leaders of city government. A family or clientage connection between clergy and laity does not always mean a lay civic leader espoused particular views in his public role. And some of the connections are rather qualified and circumstantial: a commentator on separatism "conceivably" had personal knowledge of separatist groups in town (p. 88); an alderman interested in maintaining the fabric of a parish church in James's reign "was conscious of his responsibility to his church's Catholic heritage" (p. 145).

In addition, this reviewer found the tone of Reynolds's condemnation of other historians' interpretations and research somewhat gratuitous. A more careful copyediting of the book would also have helped, as the text is marred by typographical errors; the eminent historian of the English Civil War, Samuel Rawson Gardiner, is referred to as Samuel Rawlinson Gardiner on the very first page. These concerns aside, Reynolds's book offers a spirited call for rethinking the process of Reformation in Norwich and the role that religious debate had on local politics and society. It places belief at the forefront of analysis for understanding the period, giving support to John Morrill's characterization of the

English civil war as the last of the European Wars of Religion.

CATHERINE F. PATTERSON
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ANN HUGHES. *Gangraena and the Struggle for the English Revolution*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2004. Pp. vii, 482. \$125.00.

In the third part of *Gangraena*, published late in 1646, Thomas Edwards wrote rather hyperbolically but evidently sincerely that "it had been better the Sword of the Enemy had raged from North to South, then this Sword of Heresie, and Plague of Error like a Gangrene should over-run the Kingdome as it doth," proclaiming in effect that it would have been better had the Parliamentary armies lost the civil war than to have defeated the king at the cost of spreading sectarian error, for "Our Armies are the Nurseries of all errors and all our evils" (p. 218). A clerical polemicist, Edwards pursued only three themes: the danger of independent congregations, the evil of religious toleration, and the explosion of sectarian heresy that was their consequence. Although a Presbyterian, in his writings he defended that form of ecclesiology not as dictated by scripture as the necessary form of the true church on earth (which he doubtless believed), but rather as a bulwark against heterodoxy and sectarian error. John Milton, Roger Williams, and William Walwyn might champion religious toleration and liberty for tender consciences, a toleration rarely extended to Catholics or anti-Trinitarians, but for Edwards toleration inevitably led to such horrors as women preachers (Katherine Chidley and Mrs. Attaway), to Baptist "dippers" (the notorious Samuel Oates), to radical army chaplains (William Dell and John Saltmarsh), and, worst of all, to John Goodwin, an Independent and a fellow London preacher who, in Edwards's view, should have known better.

Edwards was never seen by his contemporaries as one of the great Puritan preachers of the like of Richard Sibbes, William Gouge, John Preston, or Thomas Gataker. He was London born, probably in 1599, went up to Queens College, Cambridge, which was reputed a Puritan establishment, where his future enemy, John Goodwin, was already a fellow, and left in 1626 after receiving his M.A., following an intemperate sermon that he was required to recant. He subsequently held a number of London lectureships and—briefly—a curacy at All Saints Hertford. By 1644 Edwards was preaching a provocative weekly lecture at Christ Church Newgate, where week after week he railed against the Independents and the sects in passionate sermons that elicited equally vociferous heckling from a not always sympathetic audience.

Edwards published four tracts between 1641 and 1647, the first an attack on Independency; the second an attack on the *Apologetical Narration*, a defense by the five members of the Westminster Assembly of Divines, asking for toleration of Independent congregations in the face of the impending imposition of a national Pres-

byterian church; then the three parts of *Gangraena* published over the course of 1646; and a final tract on the dangers of religious toleration published in the following year. Although Edwards had achieved a certain notoriety by 1644, the publication of *Gangraena* made him famous. It was an unwieldy and disorganized work numbering some 800 pages, published in three parts and containing lists of errors and heresies that grew to 300, snippets from tracts he found offensive, letters telling of sectarian heresy elsewhere in England, and stories culled from newsbooks and other sources (including one that Edwards found particularly outrageous, about a group of Parliamentary soldiers who led a horse to the font in a parish church and baptized it).

It is hard in so brief a review to do justice to the richness of Ann Hughes's analysis, which ranges from the structure of *Gangraena*, to its sources, to Edwards's place among the heresiographers, to the response to the work (part two is in part a response to the published response to part one), to its impact and role in the city Presbyterian attempt to obtain a national church, gain control of the city government, and outmaneuver the New Model Army. Along the way Hughes illuminates such issues as the workings and politics of London publishing (both Edwards and his enemies had their sympathetic licensors and publishers). Edwards's reliability as a chronicler of sectarian heresy has always been a vexed question, and Hughes in her careful investigation demonstrates convincingly that although Edwards was not above selective quotation to make his case, he did not invent his material. The Presbyterians of the 1640s have on the whole received short shrift in the hands of modern historians more sympathetic to the radicals and libertarians in religion than to the clericalist Presbyterians. In the course of elucidating Edwards's work Hughes has illuminated, not unsympathetically, the prospects, hopes, and fears of the London Presbyterians between the Solemn League and Covenant and their political defeat by an army Edwards had done much to provoke. Hughes's book has been long in the making but well worth the wait. It is a splendid achievement.

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KAREN HARVEY. *Reading Sex in the Eighteenth Century: Bodies and Gender in English Erotic Culture*. (Cambridge Social and Cultural Histories, number 3.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 2004. Pp. ix, 261. \$75.00.

In this important book Karen Harvey demonstrates how an understanding of erotic culture challenges a number of grand narratives that social and cultural historians have posited for the eighteenth century. Harvey distinguishes erotica from pornography by arguing that the former "depicted sex, bodies and desire through illusions of concealment and distance: bodies were represented through metaphor and suggestion, and depictions of sexual activity were characterized by deferral

and silence," whereas the latter was concerned with the "explicit depiction of sexual action" (pp. 20–21). Through her detailed analysis of a wide range of erotic material, Harvey questions assumptions that the eighteenth century was either a period of control and restraint, characterized by politeness, or a time of unprecedented sexual license and pleasure. She argues instead that erotic culture exemplifies how both could be achieved within eighteenth-century society: erotic literature was about sex and celebrated sexual pleasure, but it was enjoyed within all-male sociable environments such as the coffee-house and club, which had a reputation for refinement and civility. In contrast to pornography, and given that the reader of erotic literature had to decipher sexual meanings from a variety of classical and botanical metaphors, its enjoyment was more of an intellectual exercise than one that was intended to bring about immediate physical gratification.

Harvey's findings add further weight to criticisms of the thesis, most famously championed by Thomas Laqueur, that the eighteenth century saw a change in understandings of sexual difference, in which the one-sex model was replaced by the two-sex model of the body. Erotica paid scant attention to these scientific and medical models, Harvey argues, but portrayed male and female bodies as being both the same and different. Whereas the commensurability of male and female bodies could be depicted during reproductive sex, bodily difference was also present in representations of breasts, menstruation, pregnancy, the penis, scrotum, and testicles. Bodily movements, appearances, and sounds played an important role in determining sexual difference. Thus Harvey's book shows the limitations of historical studies on the sexual body that focus just on theories of conception. Furthermore, the diversity of ideas about the body revealed within erotica belies any attempt to reduce contemporary understandings to a single model of change.

Harvey examines gender roles and challenges the argument that the eighteenth century was a transitional period in the representation of female sexuality, in which the early modern woman of insatiable sexual desire was replaced with the passive, desexualized, and prudish woman of the nineteenth century. The eighteenth-century woman of erotic literature, Harvey argues, was thoroughly sexualized and played crucial roles in generating male sexual pleasure. Significantly, although women's maternal roles were increasingly emphasized, this should not be equated to a loss of sexual power. Instead, in eighteenth-century thinking, the sex body was the fertile body. Female and male bodies were only viewed positively or as having erotic potential if they were capable of reproduction. Maternity was indisputable evidence of a woman's sexual power.

By suggesting so many new ways of thinking about this period, there is no doubt that Harvey's book will provoke much historical debate. It is especially encouraging to see a thorough consideration of the male body as so much writing in this field has been dominated by studies of female bodies and experiences. What may be

particularly disturbing for gender historians is Harvey's observation that men's love making was frequently depicted in erotic literature as forceful and violent. Indeed, the language used in these texts was often indistinguishable from that used by female plaintiffs in contemporary rape cases. The idea that sex needed to be consensual for it to be pleasurable was absent in erotica. Furthermore, Harvey argues that one crucial difference between the sexes was that although female bodies could be portrayed as objects to be both desired and feared, male bodies were confidently regarded as only possessing desirable qualities. Thus erotica presents us with an eighteenth-century masculine view of the world in which it was valid or even desirable to deploy violence in the pursuit of sexual pleasure. The devastating consequences of these erotic fantasies will have to be explored by future historians.

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ARTHUR H. CASH. *John Wilkes: The Scandalous Father of Civil Liberty*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2006. Pp. xii, 482. \$37.50.

This book is an elegantly written and meticulously researched biography of eighteenth-century British radical icon John Wilkes. Arthur H. Cash presents in vivid detail the story of how an unlikely hero, a flamboyant and scandalous son of the patrician establishment, became an early and powerful advocate of parliamentary democracy and responsible government. While the book is a comprehensive account of a fascinating and lengthy political life, the primary focus is on the main events in Wilkes's career, including his role in the General Warrants Affair of 1763–1765, the Middlesex Election Controversy of 1768–1774, his longstanding role as a champion of the free press, and his much publicized support for the colonial cause in the imperial dispute with Britain that led to the American Revolution.

Cash argues that Wilkes and the popular movement he inspired represented in embryonic form the precursor to the great political and electoral reforms of nineteenth-century Britain. He illustrates how Wilkes's career gradually progressed from challenging particular government measures such as the odious practice of general warrants and the incapacitation of elected members of parliament toward demands for fundamental structural reform that shook the Whig oligarchy to its core and set in motion political and social forces determined to free the legislature from ministerial control and make it accountable to the public. Cash claims that Wilkes's impact and legacy were enormous, for after Wilkes "General Warrants were a thing of the past, and the right to privacy had been recognized as common law" (p. 370). Moreover, by successfully overturning repeated ministerial measures to invalidate his election or Middlesex, Cash insists that Wilkes "would provide the foundation stone for the American Constitution and open the door to British electoral reform" (p. 318).

Cash concludes that Wilkes's great achievements, rooted in a unique combination of libertarian principles and canny political skills for popular mobilization and self-promotion, entitle him to the exalted status of the "Father of Civil Liberty" in the Anglo-American political tradition.

The strengths of this book are manifold. The central claim for Wilkes's impact on the development of civil liberties and constitutional democracy in Britain and America largely eschews hyperbole and rests on tight reasoning and persuasive supporting evidence. Moreover, Cash's skillful treatment of the intricacies of the eighteenth-century English legal system and the Byzantine inner workings of the mid-century patrician establishment makes this a book that will be valuable both to specialists of the period and to a general audience. Cash successfully captures and transmits the spirit of an age in transition, in which we see the awakening of not only incipient popular political culture but also the introduction of new techniques of mass mobilization through propaganda, the use of the legal process as political theater, and the establishment of extraparliamentary institutions such as the Wilkite Society of Supporters of the Bill of Rights.

Perhaps the greatest strength of this book is that it is a very good example of the genre of political biography. Cash argues effectively that Wilkes's personal history is a constitutive element of his political achievements. Whereas most historians deem Wilkes's flamboyant character, scandalous behavior, and the salacious details of his private life to be inconsequential or unworthy of consideration except in the context of specific legal cases such as his prosecution for publishing "North Briton No. 45" and the obscene "Essay on Woman," Cash demonstrates that Wilkes's social skills and irreverent nature were crucial to his political career. Cash reminds us that in the context of the eighteenth-century Anglo-American politics of liberty, it was sometimes advisable to suffer not the rake.

The weaknesses of this book are few. More could have been said to explain the economic factors underlying Wilkite philosophy. While Cash ably illuminates Wilkes's status as the hero of working-class London, he does not explore sufficiently the tension between artisan radicalism, on the one hand, and the decidedly bourgeois nature of the broader Wilkite movement, with its support for prevailing ideas about property rights, on the other. Another significant omission in this generally impressive book is the author's failure to locate it within the broader cosmos of Wilkes historiography. As a result, the genuine originality of the argument is often underexposed. Cash frequently alludes to the fact that his interpretation of Wilkes's career departs from the conventional reading; however he does not provide the necessary account of the scholarly literature to help the reader understand how it does so or why these departures are significant. In this respect, the work of John Brewer may be a valuable supplement for the reader unfamiliar with the general trends in Wilkes historiography. These relatively minor issues aside, this

is an important book about a seminal figure in the Anglo-American political tradition.

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SANDRA HERBERT. *Charles Darwin, Geologist*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 2005. Pp. xx, 485. \$39.95.

For most of his life Charles Darwin was a somewhat hypochondriac "armchair" naturalist. After his return from the *Beagle* voyage in 1836, he made few, brief, and not-far-distant excursions from his study. Nevertheless, his work on the *Beagle* sustained much of the writing done subsequently. The vigorous young Darwin was primarily, and pre-eminently, a geologist. The burden of Sandra Herbert's account is that Darwin's geology was his central concern on the voyage, that it was as a geologist that he saw himself and was first known in the scientific community, and that his geological thinking remained crucial in the development of his theory of evolution. Only the final two of ten numbered chapters deal with the species question. The rest of the book is devoted to the making of Darwin as geologist, his geological investigations on the voyage, and the subsequent development of his geological work.

While the stress is very much on the importance of Darwin's geological work, Herbert also makes it clear that he was not part of the geological mainstream. He did not work within the stratigraphical paradigm but on problems that geologists regarded as of secondary importance. However, it was precisely his investigations of elevation, volcanoes, and coral reefs that proved important to linking Darwin's geology with the problems of distribution, variation, and extinction of organic life. Speculations on the relationship between marginality and creativity are tempting, although Herbert does not pursue them.

Herbert reflects and maintains the track record of leading historians of geology for innovative study of the practice of science. Martin J. S. Rudwick's attention to the social structure of the intellectual field (though not his radical contextualism) in *The Great Devonian Controversy: The Shaping of Scientific Knowledge Among Gentlemanly Specialists* (1985) makes a mark here, as does David Oldroyd's Collingwoodian approach (in *The Great Highlands Controversy: Constructing Geological Knowledge through Fieldwork in Nineteenth-Century Britain* [1990]) to retracing the protagonists' steps and his emphasis on the importance of understanding the realities of fieldwork practice. Thus we learn not only about Darwin's ideas but also about his strategy for fieldwork. We learn how he collected, labeled, and stored specimens and how he linked them to his notes, his more developed writings in the field, and to work subsequently drawn up for publication. Darwin's literary practices—his conception of himself as author and writer of books (in preference to articles), the resources he used in developing his style, and a romantic sensibility—are also given their due, yielding considerable

insight into Darwin's distinctive writing and into the progressive construction of his arguments.

This is an accomplished piece of scholarship, thoroughly and heavily documented. Almost a third of the book is given over to notes, bibliography, and index. It is very usefully illustrated with Darwin's diagrams and with scenes of places, and formations, that were important in his fieldwork, especially in South America and the Pacific but also in Wales. I would have welcomed a more extensive, summary conclusion, especially since there are no conclusions to individual chapters, seemingly to avoid interrupting the narrative thread. Also, while the title is obviously apposite, there is a sense in which it is misleading; this is not a comprehensive account of Darwin's geological work. Being still very much focused on the place of geology in the origin, and argument, of the *Origin of Species* (1859), it gives virtually no attention to Darwin's post-1859 geological investigations. Finally, the style of the book is such that it caters most readily to the serious general reader interested in Darwin, to the specialist in history of geology, and perhaps also to geologists, in that there are a number of otherwise puzzling forays into current geological thinking about some of the topics of Darwin's investigations that seem irrelevant to the historical task in hand. Precisely because the book does not take on the job of delineating, and comparing academic positions within the Darwin industry on Darwin and geology, it is less useful than it might have been to historians outside that industry seeking to come to grips with the field.

All this said, it is precisely the importance and originality of Herbert's scholarship on Darwin's geology that makes one want it communicated to every conceivable audience. To expect that of one book is to expect too much. Herbert deserves our gratitude for the many years of dedicated work behind this book and for the insight that it provides into the Darwin phenomenon.

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HARRO MAAS. *William Stanley Jevons and the Making of Modern Economics*. (Historical Perspectives on Modern Economics.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 2005. Pp. xxii, 330. \$75.00.

This study of the British political economist William Stanley Jevons (1835–1882) makes the bold claim that he was the pivotal figure in laying the foundation of modern economics as a natural science. Harro Maas notes that his work owes much to joint meetings between economists and physicists on measurement. He approvingly quotes J. M. Keynes's characterization of Jevons as "the prying eyes" that peered into statistical data with the tools and patience of the natural scientist. Jevons showed that deliberations designed to maximize utility by analyzing the marginal increments of utility to be derived from economic actions could be described as mathematical functions and has been credited with introducing the calculus to the discipline. His work also

offered a break with the classic labor theory of value, which analyzed value chiefly from the side of production, and substituted a theory of exchange value, which saw value primarily from the perspective of demand. Finally, Jevons was a key contributor to the development of sophisticated statistical tools for analyzing the economy. Recent work by Margaret Schabas, Phillip Mirowski, and others have drawn attention to the importance of Victorian developments in natural sciences and mathematics to the history of political economy, but Maas does not find their explanations of why Jevons adopted the methods of the natural sciences for economics entirely convincing.

Although there is not much discussion of the social, institutional, and political context of the development of the discipline of economics during the period in this study, Maas does place considerable emphasis on Jevons's intellectual background and education in shaping his vision for economics. Born into a prosperous middle-class iron merchant family in Liverpool, Jevons was reared in a Unitarian intellectual tradition that valued the advancement of science as a public good. After attending Liverpool's Mechanics Institute, where he first became familiar with the importance of mechanical tools in science, he attended a grammar school, a London University College preparatory school, and finally University College, London. Here he studied chemistry and was much influenced by the mathematician, Augustus De Morgan. His father's bankruptcy forced him to interrupt his education and take a position as gold assayer in Australia, where he conducted scientific observations and experiments on cloud formations and other scientific topics. Jevons returned to England to complete his education at University College in 1860 and two years later published a pioneering paper that outlined his early ideas on utility expressed in mathematical terms. At London he also pursued his experimental science research, published papers on meteorology and on measuring devices in chemistry, and constructed a mechanical device to demonstrate the importance of George Boole's logical system. His 1863 statistical study on the fall in the value of gold was the first economic study to use index numbers. Jevons published the widely acclaimed *Coal Question* (1865), and he was subsequently appointed to the Cobden Chair in Logic and Political Economy at Owen's College, Manchester. His *Theory of Political Economy* (1871) and *The Principles of Science: A Treatise on Logic and Scientific Method* (1874) established him as the foremost British economic theorist of his time, but he was unable to translate his intellectual success into institutional support for his vision of economics—a task left to Alfred Marshall during the next generation.

One of the major contributions of Maas's study is his emphasis on portraying Jevons within the tradition of British empirical science. He devotes considerable space to such topics as the calculating machines of Charles Babbage, Boole's formal logic, the psychophysics of William Carpenter and Thomas Laycock, and

Jevons's experiments on the nature of work as muscular force, the development of the graphical representation of statistics and time series in history, and the use of the scientific balance as a metaphor for measuring equilibrium in economics. Much less successful is Maas's discussion of John Ruskin's aesthetic view of work as a foil for Jevons's materialist analysis of labor.

Maas explains that Dugald Stewart established the pattern for nineteenth-century political economy as the highest branch of the moral sciences. The task of the discipline was to discover the laws of social behavior based on the universal nature of man within a providential order through an introspective method. According to Maas, it was James and John Stuart Mill who combined association psychology, Benthamite utilitarianism, and Ricardian economics into a logic that demanded separate scientific methods for the science of the mind and the science of matter. Maas is especially critical of John Stuart Mill and calls him a "violent" opponent of the "methods of the sciences in general and political economy in particular" (p. 281). According to Maas, Mill's reluctance to abandon free will, combined with his belief that certainty was possible in science, led him to construct a logic in which political economy was a science of the mind that required an introspective method rather than the inductive method of the natural sciences. Jevons, by contrast, maintained that certainty was only a mathematical probability in science and that the mind was a machine. Thus a unified, empirical, and mathematical method should be used for all the sciences. In short, for Jevons political economy was a natural science. Despite Maas's bold characterization of the contemporary discipline of economics as a natural science, and his Whig view of the discipline's history, his book is of considerable utility to historians. Maas is well versed in the literature and humanists can learn much from his book about the history of British economic thought and its ties to Victorian science from this fascinating and logically organized study of Jevons's "mechanical reasoning."

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TAMMY C. WHITLOCK. *Crime, Gender and Consumer Culture in Nineteenth-Century England*. (The History of Retailing and Consumption.) Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate Publishing Company. 2005. Pp. 244. \$89.95.

Twenty years ago, the department store became a major point of entry for new historical inquiries into gender, modernity, and public space in *fin-de-siècle* Paris, London, and New York. Since then, the literature on consumption has mushroomed, covering a truly extraordinary terrain of things, practices, technologies, and ideas before, at, and after the point of purchase. Once at the center of attention, shopping is now only one facet, outnumbered by inquiries that range from domestic use and routine practices to transnational flows and public consumption.

In this book on Victorian Britain, Tammy C. Whitlock returns to the older historical concern with retailing and social anxieties. Instead, however, of revisiting directly the classic age of the Bon Marché or Selfridge's at the turn from the nineteenth to the twentieth centuries, Whitlock moves the focus to the early and mid-nineteenth century and to frequently forgotten new retail enterprises. Her study offers some helpful qualifications about the novelty of practices and anxieties associated with the department store. Shopping and entertainment, she rightly emphasizes, were already fused in earlier charity bazaars and emporiums. By the 1830s large stores were turning into emporiums of goods selling all sorts of clothing. And they boosted the practice of shopping with cash, instead of credit. The book restores these new types of retail businesses to their rightful place in the history of consumption, bearing out recent European research on the multiple, parallel forms of retail innovation. Instead of thinking in terms of one modern watershed, symbolized by the new department store, it may be more helpful to look at consumption in several different retail venues.

Whitlock also shows that moral panics about shoplifting—a second strand in the earlier literature on the department store—can be reconnected to earlier debates. The growing use of shopwindow displays and the more direct and tactile form of the shopping experience favored by retail emporiums went hand in hand with shoplifting and fraud. While lower-class shoplifting women could be deported, their more prosperous and respectable middle-class sisters caused anxieties about status disorder. As the nineteenth century advanced, the discourse about middle-class shoplifters changed from one invoking absent mindedness to one using a medical language of mania. Here was a fertile soil for the subsequent, sexualized discourse of female disorder and of the department store as a site of seductive temptation.

These are useful revisions of the older literature, situating the department store in a longer, more drawn out and variegated landscape of shopping. At the same time, it could be argued that historians have committed rather disproportionate energies to moving the chronological markers of modern consumption. It is always possible to find precursors; in this case, seventeenth and eighteenth-century historians might point to poor consumers, shopwindow displays, and anxieties about female consumers that all existed before the nineteenth century. Revising the dates of the birth of consumerism or of certain shopping experiences can be interesting, but it is only one of many important questions.

Consumption has been (and continues to be) a central site for pathologies: shoplifting, excess, debt, addiction. Yet, to give us historical perspective on the changing attitudes and practices of consumption, these anxieties need to be placed in their full context. Whitlock's book focuses on a set of magazine articles, authors, and court cases warning of the dangers of "cheapness" and the new temples of consumption. But how significant or central were these voices? Did people be-

lieve Anthony Trollope's shrill accounts of addicted female shoppers? Here discussions of shopping would gain from being connected to other social and political developments and from comparative perspective; why Victorian Britain is presented as a "post-capitalist economy" (pp. 11, 12, 225) is a mystery. Arguably, there were more Victorians who embraced a new regime of "cheapness" than those who opposed it. Victorian and Edwardian Britain was built on consumer power. What is distinctive is not a group of critics but the many middle-class groups who came to terms with the new culture of shopping and commerce and openly supported new retail outlets and public spaces. Anxieties about uncontrolled shoppers in Britain look far more moderate and far less overwhelming when compared to similar debates in imperial Germany, with their antisemitic overtones, or even in parts of the United States, where opponents introduced a special tax on department stores.

Whitlock's book, like other recent studies, is keen to restore women as agents with autonomy and purchasing power. Women appear as pleasure-seeking but also manipulative, corrupting shoppers. The author shows how some middle-class women used the law of necessities, and their husband's credit to support a material lifestyle beyond their means (and that of their husbands, in many cases). The role of pleasure, however, is more problematic. In fact, the book is full of evidence and quotations that present shopping as a battle, a stressful and sometimes aggressive encounter between shoppers, fearing to be tricked, and retailers, who had good reason to worry about fraud and theft.

The book looks to conspicuous consumption as the engine behind shoplifting and the passion for goods. Shoplifting here is a reflex to commodity capitalism with its ever-faster production of novelties and fashions and the need to preserve status. There is some truth to this, of course, and the book highlights the theft of fashionable lace and clothing by middle-class women who had fallen on hard times—though, importantly, prosperous women could be shoplifters too. Yet, the study also contains evidence that suggests more was involved than obtaining goods for display, so crucial in Veblenite theories of conspicuous consumption. The case of the respectable Mrs. Jane Tyrwhitt, for example, springs to mind: she was a respectable lady who was accused of slipping a microscope into her sleeve (pp. 143–146). Status emulation is one force in cultures of consumption, past and present, but it may not always be the only or necessarily the decisive engine of change.

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MICHELLE ELIZABETH TUSAN. *Women Making News: Gender and Journalism in Modern Britain*. (The History of Communication.) Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 2005. Pp. x, 306. \$45.00.

Michelle Elizabeth Tusan has written a very useful book on the women's advocacy press in nineteenth and twentieth-century Britain. Rather than mining the press for accounts of women's attitudes toward political issues, Tusan examines the press itself as constitutive of women's political culture in the public sphere. What she has written is a history of women's political journals that takes a detailed look at the editorship, circulation, format, and run of a surprising number of newspapers, journals, and news sheets published for and by politically minded women. Beginning with the mid-nineteenth-century origins of the women's advocacy press and ending with a short chapter on the women's liberation press of the 1970s, Tusan offers a thorough overview of serious women's periodicals, focusing special attention on the years during which the suffrage question was debated. Her detailed treatment of the journals and a splendid appendix (including the names and locations of many of the periodicals she covers) make this book an invaluable tool for researchers in British women's history.

Tusan argues that women's periodicals "facilitated the growth of a gendered community of activists who met in a print-based Habermasian public sphere found in the pages of the women's press" (p. 4). The presence of this print-based community gave female reformers a sense of identity with one another and with their political causes. Though the circulation of most women's advocacy papers was small and the runs often relatively short, they nevertheless offer an insight into the way female political communities were constituted during a period of vibrant social change. Intellectually, the advocacy press offered a venue for women writers and readers to formulate their political positions in a sympathetic environment. The "letters" columns, which printed contributions from rank and file subscribers, offered lively debate and invited amateur writers to express opinions on a myriad of issues raised in the articles. The content of these journals reveals the tremendous range and diversity of female political thought and shows that the issues of concern to nineteenth and early twentieth-century women were not focused exclusively on the vote.

In addition to examining the content of the papers he treats, Tusan offers a revealing social history of their production. The infrastructure of the women's advocacy press offered a variety of opportunities for women to engage in nontraditional employment and to proclaim their political views in the public sphere. Female financial backers, editors, journalists, and printers were all employed in a variety of the papers she studies. Furthermore, her vivid account of female paper-sellers, who paraded up and down busy public streets wearing andwich boards carrying the day's headlines, gave female activists the opportunity to engage with passers by as they hawked their publications. Carapaced, both literally and figuratively, by the journal on the sandwich board, the community behind the woman on the street empowered her to go out alone and argue with men. Despite their seemingly radical bent, more successful

women's advocacy papers were recognized for their economic value. As an important part of the cultural economy of middle-class women, high-profile feminist journals attracted surprising amounts of advertising and inspired the mainstream press to float a variety of women's columns in the hope of attracting some of this readership.

Tusan's book shows how the female advocacy press began to lose steam and direction in the interwar period, as it struggled to re-define itself in the wake of women's limited franchise. While women continued to advocate for equal suffrage, new issues such as child and maternal welfare began to dominate the feminist political agenda, and, after the passage of equal suffrage in 1928, the advocacy journals Tusan covers seemed to lose their sense of purpose. During this period, the women's advocacy press had to compete with glossy women's magazines and the tremendous appeal of consumerism. While a few women's advocacy papers continued to carry on, the enthusiasm of the early years returned only with the women's liberation movement.

Tusan has done a real service to women's historians by writing such a thorough survey of the women's advocacy press. Those wishing to draw on women's periodicals in their research, and those wishing to historicize the journals they are working with already, will find Tusan's book an invaluable reference. Her thorough research and her ability to put a multiplicity of journals into a compelling social context give two-dimensional print culture a three-dimensional character.

NICOLETTA F. GULLACE

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PETER THORSHEIM. *Inventing Pollution: Coal, Smoke, and Culture in Britain since 1800*. (Ohio University Press Series in Ecology and History.) Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press. 2006. Pp. xii, 307. Cloth \$55.00, paper \$26.95.

In the last paragraph of this book, Peter Thorsheim summarizes his intellectual position that "Pollution is a social construct, but the stuff that this concept signifies is very real indeed." While this would not appeal to ardent poststructuralists, it is an area of firm ground from which to chronicle the course of smoke control in Great Britain after the nineteenth century as seen in official documents and printed sources. Thorsheim's book has the advantage of a wider spatial scale than Peter Brimblecombe's *The Big Smoke: A History of Air Pollution in London since Medieval Times* (1987) and of longer time than James Winter's *Secure from Rash Assault: Sustaining the Victorian Environment* (1999); its source material comes from a wider range than John Sheail's *An Environmental History of Twentieth-Century Britain* (2002). Thorsheim tells us about the transition from organic effluvia as sources of ill-health to a fixation of coal smoke both in terms of scientific understandings, of the purely administrative responses and of the painfully slow progress of legislation. Although the latter hinged effectively on the Clean Air Act of 1956,

Thorsheim points out that it did little to control sulphur dioxide and is certainly impotent in the face of the carbon dioxide emissions that have taken over as the equivalent of smoke.

One of the interesting things about the Clean Air Act was its permissive nature, so that some local authorities where the mining unions had political influence did not introduce smokeless zones until the 1980s. Thorsheim points to the 1956 Act as a response to the Great London Smog of 1952 but is careful to notice that a subsequent change of fuels toward greater use of natural gas has also been a major component of the unfolding processes. Hence his book, while narrating major themes, is also sensitive to contextual changes; it is a piece of weaving that combines strands of different colors, rather like the Turner sunsets that apparently benefited from particles in the atmosphere. I missed one strand of color, however. This is a top-down history, drawn from archives of various sorts, and it lacks any significant contribution directly from the people. Perhaps there are no diaries or memoirs from officials who battled to emplace legislation or bylaws, but there are still people who remember London before the Clean Air Act. There is an interesting but untapped seam of material, too, in the history of the appeal of the open coal fire, inefficient though it is, to a wide variety of people. Go into new "executive" homes in the United Kingdom now and like as not you will find a gas fire that tries very hard to imitate a coal fire; many a pub has gone the same way. This accurate, interesting, and reliable history could perhaps have been warmed up a bit with the aid of some qualitative data. But that Thorsheim has it right about the need for a dual narrative of the social and the scientific cannot be gainsaid, and here I add my personal memory: I was at secondary school in 1952, and the fog was so bad fifteen miles out in the Thames Valley that the trains were cancelled and I had a few days off. The cough may have been real, but the experience was mostly pleasure.

I. G. SIMMONS
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HELEN B. MCCARTNEY. *Citizen Soldiers: The Liverpool Territorials in the First World War*. (Studies in the Social and Cultural History of Modern Warfare, number 22.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 2005. Pp. xv, 275. \$90.00.

Helen B. McCartney engages with both the military and social history communities in a study that seeks to revise some of the broad claims of past works on the 1914–1918 conflict. McCartney's well-written and carefully researched monograph constitutes a useful local microcosm of one piece of the larger Territorial volunteer army in the United Kingdom, and the book's main strength lies in the author's ability to place the experience of Liverpool into the larger historiography of the British war experience. The Liverpool Territorials in McCartney's work function as both an example of larger trends within Britain's army and society during

the war, and a cautionary tale about too-large generalizations that ignore the still-important local variations in British experience. While many scholars have insisted on an emotional and physical gulf between civilians and soldiers, McCartney shows that soldiers maintained close connections with their families, reliving their wartime experiences for those at home through correspondence, news accounts, and personal visits. McCartney thoroughly revises the "alienation thesis" that other authors have offered up, noting that soldiers remained invested in thoughts of home and saw their war service as an interlude primarily designed to protect their civilian lives.

McCartney's focus, the Liverpool Rifles and the Liverpool Scottish, were Territorial units with clear identities forged through a strong sense of what it meant to be a "Liverpolitan" and, in the case of the latter, what it meant to be "Scottish." The author begins her examination by situating her study in the local conditions prevailing in Liverpool prior to and during World War I. As a major port and industrial center, Liverpool had Territorial units that mirrored its social class divisions with a large number of middle and lower-middle-class volunteers, mostly from professional and commercial occupations. Despite an established local identity as a "club" or force, the Territorials were not popular and recruiting was never easy. As McCartney notes, this led to relaxed notions of authority and discipline and a more consensual camp decision-making structure, traditions that would influence the Liverpool Rifles and Scottish when they saw overseas service. By examining recruitment, discipline, trench life, and contact with home, McCartney shows how the Liverpool soldiers negotiated the foreign world of wartime by maintaining social ties, traditions, and points of reference among themselves. Just as the soldiers constructed a little Liverpool in France, complete with street signs and major Liverpool landmarks (p. 78), the units experienced the war through the lens of members' civilian lives. McCartney argues, quite convincingly, that the Liverpool Territorials demonstrate that most of the recruits maintained their prewar identities both during and after the war, and that, in fact, "they remained civilians in uniform for the duration of the war" (p. 8).

The book relies on a wide variety of primary sources and situates its argument well within the variety of historiographies on the war. McCartney uses her material creatively, interweaving regimental histories, official military publications, and printed sources at the national level with local newspapers, newsletters, and correspondence. Particularly compelling is her chapter on discipline for the Liverpool Territorials at the front which juxtaposes statistics on punitive measures within the units with careful readings of the papers of participants. The author also bolsters her argument regarding Liverpool by setting it in the context of other local studies, namely of London and Buckinghamshire, citing comparisons and points of significant differences in these local experiences. For example, the Liverpool units remained remarkably socially homogenous in

makeup, even after the advent of conscription in January 1916, with the Rifles and Scottish receiving drafts of Liverpool men rather than substitutes from other regiments on a consistent basis. As McCartney points out, this policy helped the Liverpool Territorials retain their civilian identity and ties longer than some other British units.

For scholars and students of the Great War in British history, this volume is an important addition to any bookshelf. The book is engagingly written, with clear supporting evidence for the author's claims and a wide range of source materials. Most importantly, the emphasis on returning again and again to the historiographical context makes this a doubly useful study for scholars of World War I because it outlines many of the revisionist arguments of the last ten years about the nature of trench warfare, the impact on the "common" soldier, and the homogeneity of the war experience. The study does seem a bit thin in its examination of demobilization and commemoration, which constitutes a much shorter section placed in the conclusion of the book, but as the author's focus is clearly the war itself, this does not undermine McCartney's larger argument.

TAMMY M. PROCTOR
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CHRISTOPHER LAWRENCE. *Rockefeller Money, the Laboratory, and Medicine in Edinburgh, 1919–1930: New Science in an Old Country*. (Rochester Studies in Medical History.) Rochester, N.Y.: University of Rochester Press. 2005. Pp. viii, 373. \$85.00.

Traditional accounts of twentieth-century medicine have favored modernizing narratives that celebrate the triumph of biomedical science. Christopher Lawrence's telling study of academic medicine in Edinburgh in the 1920s offers a more nuanced narrative that is attuned to the different cultures of medicine in the period. Lawrence's fine-grained account is more than an examination of the vicissitudes of the Rockefeller Foundation's relationship with the Edinburgh medical faculty and the Royal Infirmary, which led to the creation of the Biochemical Laboratory. At the heart of the book are the interaction of British and American medicine, actors, institutions, and funding bodies with larger social forces and ideas about how medicine should be structured. Building on the growing scholarly rejection of progressive, monolithic views of twentieth-century medicine, Lawrence explores the familiar dyad between clinical art and the laboratory. He structures his account around the variety of the culture of medicine, Scottish culture, and modernity, although it is the first theme that dominates. Through these themes, Lawrence examines how the laboratory sciences were applied to hospital practice and how the "wholesale importation of transatlantic medicine" (p. 49) was resisted.

At the center of the book are the labyrinthine negotiations among the Rockefeller Foundation, University and Royal Infirmary, and the Medical Research Council (MRC) that formed the backdrop to the foun-

dation's involvement in the medical faculty and infirmary and attempts to transform medicine in the city. Lawrence carefully places the Rockefeller's messianic vision of the superiority of the American way of medicine and the traditions of the University of Edinburgh in context. This allows him to address the culture of these two institutions, which for him represent the competing approaches to medicine in the period. As with his earlier work, Lawrence asserts the influence of elite hospital physicians—or a patrician class—on the faculty and hospital. Rather than being backwoodsmen, Lawrence shows that these patricians were not anti-science but that they resisted attempts to reduce clinical medicine to a science. Although the divisions between patrician and academic physicians were not always clearly defined, Lawrence argues that the views held by Edinburgh patricians, who upheld the university's values of tradition and individualism, and the faith in laboratory science propounded by academic physicians, who was often not Edinburgh graduates, created a clash of medical cultures that was central to interwar medicine.

From here, Lawrence addresses North American attitudes to London and Edinburgh medicine. Although both were the subject of unfavorable comparisons with the Rockefeller's vision of medicine, Lawrence shows that Edinburgh was perceived as a good bet for Rockefeller support following the appointment of Jonathan Meakins as professor of therapeutics. In the middle chapters, the focus shifts to reconstructing the negotiations that led to the Rockefeller Foundations's support for a biochemical laboratory and how it endeavored to use its influence to reform the departments of surgery and medicine to create a style of medicine and training that the Rockefeller considered superior. Here the detail is at times overwhelming. However, by concentrating on the lengthy correspondence among Meakins at Edinburgh, Richard Pearce at the Rockefeller, and Walter Morley Fletcher at the MRC, and by offering a thorough chronology of the researchers in the new biochemical laboratory, Lawrence sheds light on the dynamics of the Edinburgh medical establishment and the reforming and scientific program of those who sought to promote academic medicine. In Lawrence's view, the biochemical laboratory became "a Trojan horse of medical change at Edinburgh" (p. 3) as reformers employed the knowledge and practices of the laboratory sciences to transform medicine and society.

As later chapters make clear, if the Edinburgh medical faculty remained one of the most important in the British Empire for the Rockefeller Foundation in terms of its influence on teaching and research, the style of academic medicine that it favored was not imported wholesale, especially after Meakins's departure for Montreal. This is made clear in the concluding chapter. Here Lawrence effectively balances the case notes of Edwin Bramwell, an elite hospital physician, against the work of Meakins and others in the biochemical laboratory to offer much needed and fruitful insight into the impact of academic medicine on medical practice. The

case notes suggest that for elite physicians the laboratory was not a major clinical resource; older methods, such as urine testing in side rooms, remained more important in the 1920s. As Lawrence meticulously shows, stronger traditions embedded in the culture of medicine in Scotland posed objections to the Rockefeller Foundation's vision of medical reform and academic medicine that were not easily resolved. However, the extent to which Bramwell can be seen as representing the practices of every Edinburgh physician remains uncertain. Focusing on clinical medicine also offers little opportunity to examine the impact of the laboratory on surgery, where laboratory practices were more easily integrated, a point Lawrence notes but does not fully address.

Lawrence's empirical microhistory shows the value of exploring the conflicting ideas that shaped medicine at an institutional level to a wider understanding of the evolution of biomedicine in the twentieth century. He offers a rich and detailed study that effectively integrates broad cultural, institutional, and medical trends to highlight the clash of medical cultures in the 1920s. The result is an impressively researched, engaging, and frequently challenging study.

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GEORGE MCKAY. *Circular Breathing: The Cultural Politics of Jazz in Britain*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 2005. Pp. xiv, 357. \$22.95.

George McKay's book plugs a significant scholarly gap and provides a much-needed cultural history of jazz in Britain. The book covers the period from World War II through to the 1970s and considers jazz as the soundtrack to this period of rapid social change.

McKay's impressive work has two main aims. The first is to provide a case study for an investigation of the process of "Americanization." Jazz is thus regarded as an "export culture." However, as McKay observes, it is not the case that "American culture" was merely shipped across the Atlantic and absorbed wholesale and without problem. The processes by which the international medium of jazz was imbued with a specifically British idiom are of considerable interest. McKay's second aim is related to the first. He investigates the cultural politics of jazz in Britain: the ways in which jazz has been used, and given meaning, by its various enthusiasts and enemies whether musicians, critics, or members of society at large.

McKay concludes that the process of Americanization was complex and multifaceted. In particular he points out that reactions to jazz—acceptance, resistance, adaptation—mirrored the schizophrenic British attitude toward America in general during the twentieth century. Thus, jazz was seen as symbolic of American "pollution," the cultural, economic, and political imperialism of the United States. Its spread via American multinational companies and media agencies was symbolic of American power. Yet at the same time jazz

was seen as symbolic of freedom, the voice of the oppressed, anti-establishment and anti-commercial. Thus, there were a range of British reactions. On the one hand, attempts were made to make British jazz as "authentic" (i.e. American) as possible. This involved British musicians, from Leonard Feather to Courtney Pine, immersing themselves in the music in America. On the other hand, jazz in Britain was given its own twist, its own special shape, to distance it from its American origins. There was a deliberate attempt by some British musicians to use British cultural traditions and references, and in particular to exploit the many musical resources of the British Commonwealth.

On the related theme of the cultural politics of jazz McKay presents a sophisticated, convincing, and well made argument. Perhaps the least well-known and politically most interesting topic covered in this book is British jazz's relationship to the Left and its association with a wide range of British protest movements, such as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament and the anti racist and women's movements. In this period, the origins of the music among oppressed African Americans were taken as a symbol of its anti-establishment credentials. The Young Communist League had been involved from the start in the New Orleans jazz revivalist movement in Britain, putting on concerts by George Webb's pioneering Dixielanders. While there were problems both with the cultural politics of Stalinist Russia and the presence of Communist Party members unsympathetic to jazz on the executive of the Musicians Union, traditional jazz was boosted by the Communist Party as a "people's music." McKay thus defends the revivalist jazz against accusations of political and musical conservatism, calling it "leftist marching music of the streets" even though he admits traditional jazz also found an audience among "angry," nostalgic, and conservative young men such as Kingsley Amis, John Osborne, and Philip Larkin. In doing so, he redresses the balance and confirms jazz's role in Britain's postwar counterculture.

McKay also brings out valuable insights into the issue of race and Britain's postcolonial identity. Jazz music has always involved issues of whiteness and blackness and in this period it did so against the backdrop of imperial decline. McKay traces a continuous black contribution to British jazz from the 1930s to the present. He sees this as a by-product of London's role as the erstwhile imperial capital where African, Caribbean and South Asian musicians could meet, play, and influence British players. Particular attention is given to the Jamaican pioneer of free jazz and "Indo-Jazz fusions" Joe Harriott, and to the South African exiles the Blue Notes. Britain and British culture and national identity were transformed by the ending of its empire and jazz was a key part of that painful, exhilarating shift.

This book is a hugely impressive, detailed, and fascinating cultural history of jazz in Britain and should be recommended not only to cultural historians but also to historians of the Cold War, the British Left, and those

interested in race relations and national identity in twentieth-century Britain.

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DAVID DICKSON. *Old World Colony: Cork and South Munster, 1630–1830*. (History of Ireland and the Irish Diaspora.) Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 2005. Pp. xvii, 726. \$65.00.

David Dickson's monumental work analyzes society in the southern Irish counties of Cork, Kerry, and west Waterford in the two centuries before the Great Famine, addressing the evolution of a key region and exploring plantation, cultural assimilation, and socioeconomic change. It not only reconstructs contemporary society but illuminates developments in the region and beyond in the following century when the twin forces of reforming state and emergent nationalism undermined the "old colony."

The study's core is an exploration of the combined variation and cohesion in the South Munster economy. Close analysis of eleven different economic zones in the region also emphasizes the development of a region-wide economy with a cash and credit network, and an evolving transport infrastructure opening up even the most inaccessible parts to commerce and law. Documentary and visual sources (maps, landscapes, and character drawings) combine to excellent effect in linking such changes to the "improvement" phenomenon. Encouraging estate manicuring and "big house" building, land reclamation, linen manufacture, and the introduction of Protestant tenants, improvers sought to boost rentals while establishing islands of English civility in the midst of perceived backwardness. The planners of improvement were those second-rank landed proprietors benefiting from the mid-sixteenth-century fragmentation of the great New English estates, although the shock troops were those farther down the socioeconomic ladder (i.e. the marginal tenants whose cultivation of the pioneering potato sped the progress of reclamation during the later eighteenth century).

Rural economy and landscape development were intimately related to the emerging hegemony of Cork city. Briefly challenged by other centers like Kinsale, Youghal, and Dungarvan, the city's rise to economic prominence depended on several interlinked factors: physical location, water power, access to a splendid harbor, and direct colonial and continental contacts. Thus developed meat processing, a successfully regulated butter trade, a drink industry boosted by the presence of army and navy, and, in the outlying river valleys, a proto-industrialized textile trade. The port's inward flow of grain, timber, wine, and cotton, and the outward passage of beef, butter, emigrants, and (periodically) recruits for continental armies, met increasing consumer demands, built the fortunes (and expectations) of urban merchants, and further opened city and hinterland to the wider world.

This study's particular richness lies in matching

broader economic change with oscillating social fortunes: marginal holders digging their way into uplands and uncultivated areas; substantial *gneevvers* or farmers; urban artisans and bread rioters; middlemen and landed proprietors; and emerging merchants, bankers, and professionals. The fading optimism of New English beneficiaries of the seventeenth-century settlement is stressed as, weakened by financial burdens, fearful of French attackers and Irish swordsmen, and disillusioned by England's apparent lack of concern, some turned absentee. Others set the tone for future anti-Catholic politics by supporting penal legislation, monopolizing borough politics, or operating Protestant parliamentary lobbying groups. Embryonic political Catholicism is also scrutinized, as Catholic merchants and professionals wedged their way into economic prominence and reached for and netted political power. This advancement ladder (inaccessible to laborers increasingly entrapped in poverty) was potentially within reach of many groups. Some dairymen became *gneevvers*; city butchers rose to merchant status; merchants pushed their sons into the professions; lesser gentry passed via Grand Jury service into the higher gentry; mid-eighteenth century smaller landholders became leaseholders on the middlemen's demise (an indication, incidentally, that descent, too, was possible); and larger landed proprietors conforming to Protestantism insured undivided land inheritance.

The religious polarization of seventeenth and eighteenth-century Irish society is closely reassessed. Although New Englishness was characterized by theologically based self-belief while the "dispossessed" increasingly equated their own emergent "Irishness" with Catholicism, political divisions between Catholic and Protestant were not clear cut, nor was there denominational political cohesion. Some (though few) Protestants were Jacobites and United Irishmen; Whig-Tory divisions separated Protestant gentry and clergy; parliamentary union met cross-denominational support and opposition; and city merchants united in a nonsectarian Hibernian patriotism from the 1770s onward. Moreover, a common male sociability provided bridges, whether through gentry fosterage of foxhound pups or shared membership in urban cultural and intellectual associations.

Dickson's lucid writing style and sure command of primary sources and comparative scholarship open up the complexities of an evolving colonial region over the *longue durée*. Reconstructing the framework and socioeconomic, political, and religious dynamics of that region in a manner untried until now, this study casts its light forward into the equally complex developments of the following century. It is a must for anyone seeking to understand the evolution both of one key Irish region and of modern Ireland generally, as well as the nature of power and identity in their broadest senses. It is a book that I, for one, would love to have written.

MAURA CRONIN
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LIAM CHAMBERS. *Michael Moore c. 1639–1726: Provost of Trinity, Rector of Paris*. (Irish in Europe Monographs.) Portland, Oreg.: Four Courts Press. 2005. Pp. 160. \$55.00.

This book, the first volume in the “Irish in Europe” monograph series, presents a detailed, well-written study of one of Ireland’s leading émigré scholars. In his introduction, Liam Chambers systematically sets out the rationale and scope of his study, which extends well beyond the remit of a standard biography. He maintains a realistic sense of his subject’s importance and presents a lively engagement with current themes and trends in Irish and continental historiography concerning the survival and revival of Irish Catholicism, the nature of church-state relations in Ireland (especially during the Jacobite era), intellectual life in the universities of Europe, Irish émigrés’ involvement in the great philosophical and theological debates of the time, and Irish experiences of migration and exile. All of these are effectively woven together in an engaging, nuanced, and generally well contextualized examination of the life of this celebrated priest, philosopher, and educationalist.

Michael Moore’s family life, education, and early career are charted down to 1686. Born in Dublin in 1639, he studied philosophy at the University of Paris, where he graduated in 1662, and thereafter pursued grammar studies at Nantes. By the 1660s, Moore was lecturing in philosophy at the Collège des Grassins, Paris. Drawing on the scholarship of Laurence Brockliss, Chambers very effectively shows how Moore rose to prominence within the German nation at the university. Moore’s alleged implication in the “popish plot” (1678) and his contentious role as legal guardian of the young baron of Slane are then cited as evidence of his ongoing engagement with developments back home in Ireland.

In a particularly revealing chapter focused on Moore’s return to Ireland (1686), the controversy surrounding his appointment as provost of Trinity College, and, ultimately, his banishment in 1690, the author exposes the superficiality of interpretations published by both William King and Walter Harris. He demonstrates effectively that the debacle surrounding Moore’s appointment must be seen within the broader context of “a more deep-seated set of problems concerning the rate of change in favour of Catholics and the role of the monarch in the affairs of the church” (p. 42), concluding that it was Moore’s strong line on these issues that led to his downfall and return to France in 1690.

In examining Moore’s stance on the Aristotelian-Cartesian debate that gripped professors of philosophy at the University of Paris in the 1690s, Chambers contends that his subject is “not well understood by modern historians of ideas in Ireland” (p. 80). A detailed analysis of Moore’s challenge to Cartesianism, articulated in his *De existential Dei* (1692), is well contextualized within a European setting. While Chambers does refer to the “new philosophy” primarily associated with the emerging Protestant ascendancy in Ireland, more attention might have been devoted to the stance adopted by

the Hartlib circle and the Dublin Philosophical Society in order to explain the author’s assertion that “Moore’s philosophical position stands in contrast with this strand within the Irish intellectual élite” (p. 81). An indication of the relative sophistication and the impact of Moore’s publication in the wider arena of the debate would also have enhanced this aspect of the study.

Moore’s sojourn in Italy (1692–1701), first in Rome and then in Montefiascone, where he was rector of the seminary, equipped him with the vision and skills to undertake a major reform program at the Collège de Navarre. Chambers explains that “Moore’s successful return to Paris [where he became rector in 1701] was predicated on a dual strategy for the future of the university, emphasising the need for reform along the model he had become familiar with in Montefiascone while at the same time opposing the encroachment of Cartesianism” (p. 97). As to whether Moore was a Jansenist, Chambers concludes: “there is no evidence to indicate that Moore sympathised with theological Jansenism” (p. 111).

The author shows particular skill in situating his examination of the later phase of Moore’s career within the overlapping contexts of the growing Irish student body in Paris, the Irish college (Collège des Lombards), the Old English familial and community networks at home and in France, and, lastly, the exiled Jacobite population in Paris. The focus shifts once again to analysis of his later works: *Vera sciendi methodus* (1716), in which he asserted that Cartesian logic was “riddled with problems and could not be relied upon to produce ‘sure knowledge’” (p. 123); and *De principiis physicis* (1726), “probably the last course of Aristotelian natural philosophy to appear on the market in France” (p. 121).

Meticulously researched, based on rigorous verification of all facts about his subject, and set within a broad conceptual framework, this study greatly advances our knowledge and understanding of an important Irish intellectual and represents a significant contribution to scholarship in Irish history and in the history of the Irish abroad in the early modern era.

MARY ANN LYONS

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IRENE WHELAN. *The Bible War in Ireland: The “Second Reformation” and the Polarization of Protestant-Catholic Relations, 1800–1840*. (History of Ireland and the Irish Diaspora.) Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 2005. Pp. xx, 347. \$60.00.

In the early years of the nineteenth century, evangelicals in Britain and Ireland embraced a movement to convert the majority Roman Catholic population of Ireland to Protestantism. The movement was initiated by Nonconformists, especially Methodists, filled with the fervor of the eighteenth-century Protestant awakening in the North Atlantic world. Then, after about 1810, the cause was taken up by members of the established Protestant United Church of England and Ireland. Protes-

tants came to view the conversion of Irish Catholics as a means to consolidate the 1801 Union of Britain and Ireland, forging the United Kingdom into a single nation-state, whose peoples would be united around a shared set of religious and moral values. The exclusively Protestant Parliament supported the movement, and by the early 1820s, the United Kingdom was investing substantial amounts in building churches and subsidizing a growing number of Scripture-based schools in Ireland, while individual British and Irish Protestants supported a plethora of voluntary mission societies. For a time, it seemed the movement would prevail; in 1826, evangelicals proclaimed the beginning of the "Second Reformation" that would soon achieve a Protestant Ireland.

Despite the considerable resources behind it, however, the movement failed. From the mid-1820s, the Roman Catholic community was mobilized against the Protestant missions, largely through the efforts of the able James Doyle, bishop of Kildare and Leighlin, and the charismatic lawyer Daniel O'Connell. By 1829, Catholic popular resistance had effectively halted the "Second Reformation" movement. That same year, confronted by the threat of sectarian civil war in Ireland, Parliament reluctantly enacted Catholic emancipation, granting Roman Catholics almost full rights of citizenship. This was followed in the early 1830s by acts providing equal educational opportunities for Catholics and reducing the size of the established Protestant Church in Ireland. The evangelical missions continued, but no longer with large-scale state support, and increasingly converts to Protestantism had to be organized into "colonies" under the protection of sympathetic Protestant landlords.

It is this story of the Irish evangelical missions between 1800 and 1840 that Irene Whelan relates. The evangelical campaign has been explored before, by the late Desmond Bowen in his pioneering *The Protestant Crusade in Ireland, 1800–1870* (1978) and more recently in Thomas McGrath's *Politics, Interdenominational Relations and Education in the Public Ministry of Bishop James Doyle* (1998) and my own *National Churches of England, Ireland, and Scotland 1801–1846* (2001). Whelan's lively and balanced study adds significantly to our understanding of the movement. It is based on extensive research into the Irish evangelical campaign and an impressive knowledge of the personalities and events. One of the strengths of Whelan's book is her analysis of evangelical landowners in Ireland—the so-called "Bible gentry"—who embraced the "Second Reformation" movement in large part as a means to preserve both the "Protestant ascendancy" and political Union with Britain. Such landed families as the Farnhams of County Cavan, the Powerscourts of County Wicklow, and the Rodens of County Down provided material support to the Protestant missionary and educational societies, maintained "moral agents" to promote education and evangelism on their estates, and provided protection and material support to converts.

It is easy with historical hindsight to dismiss the early nineteenth-century Protestant evangelicals as bigoted

fanatics or enthusiasts deluded in their belief that the Irish Catholic majority could be converted. However, as Whelan shows, many evangelicals—among them Power le Poer Trench, the Protestant archbishop of Tuam—were deeply committed to the welfare of the Irish people and sincerely believed that Protestantism would promote Ireland's interests. Further, the prospects for the Protestant mission in Ireland did not appear so implausible, especially after 1815, with Roman Catholicism in Europe weakened by a quarter century of revolution and war, with Britain triumphant over Napoleonic France, and with the beginning of British Protestant missions in India and the Far East.

Whelan's book is less satisfactory in explaining how an impoverished Irish Catholic Church—suffering from an insufficient number of priests, churches, and schools, weakened links with Rome, and the effects of decades of penal legislation—was able so effectively to resist the pressures of the "Second Reformation" campaign. She rightly directs attention to the leadership of Doyle and O'Connell, and to the effective propaganda of the Catholic Association, founded by O'Connell in 1823. But her book does not explain how it was that the Catholic Church had come to exercise such a profound influence over the hearts and minds of the Irish peasantry, so that Catholicism was integral to their identity in the emerging era of democratic politics. For an account of the Catholic side of the story, the reader is directed to Emmet Larkin's masterful study, *The Pastoral Role of the Roman Catholic Church in Pre-Famine Ireland, 1750–1850* (2006), which appeared after the publication of Whelan's fine book.

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FERGUS CAMPBELL. *Land and Revolution: Nationalist Politics in the West of Ireland, 1891–1921*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2005. Pp. xvi, 356. \$99.00.

Fergus Campbell's analysis of the intersection between political and agrarian conflict in Connacht joins a rapidly expanding list of localized studies of the Irish revolution and its origins. In common with his predecessors over the past quarter-century, Campbell draws most of his local detail from newspapers and police reports, using census and valuation schedules to compile mini-prosopographies of several hundred activists. Like Michael Wheatley in *Nationalism and the Irish Party: Provincial Ireland, 1910–1916* (2005), he applies a cinematic approach to locality, periodically "shifting from the wide-angle shot to the close-up" of events in his epicenter of east Galway (p. 5). Although understandably eager to claim novelty for his own methods and findings, and to extricate himself from the increasingly uncomfortable company of "revisionist" historians such as Paul Bew, Peter Hart, and myself, Campbell does not ultimately undermine "the new historiographical orthodoxy of the revolution" (p. 297). Like a vintage *fin-de-siècle* revisionist, he seeks socioeconomic explanations for political change, aims to subvert conventional in-

interpretations by viewing history "from below," and hankers after lost opportunities for social revolution.

The local embodiment of the social revolution that might have been was Tom Kenny, a blacksmith in Craughwell, whose notoriously violent secret society provided a pivot for local domination of the United Irish League, the Gaelic Athletic Association, the Irish Republican Brotherhood, Sinn Féin, and the Irish Volunteers. Although Kenny's faction was often outmaneuvered by less radical and more respectable nationalists, it was an essential strand in the "continuity" which Campbell detects between nineteenth-century agrarian agitation and revolutionary Sinn Féin. According to Campbell, this radical tradition was far more important in shaping the revolution in Connacht than the abiding influence of John Redmond's Home Rule movement, with its social conservatism and propensity for political compromise.

Yet, as numerous "revisionist" studies of Charles Stewart Parnell and his successors have argued, these two traditions were in practice complementary. If early Fianna Fáil was "slightly constitutional," as Sean Lemass jested, its "constitutionalist" forerunners were always slightly revolutionary and sentimentally attracted to physical force. Respectable gentlemen such as Redmond and John Dillon did not hesitate to use the menace of violence and the fact of intimidation to force legislative reform, with considerable success as Campbell rightly observes. Until at least 1914, the "old party" showed astonishing skill in both fanning and manipulating social discontent, infiltrating radical organizations, and, when necessary, overpowering overzealous factions (such as the Kennyites) in the United Irish League or the Irish Volunteers. When Kevin O'Shiel emasculated the campaign of land seizures in 1920 through the imposition of a republican Land Commission, he was re-enacting the past success of the Land League, the National League, and the United Irish League in harnessing potentially revolutionary unrest behind a campaign with restricted and practicable political objectives. Despite himself, Campbell has assembled compelling evidence for the replication of prewar political strategies and alliances in the revolutionary period. Although more violent and more persistent in Connacht than elsewhere, agrarian combination was endemic in Irish nationalism both before and after the change of guard in 1916.

Campbell's decision to span three decades and range well beyond Craughwell, while enhancing the comparative value of his analysis, entails certain costs. Unlike Wheatley, who offers some remarkably intricate and revealing analysis of local political alignments in his "Middle Ireland" (especially Roscommon and Sligo), Campbell does not "attempt to describe local life in all of its quotidian detail" (p. 3). His analysis of the major political organizations is uneven. This account of the United Irish League at local level adds significantly to the pioneering work of Bew and Philip Bull, while the collective profiles of republican activists invite direct comparison with several other local studies. Yet Camp-

bell glosses over the local organization and activities of post-Rising Sinn Féin, the prewar Irish Volunteers, and the influential Ancient Order of Hibernians (admittedly weak in Galway). Virtually no attention is paid to the strategies adopted by organizations defending the interests of landlords, or even to the agencies by which agrarian demands were channeled into the political process. Thus Shawe-Taylor's seminal Land Conference of 1902 is treated in a political vacuum, ignoring the negotiations that led to the full-fledged participation of nationalist leaders and the absence of their Unionist counterparts (pp. 76-78). Despite such self-imposed limitations, this book elucidates the social dimension of Ireland's so-called revolution, adding another regional variation to an already complex story. It also reinforces the familiar if unpalatable thesis that British governments, however well intentioned, have seldom initiated Irish reforms in the absence of violence or the threat of violence.

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BENJAMIN EHLERS. *Between Christians and Moriscos. Juan de Ribera and Religious Reform in Valencia, 1568-1614*. (The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, 124th series.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2006. Pp. xiv, 241 \$45.00.

How could a virulent racist and cruel xenophobe come to be canonized as a saint by the Roman Catholic Church? This is the essential question this book seeks to answer. Well researched and clearly presented, Benjamin Ehlers's study draws us into a vertiginous vortex of "spin" by subsequent biographers, but most notably by Juan de Ribera himself, which eventually led to his beatification and subsequent canonization. In this perennial story of the clash of civilizations, we may well find a parable for our own times.

Juan de Ribera was archbishop of Valencia from 1568 to 1611. Ehlers chronicles his career, inviting us to watch as Ribera evolved from a young, idealistic prelate to the scourge of the Moriscos. For someone not familiar with the intricacies of Spanish history, a few clarifications might be in order. The Moriscos were people of Arabic ancestry, living as nominal Christians in Spain after the end of the almost 800-year period of Reconquest ending in 1492. In that year, the Jews were expelled by the Catholic monarchs Ferdinand and Isabella, but the Moriscos were allowed to remain provided they converted to the state religion. This they did, with varying degrees of willingness. Many of them were in fact Christians in name only, managing to preserve their language, customs, and traditions, albeit under the veil of secrecy. Unlike the Jews, who had no powerful nation to back them, the Moriscos were increasingly perceived as a threat because of their supposed alliance with the Turks. Conspiracy theories abounded, favoring a scenario in which the Morisco

would form the proverbial fifth column of an invading Moorish army—which could even, if the invasion were successful, threaten to reverse what had been accomplished through the Reconquest.

Such, at least, was the fear of Old Christians faced with an alleged other or enemy in their midst. The situation was even worse in Valencia, a fairly remote and notoriously lawless land where banditry was all too common. In point of fact, most Moriscos lived peaceable lives. But in this atmosphere charged with fear, any scrap of paper which happened to be found with writing on it in Arabic could stoke the flames of hysteria. Uneducated “converts” who were confused about some of the finer points of doctrine were assumed to be deliberately deceitful, holding on to vestiges of the sect of Mohammed while pretending at the same time to frequent the sacraments. Not everyone saw them in this way, and the Moriscos were not without their protectors. But these tended to be, not surprisingly, the seigneurial lords who employed them as a source of cheap labor to work their estates. Thus their defense of the Moriscos could, not without cause, be maligned by their attackers as merely self-interested.

The title of Ehlers's book is perhaps deliberately ambiguous. It could be taken to mean both relations between two groups of people or a state of identity in flux, somewhere between Christians and Moors and always caught in the middle. This “space in the middle” is in fact the place where Ribera found himself. As a young archbishop torn between radically different constituencies, he eventually came to favor the Old Christians in his flock at the expense of the New Christians (another derogative name for the Moriscos). After several years of unsuccessful proselytizing—during which, to his credit, he spent some of his own (considerable) personal wealth to build churches and pay priests for Morisco parishes which had none—he lobbied King Philip II incessantly to expel all the Moriscos from Spain. The fact that Philip II rebuffed him, while a credit to that monarch, may have been more a matter of political expediency than enlightened tolerance. But Ribera was undeterred. After the death of Philip II, he renewed his campaign by writing letters to the heir to the throne, Philip III. The fact that these letters were ultimately successful, and that the Moriscos were ultimately expelled in 1609, is a testament to the dogged enacity of this churchman, who did not hesitate to needle in affairs of state. The saddest aspect of this tragedy, as reflected in the book's cover (derived from paintings of the period), was the tearing apart of Morisco families, as adults were forced to leave and children under the age of four were forced to stay. They were destined to become slaves to their Christian masters.

So how could this relentless persecutor of a marginalized group attain the status of sainthood in 1960? Part of the answer, the part dealing with Francisco Franco's regime, pertains more to modern history and thus lies outside the scope of this study. Nonetheless, a powerful clue lies in a statement made by Ehlers in his conclu-

sion: “The archbishop's essentialist arguments for the collective guilt of the *moriscos* offered moral clarity in an age of unresolved ambiguity” (p. 155). We are still being seduced by such offers of apparent “moral clarity” today. This book, and the life it details, may be viewed as one sweeping case of conscience. Unfortunately, as was happening in so many confessionals of the period, casuistry ultimately triumphed.

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J. MICHAEL HAYDEN and MALCOLM R. GREENSHIELDS. *Six Hundred Years of Reform: Bishops and the French Church, 1190–1789*. (McGill-Queen's Studies in the History of Religion, series two, number 37.) Ithaca, N.Y.: McGill-Queen's University Press. 2005. Pp. xx, 604. \$80.00.

This book by J. Michael Hayden and Malcolm R. Greenshields presents a powerful challenge to the reader in terms both of the difficulty in understanding it and its thesis that the Catholic Reformation must be traced as far back as 1190. In regard to the first, over half of the book is taken up with maps and nearly impenetrable graphs and tables. The 187 pages of text are dense with references to the supporting materials and such terms as categories, subcategories, and subsubcategories. The book's thesis is based largely on data accumulated by the Pastoral Visits Project of the Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, which published a catalogue of 8,483 pastoral visits made in the era 1190–1789. A pastoral visit involved the appearance of the bishop or his representative in a parish to inspect the parish fabric and the spiritual well being of priest and parishioners. A second source for determining the reform activity of French bishops is the set of 1,773 statutes issued by diocesan synods in the same period. Hayden and Greenshields chose their beginning date because it essentially marks the onset of synods and pastoral visits, and it creates a convenient block of 600 years for quantitative analysis.

The authors find four periods of extensive episcopal efforts at reform in those 600 years. The thirteenth-century reform saw the first use of synods and visits for improving the spiritual quality of parish priests and monks while paying little attention to the laity. Such issues as enforcing clerical celibacy and correctly performing the sacraments took center stage. In the mid-fourteenth century such woes as the Hundred Years War and the Black Death led to a period of reduced effort at reform. The late medieval reform began about 1410 and lasted for about sixty years, as judged by an increase in the number of synods and pastoral visits. Clerical concubines and behavior remained their focus, but there also was more emphasis on correcting the laity: for example, forbidding working on Sundays and dancing in churches and cemeteries.

Hayden and Greenshields propose that after a thirty-year slackening of reform, the French episcopate began a more concentrated effort after 1490, which they term

the First Catholic Reformation. The authors emphasize the continuity they see between the earlier reforms and this reformation, but the far larger record base available from 1490 on affords them the opportunity to provide a detailed description of reform activities. While the earlier concerns involving priests' behavior did not disappear, there was a greater emphasis on whether the laity knew the truths of their faith. This emphasis was already displayed before 1517, but soon the need to counter Protestant ideas appeared. The greater amount of evidence also enables the authors to discern a geographical pattern—strongest in the northwest—and to rank bishops according to their reforming zeal.

With the outbreak of the religious wars in 1561, French bishops had less opportunity to implement reform, and the authors present the next forty years as the transition to the Second Catholic Reformation, which, they argue, corresponds to what historians have called the French Catholic Reformation. While there is little new about the authors' understanding of that movement's substance—implementing the decrees of Trent even if they were not officially accepted in France and removing priests from their close relationship with the laity, to name but two elements—they argue for a greater role for the episcopate in bringing it about, using the tools of synods and visits. By 1690 the bishops had succeeded in persuading most French Catholics to accept Trent's wide-ranging reforms, but in the century after that, they failed to respond to the intellectual ferment of the Enlightenment and the routinization of their own processes for reform. Nonetheless, Hayden and Greenshields conclude, the bishops prepared the church to survive the French Revolution's onslaught.

By concentrating exclusively on the episcopacy's synods and pastoral visitations, the authors exaggerate the role of the bishops in trying to achieve reform in the French church. The monarchy and the religious orders were also involved and arguably had more success in some respects than the bishops. Nor does the fact that a bishop had done his minimal duty in dispatching his vicar to do visitations make him a reformer. More seriously, their evidence fails to provide any insight into the extent to which the bishops' efforts had results before 1600. The repetition of the same questions and statutes over centuries suggests that prior visitations and synods had been ineffective in achieving change. The authors also ought to have noted that Pierre de Gondi, praised as the "most advanced" (p. 87) of the reforming bishops of the late 1500s, albeit born in France, came from an Italian family with extensive contacts in the Italian church.

Such criticisms may call into question Hayden and Greenshields's claim that they have traced the origins of the Catholic Reformation back to the twelfth century, but they do not detract from what the book does best: provide a wealth of information on parish visits and diocesan synods. It gives keen insights into how church administration was carried on at the local level.

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JOSEPH F. BYRNES. *Catholic and French Forever: Religious and National Identity in Modern France*. University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 2005. Pp xxiii, 278. \$50.00.

The title of this book, explains Joseph F. Byrnes, was suggested by a song with the refrain, "Catholique et français toujours" that he once heard an old Breton priest sing. It provides the guiding thread for a study or series of studies, of the difficult relationship between the Catholic Church and the nation in France since the revolution. The second half of the subject is "nation" rather than "state," which allows Byrnes to move beyond the familiar battles between church and state to engage with the actual religious and cultural practice of French people. Seven chapters explore interesting angles, from a minority of priests who embraced the French Revolution to the extent of marrying and abjuring the priesthood to attempts by the authorities under the Directory to "transfer sacrality" from religious to civic celebrations, and attempts by the church to recover the loyalty of the French people by promoting pilgrimages. Other chapters explore the defense of local languages as a medium for teaching religion, the rapprochement between priests and school teachers during World War I, and a revival of interest in medieval Catholic art stimulated by the work of secular scholars. In a sense, the book reads like a collection of related seminar papers, but Byrnes has provided an overarching narrative of three stages: "divorce" of Catholics and nation at the time of the French Revolution, "defence" of their religion for most of the nineteenth century, and "détente" after the separation of church and state in the twentieth century. The author is fully aware of the complexities and inconsistencies of the subject. For example, while the Catholic Church in Alsace used the German language to defend Catholicism, the hierarchy in Roussillon did not make use of Catalan. This study does not pretend to be comprehensive, and other micro-studies might have been equally illuminating. Little is said about attempts by Catholic intellectuals to come to terms with modern liberal and democratic ideas, or about the religious background of many French anticlericals. Byrnes is equally coy about French Catholic antisemitism and support for the Vichy government, although the epilogue (which reaches through the post-1918 period in ten pages) argues that the Catholic Church in France has now adapted to a pluralistic society. There is much of value and deep interest to scholars in this work, but despite the narrative linking the different studies, newcomers to the history of French Catholicism in the modern period might prefer to start with Ralph Gibson's *Social History of French Catholicism, 1789–1914* (1989).

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JONATHAN SIMON. *Chemistry, Pharmacy and Revolution in France, 1777–1809*. (Science, Technology and Cul

ture, 1700–1945.) Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate Publishing Company. 2005. Pp. vi, 189. \$89.95.

Jonathan Simon has a bone to pick with the way traditional historians of science have characterized the chemical revolution, and he is right. The substitution of Antoine-Laurent Lavoisier's oxygen-based theory for older approaches transformed the earlier activity that Simon centrally locates with the art of pharmacy. By following only one dimension of this revolution to its modern (late nineteenth-century) outcome, historians of chemistry have avoided considering how it seriously affected the profession of pharmacists. This short book seeks to redress the balance by focusing on the unintended consequences Lavoisier's revolution had on the profession of druggists.

The key to the author's credible assertion comes from a hardly cited "Report on the State of Pharmacy" published in 1809 by Napoleon Bonaparte's chief pharmacist, Louis-Claude Cadet de Gassicourt, who during his long career, witnessed both the chemical and political revolutions that set the stage for Simon's account. It is a complex story, which he tells with close attention to legislative texts, chemical manuals, and contemporary periodical literature. Simon argues that French chemistry of the first part of the eighteenth century was mainly supported by apothecaries who sought to teach and promote their practices in textbooks. Following Enlightenment ideals, they hoped thereby to raise their art to the level of an intellectually acceptable activity. In the event, by focusing on changing theories of the transformation of matter, they undermined attention to the manipulation of chemicals carried out for pharmaceutical ends. Ultimately, after the institutional transformations brought about by the French Revolution, pharmacy emerged as an applied science deriving its nature from the new theoretical advances made by Lavoisier's collaborators instead of its original supportive role. Moreover, in an effort to liberate themselves from the guild-like restrictions imposed by Old Regime corporatism, pharmacists now found themselves tied to the government and subservient to philosophical chemistry.

The first two dozen pages of Simon's monograph are a superb account and critique of the historiography of chemistry, which he sets out to revise. The overemphasis on changes in concepts and nomenclature championed by Lavoisier obscured the practical art of mixing chemicals that is essential to apothecaries and was originally the source of theoretical concerns. Even though there was no conspiracy to demote pharmacy, according to Simon it lost its former preeminence. Pharmacists thought they had achieved autonomy, respectability, and control of their corporate affairs when a Collège de Pharmacie was founded in 1777. An important feature of this institution was its educational program, firming up its definition as a profession. Unfortunately, the college was disbanded by the liberal edicts of the revolutionaries, and the status of the profession was left dangling until several years after the French educational

system had been revamped. Curiously enough, pharmacy, which might have been included in the reform of medicine, was allowed to drift unattended. Not until the Napoleonic period did its practitioners reestablish their identity with their own journal. This is where Simon ends the story.

Given that much of Simon's critique of past writing centers on the issue of disciplinary identity, it is surprising that he pays so little attention to its social character and to the economic consequences of the changes he is chronicling. While he is explicitly aware of the importance of the sociology of science, he has not in this work examined the sociology of the profession, either prior to or during the revolution. There is a clear need to carry out a prosopography of French apothecaries in order to understand how change affected them. The separation of the guild of apothecaries from grocers, the regulations that thwarted them from selling drugs without a prescription from physicians, and their changing status all must have seriously affected their economic well-being. The examination of notarial archives would most likely reveal how their numbers changed over time, how much their personal fortunes prospered or suffered from the turmoil Simon so well depicts. Business records about pharmacies would also help to contextualize the profession, which continues to play a prominent role in French life.

Simon's pioneering work has opened up an area of investigation that ought to be further explored by social historians as well as historians of chemistry. He is to be commended for starting the process.

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EILEEN S. DEMARCO. *Reading and Riding: Hachette's Railroad Bookstore Network in Nineteenth-Century France*. Bethlehem: Lehigh University Press. 2006. Pp. 172. \$38.50.

Eileen S. DeMarco recounts the history of Hachette's railway bookstores from their establishment in 1853 until the early twentieth century. Initially her focus is on the founder, Louis Hachette, and his maneuvering to create a monopoly of bookstores in the railroad depots of the major French rail lines. Using Hachette company archives and railroad company records, DeMarco proceeds to describe the expansion of the network and the roles of railway companies, the French state, Hachette, competing publishers, and bookstore employees. A final chapter traces unsuccessful legislative threats to Hachette's monopoly from competitors' allies in the Chamber of Deputies. Only at the turn of the century did the Ministry of Public Works, which had responsibility for regulating railroads, force railway companies to open up bidding for bookstore concessions to Hachette's competitors. Even then the financial weight of the company ultimately allowed Hachette to drive others from the field, preserving its dominance.

As DeMarco repeatedly notes, Hachette's railway

bookstores were positioned to have an important impact in nineteenth-century France. By employing widows and wives of railway employees, Hachette increased the number of women in the book trade. By establishing bookstores in rail stations across France, Hachette brought bookstores to towns otherwise bereft of them. By publishing large numbers of books and distributing books with ever-lower prices, Hachette contributed to the rapid expansion of literacy in nineteenth-century France. Although DeMarco is limited by her sources (it appears that the company did not preserve much of the correspondence with the booksellers about their trade or their clientele), there is little doubt that Hachette's bookstores were important fixtures in nineteenth-century France.

This is a book that would have been greatly improved by better editing. It reads like an unrevised dissertation with previews about what we shall learn, reviews of what we have just learned, and much repetition. In addition, often we are told what Hachette "probably" intended to do, what "perhaps" Hachette meant, or what Hachette "could have" intended. A good editor pushes an author to make an assertion or remain silent on the matter; repeated tentative suggestions without evidence just muddy the waters.

More troubling is that this book is very short, with a mere 121 pages of text. Such brevity does not give DeMarco space to pursue angles that would have strengthened her argument. To give but one example: she contends repeatedly that the offerings of railroad bookstores in the Second Empire were politically neutral. I am skeptical that any such thing as political neutrality can exist. Even if DeMarco did not want to engage the theoretical literature, at the very least the work of Michel Foucault, analysis of railway bookstore offerings could have altered her conclusion. Although DeMarco makes no study of the books themselves, she offers a list from 1862 in the appendix, and it begs further analysis. It is remarkable that many works by René de Chateaubriand and Alphonse Lamartine were readily available in Hachette bookstores, but all of those by Denis Diderot, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Victor Hugo were conspicuously absent. The only work by Voltaire was *Zadig*. Even without having Louis Hachette's written criteria for inclusion, the absence of which DeMarco laments, the author might have reconsidered the presumed political neutrality of Hachette's collection by analyzing the books themselves. DeMarco is no doubt correct that Hachette railway bookstores were the only bookstores in many areas of provincial France; it would be thus doubly interesting to know more about the contents of books they stocked, particularly books by authors much less well known than those listed above.

On a related topic, DeMarco asserts that the experience of the railway bookstores reveals the limits of censorship in the Second Empire, because the government did not find cause to intervene in Hachette's trade. Yet she herself notes that "the Second Empire did not have to concern itself too much with the railroad

bookstores because Hachette and Company was an even stricter censor than the government itself" (p. 118). In the end, I would argue that self-censorship by publishers indicates the ultimate success, rather than the limits, of government censorship in the Second Empire (after all, as DeMarco later writes, Hachette changed tack in the 1870s).

Despite my frustrations with the book, I remain convinced that this is a fascinating topic, and readers can find much here that is interesting. DeMarco has sources not previously used by other historians, and to that extent makes a noteworthy and unique contribution.

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WILLIAM A. PENISTON. *Pederasts and Others: Urban Culture and Sexual Identity in Nineteenth-Century Paris* (Haworth Gay and Lesbian Studies.) New York: Haworth Press. 2004. Pp. xi, 258. Cloth \$49.95, paper \$24.95.

For many years, historians of gay and lesbian life have mined the rich cultural sources of the twentieth-century, or they have concentrated on a handful of well known court cases. This book is welcome, therefore, as it brings fresh evidence to bear on the social life of urban Paris following the failed 1870 Commune and the fall of Louis Napoleon. William A. Peniston's careful examination of Paris police ledgers and court record during the 1870s has uncovered detailed information about working-class men who sought same-sex sexual pleasure during a time of social and political instability. He argues that, as part of a concerted attack on potential troublemakers, the police systematically harassed pederasts or sodomites, as they were then called. Thanks to their detailed reports, Peniston convincingly demonstrates the ways in which they linked minor sexual offenses to theft, blackmail, assault, and even murder. He concludes that in spite of being the first European country to abolish its laws against sodomy throughout the 1870s the French police treated men who had sex with men as criminals. This book demonstrates the benefits of a fine-grained study covering a limited period.

By the 1870s specific locations to cruise men were well established, so police could easily make regular sweeps through such popular areas as the Palais Royal or the passages Jouffroy, Verdeau, and Panorama. Suspects were thoroughly interrogated and often ended up implicating numerous friends; anyone with a previous arrest record, however minor, was then often subject to rearrest and trial. Peniston has carefully compared his sources and concludes that the most common offense was some form of public masturbation. For example, on October 26, 1878, the police arrested two men for "holding each other's penises in a group of spectators" on the boulevard des Italiens, but they did not arrest any of the onlookers (p. 95). Peniston found isolated instances of resistance to systematic harassment, but no examples of organized or politicized ac-

ions. All participants in this informal subculture, of course, took risks; nevertheless, Peniston found only nine cases of blackmail and fifteen of theft out of the 328 he examined in detail (p. 98). He does not speculate about whether this was because most of the men were of the same social class and had few resources, or whether it was more difficult to prove these crimes than, say, exposing oneself to a crowd.

Both medical and legal experts insisted that effeminacy was the identifying characteristic of the sodomite. In fact, arrest records show that few men filled this stereotype, and sex in public rarely involved anal intercourse. Although a good many teen-aged youths were among the arrested, almost all the couples were roughly the same age and from the same socioeconomic group. Peniston suggests that the classic pederastic model was being replaced by the modern system of adult men having sex with adult men. If so, the 1870s in Paris can be seen as a pivotal decade, in which same-sex desire was not only criminalized but also becoming a way of life. A fully formed subculture could not be far in the future. Regrettably, Peniston does not develop this exciting conclusion in greater detail.

Since the better off and the intellectual classes had easier access to privacy, they could largely avoid the police persecution faced by those who frequented the urinals and alleys. Peniston explores the interpretive difficulties of cross-class erotics in his careful consideration of the Comte de Germiny, a married, Catholic lawyer. Germiny, who vigorously protested his innocence, was caught in December 1876 soliciting an eighteen-year-old jeweler's apprentice already known to the police. The press, eager to portray the aristocracy as decadent and the proletariat as weak, had a field day. In the end, both men received lighter than normal sentences. Peniston argues convincingly that the core of Paris's nascent homosexual subculture consisted of young working-class men, wise to its dangers and attractions, and de Germiny may well have been naïve or ignorant. Certainly de Germiny was not typical, but perhaps the police also avoided arresting men who were obviously upper class, so their records may be skewed toward the vulnerable and friendless classes. Peniston could move away from his sources to consider why so few aristocrats, much less intellectuals, were ever arrested for cruising the streets of Paris. The great strength of this book—its careful reading of police and court records for the 1870s—is also its weakness. The larger context of the times is only briefly described in the opening chapter, whereas a broader consideration of the context within which the police worked would make this a stronger book. I hope that it will be widely read, but its narrow focus may deter all but specialists.

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JEAN-FRANÇOIS CHANET. *Vers l'armée nouvelle: République conservatrice et réforme militaire 1871–1879.* (His-

toire.) Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes. 2006. Pp. 320. €22.00.

In the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War, France had to overhaul its army while simultaneously erecting the scaffolding of a republic that, in the view of Adolphe Thiers, would be conservative or would not exist. One thing that guaranteed the conservatism of *la Troisième*, Jean-François Chanet notes, was that the army was at the center of France's nation-building project: the revival of nation-state and army were simultaneous and inter-related activities (p. 107). In this way, Chanet carries forward the nation-building theme explored in Eugen Weber's classic *Peasants into Frenchmen: The Modernization of Rural France, 1870–1914* (1976). But while other authors have written about the organization of what contemporaries were already referring to as *l'armée nouvelle*, Chanet places the army at the center of the republican national project. "Everything has been said on the birth of the Third (Republic)," he writes. "What remains to be discovered is the institutional, material, symbolic place of the army in the town" (p. 16).

The resurrection and resurgence of French military institutions had to be a top-down enterprise imposed by legislators on the French people because of what Chanet identifies as the central paradox of French civil-military relations and the role of the soldier in society: for much of the nineteenth century, the French were considered Europe's quintessential soldiers. Unfortunately, French fascination for military events and notorious hair-trigger chauvinism went unmatched by a popular taste for soldiering. This aloof, detached variety of French militarism—perhaps the only variety in Europe of the time—meant that in 1870–1871, France was outmaneuvered, overwhelmed, and thoroughly dishonored by a country more or less its own size, whose army had truly become the school of the nation in the course of the nineteenth century.

However, Chanet believes, the humiliation of defeat combined with a remarkably honest and constructive generation of French leaders to fuel a sense of national unity and purpose among a notoriously factious people. Chanet credits the successful transition from empire to republic to Thiers, who fashioned a national vision centered on military service and convinced the generals to acquiesce to the republic. Although lampooned by his detractors as a politically inept "MacBête," Thiers's successor, Marshal Patrice MacMahon, drew his legitimacy from his ability to hold the army in republican harness. This proved a relatively easy task for, although politicians promised *La Revanche*, the predominate public mood was fear of another war and a repetition of the Paris Commune.

The republic's military project was both a spiritual and an engineering endeavor. It was also one in which the army, although excluded from electoral politics, could participate through a vigorous military press and the writings of outspoken critics of *la vieille armée* like General Jules-Louis Lewal. An army promoted as the

"*centre national de l'hygiène et de la vigueur physique*" (p. 226) united conservatives and progressives around a common symbol of youth, order, and national resurrection. Military renewal also required an infrastructure of steel and stone to match the reinforcement of hearts and minds. Railways, the arteries of communication, were built to hasten mobilization: already the notion that a rapid and efficient mobilization would make the difference between victory and defeat in the first decisive battles of the next conflict had taken hold. Engineer General Séré de Rivières directed a campaign to fortify France's eastern frontier and construct modern, hygienic barracks in cities that heretofore might have remained innocent of military presence. These barracks also became a symbolic link between national government and province, town, and country. The ubiquitous *monuments aux morts* sprang up in towns, a product of cooperation between church and republic that would later collapse in the bitter fights over education and the Dreyfus affair. However, only gradually did republicans overcome their concerns that a geographically stable force would "become involved in the nation's political agitation" (p. 103). Likewise, conservatives, fearful of uprisings in Paris and Lyon, were reluctant to acquiesce to dispersing military forces around the country where towns competed to attract garrisons with generous subsidies.

Modernization and national renewal anchored in military expansion offered mixed blessings. While this policy introduced a new source of prosperity into the provinces, in the eyes of traditionalists, military service also exposed innocent farm boys to urban promiscuity (p. 203). This was merely the first step in the process of establishing military service as an essential part of French nation-building. The conservatism of the project meant that, until the Republicans captured the republic from 1879 and were able to institute more egalitarian recruitment policies, the *armée nouvelle* resembled the *vieille armée* in that the republic's poorest citizens were immobilized for long periods in military servitude.

Chanet offers an interesting view of the Third Republic's early nation-building project that is captured in the later chapters by his reliance on the little-used barracks-building archives of the military engineers. It complements Weber but lacks the flair and human touch of *Peasants into Frenchmen*. Nor is it comprehensible why a university press book should lack an index.

DOUGLAS PORCH

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CHRISTOPHER S. THOMPSON. *The Tour de France: A Cultural History*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 2006. Pp. x, 385. \$29.95.

The first full-scale bicycle circuit of the Hexagon was run in July 1903. By that time, as Christopher S. Thompson tells in his readable, instructive, and engaging book, *véloce*men and their steeds had been erasing time and space (p. 26) for quite a while. In 1903, machines that

started out as rich folks' playthings were being reassessed as poor men's horses. Indoor and outdoor races had popularized their possibilities for decades. The time had come to link technology and trade, speed and entertainment, to spur broadsheet circulation and cycle sales.

This is where Thompson starts a story that he carries down to our own day. As the subtitle suggests, his cultural history touches on many aspects of French society, economy, and even the politics without which, as he makes clear, the race itself might not have come to pass. With Social Darwinism riding high in the wake of humiliating defeat in 1871, the Tour de France could be regarded as a forceful counter to decadence and degeneration: a great endurance trial on potholed roads, a stage for heroically regenerating efforts; a celebration of virility, struggle, suffering, and survival at a time when French men needed to reassure themselves, their fellows, and their mates about their manhood. Which may be why no gear shifts were tolerated on Tour racers' bikes until the 1930s, and why celebrations of technological triumphs went hand in hand with physical exigencies in overdrive.

Attrition rates testify to the harsh demands of the Tour's early days, as to their progressive relaxation. From 1903 to 1929, only one rider in three completed the Great Loop around the Hexagon. In the 1930s thanks to laxer rules, better than one rider in two reached Paris. Between 1947 and 2000 about two thirds made it. Traditional gender roles also relaxed, although they were imposed longer than women's disfranchisement, which ended in 1945. Only in 1984 (when Marguerite Duras won the Prix Goncourt, and a century-old divorce law was eased at last) was a women's counter part Tour first run. Happily, though, Thompson pays sportswomen plenty of attention, chronicling them as competitive cyclists, supportive family members, or, too often, targets of stereotypes, bias, and prejudice.

Like cycling itself, the Tour turns out to be more than a spectator sport: an opportunity to discuss labor relations, conditions of work, conflicts, wages, and strikes and their attendant exchanges of blame. Thompson chronicles all with scholarly and writerly flair, against the background of a riven society and culture(s). What once-gratuitous exertions turn into professionalism; "Giants of the Road" (p. 95) become "Convicts of Toil" (p. 180), with both organizers and racers focused on performance, profit, publicity, and "legends" designed to enhance all of the above. Racers are increasingly likened to machines, to be treated much like mechanical devices. Cheating and loutish aggression mar fair play. Finally, in the 1970s, as pharmacological contributions rise to scandalous heights, stimulants and performance-enhancing drugs begin to be denounced and ill regulated.

Fin-de-siècle velophilia had been a faith. An early apostle of velocipedics, Baudry de Saunier, referred to cycling as a religion, to sport as a vocation, to relation between rider and bike as a communion (p. 24). The fervor has turned into agnostic materialism. If some

thing works, as long as it works, it is good enough. That is progress. If and when it no longer works, jettison it. That is progress too. And Thompson's epilogue ends on a reference to the once vastly popular Marco Pantani, the Italian champion who won the scandal-plagued Tour of 1998 and died in his hotel room in 2004 from a cocaine overdose. "In cycling," Pantani affirmed, "there is no cult of doping, rather a cult of champions . . . That means doing things that are forbidden, but forbidden only if they catch you" (p. 343).

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GARY WILDER. *The French Imperial Nation-State: Negritude and Colonial Humanism between the Two World Wars*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2005. Pp. xi, 404. Cloth \$75.00, paper \$25.00.

Gary Wilder's ambitious book is a provocative challenge to those who claim that the French nation-state between the two world wars was essentially republican in nature, and who dismiss French imperial practices as an awkward aberration. Wilder argues, rather, that the French nation-state of the Third Republic was essentially imperial, one in which Africans and other colonized peoples were "racialized and disenfranchised . . . within a republican framework" (p. 118). In other words, republican universalism and the particularism of a racist, exploitative, and authoritarian empire were simply diametric poles of the imperial nation-state. Defined by its internal contradictions, the imperial nation-state was simultaneously "modern and illiberal, republican and racist, welfarist and mercantilist" (p. 22).

To illustrate his point, Wilder focuses on two intellectual movements that strove to reform the empire between the two world wars. The first, colonial humanism, was promoted by French reformers who attempted to implement a more rational method of colonial administration, bolstered by a new concern for economic development. The second, *Négritude*, was a cultural nationalist movement led by African and Caribbean elites in Paris who challenged the assimilationist ideology that characterized the imperial nation-state, promoting in its place a transnational black aesthetic.

Wilder investigates these issues in some 300 densely packed pages. He begins by exploring the notion of "Greater France," the ideological underpinnings of the imperial nation-state. At the time of conquest in the nineteenth century, French colonies were perceived as something quite separate from the republic. During the interwar years, however, metropolitan France and its colonies were reconceptualized as a political whole. The two parts were tightly linked through social, economic, and cultural interaction. The empire bestowed prestige on France, ensuring its place as a great power, and it provided the basis of French economic prosperity.

Next, Wilder examines the visions of Greater France championed by various proponents of colonial human-

ism. Although they proposed diverse models, all of these reformers envisioned a more rational colonial administration characterized by paternalism, economic restructuring, and colonial development. During World War I and its aftermath, colonies had been mobilized to provide raw materials, labor, and military recruits to defend and sustain Greater France. French communists, metropolitan journalists, colonial reformers, and indigenous activists critiqued the abuses of the old colonial system and called for reforms as repayment for sacrifices made during the war. Yet, even the reformers could not escape the inherent tensions between the universalizing principles of French republicanism and the particularizing ones of empire. On the one hand, they strove to create an elite class of "black Frenchmen," differentiated from the majority of the population, who would serve as auxiliaries of the colonial administration. On the other hand, they attempted to "protect" indigenous cultures from dilution and obliteration. Ironically, if quite intentionally, it was the very Africanness of the unassimilated majority that rendered them ineligible for French citizenship. Charged with embracing and protecting their own cultures (albeit transformed to suit imperial needs), the colonized were penalized for not being sufficiently French.

The contradictions inherent in the French assimilation policy led to the emergence of an alienated African elite, who had been taught to disparage their own cultures, but who were not fully accepted by France. Isolated, and often impoverished, African and Caribbean elites in Paris began to question the culture and values that they earlier had embraced. Creating a black public space in the heart of the imperial nation-state, they confronted its contradictions, developed alternative models of governance, critiqued contemporary Western culture, and championed a black aesthetic in its place. This movement of black humanism would become known as *Négritude*.

In the book's final chapters, Wilder examines in detail the thoughts and practices of *Négritude*'s diverse participants. It is here that he attempts to answer the book's overarching question: how can colonial peoples relate to Western-derived conceptions of civil society, citizenship, humanism, and reason—the categories of Western political modernity—when their very domination has been mediated by these categories? His conclusion is both intriguing and complex.

Wilder's trenchant and insightful book will be of considerable interest to scholars of French and African history, particularly in the subfields of intellectual, cultural, and political history. While its theoretical complexity and length do not render it suitable for undergraduate audiences, Wilder's book should grace the collections of all college and university libraries.

ELIZABETH SCHMIDT
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BRIAN ANGUS MCKENZIE. *Remaking France: Americanization, Public Diplomacy, and the Marshall Plan*. (Ex-

plorations in Culture and International History, number 2.) 2005. Pp. xii, 259. \$60.00.

Brian Angus McKenzie offers an intriguing analysis of the postwar Marshall Plan as a form of public diplomacy to win the hearts and minds of the recalcitrant French. It is a timely study given the current calls for a revival of the Marshall Plan as part of American global strategy. Rather than focus on the well-known economic mechanisms for European reconstruction, McKenzie takes on the Marshall Plan as an attempt to reorder European society, a vast propaganda operation to counteract communism and promote American interests. The plan promoted a modernization that was Americanization in its most explicit guise. Despite a relentless campaign to tell the story of America, however, McKenzie argues that the Marshall Plan as public diplomacy actually backfired. It created mythical expectations the United States was unable to fulfill even in the short term and ended by fueling French anti-Americanism.

The U.S. State Department and the Marshall Plan focused considerable attention on France. Their French Mission had more money to spend on informational and cultural projects than any other European country. After surveying the shift in U.S. public diplomacy in France from "psychological warfare" (p. 31) to shaping opinion on American culture and society, McKenzie explains the more imaginative projects with dexterity and verve. Traveling agricultural exhibits and participation of the United States in regional fairs showcased modern farming methods and American aid. Art expositions were meant to convince the French of American willingness to uphold Western cultural standards. Labor exhibits promoted productivity drives and consumerism as the magic formulas to American-style affluence and easy living. The creation of tourist-class airfares was an opportunity for Marshall Plan officials to promote the economic and cultural benefits of American travel to France. The "invasion of the American mass media" (p. 221) from films and radio to exhibits, pamphlets, and publications such as the Labor Information's *Bulletin syndical*, the French Mission's magazine *Rapports*, and private publications such as *Sélection du Reader's Digest* comprised an unrelenting information offensive. It was all meant to sell the idea of America and the benefits of the Marshall Plan to the French. As portrayed by McKenzie, this broad-ranging discourse offered a lofty normative vision of modernization that corresponded to American omnipotence and cultural universality.

Despite the book's rich engagement with these new perspectives on the Marshall Plan, the narrative and analysis are at times overly absorbed in the official machinations involved in articulating policy initiatives. This is due to the research itself, which is drawn largely from diplomatic archives and State Department records as well as from oral accounts by policy makers, the press, and official public opinion polls. These sources are both the book's strength and its weakness.

McKenzie provides us with rich and convincing evidence of the bureaucratic turf battles, the haggling between European recovery agencies, the naïve propaganda experiments. The retrieves the Marshall Plan from its utopian heights and discusses the inconsistencies and complexities of its implementation within the context of French culture. We are reminded of the Marshall Plan's breath-taking intent to remake Europe in America's image and the degree to which it was driven by anticommunism and the escalating Cold War. The result was an increased militarization of American information strategies and rigidity among Marshall Plan field officers, who were patronizing in explaining America to France or, worse, misread French political culture and slighted French pride. The information campaign so excessively mythologized the American way of life that it was easy for the French to be skeptical and offended—and outright critical in the case of French communists. Many of the programs succeeded only in provoking anti-Americanism, especially in the case of ill-conceived, pie-in-the-sky imagery of American workers "who owned houses, cars, and appliances" (p. 148). Such descriptions did nothing but create hostility among French still suffering from shortages, falling wages, and longer working hours and reinforced stereotypes of Americans as shallow and materialistic. The vituperative anticommunism of American propaganda made it even harder to swallow. Although McKenzie makes clear that activities such as the Cannes Film Festival, the promotional Train of Europe, and propaganda films like *Productivity*, *Key to Plenty* were meant to extend American influence, this conclusion is not necessarily new. The book's potential for adding to the broader understanding of the forces of Americanization is only partially fulfilled. McKenzie's contention that "the public diplomacy of the United States permeated the public and private sphere in France" (p. 43) remains open to question, especially in comparison to the overpowering American cultural influences that swept across Europe in the postwar years, most of which were outside the U.S. State Department's control. Although McKenzie contends that the Marshall Plan contributed to the Americanization of France, his conclusion on its failure as public diplomacy suggests otherwise. Yet there is much to learn from this book about what happens when foreign policy distorts into a vision of American national culture as a transformative model for the rest of the world.

ROSEMARY WAKEMAN
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DEAN PHILIP BELL and STEPHEN G. BURNETT, editors
Jews, Judaism, and the Reformation in Sixteenth-Century Germany. (Studies in Central European Histories number 37.) Boston: Brill. 2006. Pp. xxxi, 572. \$196.00

In the long and altogether well-researched history of Jews in German lands, the sixteenth century has received the least attention, for intricate reasons that

would warrant an essay in historiography. This volume, edited by Dean Phillip Bell and Stephen G. Burnett, is a valiant attempt to correct this situation, even before completion of the Germania Judaica IV research project, which aims at establishing the salient facts of where and when Jews actually dwelled in early modern Germany. By contrast, the Reformation and Counter Reformation have been keenly studied for a long time. The historiographical imbalance finds perfect expression in the structure of the volume under review. After an introduction by the editors, there are four parts. Part one, "Road to Reformation," contains two essays; part two, "Reformers and the Jews," contains eight; part three, "Representations of Jews and Judaism," contains four; and part four, "Jews, Judaism, and Jewish Responses to the Reformation," contains four. In other words, the main focus is on the attitudes of the reformers (from Martin Luther to the Anabaptists, with a single contribution on Catholic reformers) as they were expressed in theological and polemical writings, in visual media, and in literature. Each essay is a welcome addition to our knowledge, but I would have liked to see an attempt to draw these varied probings together. They do once again illustrate in detail to what extent European (in this case mostly German) Christian spiritual leaders were obsessed by Judaism, even though the period marks a low point in the actual presence of Jews in German lands.

How Jews themselves lived under the changing circumstances of "Confessionalization" is treated in a single contribution thoughtfully written by Bell. His conclusion is a double one: on the one hand, anti-Jewish legislation and discourse seem to have changed little; in fact, much of what has traditionally been ascribed to the Reformation existed long before. On the other hand, the increasing political centralization, complexity, and bureaucratization of Germany, combined with the emphasis on the moral obligation of secular authority and the reassessment of the idea of community, affected Jews significantly. An essay by Elisheva Carlebach gauges yet another central concern, Jewish responses to Christianity, which can be seen in the new development of Jewish messianic movements as well as in the traditional framework of martyrdom. Two further essays, by Jay Berkovitz and Burnett, deal with internal developments in Jewish law and ritual and with the fascinating and colorful subject of Jewish printing. Basically, that is all we learn about Jews themselves, as distinct from their image in the eyes of Christian beholders. Clearly, such disparity between the view from the outside and the one from the inside is an indication of where further research is most needed. Indexes of subjects, persons, and biblical passages cited complete the volume. The select bibliography, because of its division into twenty-two different subject headings rather than by alphabetical order, makes life miserable for anyone looking for full details of an item quoted in the footnotes. Still, this is a technical flaw in a volume important

both for what it provides and for its indication of what the state of the field has not yet delivered.

MICHAEL TOCH

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AMY LEONARD. *Nails in the Wall: Catholic Nuns in Reformation Germany*. (Women in Culture and Society.) Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 2005. Pp. xiii, 218. \$45.00.

Amy Leonard asks an important but frequently ignored question in her new study: what happened to female religious houses in the Reformation? The subject of Leonard's work, the situation and survival of several Dominican convents in evangelized Strasbourg during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, points effectively to the misguidedness of the assumption that women's experience and roles in the Reformation simply reflected men's: female religious orders frequently survived the introduction of Protestantism where male houses did not.

Leonard capably lays out the basis for that assumption: Protestants rejected religious vows and the orders based on them, insisting that the proper role and vocation for the Christian woman was in the home, as wife and mother. Many convents in and around Strasbourg did not survive the introduction of evangelical reform. Family members, recently converted, removed their daughters and sisters from convents, and on a number of occasions women left on their own. The city council, harried by local Protestant clergy and after 1525 evangelical themselves, passed many restrictions on the convents, pressured the women through frequent sermons and financial enticements to renounce their vows, and threatened forcibly to lock the doors of convents in times of war or scandal. But as in many towns and areas throughout the Holy Roman Empire, a patchwork of competing authorities under a weak centralized government, in Strasbourg the situation for the convents was far more complex than it would seem at first glance. Three convents did, after all, survive the introduction of Protestantism, and two of these convents were still functioning in 1681, when the victorious Catholic king of France entered the city.

Identity is a prominent theme in this study: the women of the three convents had such strong identities as Catholic, Dominican nuns that they were willing to use any means to ensure their survival, including compromise with Protestant demands, outright duplicity, and even law breaking. Their strong sense of religious identity and purpose derived from the successful observant reform of the fifteenth century. They used their identity as the daughters and sisters of Strasbourg's local elite to stress their loyalty and civic duty to the city. They even used their identity as females to argue, when useful, that they were weak and could not understand the new theology or learn new prayers and liturgies in German; they effectively supported the assumption that as women they would be more easily controlled and less threatening than religious men. The nuns called

only infrequently upon the more distant authorities of their religious order and the Catholic emperor, when their property or entire way of life seemed at risk, preferring (wisely it seems) to use their local identity and connections to continue to survive.

The nuns were forced to make a number of concessions to the Protestant authorities and clergy. They heard weekly Lutheran sermons (not always politely), and agreed in principle to give up many distinctive aspects of their lifestyle, including the Mass, Latin prayers, even their habits. Their survival became far more certain when the city council realized the convents could fill a pressing need—that of educational institutions for its young girls. Such a “convent” would hardly be recognizable as a Roman Catholic institution, and although it was largely a fiction, the fiction allowed the city council to please the greatest number of its constituents, maintain a measure of peace with its Catholic emperor, and neutralize the Protestant clergy who continued to fume at the convents’ presence in the city.

That the nuns were largely duplicitous is clear: they continued many of their former practices, even sneaking in priests to perform the sacraments. They also regularly encouraged the girls they were educating to become novices in their houses, ensuring their continued survival despite its illicitness; the convents were to accept no novices without approval of the city council. This flouting of council authority was grudgingly tolerated, except in circumstances where internal dissension and sexual scandal threatened a convent from within, making it an easy target for Protestant authorities keen to close the convents.

Leonard’s study highlights a neglected field of inquiry and provides a significant contribution to our understanding of the situation of women in the Reformation. She also provides a useful corrective to the confessionalization thesis, showing that local situations and confessional identity were often more complex than has been suggested, and interconfessional relations could at least in some circumstances be based on compromise and limited tolerance. The relation of these Catholic women to their own Tridentine reform is not thoroughly investigated, but enough is addressed to indicate that Catholic reformers might have had as many problems with these nuns as the Protestants did. “Catholic identity” in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries was not as monolithic as many have assumed.

BETH KREITZER
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ROBERT BEACHY. *The Soul of Commerce: Credit, Property, and Politics in Leipzig, 1750–1840*. (Studies in Central European Histories, number 34.) Boston: Brill. 2005. Pp. x, 248. \$165.00.

The Kingdom of Saxony has always been something of an anomaly in Germany during the age of the French Revolution. It came through the period with its old regime institutions intact, having missed out on the political reform movements of the era, whether conducted

under anti-Napoleonic auspices, as in Prussia, or with Napoleon Bonaparte’s patronage, as was true in Germany’s south and west. Political change would have to wait for the revolution of 1830.

Robert Beachy’s study of politics and fiscality (a more accurate description of his topic than the “property” in his subtitle) in the Saxon commercial metropolis of Leipzig addresses the origins and nature of political change in Saxony. His work comes to three main conclusions. The role of the state and of an enlightened bureaucracy in promoting reform, a frequent theme in German historiography, has been grossly exaggerated, at least in regard to Saxony. The influence of Jürgen Habermas’s public sphere, particularly in the form of voluntary associations, also seems somewhat misplaced; such groups were at least as much defenders of the old order as promoters of a new one. Political change emerged from conflicts in the old regime society of orders itself, magnified and intensified by the fiscal demands of warfare. Beachy’s nicely written and well-researched book offers good evidence for his assertions, although some questions about the causes of political change remain unanswered.

Beachy’s work begins with the impact of the Seven Years’ War, during which the city of Leipzig was occupied by Prussian troops, whose relentless fiscal demands, whether in the form of open plunder or bureaucratically organized extortion, were an extraordinary burden, largely met from the pockets of the city’s mercantile elite. Following the end of the war, the estates of the Saxon realm imposed new fiscal arrangements on its ruler, the elector. Renouncing the aspiration to turn Saxony into a great power, an objective pursued by Saxony’s rulers since the 1697 election of August the Strong as king of Poland, the elector agreed to reduce expenditures and to create an organized state debt with a sinking fund and amortization schedule. This quite modern fiscal arrangement, the *rétablissement*, went along with a continuation and reinforcement of the old regime corporate governmental institutions, both in Leipzig itself and in the electorate more generally.

A second fiscal challenge arose in the Napoleonic era, as Leipzig was again occupied by foreign troops. Although Napoleon’s fiscal exactions were less than half those of Frederick the Great, his prohibition on the import of English goods struck directly at Leipzig’s role as a conduit of trade from western to eastern Europe, reducing drastically the business conducted at its celebrated commercial fairs. The response of Leipzig’s city fathers to these wartime fiscal exigencies was to sell bonds, with a fixed repayment and amortization schedule, financed by a landed property tax, thus placing the burden of fiscality on all the city’s landlords and tenants. Corporate fiscal disparities, the tax exemptions of Leipzig’s university, its employees and graduates, or of property in the *Amt*, a portion of the city under the direct rule of the elector, exacerbated the situation.

Leipzig’s property owners had no way to articulate their grievances. The city council was a self-recruiting body, and the elites within it dominated the city’s Ma-

sonic Lodges and its other voluntary associations, making them inappropriate vehicles for reform. In 1814 property owners proposed the creation of a burgher committee to oversee the city's budget in general, and its debt, in particular. (The author might have noted the old regime precedents for such a group, particularly Cologne's eighteenth-century Civic Deputation, which engaged in a decades-long struggle with the city council over municipal policy and finances.) The Saxon king was only willing to accept an appointed rather than an elected committee, which did make a number of useful suggestions about refinancing the city's debt at a lower interest rate. However, the depressed commercial circumstances of the 1820s put a damper on Leipzig's commerce and the municipal budget.

Beachy argues that the revolution of 1830 in Leipzig, involving violent attacks on members of the city council and the constitution of a new municipal government, with an elected city council containing members of the burgher committee, as well as the end of the various corporate tax exemptions, was the result of previous discontent over taxation. While the outcome of the events reflected at least in part the previously expressed wishes of the burghers, the outbreak of the revolution, and its violent actions, including clashes with the police, or the celebrated storming of the city's brothels by crowds of journeymen artisans, are a sort of *deus ex machina* in the author's argument, and thus raise a question about Beachy's picture of political change emerging from old regime institutions via the pressure of fiscality. Corporate political structures of Saxony's old regime and corporate privileges, such as tax exemptions, were able to accommodate a more modern fiscal policy; bringing old regime institutions to an end required violent political disruptions involving issues and tensions going beyond the author's explanatory framework.

JONATHAN SPERBER
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KATHERINE AASLESTAD. *Place and Politics. Local Identity, Civic Culture, and German Nationalism in North Germany During the Revolutionary Era*. (Studies in Central European Histories, number 36.) Boston: Brill. 2005. Pp. xiii, 384. \$213.00.

British and American historians have a conspicuous preference for the city of Hamburg as a case study when they want to discuss crucial problems of German history. Their fascination with Hamburg is well justified by the unique political and economic position of Germany's second city, its history and character, and the mentality of its citizens. Katherine Aaslestad's book clearly belongs to this category of Hamburg case studies. She addresses the well-known problem of how and when the local patriotism of Hamburg's eighteenth-century elite turned into the German nationalism of almost the entire nineteenth-century urban population. In other words: Aaslestad raises the question as to when Hamburgers, or at least those who were literate and artic-

ulate, began to define themselves as Germans and, in the course of the process, relegated their identity as citizens of the "free city" to second place. Were the "wars of liberation" against Napoleon Bonaparte, celebrated by nineteenth-century German nationalists as the awakening of the German nation, really the onset of a complex development toward a primarily national consciousness as the older historiography tended to assume?

Aaslestad is able to prove that in Hamburg the origins of a German identity and support for the idea of a German nation-state definitely have to be traced to a much later time. In 1814, the French occupiers were hated "not because they were foreign or had subjugated the German Fatherland, but because their rule had brought misery and poverty to most of the city's residents" (p. 268). Contemporary newspapers, pamphlets, journals, speeches, and sermons prove that the mutation of Hamburgers into Germans did not happen in the "wars of liberation," nor before the liberal revolution of 1848. After the end of the city's occupation by the French, there were hardly any signs of pan-German feeling; a local and regional identity, mainly based on Hamburg's glorious Hansa past, clearly prevailed and guided the city's ambitious concept of independence as a republican city-state and of political neutrality vis-à-vis the neighboring monarchical powers of Prussia, Denmark, and Hanover. To back up her argument, Aaslestad paints a broad picture of Hamburg's political and economic history and of its citizens' consciousness in the twenty-five years between the outbreak of the French Revolution and the Congress of Vienna. She discusses the local political culture and social mores of Hamburg's self-confident middle class, changing collective identities and allegiances, as well as French influences in the years as *bonne ville de l'Empire française* from its occupation (1806) and annexation (1811) until its liberation by Russian Cossacks in 1814. In a concluding survey, she examines public festivities and anniversary celebrations in Hamburg in the decades prior to World War I in order to demonstrate how local events gradually took on a "German" flavor. In March 1913, one public speaker told his audience that a century ago "Hamburg had found her German heart." This statement, as Aaslestad points out, had nothing to do with the truth, for it did not mirror at all what Hamburgers really felt after the years of Napoleonic tutelage and oppression. A century later, local public memory had become subservient to political indoctrination with the aim of consolidating the "unfinished" German nation-state.

The years between 1789 and 1815 were certainly an era of transition, crucial years that laid the foundations of Hamburg's civic culture in the nineteenth century. As an extremely well-researched local study with much wider implications, Aaslestad's book is an admirable success. She has examined an impressive range of primary sources and her conclusions are sound and convincing. However, her unquestionable achievement is substantially marred by scholarly sloppiness. The edit-

ing of the text is truly breathtaking in its incompetence. There is hardly a page in the book that does not need a number of corrections. Aaslestad's German is faulty; her spelling careless, more than once distorting the meaning of words; her lack of precision in footnotes and bibliography is hair-raising. A number of names challenge the imagination of the investigative historian to its limits: Runner is the historian better known as Otto Brunner, Moser is George L. Mosse, Stellim is Volker Sellin, and Kushaba is Wolfgang Kaschuba. No one seems to have bothered to read the proofs. In short, Aaslestad's study of Hamburg is the sad example of a worthy scholarly endeavor that, in its execution, suffers from incredible negligence and professional incompetence.

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NILS H. ROEMER. *Jewish Scholarship and Culture in Nineteenth-Century Germany: Between History and Faith*. (Studies in German Jewish and Cultural History and Literature.) Madison: University of Wisconsin Press. 2005. Pp. x, 251. \$60.00.

In assessing nineteenth-century German Jewish historiography this book covers ground that has been well trodden, and the author's primary conclusions are not likely to surprise many historians. Nils H. Roemer's approach and use of sources, however, are somewhat less traditional, and together they open the way for an expanded understanding of Jewish historiography in the nineteenth century and more generally.

The nineteenth-century school of German Jewish historiography has long been seen as a response to the various crises of modernity and the struggle for emancipation. Roemer accepts that contention, but he argues that Jewish historiography was also central to discussions about religious and cultural reform. Jewish history, therefore, served the dual (and at times opposite) goals of integration and the maintenance of distinctiveness. Central to this development was the popularization of Jewish history, which although criticized by Jewish historians of *Wissenschaft des Judentums*, had by midcentury been coopted by Jewish scholars.

To understand this phenomenon, Roemer focuses on the reception and dissemination of Jewish history as evident in the founding and work of historical societies, reading associations and book clubs, lending libraries, monthly literary supplements, and also in the creation of textbooks and the process of canonizing core Jewish historiography. Added to his review of the central and oft-quoted cast of Jewish scholars such as Isaak Markus Jost, Leopold Zunz, Abraham Geiger, Heinrich Graetz, and Samson Raphael Hirsch is a very thoughtful consideration of these sources of the "popular" development of Jewish history. For example, Roemer details the development and demise of numerous societies and associations and tracks the membership and collections of some lending libraries. The popularization of Jewish history also stimulated the work of collecting and pre-

serving documents. In this regard, Roemer discusses new historical initiatives such as various historical commissions, research projects, the collection of Hebrew sources for publication, and intensive research on various local communities—most notably the city of Worms, with its important Jewish cemetery.

Wissenschaft itself was excluded from the German universities and took root in the rabbinical seminaries. But, Roemer argues, the turn to the seminaries softened some radical historicizing tendencies evident in early *Wissenschaft* and helped to mold Jewish history as an educational tool useful in the restructuring of Jewish identity, while also leading to the possibility of fostering unity among disparate and at times conflicting denominations. The political complexities and renewed anti-semitism of the last quarter of the nineteenth century also forced German Jews to renegotiate the relationship between their Jewish and German heritages. Many became fearful of the secular and homogenizing tendencies and principles of the Enlightenment, which seemed to threaten the internal demise of the Jewish communities. In response to these developments, Jewish history was seized upon as a means to strengthen a decisively religious identity, with some historians turning more prominently to the internal study of Jewish culture.

According to Roemer, in this context a new brand of Jewish history emerged with emphasis on topics such as ethical monotheism, Jewish cultural accomplishments, the history of persecution, and the existence of tolerant Gentiles. This history did not attempt to present or promote an understanding of Judaism as it developed chronologically but offered exemplary moments culled from the entire Jewish past, with the goal of strengthening emotional attachment to Judaism and the Jewish people. Roemer concludes that there remained a tension between the scholarly focus of *Wissenschaft* and the popularization of Jewish history. But Roemer argues that perhaps better than Jews in other parts of the West German Jews were more successful in coming to terms with this duality, explaining why they were better able to negotiate Jewish identity (and even Zionism) on the one hand and political loyalty to the German state on the other.

The text of this book is in places dense and repetitive often Roemer falls back on traditional sources and interpretations. Nonetheless, the volume is also an important step in a new direction, a fresh and well-conceived approach that pushes scholars to look at source beyond those traditionally examined and to consider new ways of defining historiography. Roemer urges that historiography be seen as a living process that helped to inform and define contemporary identity as much as it did to describe that of the past, and he is to be lauded for what is a most compelling reassessment.

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TITUS KOCKEL. *Deutsche Ölpolitik 1928–1938*. (Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte, number 7.) Berlin: Anadeuwe Verlag. 2005. Pp. 393. €79.80.

This book is an intensive, vigorously written, sometimes gripping, and often overdrawn account of the divergent ways in which German policy makers sought during the 1930s to supply their nation with motor fuels and other hydrocarbons. Faced with several competing courses of action (buying crude oil from firms in the international cartel or “outsiders,” establishing German producers abroad, encouraging drilling at home, and fostering the domestic manufacture of substitutes through distillation of fuels from coal tar and conversion of coal into gasoline via IG Farben’s hydrogenation process and the mining industry’s Fischer-Tropsch method), the country lurched, Titus Kockel argues, from one improvised approach to another, depending on which cabal of political figures and economic interests had the upper hand at any particular moment. Finally, in mid-1938, the Nazi regime arrived at the “pseudo-autarkic” program (p. 344) promoted by Farben’s representatives and friends in high places. In effect, this scheme rescued the firm’s massive investment in coal conversion, preserved its ties to major participants in the international cartel, and mollified most other parties by matching specific sources of oil to distinct outputs. Coal became the feedstock for most of the nation’s gasoline and diesel fuels, bought by the Reich at prices well above international market levels. Most domestic crude, its production buoyed by large government subsidies for exploration, was earmarked for processing into lubricants by local refiners. The output of coal tar distilling firms was dedicated primarily to furnace oil. All needs not thus met, especially stockpiling for the German navy, would continue to be satisfied by the members of the cartel until such time as the Romanian oil fields could substitute as suppliers.

Although Kockel’s emphasis on the nonlinear unfolding of German oil policy is welcome, he exaggerates the open-endedness of events. In part, he has to do so in order to give significance to his story. IG Farben’s machinations are a more than twice-told tale, and Kockel presents virtually no new documentation to back his emphatic endorsement of several shopworn interpretations of them. The fresh sources that inspired his research—chiefly the records of the Prussian Geological Institute, the Reich Office for Ground Research, and the man who headed both, Theodore Bentz—add only to knowledge of the extent of German efforts during the 1930s to find and extract crude oil at home and to tap foreign supplies in Iraq, Mexico, and Ecuador at little cost in scarce foreign exchange. But these pursuits labored under debilitating geological and geographical handicaps: the tiny size of the Reich’s oil deposits and numerous uncertainties surrounding the cost, accessibility, and distance from Germany of the overseas fields. Kockel repeatedly downplays these problems. He thereby inflates the initiatives chronicled in his newly available files into genuine threats to the

giant chemical concern’s hydrogenation project. Sharp-eyed readers will notice that the statistical data he presents on actual and potential German crude oil output by the late 1930s do not substantiate the case he asserts in the text.

The flip side of this process of exaggeration concerns the political context of oil policy-making in the Third Reich. For Kockel, who draws heavily on the schematic writings of Dietrich Eichholtz, governmental decisions in Nazi Germany emerged largely from power struggles between blocks of industrial and bureaucratic actors, all motivated by their own immediate concerns. Thus, in the field of oil policy, “No captain steered this ship. A handful of divided first-class passengers with opposite destinations scuffled to control the wheel while the wind outside blew. The decisions of 1938 thus appear as the accidentally final prewar position on an uncharted and dynamic zigzag course” (p. 334). But such a formulation greatly overstates how far or long the oil policy could zig or zag in some directions and why. It is telling that this book’s bibliography contains no reference to the ground-breaking works by Avraham Barkai on National Socialist economic ideology, an omission that enables Kockel to insist that no such thing existed. Equally telling is that Kockel fails even to mention an occasion that greatly narrowed the parameters of the possible (Hermann Goering’s speech to 200 industrial representatives in Berlin in December 1936, which made the economic directives of Adolf Hitler’s Four Year Plan Memorandum of the preceding August operational) and trivializes beyond recognition key utterances by the Nazi Führer (e.g. that Memorandum and his statements at the Hoßbach conference in November 1937). Only by thus minimizing the political constraints on policy making can Kockel lend credence to his contention that dreams of supplying Germany with oil from Latin America and imaginarily deep domestic pools still had a future until IG Farben’s agents prevailed by manipulating statistics. In fact, however, their program won out, as Kockel cannot help but occasionally concede, because Nazi leaders found it better suited than any other possible package to their quest for contiguous, self-sustaining expansion.

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SAMUEL MOYN. *Origins of the Other: Emmanuel Levinas between Revelation and Ethics*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 2005. Pp. xi, 268. \$29.95.

In the 1970s, concomitant with the rise of poststructuralism and the priority this wide-ranging theoretical approach placed on “the Other,” Emmanuel Levinas was belatedly consecrated as one of the great moral thinkers of the twentieth century. Samuel Moyn’s text is a careful archaeology of the painstaking process of the transformations in Levinas’s oeuvre from his enthrallment with Heideggerian ontology to his celebrated affirmation of the primacy of ethics and “the Other” as constitutive of the self and society. Moyn’s

rigorous, learned, and lucidly written work takes the reader on a breathtaking foray into interwar German discussions of philosophy and theology, reorienting the scholarship on Levinas by suggesting that this iconic figure of French and Jewish thought was more influenced by Protestant thinkers than by his Jewish upbringing or the Holocaust in formulating his widely resonant conception of "the Other."

Written in the style of a mystery, Moyn's book unearths the genesis of the history of the concept and theme of "the Other" in the arcane discourse of twentieth-century post-Kantian philosophy and theology, which he explains in clear but nonreductive terms. Doing so, he debunks the myth of Levinas's primal Jewishness as the source of his insistence on ethics as first philosophy. Moyn reveals instead "an orthodox Heideggerian and ardent disciple of the great German philosopher" (p. 92) whose itinerary was halted by his master's enthusiasm for the Führer and who found in the primarily Protestant theological debates of interwar Germany a means to transcend the limits he came to apprehend in Heidegger's nonetheless brilliant critique of the Western philosophical tradition, especially the ways in which it reified the autonomous, rational subject as the measure of all things.

Moyn's provocative and compelling claim is that "it is ultimately impossible to understand the shape of Levinas's intersubjective theory except as a secularization of a transconfessional, but originally Protestant, theology of encounter with the divine" (p. 12). The capstone of this contention is that two overlapping debates shaped Levinas's trajectory out of the quagmire of Martin Heidegger's thought. First was Franz Rosenzweig's *The Star of Redemption* (1930), itself reinserted into primarily Protestant discussions of God as *Totaliter aliter* (wholly other) with Karl Barth's interventions serving as the major catalyst. Second, Levinas interpreted Rosenzweig through the prism of the enthusiasm for Søren Kierkegaard's work that emerged on both sides of the Rhine in the 1930s as the constitutive framework of existentialism. Having established the heart of his argument, Moyn proceeds to trace how Levinas secularized and humanized these insights in creating his postwar ethics and in the process helped to reinvent Judaism. As such, we are treated to "a difficult but fascinating exercise" in "reconstructing and unraveling a complex filiation" that "demands both textual and philosophical reading and contextual and historical reasoning" (p. 114).

But for most of this work, the context is limited to philosophical and theological debates. Unlike Moyn's *A Holocaust Controversy: The Treblinka Affair* (2005), which offers a *Rezeptionsgeschichte* of Jean-François Steiner's *Treblinka* (1966), treating it as a textual event that reconstructs the Jewish and non-Jewish intellectual field in which it was embedded, this book examines the unfolding of Levinas's conception of intersubjectivity as if it emerged solely within the immanent problematic inherited from Heidegger's philosophy and politics (pp. 109–110). Moyn simply dismisses (p. 109) the

standard account of the centrality of the Self/Other dialectic and its influence on twentieth-century thought, which attributes its naissance to Alexandre Kojève's seminars on G. F. W. Hegel (works by Michael Roth, Judith Butler, Vincent Descombes, and Ethan Kleinberg elaborate this argument). More problematic is that Moyn's narrow optic does not encompass the cultural field outside of philosophy in the interwar period. In *art nègre*, in the simultaneous representation of other points of view in cubism and Dadaism, in the breakdown of the omniscient narrator in modernist fiction, in the unconscious Other in surrealism and psychoanalysis, not to mention the assault on the Jewish "Other" inextricably woven into the politics of the 1930s, the period was utterly suffused with the thematic of the Other and its influence on subjectivity as Carolyn Dean and other intellectual historians have explored. The "Origins" of Moyn's title is plural, and the text would have been stronger had it acknowledged that the sources of the Other in twentieth-century intellectual history go well beyond the philosophical and theological debates that Moyn shows were so crucial in Levinas's itinerary.

But Moyn's work is nonetheless exemplary. Unlike many practitioners of the history of philosophy, Levinas is evaluated without "submissive piety." Moyn is excellent on Bergsonianism as a response to the reigning neo-Kantianism of the French philosophical academy and its impact on French phenomenology; the formative environment of the University of Strasbourg in the 1920s; the controversy over intersubjectivity engendered by Edmund Husserl's *Cartesian Meditations* or more specifically, Heidegger's critique of them in *Being and Time*; the early works of Karl Löwith and Hannah Arendt; theological discussions from post-Enlightenment liberal advocates to their critics (Leo Strauss, Ludwig Feuerbach, Albert Schweitzer) and how these debates were taken up in the twentieth-century; and the reception of Barth, Kierkegaard, and the origins of existentialism. The result is a book that makes an important contribution not only to intellectual history but to the endeavors of scholars across a wide array of fields who are interested in Levinas and twentieth-century French and German thought more generally.

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GEOFFREY P. MEGARGEE. *War of Annihilation: Combat and Genocide on the Eastern Front, 1941*. (Total War) Lanham Md.: Rowman and Littlefield. 2006. Pp. xv + 177. \$24.95.

In what Geoffrey P. Megargee calls "a work of synthesis, not original scholarship" (p. xiv), he attempts to attack the "dual myth of German military genius and moral correctness" in the German war against the Soviet Union (p. xii). Trying to overcome the division between military history and scholarly accounts on German policies of extermination in that campaign, he

combines them in one account that follows a chronological order.

In a strategic dead end after the Battle of Britain, Nazi Germany attacked the USSR in June 1941 for a mix of ideological, geostrategic, and political reasons that included the drive for colonial space, the eradication of communism, secure sources of food and raw materials in a war of attrition, and the hope to scare Great Britain and possibly keep the United States out of the conflict. Even according to the overly optimistic assumptions and arrogant misconceptions of German planners, their forces were hardly sufficient to overcome so strong an enemy and to conquer such a huge adversarial terrain. As a result, Germany lacked forces to control the occupied Soviet areas and was in desperate need of rear supply capacity. Only ruthless persecution of potential resisters and depriving millions of civilians food to provision Germany's eastern troops offered a way out. The actual military campaign only aggravated problems with "securing" the area, guerilla fighting, economic disruption, transportation, troop replenishments, and unrealistic time schedules. In harmony with racist feelings of superiority and fierce anticommunism, the course of the campaign thus contributed to the intensification of German extermination policies over several months. By the end of 1941, in addition to millions of Red Army soldiers, some two million Soviet POWs, 800,000 Soviet Jews, and uncounted other civilians were shot or starved to death. Megargee tries to connect military operations to the increasingly radicalized persecution of these groups. He does so in a knowledgeable and balanced way.

Reasonable and important as this is, none of it is entirely new. In a study almost exclusively based on published sources, the sparse footnotes document direct quotations only. Since the very short bibliographical essay, with one exception, only refers to English-language sources, much of the German scholarship goes unacknowledged (to which Megargee not merely owes many details, but numerous of the analytical passages as well). Only the work of the Research Institute for Military History from the 1980s receives brief but well-deserved recognition.

A short synthesis of a vast topic can hardly go in-depth. But the war the author presents remains largely one of commanders and high-level decisions; it is not an accident that eleven portrait photographs of German generals are sprinkled through the text. This conventional perspective leaves only room for passing, fairly general remarks about the fight of the lower ranks, and it especially leads to fading out or glossing over the results of an entire literature about local and regional choices or what we could call the participatory aspect of German mass violence against Soviet civilians and POWs.

Stressing the more optimistic of the documented assessments by German military leaders, Megargee identifies the point in time when it became clear that the war could not be won within that year in late October 1941. According to other views, however, this occurred at

least a month earlier. It would seem that the author therefore overlooks crucial policy developments concerning provisions, the treatment of Soviet POWs, the mass murder of Jews, and anti-guerilla warfare in September 1941, as well as links among these. In a broader sense, the study—while making clear that political and strategic war aims, military developments, and German policies of violence against noncombatants were interrelated—does not provide for an overall framework or cohesive analysis of bonds between military struggle and atrocities. The long-debated question of whether German persecutions intensified over the second half of 1941 because of euphoria or crisis is left undecided; the discussion is not even explicitly taken up. The chapter (sub)titles "Initial Victories and Atrocities" for the phase from June to August, "Expanding Conquests and Genocide" for August to October, and "The Final Drive on Moscow and Systematic Killing" for October to December 1941 point to a lack of clear distinctions.

This could also be seen as the outcome of risk avoidance in a book that aims at undergraduates and a broader than academic audience. The study provides such readers with thorough information and a good deal of up-to-date analysis, underlining popularly overlooked connections between German warfare and mass murders that belong to the most notorious in history.

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ALAN McDUGALL. *Youth Politics in East Germany: The Free German Youth Movement 1946–1968*. (Oxford Historical Monographs.) New York: Oxford University Press for Clarendon Press. 2004. Pp. xiv, 261. \$99.00.

In writing the history of East Germany (GDR), scholars are often split between conveying the perspective of the political leadership and its totalitarian intentions on the one hand, and the history of GDR society, everyday life, and ordinary people on the other. In his study of youth politics in East Germany during the regime of Walter Ulbricht, Alan McDougall aims to combine both perspectives. He analyzes *Herrschaft* as a relationship shaped by actors on both sides, who communicate both directly and indirectly. The debate about how to write the history of the GDR, highly politicized, has recently been rekindled over the question of how to present GDR history in museums and in monuments. McDougall takes a clear stand: he criticizes totalitarian theory for confusing political intentions with practices and results, and, by focusing heavily on the state and its apparatus of repression, for ignoring society and its resistant and stubborn tendencies and the instrumental use that ordinary people make of politics. Political power was much more chaotic in practice than in theory, he argues, and repression less effective than the political leadership hoped for and than some historians still tend to believe.

East German Communists focused on youth as the most promising social group to be formed into the New Man (of both sexes). McDougall uses two concepts to

structure his material: "generation" and "crisis point." For the 1950s and 1960s there were basically two different youth generations to consider: the Hitler Youth generation with its very specific experiences of Nazi education, war, and dashed dreams of hegemony, and the first postwar generation, whose initial confidence in a peaceful and secure future ended in disappointment and resignation. While the Hitler Youth generation was broken from the beginning, the first postwar children had to be broken when they failed to function according to the pedagogical optimism that drove youth politics in the first decades of the GDR's existence.

McDougall finds a general lack of deep analysis, coherent strategy, and flexible practices on the side of the political class in general and the official youth organization, the Free German Youth or FDJ in particular. Here McDougall identifies a series of "crisis points," moments in GDR history that challenged youth functionaries and their belief in their own political work. These "crisis points" begin with the June uprising in 1953, in which young people were overrepresented among the active participants and a large number of functionaries themselves turned out to be ideologically unstable. The next crisis occurred in 1956, when the disillusionment about Joseph Stalin as a heroic figure and adversary to Adolf Hitler shocked older believers, in turn weakening their ability to face criticism from the youth they most wanted to win over. The building of the Berlin Wall presented a major turning point in GDR history; while it seemed to solve many problems in dealing with youth, it was one of those rare events in history that had an immediate and obvious impact on lives and provoked severe critical reactions. The triumph of Anglo-American popular youth culture in the mid-1960s initiated a culture war that the FDJ could not win. The Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia in August 1968 destroyed any hopes for a more democratic socialism and succeeded in depoliticizing GDR youth, discouraging them through greater control and repression. As a result, youth were basically lost for socialism or any other political movement until tiny segments in the late 1970s and early 1980s began to create what would become a small but articulate opposition movement.

McDougall presents rich evidence to prove his point: during the period he is investigating, the FDJ never functioned to the satisfaction of the Communist Party (SED). Rather, youth politics in the GDR, and particularly in the FDJ, faced serious opposition, whether openly political or cultural or expressed in a more general attitude of passivity and resignation. While the latter was probably the most common reaction to FDJ demands, especially outside of historical "crisis points," the archives reflect more of the outspoken criticism, the visible acts of resistance. There is a certain tendency in McDougall's book to overestimate the nonconformist energy among youth and to underestimate the more long-term effects of a rationale to avoid all conflicts with the authorities. The FDJ and its functionaries reacted to this situation with a similar attitude of resignation, passivity, and empty ritualization after having

successfully repressed the last attempt at political protest in the summer of 1968.

McDougall's case study shows convincingly how a critique of the totalitarian concept opens up questions that lead us to the central dilemma of dictatorship: it could not do without repression but at the same time could not achieve its goals without offering some freedom and space for people. Youth used such "freedoms" for their own way out; youth politics eventually made peace with youth by being less political.

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REBECCA WITTMANN. *Beyond Justice: The Auschwitz Trial*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2005. Pp. 336. \$35.00.

The twenty-month trial in Frankfurt of twenty perpetrators from the Auschwitz concentration camp, which lasted from December 1963 until August 1964, was the largest and best publicized of all of West Germany's trials against Nazi perpetrators. A wealth of information has been available about the trial since 1965, when extensive excerpts from pretrial documents, the indictments, much daily courtroom dialogue, and the judgment were published in the two-volume documentation by Auschwitz survivor Hermann Langbein, *Der Auschwitz-Prozess*. Additionally, the over 500-page compilation of Bernd Naumann's trial reports from the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* was published in English as *Auschwitz: A Report on the Proceedings* (1966). There were, however, no scholarly assessments until the publication of a collection of essays edited by Ulrich Schneider (*Auschwitz: Ein Prozess* [1994]) and a monograph by Gerhard Werle and Thomas Wandres (*Auschwitz vor Gericht* [1995]).

This was the situation when Rebecca Wittmann began her doctoral research on the Frankfurt trial. Four main bodies of source material form the basis of four of the six chapters of Wittmann's monograph: the voluminous pretrial investigation files, the indictment, 101 audiotapes of the proceedings, and the final judgment. These chapters are bracketed by a background chapter on the evolving legal framework of West German perpetrator trials, and a concluding discussion of press responses to the verdicts. Beyond offering the first scholarly assessment in English, Wittmann's main contributions to scholarship are her explication of the pretrial investigation and the descriptive analysis of the trial based on the audiotapes and press clippings. Her core argument is the "paradox" that the West German court focused narrowly on specific individual acts that were considered criminal under Nazi law, and did not place mere participation in the genocidal enterprise at Auschwitz (pouring cyanide pellets into the gas chamber, for instance) on trial. As Wittmann puts it, "The killing of millions in the gas chambers . . . became a lesser crime, calling for a lighter sentence, than the

murder of one person carried out without orders from superiors" (p. 6).

This phenomenon, attributable to the strong West German rejection of *ex post facto* law, has been explicated in most scholarly publications on trials of Nazi perpetrators since the 1960s. It had two important consequences. First, in order to obtain a conviction for murder, the courts had to show that the perpetrators were motivated by base intent, such as hatred, greed, or sadism. Thus the trial focused disproportionately on acts of "excessive" zeal or brutality. Second, convictions could only be obtained for specific murders of specific individuals at precise places and times. Thus witnesses were cross-examined about details of crimes they had observed nearly two decades earlier. Such psychologically burdensome treatment gave rise to many unpleasant exchanges in the courtroom. These consequences contributed to the low proportion of convictions and relatively lenient sentences resulting from this and other such trials.

My main criticism of this book is that it so closely follows the trial sources, with little attention to other archival materials (such as the lawyers' papers) or the results of prior and ancillary scholarship. Since there is much overlap between the pretrial investigation documents, the indictment, and the judgment, there is a tendency toward repetition. For example, the so-called Boger swing is described twice (pp. 90, 120). Other scholarship is often merely listed without discussion (e.g. p. 289, n. 21; p. 290, n. 4; p. 293, n. 22, 23; p. 294, n. 39), and Wittmann's notes rarely name (or date) individual documents, citing only the archival reference number (particularly egregious: p. 299, n. 16). Finally, a few embarrassing lapses of fact escaped the prepublication readers' attention: Konrad Adenauer spending much of the Nazi period in hiding (p. 27); Rudolf Höss having written a diary that was banned from publication (pp. 182, 309, n. 72).

Such limitations would be less noticeable if another monograph without such shortcomings had not been published simultaneously: Devin Pendas's *The Frankfurt Auschwitz Trial, 1963–1965*. I found that I learned and understood more from a cursory examination of Pendas's monograph than I had from a close reading of Wittmann's. Not only do Pendas's footnotes fully cite the documents and include the latest literature, but the cited secondary works are summarized and assessed. Additionally, Pendas has a knack for engaging narrative that contrasts with Wittmann's close analyses of legal sources. Pendas also draws on material from the East and West German national archives, the Frankfurt city archive, the institutional archive of the Institute for Contemporary History, and the Federal Press Office, which enables him to give a much more comprehensive account of the proceedings and their actors than Wittmann. Surprisingly, neither account offers any biographical details about the defendants, although these were ably summarized by Naumann. Still, Wittmann's concise narrative contains most essential details, and he discusses some important documents that Pendas

omits, such as Peter-Heinz Seraphim's expert opinion on the superior orders defense. In sum, while Wittmann's portrayal may better serve an audience seeking basic information and interpretation, specialists will appreciate Pendas's more comprehensive research and more informative citations.

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EDWARD TIMMS. *Karl Kraus, Apocalyptic Satirist: The Post-War Crisis and the Rise of the Swastika*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2005. Pp. xxi, 639. \$50.00.

Edward Timms dedicates this second volume of his Karl Kraus study to the memory of J. P. Stern "and the refugees of the 1930s from whom I have learnt so much." This magisterial work is a fitting tribute to Timms's mentors and a significant contribution to Austrian intellectual history during the interwar period. Volume one, which appeared in 1986, is a cultural analysis of *fin-de-siècle* Vienna that portended World War I, the end of the Habsburg Empire, and the collapse of European civilization. Volume two resumes in the early postwar period. Although the apocalypse had been postponed, the rise of fascism threatened to complete the destruction of civilization begun by the war and hurl mankind backward thousands of years. As one dedicated to peace, Kraus could not stand idly by.

One of the most positive aspects of Timms's book is its demonstration of both the timeliness and the timelessness of Kraus's polemics, the vehicle for which was his critical periodical with red covers, *Die Fackel* (*The Torch*). Timms refutes those who would dismiss Kraus as merely a Viennese critic of the early twentieth century whose preoccupations were often ephemeral. The 1921 selling of "the horrors of World War I as a tourist attraction" by the newspaper *Baseler Nachrichten* through trips to the Verdun Battlefield—"There will be time for lunching at the best hotel in Verdun with wine and coffee" (p. 81)—anticipated the *Daily Telegraph* marketing of concentration camp tours in 2001: "THE HOLOCAUST Great guides, great company. Full colour brochure from Midas Tours" (p. 83). Timms convincingly argues that although Kraus "did not live to witness the emergence of the media-generated myths of the television age . . . his ideas have been taken up by more recent critics of the nexus between mass communications, global corporations and the military-industrial complex. Thus the spirit of Kraus . . . transcends its own times" (p. 549).

Timms defends Kraus against the charge of "intellectual bankruptcy" (p. 492) in reply to Adolf Hitler's coming to power. Kraus had responded to that event with *The Third Walpurgis Night*. This work, which was never published during Kraus's lifetime for fear of reprisal against himself and German Jews, "enable[d] Kraus to express not simply his own opinions, but the struggle for the soul of Germany" (p. 496). More than that Kraus realized that with Hitler's accession to

power, the word had failed, indeed “a whole language . . . had reached its ‘breaking point’” (p. 494). Kraus’s masterpiece, *The Last Days of Mankind*, also unpublished during his lifetime, is seen as prophetic: not only was it a commentary on the end of civilization as Kraus had known it, this work—in the form of a play to be performed over several nights—prefigured the physical destruction of Germany in World War II.

Timms devotes a chapter to the women in Kraus’s life. World War I changed his attitude toward eroticism. The war initiated a breakdown in sexual relations. The establishment of field brothels, “spread of venereal disease” and utter “reduction of prostitutes, whose cause he had so eloquently defended” prior to the war caused Kraus to revise his views of “unrestrained eroticism” (p. 180). He adopted a more measured stance. This is reflected in his twenty-year involvement with Irma Karczewska, for a short time Kraus’s mistress and subsequently the mistress of the psychoanalyst Fritz Wittels, one of Sigmund Freud’s prominent disciples. Kraus became a father figure to Karczewska, who remained preoccupied with him until her suicide in 1933. By then they had been estranged for many years.

Kraus had many female friends, so many that Timms finds it is “surprising that Kraus found time to sustain so many love affairs, when the pressure to get *Die Fackel* into print often led him . . . to work from early evening right through the night for sixteen hours” (p. 193). Kraus made women seem to be “the centre of the universe, while communicating to the readers of his letters an enhanced self-esteem. He provided them with a dramaturgy, inspiring them to defy convention and live at the height of their powers” (p. 197).

One of Kraus’s friends, Sidonie Nadherny, a member of the landed Bohemian gentry, who like Karczewska always returned to him, survived until 1950. She witnessed many upheavals, the worst of which, World War II and the Holocaust, were spared Kraus, who died of a heart attack in June 1936. Although he had “left the Jewish community” to become a Catholic, he “left the Church” in 1923 (p. 203). He would most surely have been sent to Dachau immediately following the Anschluss in March 1938, and had he survived this camp, would have been dispatched to Auschwitz. In fact, his writings circulated clandestinely among the German inmates at Dachau, thus introducing a new readership to Kraus.

There are a couple of quibbles. In at least two instances Timms refers to Hitler’s “seizure of power” (pp. 492, 504), when in fact Hitler, thanks to a backstairs intrigue, was appointed chancellor by Paul von Hindenburg through the power vested in him as president of the Weimar Republic. Hitler staged a revolution after power in 1934 by breaking the power of the storm troopers and bringing the army to heel. Also, Timms indicates “Anti-militarist models of modern Germany emerged on both sides of the Iron Curtain, programmatically anti-fascist in the east, systematically denazified in the west” (p. 546). Anyone who witnessed the changing of the goose-stepping guard clad in fascist-

style uniforms in communist East Berlin before the former Zeughaus, as did this writer in the late 1960s, would question just how “programmatically anti-fascist” the East Germans had become. And in the “denazified” west, some former Nazis were appointed to higher posts in the Adenauer government. But it would be churlish to cavil over this handsomely produced work that in many ways defines Vienna during a time of cataclysmic change.

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ANTHONY F. D’ELIA. *The Renaissance of Marriage in Fifteenth-Century Italy*. (Harvard Historical Studies, number 146.) Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2005. Pp. 262. \$49.95.

This book views marriage, gender, and power politics in Renaissance Italy from a previously overlooked vantage point: that of the wedding orations composed by humanists for the rulers and nobility of the Italian courts. The ancient genre of the prose epithalamium revived by Guarino Guarini for his Este patrons in the early 1420s, spread beyond Ferrara to other courts, especially Naples, Milan, and Rimini, where it remained popular until the early sixteenth century, when music dance, and theater became the favored wedding entertainments. According to Anthony F. D’Elia, nuptial oratory not only expressed the new values and aspirations of the courtly class but also provided a framework for the Reformation debates on marriage and celibacy in the following century.

Of particular interest are D’Elia’s findings with regard to the treatment of women. He notes that “while there were clearly different expectations for men and women in Italian courts, brides and grooms were often praised in surprisingly similar ways,” and they were both ideally “wealthy, powerful, beautiful, learned, and passionate” (pp. 115–116). Moreover, “some courtly orators praise specific women for their political acumen, humanist learning, and rhetorical ability” (p. 108). Such representations are in tune with defenses of women and catalogues of illustrious women written in court circles during the same period, attesting to the greater agency and influence of elite women in the Italian Renaissance courts, especially Ferrara, compared to the republican centers of Florence and Venice (see also Stephen Kolsky’s *The Ghost of Boccaccio: Writing on Famous Women in Renaissance Italy* [2005]).

The first chapter, “Marriage and Wisdom from Antiquity to the Renaissance,” provides a historical overview. Against the anti-marriage and misogynist convictions found in writings from the early church fathers down to Francis Petrarch, D’Elia documents how fifteenth-century humanists used select ancient authorities and their own personal experience to celebrate the worth of marriage and of women in general.

Chapter two, “The Revival of the Ancient Epithalamium in Courtly Weddings,” treats the epideictic as

ject of nuptial oratory. Unlike medieval sermons, humanist wedding orations used ancient Latin and Greek models and were laudatory rather than admonitory in nature. These orations became a fundamental part of increasingly magnificent and complex wedding ceremonies, corresponding to the more chivalric and regal tone of court festivities after 1450 (p. 44). Examples of the extravagant wedding festivities, such as those for Eleanor of Aragon and Ercole d'Este in 1473 and for Lucrezia Borgia and Alfonso d'Este in 1502, vividly render the political importance of marriage alliances.

In the third chapter, "Weddings as Propaganda: Rhetoric and Court Culture," D'Elia considers epithalamia as encomia that reveal how rulers and aristocrats wished to be perceived by a foreign and domestic courtly audience (p. 52). In this vein, some wedding orations included discussions of political philosophy, particularly questions associated with the monarchical form of government that they inevitably favored. In the following chapter, "The Culture of Marriage and Sex in Italian Courts," D'Elia notes that in reviving the classical epithalamium's function as an erotic prelude to the wedding night, humanists "celebrated physical beauty, companionship, and the joys of sexual pleasure" (p. 83). In tune with the Epicurean thought of Lorenzo Valla and the chivalric romances popular in the courts, humanist wedding orations defended sexual intercourse along with other pleasures of the material world. In this context, passionate love is no longer viewed as a dangerous and subversive force but rather as the very foundation of the family and thus of social harmony (p. 23).

The final chapter, "Humanist Criticisms of Celibacy and the Reformation," argues that epithalamia celebrated the married state as "the highest affirmation of . . . active piety" (p. 131) and that this family-centered civic ethic and anticelibate discourse paved the way for debates on the topic by Erasmus, Martin Luther, and other reformers. D'Elia notes that Erasmus, although more conservative than Italian humanists, composed at least one humanist wedding oration and cited Italian humanists in his marriage works (pp. 131–132).

The prose is reader friendly and, although sometimes repetitive, engaging throughout. Given that the study itself is limited to only 137 pages, this reviewer would have appreciated more close readings of noteworthy orations, like the ones in which Giovanni Marliani and Ludovico Carbone discuss the Huns and the Ottoman Turks respectively (pp. 66–72). D'Elia completes the volume with a useful tool for further study, a forty-page "Finding-List for Wedding Orations in the Italian Renaissance," registering 336 extant humanist wedding orations found in manuscripts and incunabula, pamphlets, and printed editions.

In sum, the author argues convincingly that the revived genre of the wedding oration provides a window into Italian Renaissance court culture and at the same time sets forth ideas that would shake up the rest of Europe in the following century. This study should be

of interest to a broad range of scholars and students of the Renaissance and Reformation.

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NICHOLAS TERPSTRA. *Abandoned Children of the Italian Renaissance: Orphan Care in Florence and Bologna*. (The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science, 123rd series, number 4.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2005. Pp. xii, 349. \$50.00.

Hospital—shelter—foundling home—orphanage—convent—guild—factory—confraternity: these are protean entities that morph into each other, exchanging organizational models, sharing ideals and vision. Although the orphanage (for boys) and its sibling conservatory (for girls) are the main concern of Nicholas Terpstra's superbly executed study, author and reader trip over these cognate institutions in pursuit of the quarry. All were self-starting and autonomous, imposed by neither state nor church; they testify to the struggle by conscientious Italian Catholics of the Renaissance to manage social crises. They did so not at all badly, we might conclude from the richly detailed description of their operation that Terpstra provides, mined from the archives of multiple institutions, establishing a pattern for the provision of welfare services that other early modern societies could imitate.

Terpstra's investigation of the orphanage systems of Florence and Bologna considerably advances the inquiry into abandonment in the Renaissance that has been pursued by Philip Gavitt, Richard Trexler, Volker Hunecke, and Francesco Bianchi, looking at the foundling homes of Florence, Milan, and Padua, while Anne E. C. McCants, Thomas Max Safley, Joan Sherwood, C. K. Manziane, and Ruth McClure have brought the investigation to Amsterdam, Augsburg, Madrid, and London. The book relates as well to the study of youth confraternities by Konrad Eisenbichler and Lorenzo Polizzotto, and of women's communities by Sherrill Cohen, Jutta Sperling, and Sharon Strocchia, as well as to the history of childhood dissected in a stream of books flowing from the spring of Philippe Ariès's *Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of the Family* (1962).

After an introductory chapter that admirably sums up what is known about Renaissance demographic crises and their impact on families, Terpstra walks the reader through the many aspects of orphanage creation and operation in Florence and Bologna over the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. A first chapter on "Opening A Home" shows how, in both cities, outbreaks of plague and accompanying disasters stimulated the creation by the 1550s of a network of multiple forms of houses to accommodate the children left "orphaned"—a term that includes those abandoned by their families, or bereft of one parent, as well as the "true orphans" who had lost both.

The next chapter explains how a child entered one of these homes, a process that often involved filling out an

application and being interviewed by the board for clients were not foundlings abandoned at birth but in their middle or later childhood. The next two chapters survey the experience respectively of girls and boys in their different settings. The fifth chapter explores how these homes were managed, and the sixth considers to what destinies the former orphans were released, at around fourteen for boys and sixteen for girls (not a few died in the orphanage still young, while others stayed through old age), into the world.

Across this gracefully written and well-developed narrative, some key points emerge. The first concerns gender. Girls entered orphanages later—generally at the onset of puberty—than did boys, who were enrolled in middle childhood (seven, eight, or nine). The principal mission in rearing orphan girls was preparation for marriage or, failing that, domestic service; only a few entered a formal convent (the preserve of the daughters of patricians and professionals). The goal in rearing boys was to release them, with gradually diminishing levels of supervision, in full adolescence, into the world. During their stay in the orphanage, moreover, boys were schooled, in some cases up through the secondary curriculum, to the extent that an orphan boy had a greater chance of gaining an education than poor boys outside the orphanage. Girls, in contrast, were trained in religious observances, domestic tasks, and textile skills, to the extent that some orphanages became factories reputed for specialized textile production—lace, for instance, or brocade.

Class is another prominent theme. The multiple forms of orphan homes that evolved were generally class-specific: certain kinds of institutions were designated for the unfortunate (but legitimate) children of respectable parents; others for the poor, others still for the offspring of beggars. Bologna was fussier about social origin than Florence, whose grand duke coaxed the various organizations that supervised orphanages to serve all of his subjects, and not just the inner circle of Florentines.

This difference between the two cities in terms of stratification by class is seen elsewhere as well: Bolognese caretakers supervised their charges more closely than did the Florentines, while the charitable outreach of the Florentines was more systematic and comprehensive. In both cities, it was assumed that the whole community was responsible for the welfare of vulnerable children, and both cities, by the early seventeenth century, had developed massive, complex, and largely successful systems for executing that responsibility.

These Renaissance welfare systems are striking for their pluralism and fungibility. There were not only homes for boys and for girls, for rich and for poor, but also small homes and large ones; homes run by women, by clerics, and by whole confraternities; homes that looked a lot like convents or like factories. They were scattered across the landscape: distributed fairly evenly through all the sectors of Bologna, arrayed in a wheel around the central core of Florence. Their origin was

religious, their motive compassion, but their function was political, especially in Florence, an absolutist state that outsourced its welfare obligations to a free market of faith-based organizations.

The story of the Florentine and Bolognese orphanages continue to stir up the question that has been raised about foundling homes in general: does institutionalization create the behavior that is then accommodated by increasingly complex and expensive institutions? Do foundling homes create foundlings? The number of *esposti* seems to increase with the multiplication of homes to receive them. Do orphanages create orphans, by providing an incentive for parents to abandon their children to institutional care, thus relieving themselves of cost and anxiety? Terpstra presents some evidence that this is the case.

On the whole, we must admire the achievement of these two Renaissance cities in meeting the needs of vulnerable children, especially when the current U.S. foster care system fares unevenly in preparing our own *abbandonati* to be responsible and productive adults.

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STEFANIE B. SIEGMUND. *The Medici State and the Ghetto of Florence: The Construction of an Early Modern Jewish Community*. (Stanford Studies in Jewish History and Culture.) Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2006. Pp. xxiv, 624. \$70.00.

This book's central argument is that the ghetto of Florence is to be perceived as an instrument of early modern state building. This squares with the argument already made that the Roman ghetto responded to both the civic and religious needs of the papal domains. Yet as presented by Stefanie B. Siegmund, the thesis linking ghetto and state is forcefully articulated and thus merits careful attention.

The problem sixteenth-century rulers faced, as has been explained with respect to the Roman ghetto, is that the old medieval structures no longer worked. In a unified Catholic world, it had been possible "to retain and restrain" Jews by applying canon law without isolating them physically. The new, divided, post-Lutheran world, where religious lines had become commensurate with political ones, required a more radical solution. In the papal state, this was as part of a policy that perceived the ghetto as a limbo until the Jews converted. But Florence was not the papal state, and Cosimo de' Medici, this new book argues, had no need fully to identify with papal aims, allowing him to bend papal policies to suit political ends. In Venice, fears of divine retribution, and the perception of the state as a religious body, were more evident in the decision, in 1516, to use the locale long known as the "ghetto" as a holding space.

Yet Siegmund admits that religious issues shaped the early modern state. Although she cogently presses her case about the civil state, her argument hesitates to say exactly how religious elements fit in. Similarly, the char-

enge is never openly expressed to the position taken nearly a century ago by Umberto Cassuto that Cosimo was out to appease the pope in order to be recognized as grand duke, a position Cassuto bolstered by pointing to Pius V's call for erecting ghettos throughout Italy. Cassuto's study as a whole is never directly engaged, and readers may wonder whether his thinking would be better modified rather than rejected. A close comparison of the clauses of the ducal order of ghettoization in 1570 with those in the bull *Hebraeorum gens* issued by Pius V in 1569, which expelled Jews from all parts of the papal state save Rome and Ancona (and the French papal domains), shows that the two texts are nearly identical, certainly more so than is acknowledged. A comparison of Cosimo's pursuit of Jewish bankers with the similar campaign of Paul IV that levied heavy fines on Jews for charging what the pope called "excessive interest" might also have been worthwhile. One could argue that both the popes and the Medici dukes were out to consolidate their states in an early modern atmosphere where the borders between religion and state were porous. But this would only make papal and ducal actions so much the more alike.

There is the matter of *ius commune*. Legal determinations based on this law, which were patently applied in the papal domains and no doubt present in Medici calculations, too, limited the state's dealings with Jews. As medieval and contemporary legists had repeatedly made clear, it was nearly impossible to expel Jews legally, at least not in their entirety. *Ius commune* also considered Jews *cives*, who were no less entitled to due legal process than they were subject to civil rules. Yet the recognition of this substratum is absent, removing *ius commune* as an important dimension in assessing overall policies, whether papal or ducal. The Medici are portrayed as initiating the formation of Jewish self-government. More likely, their insistence on rules and officials in the ghetto was intended to subordinate the Jews along the lines of *ius commune*'s denial of true corporate status to the Jews. The popes, in Rome, did the same.

Florentine Jews numbered less than one hundred before the decree of the ghetto in 1570, which actually emptied Tuscany of all its Jews except those who settled in Florence (in 1593, a special edict established a ghetto-free zone in Livorno for Jews from the Levant, and these two disparate policies should have been weighed against each other more closely). Hence, whereas before 1570 the Jews of Florence acted much as did those of Volterra—as described by Alessandra Veronese, a small nucleus living in an informal structure headed by bankers (that is, lenders), subject to and benefiting from *ius commune*—afterward, with nearly five hundred Jews in Florence alone, there was a need for precise organization. Nonetheless, it seems forced to suggest, as is done, that the Medici perceived the organized Jewish community in the manner of the state's many communes or parishes. Indeed, the charters and privileges approved follow *ius commune* in allowing Jews no jurisdictional power, and what Jewish officials did su-

pervise, such as ghetto cleanliness and the collection of taxes, made them essentially agents of the state. Jews, in fact, turned to state officials to resolve their disputes; records of arbitration between Jews, though claimed, are never discussed.

It is no less ambitious to suggest that the rise of the formal community resulted in lowering the status of women. Did women's absence from communal office, for example, mean that their financial or testamentary powers had been diminished? The argument may be correct, and ghettoized Florentine Jews may, for various reasons, have begun to imitate Florentine Christian social behavior more than in the past. But one would need wider evidence, clearly presented. The story as told here, in over four hundred pages of text, is often overlaid with lengthy debate about what might have been. The conclusions with respect to marriage, marital strategies, and dowries are often based on (what the author admits are) few cases. The suggestions that Jews, before the ghetto, had a very loose halachic construction with respect to observance need deeper foundations. To say, for instance, that it is not certain that all Jews used a *ketubbah* (wedding contract) when they married is problematic. How else would Jews have married, except traditionally, in a legal system that conceded marital practice to the Jews' own law and ways? The discussion of the return of the dowry upon the death of a wife also needs refining. Siegmund says that husbands collected everything. Evidence elsewhere says they did not.

We are indebted to Siegmund for stressing the place of the ghetto in modern state formation. In the chapter on economics there is much that seems new, for example on the integration of Jews into guilds and their economic rebirth as large-scale merchants after banking was outlawed. But the story is not succinctly told. It might also have been advantageous to structure the book along less traditional lines than it now is: the order to found a ghetto, its construction, the population, the Jewish community, a (partial) view of marital institutions, and some general conclusions about the effect of the ghetto. The documentary base is impressive, particularly the ample research undertaken in the Florentine archives. However, it might have been preferable to extract individual stories illuminating Jewish culture and perception and to deal with these at length, even if, as implied, direct Jewish, Hebrew, sources to flesh out the archivally based stories are few. The voluminous secondary literature listed in the bibliography of "works cited," including studies of parallel communities and of Jewish religious and rabbinical institutions, might also have been more fully exploited, especially in the notes. From these stories and episodes, we might have learned what the sense of the ghetto truly was, just as we might also have become more aware of what Florentines, about 1570, including the Medici dukes themselves, really thought.

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MELISSA FEINBERG. *Elusive Equality: Gender, Citizenship, and the Limits of Democracy in Czechoslovakia, 1918–1950*. (Pitt Series in Russian and East European Studies.) Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press. 2006. Pp. viii, 275. \$35.00.

This is a book about struggles over the status of women and gender in (civil) law in the Czech lands from the establishment of democracy after World War I through authoritarianism and fascism to the advent of the “communist” regime. Melissa Feinberg’s narrative is built around three major arguments.

The first argument is about the limits of dominant Czech understandings of gender equality. For most Czechs, the widely held ideal of gender equality fell short of including the private sphere and the family. Feinberg identifies only one camp within the Czech women’s movement—labeled as the “Czech feminists” (p. 10)—and its occasional supporters, who clung to the language of equal rights for the two sexes as a building block of democracy. As a result, there was wide ranging support only for public political rights, such as equal suffrage for women introduced at the birth of the republic. In virtually all other spheres of civil law, such as marriage law, married women’s citizenship, and the *celibát* for women working in the civil service—the main areas covered in the book—at any given point in time reform endeavors run into resistance from various corners. No substantial progress toward creating the legal basis for true gender equality was achieved in any of these spheres, and the period after the world economic crisis brought the (re)introduction of the *celibát*. Only in the field of abortion, which was prohibited by criminal law, did the struggle over reform emerge from, and founder in, a somewhat different discursive and political constellation.

The argument about how dominant Czech understandings of democracy fell short of equality-based visions and legal regulations of gender within and related to the family is repeated time and again throughout the book, especially in the chapters about the first republic. The second major argument of the book concerns how all of this was intertwined with visions and politics around the Czech nation. Focusing on married women’s citizenship, Feinberg convincingly argues that in this one case, with its transnational and international repercussions, Czech nationalism conflicted with the otherwise pervasive antifeminist ideas of gendered hierarchy within the Czech nation and finally trumped them in part. As a woman’s citizenship traditionally followed her husband’s citizenship, Czech women were excluded from the Czech nation once they married foreigners, if Czech politics were to continue to follow this rule of gendered hierarchy. The bill of 1937, intended to change this situation by no longer automatically tying women’s citizenship to their husbands’, finally did not make it into law.

A third idea shapes the narrative of Feinberg’s book on a more general level. As Czech politics in the given period involved a substantial gender dimension, engen-

dering our insight into the fate and fortunes of democracy in the Czech lands contributes to changing and deepening our understanding of this broader subject. A closer look at the narrative reveals that it does and does not live up to this claim. This is indeed a book not so much about feminist or women’s struggles over gender relations (while any reader will learn a lot about this subject in the Czech context in the given period) as about situating these struggles in the broader context of political-legal history. There are, however, many instances in which major alterations of the political landscape and its institutional framing in Czechoslovakia—such as the advent of authoritarianism, or the coming of “communist” hegemony—are narrated in the most traditional manner. No sustained analysis of how and why politics over gender relations did or did not affect these major changes can be found in the book. There is only the somewhat vaguely developed suggestion that those—within and outside organized women’s politics—who based their vision of gender relations on ideas of difference and/or hierarchy between men and women were more prone to compromise over democracy than those few whose mindset was thoroughly egalitarian.

This clearly argued and enlightening text about a hitherto barely researched dimension of the gender of legal politics in the interwar period puts the findings of each chapter in a broader European perspective in a coherent manner. One disturbing shortcoming of the narrative is the treatment of the inherited legal pluralism lying at the core of the very “Czechoslovakian” law and upon which all of the reform endeavors tried to impact. It never becomes clear, for example, how exactly the infamous §144 inherited from the Cisleithanian-Austrian criminal code of the Habsburg period became part of what must have been the Czechoslovakian legal system of the interwar period, or what happened to the Transleithanian-Hungarian regulations of the same matter once Slovakia became part of Czechoslovakia. At times, the reader can not avoid the impression that Feinberg would have preferred not to deal with the presence of the Slovakian (Hungarian) past and presence in the legal system of interwar Czechoslovakia—at least insofar as the reader is positively biased toward taking seriously the legal pluralism stemming from this past. It does not help that Feinberg admits in the introduction that she is looking “at the conflicts within one group: the Czechs” (p. 7) only, as this focus tends to take the partial history of Cisleithanian Austria for the whole. For example, Feinberg identifies (though she does know better) the prohibition of women “from joining political organizations” in Habsburg Austria with the “legal standing of women” in this respect “during the Habsburg Monarchy” (p. 176). Another book will have to be written if we are to overcome vagueness and at times distortion in referring to gendered legal pluralism (pp. 42–43, 50, 66, 103, 131) in interwar Czechoslovakia.

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NICHOLAS V. RIASANOVSKY. *Russian Identities: A Historical Survey*. New York: Oxford University Press. 2005. Pp. 278. \$49.95.

Nicholas V. Riasanovsky has been dubbed America's "Mr. Russian History" owing to the popularity of his textbook, *A History of Russia*, first published in 1963. His new book is essentially a compendium of the interpretive views offered in the textbook as well as in his other publications, particularly *The Image of Peter the Great in Russian History and Thought* (1985). The compendium, as he says in its introduction, draws on those earlier works in "an attempt to depict the different meanings of being Russian in terms of their nature and significance in their own time and place" (p. 6). In other words, the new book is an extended, often eloquent rumination on a thousand years of supposed Russianness written, quite obviously, from a Russian nationalist standpoint.

To be sure, Riasanovsky's is the relatively liberal and cosmopolitan Russian nationalism that dates to the golden age of Russian historiography in late imperial times, when numerous Russian intellectuals including historians struggled to reconcile the realities of the Russian Empire with the rising tide of Russian nationalism even as other subjects of the emperor, like the Ukrainian historian Mykhailo Hrushevsky, sought to do the opposite: to separate the history of Russia itself from that, in his case, of Ukraine, by far the largest and most populous of the non-Russian territories of the empire. The revolutions of 1917 in part arrested these promising developments, in part distorted them. An oxymoronic Marxist Russian nationalism came to dominate historiography in the Soviet Union (which eventually included all of Ukraine and thirteen other national republics in addition to Russia itself), while the older historiographies lived on in the anti-Soviet émigré communities of Europe and America, where their nationalist perspectives were if anything intensified by the seemingly adverse course of events. The fall of the Soviet Union largely put an end to the Marxist or communist forms of Russian nationalism, Ukraine along with the other former Soviet republics became independent states, and a new set of problems arose for interested historians to contend with. Some had to create a national history for their new states; others, Ukrainians and Russians among them, had to rethink their received national histories. The work has proceeded vigorously although not, unsurprisingly, without considerable controversy.

Little of this controversy is reflected, directly, in Riasanovsky's new book; nor is much of the more recent scholarship on Russian and related histories, even that produced by his own students, cited let alone assimilated. Nor does Riasanovsky's use of the terms "nation" and "nationalism," despite some initial concessions, reflect their now generally accepted contingent, constructed, and historically modern character. Instead, his account of successive "meanings of being Russian" proceeds imperturbably, in tandem with his book, from an-

cient times to the present, at which point he falters: "In the second decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union and Communism, Russia is still in a state of transition and even confusion, contrary to the expectations of many observers" (p. 235), the latter to include, apparently, Riasanovsky himself. If so, his surprise may well be rooted in that impeturable vision of a distinct Russian identity in continuous evolution from the ninth century to 1917, when it was forced into an alien course, alien mainly because at the heart of Russian identity, (Riasanovsky repeatedly tells us) lies Orthodox Christianity, which was repressed and persecuted during the seventy years of Soviet rule. Granted, Orthodoxy played its part in the gradual formation of a national identity in Russia—as it did in Serbia or Greece, and as Catholicism did in Poland or Spain or Ireland. But it plainly cannot be made to bear the enormous historical burden that Riasanovsky imposes on it here, as he seems to realize. "Russia was in many ways in the process of becoming a modern nation-state when the October Revolution [of 1917] turned it in a different direction" (p. 229). Modern nation-states are not based on religion.

Historians as various as Richard Pipes and Geoffrey Hosking (among many others, both in Russia and abroad) have pointed out that Russian nationhood was early aborted by the assumption under Peter the Great (1689–1725) of an imperial identity that was revised rather than abandoned during Soviet rule. The often painful transition undergone by Russia since 1991 is precisely that from a longstanding imperial identity to a newly imagined national one, a deeply confusing experience for sure and a process that most would agree is not yet complete. For whom is this book intended? The often elliptical references to names and events in Russian history, the nameless allusions to historiographical debates, and the magisterial tone all suggest a circle of acolytes who share their teacher's assumptions and outlook and so will relish his fluent restatement of the tried and true. Others will find it a stimulating summary indeed of the views of one of the leading historians of Russia of his generation.

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ROLF TORSTENDAHL and NATAL'IA SELUNSKAIA. *Zarozhdenie demokraticeskoi kul'tury: Rossiia v nachale XX veka (The Birth of a Democratic Culture: Russia at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century)*. Moscow: Rosspen. 2005. Pp. 335.

This joint study by Rolf Torstendahl and Natal'ia Selunskia makes a major contribution to scholarly understanding of a crucial, transitional process in imperial Russia: integrating, on a national scale, public participation into the authoritarian political system between 1905 and 1907. The strengths of this book lie in the authors' meticulous analysis of the First and Second Duma elections in six disparate provinces, based to a

great extent on newly available archival materials; their comparison of the Russian political system with those in neighboring European states; their posing of large philosophical questions as well as attention to detail; and the clarity of their thinking and writing. Not only are many of the sources new, but the authors' methodology is innovative. They have pioneered investigation of provincial election materials, with some assistance from four Russian scholars, some former graduate students, who are graciously acknowledged. Evaluating the imperial Russian political system in a European context also gives much needed perspective.

As foundation for their study, the authors note that the *obshchina* and *zemstva* served as training grounds in participatory government. They do not discuss city governments or societies that empowered the citizenry in the late nineteenth, early twentieth centuries. Extremely important is the authors' conclusion that the events of 1905 did not constitute a revolution because the existing government was not toppled. This point is significant since the playing field between the duma and the government and tsar was obviously uneven. Nevertheless, Torstendahl and Selunskaja stress that "democratic culture" emerged in imperial Russia during 1906 and the first half of 1907.

Because the First and Second Dumas both lasted only a few months, the authors focus on Duma elections, particularly *ankety* or voter questionnaires regarding age, occupation, and education from selected, representative provinces—Voronezh, Kaluga, Vladimir, Tambov, and Nizhni-Novgorod—and the Don Cossack oblast' to prove their contention. The *ankety* reveal interesting, exciting information. They confirm wide participation of male voters in the new process. Varied elements of urban dwellers enjoyed suffrage. Generous voting requirements in the communal peasants' curia enabled individuals with loose ties to the *obshchina*, who were not agriculturalists, to vote in this curia. Even humble voters were sophisticated. Peasants often stated they were "not affiliated," but this indicated not indifference or confusion but a determination to keep options open.

Election *ankety* also display local officials' attitudes toward the new system and heterogeneity not always reflected in the Dumas' final compositions. Voronezh voters filled out their own questionnaires; in Vladimir, election officials did so. Industrialization in Vladimir province resulted in returns of engineers and enterprise owners as electors whereas peasants and nobles dominated in other provinces. Vladimir province inclined to the left in Second Duma elections, Kaluga to the right. The city of Voronezh included five Jewish electors. The clergy were active in Tambov, but peasants were also vociferous, complaining about insufficient land and other grievances. Muslims were noteworthy in Nizhni-Novgorod.

Election *ankety* show noteworthy commonalities. Electors were relatively mature. They were literate; sizable numbers had middle and higher education. Some owned vast amounts of land. Elections highlighted the

Kadets' political skills. They dominated the First Duma by being well organized and having an appealing program but also because extreme left parties boycotted elections. They achieved respectable representation in Second Duma elections through effective political strategies—cooperating with Social Democratic and Socialist Revolutionary competitors while appealing to local sensibilities, for example, supporting an independent Don Cossack region and Muslim agendas in Nizhni-Novgorod.

In a welcome departure from investigations that regard Russia as *sui generis*, Torstendahl and Selunskaja contrast Russia's embryonic parliament with European systems. In addition they deconstruct the meaning of parliamentarianism and other political concepts. These procedures reveal Russia to have been lagging only slightly in grafting democracy onto authoritarianism. Russia and Austria-Hungary had similar curiae, although Russia had a special workers' curia. The upper houses in both empires were similar. Establishing an upper chamber like the State Council, to control a popularly elected parliament, was typical.

Still, Russian ministers were not as powerful as their German and Austro-Hungarian counterparts. The German emperor controlled foreign policy and decided war, but the chancellor's signature was necessary for internal decisions. The Austro-Hungarian emperor appointed ministers, but they counter-signed executive decisions and had the confidence of parliamentary deputies. Torstendahl and Selunskaja rightly point out that Kadet frustration over lack of a responsible ministry or even one with parliamentary approval precipitated revolution in February/March 1917.

The authors also note that Russia's vastness and inadequate infrastructure impeded communication, and the government's curb on the Social Democrats prevented their playing a legitimate and lively role as in Western Europe, but they maintain that Russia's level of party formation and electioneering was on par with European countries.

I do have two caveats with this otherwise impeccably researched, solid study. The authors' apparent sympathy with "left" parties seems unfounded. Undoubtedly influenced by my affinity for Peter Stolypin, I question the statement that left parties operated on a firm democratic basis (p. 308). This may be accurate if by "democratic" one infers they appealed to "the people." However, research documents that the mayhem leftist fomented caused the economy to plummet and generated antipathy from many ordinary workers and peasants, as well as establishment types.

The authors' assertion that the dispersal of the Second Duma ended further reform of Russia's political system (pp. 312–313) also seems exaggerated, based solely on Duma representation. Indeed evidence points to the contrary. The June 3, 1907, electoral law did enlarge noble representation while cutting that of communal peasants, urbanites, and national minorities. But recent research has demonstrated that the system of pluralistic public participation on a national scale

through elected representatives continued to evolve after June 3, 1907. The Third Duma passed beneficial laws on universal primary education and simplified peasants' consolidation of land. It cooperated with the government but also asserted itself against the government. It interrogated ministers, called for reforms in the Naval Ministry, passed a law in 1911, despite Stolypin's objections, that strengthened publicly owned pharmacies at the expense of private, and criticized official handling of the Lena Goldfield's massacre. The Nationalist Party, a modern political entity, emerged during the Third Duma. The State Council became a more diverse and lively upper legislative chamber. Political stability in Russia after 1908 allowed the economy to flourish and living standards to rise. Thus, fragile democratic culture was not crushed.

Torstendahl and Selunskaja's path-breaking, seminal work illuminates rapid and substantial development of participatory government on a national scale in late imperial Russia. Their findings also help us to analyze the viability of emerging democracies in the Middle East and elsewhere today.

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MICHAEL MELANCON. *The Lena Goldfields Massacre and the Crisis of the Late Tsarist State*. (Eugenia and Hugh v. Stewart 26 Series on Eastern Europe.) College Station: Texas A&M University Press. 2006. Pp. 238. Cloth \$50.00, paper \$24.95.

At the end of February 1912, gold miners at the Lenzoto Gold Company in eastern Siberia raised complaints about meat they had received at the company kitchen. When they were rebuffed they launched a month-long strike that culminated in the most famous example of anti-worker violence of the prerevolutionary period. The Lena Goldfields Massacre, as it became known, resulted in between 200 and 300 worker deaths and as many as 400 to 500 nonfatal injuries. In the wake of this April 4 shooting, the Russian Empire erupted in a wave of solidarity strikes and labor activism that steadily increased between 1912 and the outbreak of revolution in 1917. Not only labor historians but also historians of late imperial Russian society and politics have long considered the Lena events an anchor in the era's periodization. It is therefore remarkable that we have not had a thorough investigation of the event and its repercussions before Michael Melancon's thoroughly researched and engagingly written study.

The early chapters of this book read like an adventure story in which a motley assortment of migrants, including religious dissidents, prospectors, land-hungry peasants, and outlaws, found their way to the sparsely populated Lena River region. How they got there in the era before railroads is almost inconceivable. There they joined local people in settlements based more on fishing and herding than on agriculture. After the discovery of

gold in the 1840s, pioneering entrepreneurs gradually established an industry under adverse conditions that included even greater than usual tsarist regulation as well as labor shortages. Early mine workers frequently came from the ranks of political exiles and later were attracted to the region from European Russia, often under false pretenses. In effect, once winter got underway in the Lena region, workers and their families were prisoners of the mine companies at least until spring. Melancon details many aspects of what he calls Siberian exceptionalism: the willingness of tsarist officials to turn a blind eye to employer abuses and illegalities because of the vital importance of gold production after adoption of the gold standard in 1897. For Melancon, the explosion of labor-management tension in the Siberian gold industry resulted not from business as usual in early twentieth-century Russia, but from the neglect of regulations and practices in place elsewhere.

Lenzoto grew as many Russian firms did in the nineteenth century, from a small shares company into a state-favored virtual monopoly, through the efforts of skillful native entrepreneurs. In Lenzoto's case it was the Ginzburg banking clan that held a controlling interest and that remained preeminent even after the 1908 infusion of capital from the newly formed British Lena Goldfields Company. Many of the empire's leading investors, including high officials such as Count Sergei Witte, owned shares in the firm. The State Bank granted Lenzoto a bottomless line of credit and arranged for the appointment of I. N. Belozorov as director of mining operations. In the decade before the shootings, Belozorov and Baron Alfred Ginzburg presided over a harsh regime that aimed to keep wages down in a labor-short environment and to maintain order over a workforce that frightened them, thus allowing the company to wring substantial dividends out of its operations.

On one hand, Melancon presents his story as a gripping, if tragic, tale replete with heroes and villains, and on this level readers relatively new to Russian history are likely to remain engaged while learning a great deal about how this society worked in its final decade. On the other hand, Melancon seeks to unravel the competing discourses that began to grow up around the event almost immediately. Perhaps not surprisingly, he declares the "proworker" discourse the most persuasive. Work conditions had been the subject of warnings passed by both the regional governor and the chief regional mine inspector to officials in St. Petersburg. Although socialists of various stripes populated eastern Siberia as political exiles, the strike that began over bad meat was not political in its intent or its initial leadership. The strike was peaceful and the workers' elected representatives were unjustifiably arrested. The shooting was a crime.

Melancon's most original contribution to this story is his analysis in the final chapter of Russian society's reaction to the shooting. He demonstrates that a lively nationwide press took up the story of the massacre, which quickly pushed the sinking of the *Titanic* off front

pages. In every corner of the country, and from press organs of every political persuasion, came outrage and demands for a public investigation. Even nationalist newspapers trumpeted the interpretation that entrepreneurs and stockholders, through their unwarranted ties to high government officials, had induced the tsarist regime to neglect its obligation to protect its citizen-subjects. Although scholars have long seen discord and fragmentation in late imperial society, Melancon sees near unanimity on this point. Where others see a sedimentary society, he sees a "surprising consensus." Not only newspapers but a myriad of social and civic groups protested the event and the government's complicity in it: lawyers, students, and white-collar workers thousands of miles away all organized funds for survivors. Melancon portrays a polity that fell well short of constitutionality while depicting a society that was substantially modern. In the end, the government of Nicholas II bowed to public opinion about the Lena events, appointed an investigative commission that fixed blame in high places, and sent its ministers to face the withering criticism of the elected Third Duma.

Melancon seeks a reinterpretation of late imperial society that can accommodate evidence of an emerging consensus on matters of labor-management relations and social welfare. What is at stake is nothing less than our understanding of where revolutions come from: not, perhaps, from social fragmentation, but from profound, possibly shocking, and usually fleeting unanimity.

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KATE TRASCHEL. *Under the Influence: Working-Class Drinking, Temperance, and Cultural Revolution in Russia, 1895–1932*. (Pitt Series in Russian and East European Studies.) Pittsburgh, Pa.: University of Pittsburgh Press. 2006. Pp. x, 209. \$35.00.

Proverbially, and not inaccurately, "the joy of Russia is drink." This book attempts, and within a brief span of pages largely succeeds, in describing how the nonjoyful side—the "drink problem"—was conceptualized, defined, and to a degree dealt with, in late tsarist and early Soviet Russia. The gulf between the late imperial period and the end of the first Soviet Five Year Plan in the early 1930s (by which time the Soviet model had truly congealed) is indeed wide. Kate Trachel points up a mix of continuities and breaks in the way two different versions of Russia operated.

Late tsarism's efflorescence of "voluntary" social activism included temperance societies, which were seen as one response of an emergent middle class to changes in a social order altered mightily by the liberation of the serfs in 1861, and their trouble-fraught urbanization and proletarianization in the last quarter of the century. Among the attractions of acting, organizing, agitating about peasant drunkenness for those drawn to participation was the prospect that it would "mark their ar-

rival into 'civilized' society," signaling a "demand for equal status for their tastes and values from the classes above" (p. 49). The larger tsarist order was ambiguous about much of this: as tax gatherer and also distiller/vendor it profited from Russia's thirst, even as it debated prohibition-type measures in the early (1914–1916) war years.

The Soviet regime, given to the propagandizing of radical change, made more of "behavior models" than tsarism ever attempted. On the antidrunkenness front as on so many other battlefields of forced social change, the regime "found" models of what it wanted, tried to deploy them against the unsatisfactory human material on hand—and found that the latter often prevailed. Forging into appropriately behaving facsimiles the mass of peasant recruits who flowed into industry during the first Five Year Plan meant mobilizing a minority of presumably sober, politically conscious proletarians to both discipline and change, by example and pressure, the majority of rough newcomers. Trachel seems to suggest that there was more disciplined sobriety among these hereditary, urban blue-collar types than is probable in that world of the early 1930s, but she also notes that there was plenty of joint resistance. Many of the seasoned proletarians, to whom poster art attributed so much virtue, joined with newcomers to drink heartily and heavily, asserting and expressing "as a class . . . their collective culture as workers despite the split into two strata" (p. 143).

As in arguments about other social issues at the time there was a division between "scientific/positivist" understandings of the drink problem and voluntaristic less determinist approaches. The latter emphasis prevailed, and in the world of 1933 and thereafter, controversy with regard to the "alcohol problem" gave way to simple orthodoxies. The Soviet state, brooking no criticism, remained the monopoly distiller (a function dating back to 1925). This was a matter of financial expediency and pragmatic accommodation to its thirsty pressured population. But it was "absolved of responsibility for making alcohol available since the drinker was now conceived of as a conscious actor and not a victim" (p. 148). Until the advent of Mikhail Gorbachev, through war, postwar expansion, and Cold War the USSR would grow a larger, more skilled, but no notably sober working class and make do with it. In the "indicative-imperative" language of propaganda, the government would assert that "drunkenness is alien to Soviet man"—although, as was patently obvious to a who looked, it was anything but.

Unfortunately, the epilogue that takes us beyond 1934 (and the author's prime concerns) to the end of the Soviet story in 1991 occupies only the final four pages of text; that story might have been better treated at somewhat greater length. The mature USSR, by the time Gorbachev ascended to the leadership in 1985, was surely a "drunken society" as the émigré scholar Boris Segal put it. Gorbachev failed in his anti-alcohol campaign; the bottle won the battle. He cut alcohol production, but moonshiners took up the slack. He limited

etail outlets and sale hours, but lines grew longer and rankier. He raised prices on the reduced amount of alcohol produced, and people bought it all anyway. No previous leader had risked the loss of revenue from hidden taxes of more than ninety-five percent of the price of bottles of state-produced vodka. Gorbachev did—and lost.

That a so-called “modern industrial state” should have been so dependent on revenues from a single product of such consequence was a final poignant similarity between tsarist and communist regimes.

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CHRISTINA KIAER and ERIC NAIMAN, editors. *Everyday Life in Early Soviet Russia: Taking the Revolution Inside*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 2006. Pp. 310. Cloth \$75.00, paper \$29.95.

The Russian Revolution of 1917 represented a radical change of political regime. In February of that year, the tsarist monarchy fell, and in October a party of radical socialists—the Bolsheviks, subsequently renamed the Communists—took power and established a purportedly working-class state. Eventually Communist Party leaders eliminated private property and created an entirely state-run economy. But what did the revolution mean in terms of everyday life? How did Soviet officials seek to change the way people lived, interacted, organized their homes, and raised their children? As this collection edited by Christina Kiaer and Eric Naiman makes clear, the Soviet project was about much more than installing new rulers and constructing a new economic system. It was an attempt to transform people's thoughts, identities, and daily lives.

To frame this rather diverse set of essays, the editors provide an introduction on Soviet subjectivity and modernity. They argue that the Soviet subject was “one produced by power rather than repressed by it” (p. 3). By adopting this Foucauldian approach to subjectivity, Kiaer and Naiman reject an understanding of Soviet power as purely repressive. Instead they see Soviet institutions and propaganda as productive in that they offered people a coherent sense of self and purpose. Soviet authorities sought to make citizens understand themselves in ideological terms as builders of socialism. For those who accepted this role, Soviet power offered consciousness of oneself as a historical agent who could help usher in a new era for all humankind.

While Kiaer and Naiman are careful to define subjectivity and ideology, they run into more trouble with the term modernity. Initially Kiaer and Naiman use modernity “to refer to the distinction between the public and private spheres that developed in Western Europe in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. They go on to cite a disdain for the public/private distinction as a nonmodern feature of Russian and Soviet culture. Subsequently they employ “modernity” in a sense that more clearly pertains to the Soviet case when they write, “Making private activities into the ob-

jects of penetrating, even scientific observation and ideological prescription is a constitutive feature of modernity” (p. 10). Several recent works have placed Soviet history within the broader framework of European modernity in order to highlight both the common and distinctive features of the Soviet system. Soviet leaders and professionals shared with their European counterparts an ambition to reshape society and mobilize the population. But within this modern ethos of social interventionism, they pursued a distinctly illiberal social vision—one that placed collectivism over individualism and sought the elimination of capitalism. Had Kiaer and Naiman consulted these works, they might have provided a clearer definition of “Soviet modernity.”

In order to instill in citizens a new sense of identity, the Soviet government required them to engage in autobiographical writing and speaking. Sheila Fitzpatrick, in the volume's lead article, analyzes the autobiography in the personnel file of one high-ranking Communist Party member, Anastasia Plotnikova. Plotnikova described herself as a poor peasant who suffered exploitation under the tsarist regime only to become a successful worker and Soviet official after the revolution. Fitzpatrick then contrasts Plotnikova's autobiography with a counternarrative of her life compiled by the secret police, who in 1936 accused her of coming from a kulak family and maintaining connections with class enemies. In another of the volume's articles, Natalia Kozlova examines diaries from the 1930s. Significantly, these unofficial autobiographical writings also employed elements from the Soviet master narrative to tell stories of personal transformation under the Soviet system. Evgenii Bershtein's article considers a quite different diary: Walter Benjamin's diary from his stay in Moscow in late 1926 and early 1927. Bershtein describes Benjamin's personal situation (in particular his unrequited love for Asja Lacis) as central to his fascination with the ostensible annihilation of private life in the Soviet Union.

As appropriate in a volume on everyday life, several contributors discuss issues surrounding the Soviet family. Cynthia Hooper analyzes Soviet policy toward the family and private life as part of a broader effort by authorities to inculcate nonbourgeois patterns of behavior. In particular, she argues that the mid-1930s saw no retreat in family policy and that, given the fusion of politics with private life, this period was actually more revolutionary than the era preceding it. Catriona Kelly discusses Soviet prescriptions for child raising in the 1920s and 1930s and notes a trend toward increasing regimentation. Citing parallels with Western child-care books, however, she cautions against seeing the Soviet emphasis on discipline as an ideological particularity. In her article on Soviet domestic servants in the 1920s, Rebecca Spagnolo also draws parallels with other countries. She shows that despite unprecedented efforts by Soviet trade unions to organize and regulate domestic service, the half million Soviet women employed as domestics shared the fate of their counterparts elsewhere:

isolation punctuated by intensely personalized and imbalanced relationships with their employers.

Randi Cox is also attentive to the Soviet Union's similarities and differences with capitalist countries in her article on advertising in the 1920s. Soviet trade officials used some of the advertising techniques of Western corporations, but they also sought to differentiate themselves from capitalists by portraying commodities as a tool of social transformation rather than of personal gratification. As Cox argues, this approach helped reconcile two contradictory goals of the revolution: improving people's material wellbeing and ending their selfish indulgences. Frances L. Bernstein, in her fascinating article on Soviet medical discourse regarding nervousness and male impotence, similarly places her topic in an international context. She points out that, following late nineteenth-century industrialization, physicians across Europe diagnosed ever increasing numbers of patients as suffering from neurasthenia, or nervous exhaustion. Soviet doctors likewise saw an upsurge of nervousness (and attributed cases of male sexual dysfunction to it), but they blamed factors other than industrial labor. Bernstein concludes that because Soviet authorities defined masculinity in terms of the ability to engage in productive labor, "anxiety about male dysfunction reflected far broader concerns with the potency, viability, and destiny of the workers' state" (p. 170).

Several contributors to the volume analyze film and theater productions of the period. In her article on Stalinist cinema, Lilya Kaganovsky discusses one of the most prominent films of the 1930s, *The Party Card*. She recounts the making of the film by director Ivan Pyr'ev, and explores its theme of corporeal and societal purity. Boris Wolfson's article describes Konstantin Stanislavsky's staging of Aleksandr Afinogenov's play *Fear* at the Moscow Art Theater in 1931. Kiaer's article examines Sergei Tret'iakov's 1926 eugenic play, *I Want a Child!* While the play itself was ultimately censored, it nonetheless reveals, as Kiaer adeptly demonstrates, many tensions within Soviet culture regarding reproductive norms, gender roles, and everyday life.

This volume is based on a 1994 conference held in St. Petersburg on everyday life in the Soviet Union. The conference, organized by the editors along with Natalia Leбина, was one of the most intellectually exciting in the Russian history field. Apart from a few established scholars, the participants were overwhelmingly young and their work unpublished. The research presented was highly original, much of it based on newly declassified documents in the Russian archives. The topics addressed were fresh and the theoretical approaches employed were innovative. So it is fitting that this volume based on the conference was finally published in 2006. In the intervening twelve years, however, the work has lost some of its novelty. Moreover, many of the conference papers are not included here, apparently because they were already published elsewhere. Of the volume's eleven articles, only six were presented at the conference. And it is not clear how the editors selected

the other five articles, two of which have nothing to do with everyday life. While still an important collection, this volume would have had a far greater impact had its publication not suffered a long delay.

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HIROAKI KUROMIYA. *Stalin. (Profiles in Power.)* New York: Longman. 2005. Pp. xvii, 227. \$17.95.

Within the field of Soviet history, few personalities have been the source of as much speculation and commentary as Joseph Stalin. Biographical writing about Stalin dates back to his consolidation of power in 1927, when a former secretary named I. P. Tovstukha published a short official pamphlet. Three years later, another former secretary, Boris Bazhanov, offered a tell-all alternative to Tovstukha's work from exile abroad. Over the course of the next decade, an array of other accounts, both sympathetic and critical, would appear, written by the German biographer Emil Ludwig (1934), the French communist Henri Barbusse (1935), the party card-carrying sycophant E. M. Iaroslavskii (1939), and Stalin's archenemy, L. D. Trotskii (posthumously, 1941).

Historiographically speaking, Iaroslavskii and other official biographers argued that Stalin was not only Lenin's heir, but the literal embodiment of his legacy, proclaiming "Stalin is the Lenin of today." Trotskii countered these apologetics in a Marxist vein by arguing that the general secretary instead represented the conservative Thermidorian forces of the bureaucracy that threatened to betray the revolution. More modern biographers have advanced interpretations that improve somewhat upon this early work. Isaac Deutscher (1949) regarded Stalin as a master at bureaucratic infighting, while Adam Ulam (1973) saw him as a modern-day Machiavelli. Ulam's contemporary, Robert C. Tucker (1973, 1990), advanced a psychological portrait of Stalin as an upstart desperately trying to emulate his mentor. Just before the fall of the USSR, Dmitri Volkogonov (1989) disagreed, arguing that Stalin represented a tyrannical break from Leninism. Several years later, Edvard Radzinskii expanded this attention to personality in general and the Machiavelli metaphor in particular (1997), which Simon Sebag Montefiore then adapted into a full-blown focus on Stalin's passion for games of cat-and-mouse (2003). Although E. A. Rees (2004) and Robert Service (2005) subsequently reined in this hyperbole, both retained a strong interest in the general secretary's cynical, calculating exercise of power. Erik van Ree, by contrast, focused almost exclusively on Stalin's writing and pronouncements on various subjects (both official and unofficial) in order to demonstrate quite convincingly that Stalin was not only a Marxist revolutionary but a true believer as well (2002).

Although cursory and simplistic, this survey of biographical work on Stalin may inspire doubt about

whether further biographical treatments of the general secretary are really necessary. Unfortunately, many of these volumes have serious shortcomings, due to the narrowness of their interpretive perspectives, the polemical nature of their argumentation, or the obsolescence of their source bases in the wake of the opening of the Soviet archives in 1991. Hiroaki Kuromiya's slim biography is, therefore, a welcome addition to the literature on the general secretary, as it combines a persuasive, flexible thesis with a terse, thorough, and up-to-date accounting of Stalin's career. Breaking with somewhat schematic past characterizations of Stalin, Kuromiya argues that the secretary general is best regarded as a political animal: someone who literally "lived by politics alone" (p. ix). Kuromiya's Stalin is an individual who subordinated all things—ideological belief, intellectual curiosity, egotistical vanity, philosophical consistency, familial affection, personal loyalty, and psychological need—to an obsession with the pragmatic demands of duty and office. In Kuromiya's eyes, it was perfectly possible for Stalin to alternate between being a revolutionary and realist, a dreamer and cynic, and an idealist and paranoid, insofar as all of these qualities were eclipsed by his all-consuming dedication to political pragmatism and Soviet state-building.

While at first glance almost banal, this portrait of Stalin allows Kuromiya to characterize the general secretary in compelling terms without indulging in psychoanalysis or melodrama. Stalin apparently regretted the haste and waste of collectivization, but he believed fiercely in the state control of agriculture and the threat of a Polish-inspired Ukrainian insurgency (p. 112). He was unapologetic about purging suspected enemies from the ranks of the party and military but proved willing to concede that innocent people had been sacrificed in the process (pp. 126–127). An orthodox Marxist-Leninist, Stalin demonstrated a surprisingly conventional appreciation of humor, entertainment, good food and late-night revelry (pp. 173, 201–208). And, despite the ubiquity of his cult of personality, Stalin turns out to have been considerably less interested in fame and fortune than he was in proximity to power.

Thoughtful, balanced, and accessible, Kuromiya's biography is well suited for classroom use. Specialists might read it in conjunction with two recent institutional studies of Stalin's regime (*The Nature of Stalin's Dictatorship: The Politburo, 1924–1953*, edited by E. A. Łec [2004]; Yoram Gorlizki and Oleg Khlevniuk, *Cold Peace: Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle, 1945–1953* [2004]), as well as V. A. Nevezhin's fascinating work on Stalin's off-the-cuff "table talk" at official state functions, *Zastol'nye rechi Stalina: dokumenty i materialy Stalin as Toast-Master: Documents and Materials*] (2003).

DAVID BRANDENBERGER

University of Richmond [All reviewers of books by Indiana University faculty are selected with the advice of the Board of Editors.]

THOMAS C. WOLFE. *Governing Soviet Journalism: The Press and the Socialist Person after Stalin*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 2005. Pp. xxi, 240. \$39.95.

Studying the history of newspapers is notoriously difficult in any country. Few journalists write memoirs. The day-to-day ephemera of the journalist's work evaporate into wastebaskets or digital nothingness, leaving the historian with little more than the final product. In addition, few historians understand how journalism works, tending instead to look at journalism as reflective of politics, mass culture, or public opinion. With little data to measure the interaction of journalistic content with its consumers, journalists and publishers are often credited with the power they only claim to have exercised on public opinion.

Journalism in the Soviet Union was popularly viewed as being a servant of the Communist Party, with little room for initiative on the part of journalists, and carefully censored to prevent readers or viewers from learning any information unfavorable to the party and the state. Jeffrey Brooks has offered us several books on how to read the content of *Pravda*, the party's leading newspaper, and political scientist Ellen Propper Mickiewicz has provided sociological analyses of the impact of television in the last two decades of Soviet rule. Thomas F. Remington, another political scientist, provided a picture of 1980s journalists as teachers of ideology and politics, as well as members of a bureaucracy. In the book reviewed here, Thomas C. Wolfe mines the available evidence to show leading Soviet print journalists from the thaw onward as somewhat independent agents who helped bring into existence a shared world of value and meaning. This effort to construct socialist reality succeeded under the relative freedom of action provided under Nikita Khrushchev but then boomeranged against the stagnant successor regime of Leonid Brezhnev. Journalists' freedom of action was considerably constricted, their code of professionalism was challenged, and the pictures they drew in the news media increasingly failed to reflect the realities of Soviet life. This reduced the effectiveness of Soviet journalism and diminished journalists' commitment to the system, but most significantly, journalists grew frustrated with their reduced importance as societal leaders, even as the public's media hunger not only fueled significant growth in the circulation of print media but even created shortages.

The advent of Mikhail Gorbachev's *glasnost* rekindled journalists' importance, but the collapse of the Soviet Union and the conversion of its mass media to businesses, many of which concerned themselves with profits, put an end to the longtime Russian journalists' role as members of the intelligentsia and societal leaders.

Wolfe employed a variety of disciplinary approaches for the research on this book, using not only historical methods but also those from anthropology, sociology, political science, and literature.

Instead of focusing on journalists as a whole, which

could have produced a much different picture, given the limited opportunities and time for independence for local journalists, Wolfe carefully examines the work of a small number of prominent individuals. The first chapter spotlights the work of *Izvestiia* editor Alexei Adzubei as the primary sponsor of the liberalizing media attitudes espoused by Khrushchev, his father-in-law. Elite journalists adopted a code of professionalism devoted to helping society understand itself. The second chapter provides a careful reading of the constructively critical journalistic essays of *Izvestiia* feature writer Anatolii Agranovskii, who, like many other journalists (described in chapter three) began to lose faith in the system as Brezhnev's comrades expressed their preference for ideology, images, and rituals praising the regime despite the competing views and information offered by foreign radio broadcasts. Chapter four outlines how journalists' loss of faith produced critical political journalism that was no longer committed to building and maintaining the socialist edifice.

When the communist system collapsed in 1991, journalists lost the pedagogical and leadership role to which they had aspired. Wolfe's final chapter, "Teaching Tabloids," the least satisfactory in the book, examines closely the work of three widely read tabloids in post-communist Russia, two sexually oriented and one a "supermarket" publication. Wolfe suggests these papers provided useful knowledge to readers as journalists struggled to retain positions of societal leadership, an effort that fell victim to the democracy of the marketplace. In reality consumers had started to tune out in the 1970s, as the Soviet leadership sought to pacify an increasingly indifferent public with visual entertainment while Soviet news was imprisoned by print.

Wolfe acknowledges (p. 3) that he cannot measure the impact Soviet journalism had on its readers, but in so doing he dodges an important question about journalism. Were the media reflecting elite opinion, signaling acceptable behavior or belief, or acting as independent agents of change?

While he does not successfully answer all of them, the author poses important questions in this book about the role of Soviet journalists, news and information that move us beyond the propaganda and public relations models that have characterized earlier studies.

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MIDDLE EAST AND NORTHERN AFRICA

MARK R. COHEN. *Poverty and Charity in the Jewish Community of Medieval Egypt*. (Jews, Christians, and Muslims from the Ancient to the Modern World.) Princeton: Princeton University Press. 2005. Pp. xi, 287. \$39.50.

While the study of charity as a religious ideal is well developed in both Islamic and Judaic studies, the study of poverty and of the poor has not received similar at-

tention. Legal literature laying out in detail the prescriptions for charity and its ethical and religious underpinnings abounds in both traditions, but documentary sources are scarce and chronicles reveal little about the subject for obvious reasons. The Cairo Geniza, that treasure trove of Judeo-Arabic documents from Egypt's Jewish communities in the eleventh through the thirteenth centuries, provides abundant material allowing a rare opportunity to write about poverty and the poor in a specific historical setting. Mark R. Cohen's newest contribution to the field of Jewish and Judeo-Islamic history undertakes the task with the lucidity, energy, and meticulous attention to detail that readers of his work always know they can take for granted. Cohen offers us both a monograph and a companion anthology of translated documents. Readers who do not wish to immerse themselves in the details of the monograph will find an excellent summary of Cohen's work in the introduction to the anthology.

About ninety percent of the world's Jewish population of the Middle Ages lived in the lands of Islam. This book, then, constitutes a major contribution not only to the history of the Jews in Arab lands but to Jewish history more broadly, and Cohen engages the full range of source material—especially the intricacies of Talmudic law—in his discussion. He also engages equally the Islamic prescriptive material and the scholarly literature on medieval European and Byzantine history.

Several aspects of Cohen's work are particularly welcome additions to scholarship. His chapter "A Taxonomy of the Poor" makes a major contribution to poverty studies by discussing medieval Egyptian Jewish society in terms of conjunctural and structural poverty, categories borrowed from *Annales* school studies of medieval and early modern European indigence. Cohen's justification for using these terms is entirely persuasive and it provides the analytical underpinning for several of his other important contributions. His chapter "Beggars or Petitioners?" addresses a question only rarely asked in the literature: how did the poor view themselves? This attempt to locate the social meaning of petitions and letters of appeal is approached with the author's usual deft reading of the texts. With his distinction between conjunctural and structural poverty firmly established, Cohen is able in this crucial chapter to lay out a persuasive argument for understanding the distinction made between beggar and petitioner by articulating requests for assistance in the vocabulary of medieval Near Eastern patronage. This insight opens up an entirely different way of understanding the world and self-view of the poor.

Cohen pays special attention to the relationship of Jewish law (*halakhah*) to actual practice by looking at Maimonides's code on charity in the light of the Cairo Geniza documents. He is thus able to do for medieval Egyptian Jewry what we cannot do for other medieval Jewish communities: see the workings of legal theory and prescription in a specific social, economic, and cultural context and in their relationship to daily life.

In addition to the education on poverty and charity

readers who want to learn about the historical sources for the period of the classical Geniza, the methodologies of Jewish and Islamic history, and the intricacies of philological arguments will learn much from Cohen's careful discussions of the nature of his evidence, the limits of his documents, and the methodologies of comparative analysis in this complex historical setting. These detailed discussions will probably be of more interest to Jewish and Islamic historians than others, but Europeanists and other premodern historians who are curious about how medieval Jewish and Islamic historians go about their business will find satisfaction here. The monograph itself now sets a standard for historians dealing with the classical Geniza in its thorough integration of rabbinic, Arabo-Islamic, and Judeo-Arabic sources.

Cohen's careful and transparent discussions of his sources provide a model of responsible scholarly methodology, which could be used almost as a handbook for graduate students wanting to know how to weave a variety of different genres of historical evidence together. Princeton University Press is also to be commended for doing what so many other presses will not do these days: printing the notes at the bottom of the page, leaving the 'clear trail for subsequent historians to follow' that the AHA's own standards of professional conduct enjoin.

This constitutes a major contribution to Jewish history, Islamic history, and to the history of poverty and he poor more generally. Cohen's sensitivity to historical context, combined with meticulous attention to philological detail and a deft touch with the text, make these volumes a masterful, and genuinely moving, historical reconstruction.

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ERIC C. DURSTELER. *Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern Mediterranean*. (The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science; 124th series, number 2.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 2006. 2p. xi, 289. \$50.00.

The introduction to this book is dazzling. Eric C. Dursteler opens with the deceptively simple observation that or nearly all of the early modern period, the Venetian and Turkish states were at peace (p. 6). Certainly there were conflicts, and nasty ones at that, but the great majority of years saw coexistence and cooperation. Dursteler knows well that his comment flies in the face of a deeply rooted historiography, originating in ancient Greece and, alas, if anything intensifying in the present, that sees Mediterranean relations in terms of antagonistic binaries of monolithic bodies: West vs. East, Latin vs. Turk, Christian vs. Muslim. The reality of the situation was then, and is now, rather more complex and nuanced. Dursteler's examination of the nature of personal and national identity takes him deep into anthropological theory and studies from around the globe, showing not only that there were many different

markers of identity—birth, religion, language, clothes, political allegiance—but that these could be combined in an almost infinite variety of ways; and individuals could hold apparent opposites simultaneously, or could shift fluidly from one state to another. Where tradition has seen opposition and distinction, Dursteler finds "ambiguity and multivalence in individual identity" (p. 18).

The Venetian community in Constantinople provides an excellent site for exploration of issues of nation and identity. The more formal portion of that community counted merchants and diplomats and their staffs and households, under the general direction of a *baillo* appointed by the home government. Clustered around it was a much larger, variegated population of Greek subjects of the Venetian Republic, Latin-rite Christians reliant upon Venetian protection, supplicants with some claim on Venetian justice (subjects enslaved by the Turks, or exiled from Venetian lands), and on the fringes a body of individuals who might or might not be in some manner Venetian subjects and who might not be definitively Christian. The diplomatic staff worked closely with the Ottoman government and other embassies, while spying upon them; the chancellery often served the entire international community in Constantinople, not just Venetians. It might fairly be said that virtually everything that happened in the city was routed through or known by the Venetian community; and so the Venetian community was regularly touched by all factors and dynamics that went into the construction of identity and nation.

The body of the book offers a relatively straightforward and empirical account but does not lose sight of Dursteler's larger purposes. An initial chapter traces the membership and many operations of the Venetian nation. A second looks at Venetian merchants, increasingly nonpatrician "citizens," either original (*originari*) or made so by privilege (*de intus et extra*), as well as noncitizens who came from lands subject to the Venetian empire. This section indicates how nonhomogeneous the community was, with a few patricians mixing with commoners of every conceivable background, and even some Ottoman subjects and miscellaneous others who had managed to insinuate themselves into the Venetian fold. Further blurring the boundaries are the subjects of the third chapter, the even larger body of exiles, slaves, Greeks, sailors, artisans, religious, and lesser merchants, who often had no legal right to be considered Venetian but who sought (and often received) protection by the *baillo* and his officials.

At that point any attempt to create a clean taxonomy must break down, a feature that Dursteler readily acknowledges and even makes a centerpiece of his discussion. Touching the Venetian community, and sometimes an informal part of it, were peoples whose identities and nations scarcely allow for precise delineation: Jews and Orthodox (just as various as Catholics), Marranos (distrusted by Jews and Christians alike), renegades (Christian converts to Islam). Every combination of religion and nationality could be found,

with many passing from one loyalty to another without qualm. Even the "Venetian" in the city might have little contact with Venice, or might lack Venetian credentials, or might change nationality by affiliation with other peoples in Constantinople, thus demonstrating "the fuzzy and elastic nature of identity in the Venetian merchant nation" (p. 133). Inter marriages, of course, only muddled the situation further. A final chapter, on interchanges between Ottomans and "Venetians"—economic, social, and even religious—further demonstrates that boundaries were always permeable, and that exchanges were both constant and generally amicable.

Despite the vast research and secondary reading that has gone into this book's composition, Dursteler never allows it to become antiquarian or anecdotal. His overall intention—to demonstrate cultural diversity in a place and era that has been commonly assumed to lack it—remains firmly at the fore, and he admirably fulfills his task. Constantinople, it would appear, was a thick, rich mixture, as was its Venetian community. The overriding lesson is implicit but not hard to discern: where identity can be kept fuzzy and elastic, there is still hope for coexistence.

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DONALD QUATAERT. *Miners and the State in the Ottoman Empire: The Zonguldak Coalfield, 1822–1920*. (International Studies in Social History.) New York: Berghahn Books. 2006. Pp. xii, 257. Cloth \$80.00, paper \$25.00.

In this ten-chapter book, Donald Quataert attempts to present a detailed history of the major coal basin of Turkey in order to understand the modernization of the Ottoman state and compare its labor practices with those of other coal-producing countries, especially England and the United States.

The Zonguldak-Eregli (Heraclea) coal basin, the largest in the Middle East, extends for about 150 miles along the northwestern Black Sea coast of Turkey, and for sixty miles into the interior. The fractured terrain originally was estimated to hold about two billion tons of coal, some of it close to the surface and the remainder deep in the ground or under the sea; the amount of coal exacted between 1822 and 1920 was barely one percent of the total. The coal field was discovered in 1829 by Uzun Mehmet, celebrated over a century later by the People's Houses of the Republic as a patriotic hero dedicated to the good of the state. Mehmet's belated recognition, according to Quataert, indicates "a great deal about the formation of republican ideals and of the state itself" (p. 9).

The bulk of Quataert's book, covering approximately six chapters, is dedicated to a rather minute study, of the five categories of the mining labor force (hewers, basket carriers or unskilled laborers, transporters, mine-support makers, and boatlaunchers) as well as to work conditions, pay, safety, etc. The work force was

obtained by compulsory recruitment from some 1,100 villages in the region, usually under the direction of the village headman, although only about 200 villages provided the manpower at any one time. Workers labored for fifteen days in the mines and spent the rest of the month at home tending to their fields to maintain agricultural production, which provided the bulk of state revenues. By 1914 the nearly 10,000 rotational workers, laboring in the mines under ill conditions, received a mere six piasters a day. There were also free workers, from outside the Zonguldak area working above ground, as well as soldiers in time of labor shortage. Yet, despite the lamentable conditions of work, health, safety, and pay, the villagers conscripted to work still desired to maintain their monopoly over labor in the mines.

In Quataert's view, the evolution of the operation and administration of the coal basin, and particularly of the transportation of the coal from mine to sea and land carriers, encapsulates Ottoman modernist efforts and opening to the world. The coal mines, which began to be exploited in the 1850s, were first declared *privy purse*, but the government eventually shared their exploitation with private entrepreneurs, including state dignitaries (Ragip Paşa) as well as a series of domestic or foreign companies, such as the Eregli (Heraclea), financed by French capital, and the Giurgiu. The government's efforts to improve extraction techniques and to liberalize the operation of the mines (while maintaining overall control through first the Maritime, then the Commerce, Agriculture, and Mines Ministries) probably derived from its commitment to modernism as much as sheer necessity. Indeed, necessity or *Zaruriyet* to use its Islamic term, had become the Ottoman government's chief argument in legitimizing change and innovation against Islamist opponents. Its main advocate was Ahmed Cevdet Paşa (d. 1895), the monarchist historian, adviser to three sultans, and head of the Mecelle Commission (charged to produce a new Civil Code who used his Islamic erudition to turn *Zaruriyet* into a basic principle legitimizing the government's reforms).

Quataert implies throughout his work that the development of the coal basin produced a variety of changes, which he slights somewhat to deal mainly with the situation of the workers, because "the history of workers and other non-elite groups" (p. 7) has been ignored by many Ottoman historians. But correcting this oversight should not obscure the fact that the development of approximately 120 coal mines centered around six or seven localities produced a notable degree of urbanization and movement of population. Zonguldak, the operational center and main loading port after 1850, became a quasi-cosmopolitan society, with French schools and workers recruited from Montenegro and even England as well as from other regions of Turkey. Quataert's claim that his book "makes a number of important contributions to our understanding of labor history, modern state formation, and the nature of capital" (p. 227) may be somewhat hyperbolic with regard to the latter two areas. Nevertheless, base-

on original documents and the main published Turkish sources, the book is a mine of valuable information and a solid contribution to Ottoman Turkish studies.

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URI BIALER. *Cross on the Star of David: The Christian World in Israel's Foreign Policy, 1948–1967*. (Indiana Series in Middle East Studies.) Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 2005. Pp. xiv, 240. \$39.95.

Immediately following the birth of Israel in May 1948 (actually a year earlier, when the Palestinian problem first came to the attention of the United Nations), Israel faced a series of complex issues in its relations with the Christian world in general and the Roman Catholic Church in particular. First, it had to make contact with the Vatican in order to assure that the Holy See would refrain from adopting an anti-Zionist position—whether public or secret—on the establishment of the Jewish state, and that the Holy See would use its influence to get other countries to follow suit. Second, Israel had to reduce the political damage caused by the church's hostility toward Zionism's gains in the War of Independence. Third, it had to resolve a number of questions, created at the end of the war, that were linked to Christian holy sites and the Christian minority now dwelling in Israeli territory.

Catholic policy toward the Zionist movement was basically hostile; its roots nourished in millennia-old theological doctrine. Pope Pius X had clearly stated as much o Theodore Herzl in January 1904, when the latter requested the church's support of Zionism: "The soil of Jerusalem is sanctified by the life of Jesus. As the head of the Church I cannot speak otherwise. The Jews did not recognize our Lord therefore we cannot recognize the Jewish people. If [the Jewish people] come to Palestine and settle there, the Church and its priests will be ready to baptize all of you."

Uri Bialer's book examines the answer given by the fledgling state—especially its foreign ministry—to the challenge posed by the basic positions of the Catholic Church and its political offshoots toward Israel, the Jewish people, and the *Terra Sancta*. Writing in a fluent and eloquent style, Bialer has based his work on a wealth of documentation—some of it only recently declassified—in order to answer cardinal questions that all for meticulous scholarly examination. These include the influence of the Jewish factor in Israel's foreign policy on the Christian world. That is, were the decisions of Israel's policymakers and officials "devoid" of theological-historical impedimenta? How did Israel square the circle when, on the one hand, it was officially committed to freedom of ritual and religion within its borders, and, on the other hand, as a Jewish state, it opposed the missionary activity of the church's institutes? Did this dilemma influence Israel's relations with the entire Christian religious establishment and with countries in the international system? Given that the

Christian world is not a monolithic body, to what extent was the young state able to maneuver among the diverse positions of multifarious Christian groups and derive maximum benefit from them? Were there behind-the-scenes contacts that ran parallel to the open contacts on this issue? What was their nature? And were they a case of "lost opportunity?" What was the Israeli Foreign Ministry's assessment regarding the amount of influence the Church's institutions had on the foreign policy of their respective countries and the foreign policy of other countries? And how did this assessment translate into practical policy toward those churches and states? When did the first signs of change appear in the Catholic church's position toward the Jewish state, and what role did diplomacy play in this shift (if at all)?

Bialer answers these questions using a wide range of documentation located in the Israel State Archives, material that has only lately been opened to the public. The documents include files from the Ministry of Religious Affairs' Department of Christian Communities, Israeli Cabinet minutes, protocol from the Knesset's Foreign Affairs and Security Committee, scores of foreign ministry files related directly to the issues, and hundreds of files that deal with them indirectly. Like many scholars, Bialer bemoans the conspicuous lack of Vatican documentation, material that is still off limits to researchers. His end point is 1967, the year that Israel gained control of East Jerusalem and the West Bank which then altered the regional situation from the Christian world's point of view.

Bialer examines Israel's opposition to the plan to internationalize Jerusalem; Israel's early diplomatic efforts to crack the Vatican's refusal to have any form of relations with the young state; Catholic missionary work in Israel; the status of the land and property of various churches located in Israel; and the projection of the church's historical legacy (including the Vatican's position on the rescue of Jews during the Holocaust). The book is a rapid read and parts of it glide along like a whodunit. The chapter on Ambassador Eliyau Sasson's madcap and ultimately futile attempt to take advantage of what was perceived in the Israeli Foreign Ministry as an internal struggle between the Vatican's Acting Secretary of State, Cardinal Domenico Tardini, and the Vatican's Secretary of the Sacred Congregation for the Oriental Church, Cardinal Eugène Tisserant, in order to open unofficial channels to the pope's court, is a page-turner. Equally fascinating, and with denouements no less bitter and pathetic, are the chapters that describe the prodigious attempts of Ambassador Maurice Fischer to advance moves rooted in theology and to believe that his previous connections with the Vatican and his naïve *sub rosa* overtures to it could reverse the Holy See's position.

Bialer describes, analyzes, and evaluates the indefatigable activity of Nahum Goldmann, president of the World Zionist Organization, and the activities of numerous other Jewish organizations before and during the Second Ecumenical Council (1962–1965). Bialer's portrayal of Goldmann's and the organizations' lack of

cooperation and their failure to unite their constituents into coordinated activity is no less eye-opening than his description of the debilitating internal struggle that incapacitated the Israeli Foreign Ministry in this period. Every intelligent reader will enjoy reading Bialer's painstakingly researched and fascinatingly told account.

The book tries to present the newly independent state's maneuvering—between realpolitik and the historical-religious onus that it bore and that had no less an influence on its policy making—as a case of point and counterpoint. The book also describes in detail the relations between the fledgling Jewish state and the Christian world and Vatican as reflected in the corridors of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, where differences of opinion and conflicting outlooks were hammered out and where power struggles and disputes over basic issues raged. Bialer shows that Israel's foreign policy was formulated, in effect, outside the Foreign Ministry's corridors. It was beyond the Foreign Ministry that the young state's urgent and crucial political agenda was worked out, and the decision was made regarding "who" had responsibility for these matters, especially those recognized to be in the nation's highest interest and issues considered too sensitive and discreet to be left in the hands of the Foreign Ministry and Jewish organizations of good intention.

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SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

RODERICK J. MCINTOSH. *Ancient Middle Niger: Urbanism and the Self-Organizing Landscape*. (Case Studies in Early Societies.) New York: Cambridge University Press. 2005. Pp. xvi, 261. Cloth \$90.00, paper \$34.99.

In 1977, when Roderick J. McIntosh and two fellow archaeologists first visited the site of Jenne-Jeno in the Middle Niger Delta of West Africa's Mali, they were awed by the vastness of an ancient settlement littered with ruins of clay-brick houses, exposed and still occupied burial urns, evidence of extensive iron works, and many tons of broken pottery among other surface artifacts. However, in what appeared to be an ancient urban landscape (later dated to ca. A.D. 400–1000, with earliest settlement third century B.C.), they saw nothing erected on the surface to indicate its importance as a heavily populated wealthy city and center of pre-Islamic trade. At one time, archaeological wisdom expected that a prehistoric city grounded in preindustrial economies would exhibit something indicating the seat of power of a coercive kingdom or state (pp. 10–11). Colonial-era historians and archaeologists were aware of the Jenne-Jeno site, but they failed to recognize it as an ancient urban center because of the absence of "signposts of permanence," the kinds of monumental architecture designed to convince ordinary citizens that their rulers had a divine right to rule (pp. 14–15). Thus, the author's basic challenge in this book is to grapple with

a conundrum he labels "City without Citadel." (McIntosh later discusses how and why prehistorians have abandoned their earlier "obsession with the apex of urban society, with the king and court, elites and forces of power" [p. 209].)

McIntosh reasons that monumental manifestations of state power are absent in ancient settlements of the Middle Niger because they evolved without the kinds of power hierarchies and accompanying symbols characteristic of urban centers of the ancient Middle East and elsewhere. Viewed from his stance on the tells (ancient settlement mounds) of the Middle Niger, McIntosh argues that the more familiar kinds of despotic, state-driven societies lack sustainability and are fragile and prone to eventual collapse because of their rigid hierarchical infrastructures (p. 20). For McIntosh, ancient urbanism in the Middle Niger Delta was of a different species, with nondespotic "self-identifying communities" of diverse corporate groups in no need of a king or "other appurtenances of the state-based town" (p. 43). Influenced by the unpredictable and potentially hazardous sub-Saharan Middle Niger environment (dramatically referred to here as "the edge of chaos") these communities spontaneously evolved into what the author calls a "selforganizing landscape." Passing through multiple stages of development, the process culminated by the middle of the first millennium A.D. in a kind of "multi-satellite, multicorporate Urban Complex" that was innovative and flexible enough to achieve the type of long-term sustainability (pp. 32–33) that McIntosh has found at Jenne-Jeno and other partly explored locations in the Middle Niger Delta.

The author hypothesizes that the ancient urban centers of the Middle Niger were able to emerge by themselves and achieve and sustain their nondespotic urbanism for more than a millennium and a half thanks to "the Mande complex of core rules" (p. 41). In place of despotic rule in a rigid hierarchical state system, McIntosh argues that Middle Niger urban centers were governed through heterarchy, or a network of groups of competing, overlapping interests (farmers, herders, fishermen, hunters, artisans, merchants, etc.) that worked together to create sustained resistance to the centralizing tendencies found in despotic states (p. 228).

The author's discussion of local peoples' "core concepts" and "social metaphors" (p. 136) recalls the methodology employed in *The Peoples of the Middle Niger: The Island of Gold* (1998), in which he stresses the significance of the "symbolic landscape" with its esoteric value systems and ideologies as reflected through myth and legend. Regrettably, an error committed in the earlier book (p. 145) is repeated in the present volume where McIntosh characterizes an important pre-Islamic religious icon in the form of a benevolent and revered giant serpent-guardian (ubiquitous in West African tradition from desert edge to Atlantic coast) as "horrible beast" that prohibited occupation of attractive environments (pp. 49, 138).

A particularly fine feature of this book is McIntosh's determined effort to bring all potentially relevant a

pects of local history and culture into the conversation using his "Pulse Model." Limited space precludes doing it justice, but it involves study of "the ecological and climatic patterns of the millennia preceding the mid-first millennium BC emergence of the earliest true cities on the Middle Niger alluvium." Through this, McIntosh tries to get at "the mental and symbolic circumstances of emergence and maintenance of occupational specialization," as well as "what lies behind the creation of individual and corporate identity . . . by which multiple . . . corporate groups shared the mosaic Middle Niger landscape" (p. 102). Surprisingly, the author makes no reference to Igor Kopytoff's pioneering work on the subject (*The African Frontier: The Reproduction of Traditional African Societies* [1987]). Similarly conspicuous is the lack of reference to John Hunwick's *Timbuktu and the Songhay Empire* (1999) in discussion of al-Sa'di's allegedly historical description of Jenne-Jeno, although the book that would have had the most impact on the author's perspective, had he used it, would be P. F. de Moraes Farias, *Arabic Medieval Inscriptions from the Republic of Mali: Epigraphy, Chronicles and Songhay-Tuāreg History* (2003).

At times this book appears to suffer from lack of editorial oversight. For example, the author confusingly asks the reader to recall a story about "Kaniāna," an ancestral satellite near Jenne-Jeno (p. 122) not previously mentioned, although there was an anecdote involving a settlement called Kangousa (p. 108). A defining statement on the "major thrust of this book" (p. 11) is repeated verbatim (p. 135), and there are contradictory descriptions of Bozo fishermen as "shallow-swamp" or "deep-swamp" (p. 149). Such minor flaws do not diminish the value of what is an impressive, path-breaking explanation of the origin of urban settlements on the Middle Niger River, climaxed by a fascinating final chapter in which the author offers a comparative overview of the archaeology of urban landscapes in Mesopotamia, the Nile valley, and northern China.

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BENJAMIN F. SOARES. *Islam and the Prayer Economy: History and Authority in a Malian Town*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. 2005. Pp. xii, 306. \$29.95.

In an era dominated by debate about what is loosely referred to as "fundamentalist Islam," Benjamin F. Soares's study of the shifting history of Islamic religious authority in the religious center of Niōro in Mali comes as a breath of fresh air. Soares shows that to understand any particular strand of Islam, one must see it as part of a broader spectrum of discursive traditions within Islam, each of which is shaped by relations of power at a variety of different scales, from the local to the international. Often in West Africa debates among Muslims about religious authority are more salient than debates between secularists and fundamentalists. Such debates adhere to what one

might refer to as an esoteric orthodoxy: that is, power in the region has long been understood to be founded upon access to important spiritual secrets. Sufism and the hierarchy of access to secret knowledge Sufism entails are not marginal or heterodox in such a setting, they are central to religious authority and to contemporary debates about Islam and modernity.

In choosing Niōro as his research site, Soares foregrounds the significance of spaces outside of major urban centers for the formation and maintenance of religious authority. Studies focusing exclusively on capitals like Bamako frequently miss the significance of place in the practice of religious power—authentic saintliness of the kind that is associated with exceptional Muslim leaders is understood by many Malians today as residing in provincial centers such as Niōro, not in the capital. The authority of the leaders of the two Sufi orders the book focuses on, the Hamawīyya and the Tijaniyya, is enacted and reinforced today through periodic pilgrimages to Niōro by their respective followings, out of which has emerged a "prayer economy" in which gifts are offered to these leaders in exchange for prayers, blessings, and intercession.

Soares traces the emergence of this prayer economy against the historical backdrop of broadly shared notions of hierarchy and charisma in the region, understandings that linked particular lineages (always free born) with a privileged closeness to God. Large polities governed by Muslim leaders dominated the landscape in the wake of the nineteenth-century jihad of Umar Tall. Religious authority was generally linked to descent from the Prophet, from the jihadist Umar Tall, or from a lineage understood to have particular gifts for scholarship.

The French colonial administration, in a bid to undermine the authority of the descendants of Umar Tall, tended to recruit its functionaries from within the ranks of lineages of recognized religious specialists. The book does a very nice job of showing how the French *politique musulmane* combined with a racial theory to shape preferences concerning leaders, schooling, and significantly the collection of religious gifts such as *zakkat*. The Muslim establishment was a product of the colonial encounter. However, France could not fully control the political economy that emerged with the increased mobility of populations due to the abolition of slavery, labor migration, and the construction of the railway. Mobility had complex implications: on the one hand, familiar hierarchies underwent profound change; on the other, Muslim practices became more uniform across space and time.

The book traces the rise of the Hamawīyya and its competition with the more established Tijaniyya from which it emerged. Soares explores the elements of the emerging Hamawīyya practice that have consternated other members of the Tijaniyya over time, prompting them to cast it as "subversive" to the French. He reflects on contemporary dilemmas such as the question of succession in an order devoted to awaiting the return of an exiled leader, and the status of sainthood for current religious leaders of various dispositions and backgrounds. While the histori-

cal chapters are extremely well written and well documented, it is the later ethnographic chapters addressing the actual practice of the esoteric sciences and the prayer economy in a rapidly evolving media environment that make the book a striking contribution to debates about contemporary Islam. I particularly appreciated Soares's discussion of the impasses facing the small number of reformists of a Salafi bent in attempting to reform the spiritual landscape of Niore. His observations on how both Sufi and reformist leaders channel criticism of local practice into attacks on spirit possession are also acute. This engaging and thoughtful study, which calls into question the teleological assumption that disenchantment attends modernity (an assumption implicit in both secular and Islamist discourse), will interest scholars of the history and sociology of religion very broadly.

BARBARA M. COOPER
Rutgers University

KEVIN K. GAINES. *American Africans in Ghana: Black Expatriates and the Civil Rights Era.* (The John Hope Franklin Series in African American History and Culture.) Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 2006. Pp. xiv, 342. \$34.95.

Kevin K. Gaines's book chronicles the sojourn of several notable African Americans (or as the title of his book presents it "American Africans") in Kwame Nkrumah's newly independent Ghana during the years between formal independence from British colonial rule in 1957 and the military coup that toppled one of Africa's most famous postcolonial leaders in 1966. Some, such as Julian Mayfield, Maya Angelou, and W. E. B. and Shirley Graham Du Bois, lived and worked in Ghana for a considerable time, while others, such as Richard Wright, Martin Luther King, Jr., and Malcolm X, made significant but brief visits to the country that influenced their own political development and consciousness.

As Gaines explains, this was not just the period when a "wind of change" was blowing over Africa but a time when the Cold War was raging on that continent and throughout the rest of the world, as newly independent nations such as Nkrumah's Ghana and Patrice Lumumba's Congo were striving to develop economically and to chart an independent political course, build Pan-African unity across the continent, and maneuver between the imperialist ambitions of the superpowers and their allies. This was also the period when the struggle for civil rights in the United States was at its height. The "Afros," as members of the expatriate African American community sometimes styled themselves, found that the political realities of this period, affected them just as much in exile as if they had remained in the United States.

Ghana was the first sub-Saharan African country to achieve formal independence from colonial rule, and—not least because of Nkrumah's leadership and Pan-African vision—it soon attracted African American expatriates drawn to the country for a variety of reasons. Racism and political persecution certainly propelled

Mayfield and the Du Bois's to leave the United States, but at the same time many of those who chose an African exile had a desire to contribute to the building of a new nation and shared Nkrumah's Pan-African vision. All were influenced in some way by what they found in Ghana, which for some became a base from which to oppose, or defend, the U.S. government's foreign policy in regard to Africa, as well as its treatment of African Americans at home.

Gaines skillfully manages to present to the reader a Pan-African vision that refracts various aspects of the relationship between the United States and Africa, Cold War politics, the ongoing struggle for civil rights, and aspects of African American intellectual history during this period through the prism of the personal histories and preoccupations of the "Afros," and the realities of their exile in Ghana. The first assassination attempt on Nkrumah in 1962 was clearly a defining moment, after which the loyalty of "Afros" was no longer taken for granted. Journalistic attacks on U.S. foreign and domestic policy by Mayfield and other's were sometimes at odds with Ghana's reliance on foreign aid, while support for Nkrumah's government became increasingly difficult as its domestic policies became more authoritarian and its ministers more openly corrupt.

In presenting the personal histories of some of the major African American sojourners and visitors, the book explores such key events as the 1958 All-Africa Peoples' Conference, the founding of the radical Casa blanca group of African states, and United Nations intervention and the political crisis in Congo, examining these not only as key moments in the history of modern Africa but also in terms of their Pan-African significance. Gaines manages to weave into his narrative the political and cultural concerns of "leftist" African American intellectuals of this period. In so doing, he examines questions relating to identity and citizenship throughout the African diaspora.

It might be argued that there is too much emphasis on the major male representatives of the African American exiles, and less about women and the less well-known African Americans who went to Ghana to live and work. There are detailed accounts of Mayfield's post-Ghana career and even of St. Clair Drake's scholarly concerns and critique of Afrocentrism, while there is relatively little about such major cultural figures as Angelou. Not surprisingly, there is coverage of George Padmore, Nkrumah's Trinidadian Director of African Affairs and thodoyen of British-based Pan-Africanists during the 1930 and 1940s, but tantalizingly little about Ras Makonnen another architect of British-based Pan-Africanism who was also a key figure in Nkrumah's Ghana.

But despite such complaints, this is an important book that opens up new dimensions in the Pan-African history of the relationships established between Africa and the African diaspora in the modern period.

HAKIM ADI
Middlesex University

BEVERLY CAROLEASE GRIER, *Invisible Hands: Child Labor and the State in Colonial Zimbabwe*. (Social History of Africa Series.) Portsmouth: Heinemann. 2006. Pp. xii, 284. \$29.95.

Most studies of forced labor in colonial Africa have ignored a crucial group of exploited workers: peasant boys and girls. If children appear in these analyses, they are often portrayed simply as subjects of abuse. While acknowledging such past cruelty, Beverly Carolease Grier presents a more insightful view of the lives of Shona and Ndebele children. They were not passive victims, she argues, but determined actors who resisted oppression, particularly from the 1890s to 1960s, as a white settler state advanced capitalist interests in Southern Rhodesia (Zimbabwe).

This book is informed by the ideas of anthropologist and political economist Claude Meillassoux, who examined the unbalanced reciprocal obligations that subordinated African youths to their elders. Like Philippe Ariès's *Centuries of Childhood: A Social History of Family Life* (1965), Meillassoux's scholarship offered a paradigm that outlined age transitions within agrarian societies. Grier adopts Meillassoux's framework to explain how Ndebele patriarchs, for example, maintained homestead subsistence by delegating arduous domestic tasks to dependents, mostly sons and daughters in "junior" ranks whose numbers fluctuated with captured boys and pawned girls. At no point does she romanticize African childhood as an idyllic time before white invasion. On the contrary, Grier carefully reconstructs a portrait of contested family hierarchies in nineteenth-century Zimbabwe. She then pinpoints the customary mechanisms mediating household tensions created by strict "senior" control over restive youths seeking to become married adults. Such aspirant older children could challenge authority by escaping from home, though desertion frequently brought insecurity. Grier identifies a dominant source of parental leverage in the right of polygynous fathers, with the consent of wives, to negotiate the passage of their sons' bride-wealth (cattle) and nubile daughters (brides) between households. Following colonial conquests in the 1890s, white settlers would learn what Shona and Ndebele parents long understood: African children knew how to work, but they were not easily manipulated, and they withstood hardship by choosing flight.

Grier uses her "thick" descriptions of precolonial gender and generational dynamics as a basis of comparison to assess the effects of materialist processes in Southern Rhodesia. She considers how settler land appropriations, wage employment, and migrant labor, which increased after the British South Africa Company's (BSAC) suppression of the Shona and Ndebele Risings (1896–1897), redefined childhood for African boys and girls. In so doing, Grier draws on the ideas of Elizabeth Schmidt, Diana Jeater, and others, who examined how the BSAC manipulated homestead relationships to fulfill colonial aims, re-

inforcing customs, for instance, that benefited white farmers who, as one stated, ordered the "old chaps . . . of the kraals" to make their young "piccanins available for certain kinds of work" (p. 93). Grier demonstrates that "the accumulation of capital" necessitated safeguarding "patriarchal construction[s] of African childhood" that maneuvered youths into serving the colonizer as though they were "under the direction . . . of senior males" (p. 93).

Unlike Schmidt and Jeater, whose research highlights strategies of African women, Grier concentrates on boys (and their peer-based socialization), in part because male workers feature prominently in archival records. This focus on formative masculinity shapes her main chapters, which cover nascent state policies that uprooted entire chiefdoms and shunted them onto barren reserves, where they slid into poverty. With drought and depression exacerbating scarcity and the lures of town beckoning, rural children departed in droves for urban areas and mining camps. There they took menial jobs, behaved in "anti-social" ways, and faced persecution as "vagabonds." Colonial authority sought to stem youth "vagrancy" by enforcing tighter pass restrictions, involuntary labor contracts, and juvenile apprenticeships, which primed boys for "docile" drudgery—and the boss's whip. African patriarchs, too, were enlisted to punish wayward sons and daughters. Some missionary reformers condemned these penalties as dressed-up slavery. Taken together, the corrective measures achieved few of the desired goals. Shona and Ndebele boys reacted to crackdowns by deserting work and acting out on the streets.

In a fascinating chapter titled "Earn While You Learn," Grier describes the proliferation of "farm schools," which the state and employers hoped would impose discipline on unruly children and appeal to "respectable" African parents who wanted better prospects for skilled sons and daughters. Of course pupils abandoned this institution when they saw that education revolved around mandatory work for the settler class. But they also stayed in farm school because it provided a space to organize student opposition to white rule, which fueled the rise of guerillas, known in Shona as the "boys," or *vakomana*, who fought for the independence of Zimbabwe. The book concentrates so fully on forms of resistance that other sentiments vital to youth socialization—from attitudes to courting and leisure (i.e. competitive sports) to cultural performance (praise song and street theater)—are sometimes overlooked.

In sum, Grier has produced an important investigation of the changing social dimensions of African childhood. By placing children at the center of historical analysis, Grier shows, as do recent monographs of generational struggles in twentieth-century South Africa, that young Africans not only used wage labor and urban pursuits "to challenge patriarchal controls" (p. 92). They also shaped childhood to overturn colonialism itself.

BENEDICT CARTON
George Mason University

Collected Essays

These volumes, recently received in the *AHR* office, do not lend themselves readily to unified reviews; the contents are therefore listed.

COMPARATIVE/WORLD

TIYA MILES and SHARON P. HOLLAND, editors. *Crossing Waters, Crossing Worlds: The African Diaspora in Indian Country*. Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press. 2006. Pp. xx, 364. Cloth \$84.95, paper \$23.95.

SHARON P. HOLLAND, "Not Recognized by the Tribe." TIYA MILES, Eating out of the Same Pot? TIYA MILES and SHARON P. HOLLAND, Crossing Waters, Crossing Worlds. EUGENE B. REDMOND, A Harbor of Sense: An Interview with Joy Harjo. JENNIFER D. BRODY and SHARON P. HOLLAND, An/Other Case of New England Underwriting: Negotiating Race and Property in *Memoirs of Eleanor Eldridge*. TIFFANY M. MCKINNEY, Race and Federal Recognition in Native New England. DAVID A. Y. O. CHANG, Where Will the Nation Be at Home? Race, Nationalisms, and Emigration Movements in the Creek Nation. BARBARA KRAUTHAMER, In Their "Native Country": Freedpeople's Understandings of Culture and Citizenship in the Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations. MELINDA MICCO, "Blood and Money": The Case of Seminole Freedmen and Seminole Indians in Oklahoma. CELIA E. NAYLOR, "Playing Indian"? The Selection of Radmilla Cody as Miss Navajo Nation, 1997–1998. DEBORAH E. KANTER, "Their Hair Was Curly": Afro-Mexicans in Indian Villages, Central Mexico, 1700–1820. ROBERT WARRIOR, *Lone Wolf* and Du Bois for a New Century: Intersections of Native American and African American Literatures. VIRGINIA KENNEDY, Native Americans, African Americans, and the Space That Is America: Indian Presence in the Fiction of Toni Morrison. TAMARA BUFFALO, Knowing All of My Names. WENDY S. WALTERS, After the Death of the Last: Performance as History in Monique Mojica's *Princess Pocahontas and the Blue Spots*. ROBERT KEITH COLLINS, *Katimih o Sa Chata Kiyou* (Why Am I Not Choctaw)? Race in the Lived Experiences of Two Black Choctaw Mixed-Bloods. KU'UALOHA HO'OMANAWANUI, From Ocean to O-Shen: Reggae, Rap, and Hip Hop in Hawai'i. ROBERTA J. HILL, Heartbreak.

ASIA

ODD ARNE WESTAD and SOPHIE QUINN-JUDGE, editors. *The Third Indochina War: Conflict between China, Vietnam and Cambodia, 1972–1979*. (Cass Series: Cold War

History.) New York: Routledge. 2006. Pp. viii, 242 \$120.00.

ODD ARNE WESTAD, From War to Peace to War in Indochina LIEN-HANG T. NGUYEN, The Sino-Vietnamese Split and the Indochina War, 1968–1975. CHEN JIAN, China, the Vietnam War, and the Sino-American Rapprochement, 1968–1973. CÉCILE MENÉTREY-MONCHAU, The Changing Post-War US Strategy in Indochina. LUU DOAN HUYNH, The Paris Agreement of 1973 and Vietnam's Vision of the Future. NGUYEN VU TUNG, The Paris Agreement and Vietnam-ASEAN Relations in the 1970s. NGÔ VINH LONG, The Socialization of South Vietnam. CHRIS TOPHER E. GOSCHA, Vietnam, the Third Indochina War and the Meltdown of Asian Internationalism. BEN KIERNAN, External and Indigenous Sources of Khmer Rouge Ideology. SOPHIE QUINN-JUDGE, Victory on the Battlefield; Isolation in Asia Vietnam's Cambodia Decade, 1979–1989.

EUROPE: EARLY MODERN AND MODERN

SACHIKO KUSUKAWA and IAN MACLEAN, editors. *Transmitting Knowledge: Words, Images, and Instruments in Early Modern Europe*. (Oxford-Warburg Studies.) Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2006. Pp. xv, 274 \$185.00.

SVEN DUPRÉ, Visualization in Renaissance Optics: The Function of Geometrical Diagrams and Pictures in the Transmission of Practical Knowledge. CATHERINE EAGLETON, Medieval Sundials and Manuscript Sources: The Transmission of Information about the Navicula and the *Organum Ptolomei* in Fifteenth-Century Europe. SACHIKO KUSUKAWA, The Uses of Pictures in the Formation of Learned Knowledge: The Case of Leonhard Fuchs and Andreas Vesalius. CHRISTOPH LÜTHY, Where Logical Necessity Becomes Visual Persuasion: Descartes's Clear and Distinct Illustrations. IAN MACLEAN, Diagrams in the Defence of Galen: Medical Uses of Tables, Squares, Dichotomies, Wheels, and Latitudes, 1480–1574. ALEXANDER MARR, The Production and Distribution of Muti Oddi's *Dello squadro* (1625). ADAM MOSLEY, Objects of Knowledge: Mathematics and Models in Sixteenth-Century Cosmology and Astronomy. ISABELLE PANTIN, Kepler's *Epitome*: New Images for an Innovative Book. VOLKER R. REMMERT, "Doce parva pictura, quod multae scripturae non dicunt": Frontispieces, Their Functions, and Their Audiences in Seventeenth-Century Mathematical Sciences.

MIDDLE EAST AND NORTHERN AFRICA

ISRAEL GERSHONI, AMY SINGER, and Y. HAKAN ERDEM, editors. *Middle East Historiographies: Narrating the Twentieth Century*. Seattle: University of Washington Press. 2006. Pp. viii, 336. \$30.00.

2. STEPHEN HUMPHREYS, *The Historiography of the Modern Middle East: Transforming a Field of Study*. CHARLES D. MITH, *The Historiography of World War I and the Emergence of the Contemporary Middle East*. JULIA CLANCY-SMITH, *Twentieth-Century Historians and Historiography of the Middle East: Women, Gender, and Empire*. FATMA MÜGE GÖÇEK, *Leading Genocide: Turkish Historiography on the Armenian Deportations and Massacres of 1915*. ISRAEL GERSHONI, *The Theory of Crisis and the Crisis in a Theory: Intellectual History in Twentieth-Century Middle Eastern Studies*. ELLIS GOLDBERG, *The Historiography of Crisis in the Egyptian Political Economy*. MARILYN BOOTH, *On Gender, History, . . . and Fiction*. EVE M. TROUTT POWELL, *Will That Subaltern Ever Speak? Finding African Slaves in the Historiography of the Middle East*. JUAN R. I. COLE, *Muslim Religious Extremism in Egypt: A Historiographical Critique of Narratives*. WALTER ARMBRUST, *Audiovisual Media and History of the Arab Middle East*.

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

TRACY J. LUEDKE and HARRY G. WEST, editors. *Borders and Healers: Brokering Therapeutic Resources in South-east Africa*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 2006. Pp. vi, 223. Cloth \$65.00, paper \$24.95.

HARRY G. WEST and TRACY J. LUEDKE, *Healing Divides: Therapeutic Border Work in Southeast Africa*. HARRY G. WEST, *Working the Borders to Beneficial Effect: The Not-So-Indigenous Knowledge of Not-So-Traditional Healers in Northern Mozambique*. TRACY J. LUEDKE, *Presidents, Bishops, and Mothers: The Construction of Authority in Mozambican Healing*. DAVID SIMMONS, *Of Markets and Medicine: The Changing Significance of Zimbabwean Muti in the Age of Intensified Globalization*. JAMES PFEIFFER, *Money, Modernity, and Morality: Traditional Healing and the Expansion of the Holy Spirit in Mozambique*. RIJK VAN DIJK, *Transnational Images of Pentecostal Healing: Comparative Examples from Malawi and Botswana*. JULIAN M. MURCHISON, *From HIV/AIDS to Ukimwi: Narrating Local Accounts of a Cure*. STACEY LANGWICK, *Geographies of Medicine: Interrogating the Boundary between "Traditional" and "Modern" Medicine in Colonial Tanganyika*. CHRISTOPHER J. COLVIN, *Shifting Geographies of Suffering and Recovery: Traumatic Storytelling after Apartheid*. STEVEN FEIERMAN, *Ethnographic Regions—Healing, Power, and History*.

Documents and Bibliographies

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COMPARATIVE/WORLD

DOCKERY, KEVIN. *Stalkers and Shooters: A History of Snipers*. New York: Berkley Caliber. 2006. Pp. viii, 372. \$24.95.

ASIA

DZENGŠEO. *The Diary of a Manchu Soldier in Seventeenth-Century China: "My Service in the Army."* Foreword and translation by NICOLA DI COSMO. (Routledge Studies in the Early History of Asia.) New York: Routledge. 2006. Pp. x, 140. \$110.00.

CANADA AND THE UNITED STATES

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FRANKLIN, BENJAMIN. *Not Your Usual Founding Father: Selected Readings from Benjamin Franklin*. Edited by EDMUND S. MORGAN. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2006. Pp. xiv, 303. \$26.00.

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TAYLOR, HENRY. *From Lead Mines to Gold Fields: Memories of an Incredibly Long Life*. Edited and with an introduction by DONALD R. PARMAN. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 2006. Pp. xxv, 225. \$24.95.

TAYLOR, MARION ANN, and HEATHER E. WEIR, editors. *Let Her Speak for Herself: Nineteenth-Century Women Writing on the Women of Genesis*. Waco, Tex.: Baylor University Press. 2006. Pp. xvii, 495. \$44.95.

VENN, GEORGE. *Soldier to Advocate: C.E.S. Wood's 1877 Legacy*. A Soldier's Unpublished Diary, Drawings, Poetry, and Letters of Alaska and The Nez Perce Conflict. La Grande, Oreg.: Wordcraft of Oregon. 2006. Pp. viii, 97. \$20.00.

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WHITEHEAD, DON. *Combat Reporter: Don Whitehead's World War II Diary and Memoirs*. Edited by JOHN B. ROMEISER (World War II: The Global, Human, and Ethical Dimensions, number 12.) New York: Fordham University Press. 2006. Pp. x, 236. \$26.95.

WHITEHEAD, JOHN FREDERICK, and JOHANN CARL BÜTTNER. *Souls for Sale: Two German Redemptioners Come to Revolutionary America*. The Life Stories of John Frederick Whitehead and Johann Carl Büttner. Edited by SUSAN E. KLEPP, FARLEY GRUBB, and ANNE PFAELZER DE ORITZ. Assisted by MATTHEW MUEHLBAUER and UTA KRESSE RAINA. (Max Kade German-American Research Institute Series.) University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press. 2006. Pp. xvi, 272. Cloth \$75.00, paper \$25.00.

CARIBBEAN AND LATIN AMERICA

DE LA VEGA, GARCILASO. *Royal Commentaries of the Incas and General History of Peru: Abridged*. Translated by HAROLD V. LIVERMORE. Edited by KAREN SPALDING. Foreword by KAREN SPALDING. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 2006. Pp. xxx, 232. Cloth \$45.00, paper \$16.95.

MACHADO, MARIA HELENA P. T., editor. *Brazil through the Eye of William James: Letters, Diaries, and Drawings, 1865–1866 Bilingual Edition / Edição Bilingüe*. Translated by JOHN M. MONTEIRO. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2006. Pp. 230. \$29.95.

STEALEY, JOHN E. III. *Porte Crayon's Mexico: David Hunter Strother's Diaries in the Early Porfirian Era, 1879–1885*. Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press. 2006. Pp. xv, 1085. \$65.00.

YUPANQUI, TITU CUSI. *History of How the Spaniards Arrived in Peru: Dual-Language Edition*. Translated by CATHERINE JULIEN. Foreword by CATHERINE JULIEN. Indianapolis: Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 2006. Pp. xxxix, 180. Cloth \$45.00, paper \$16.95.

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The following books were recently received in the *AHR* office. Books listed here do not include works scheduled for review.

METHODS/THEORY

- GALLOWAY, PATRICIA. *Practicing Ethnohistory: Mining Archives, Hearing Testimony, Constructing Narrative*. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press. 2006. Pp. 454. \$24.95.
- HADOT, PIERRE. *The Veil of Isis: An Essay on the History of the Idea of Nature*. Translated by MICHAEL CHASE. Cambridge: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 2006. Pp. xii, 399. \$29.95.
- HART, JONATHAN. *Interpreting Cultures: Literature, Religion, and the Human Sciences*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2006. Pp. xi, 340. \$75.00.
- ANG, KAREN. *Chaos and Cosmos: On the Image in Aesthetics and Art History*. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 2006. Pp. xiii, 295. Cloth \$55.00, paper \$24.95.

COMPARATIVE/WORLD

- AHLQUIST, KAREN, editor. *Chorus and Community*. Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 2006. Pp. x, 323. Cloth \$65.00, paper \$30.00.
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- IRIBIESCAS, RICHARD G. *Men: Evolutionary and Life History*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2006. Pp. 306. \$28.95.
- ARLISLE, RODNEY P., editor. *One Day in History: December 7, 1941*. Foreword by JOHN KEEGAN. (The Days That Changed the World.) New York: HarperCollins. 2006. Pp. xv, 272. \$24.95.
- ROMPTON, LOUIS. *Homosexuality and Civilization*. Paperback edition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. 2006. Pp. xv, 623. \$19.95.
- EL MAR, DAVID PETERSON. *Environmentalism*. (Short Histories of Big Ideas Series.) London: Pearson Education Limited. 2006. Pp. xvii, 214. £9.99.
- ICK, STEVEN J., and ROGER D. LAUNIUS, editors. *Critical Issues in the History of Spaceflight*. Washington, D.C.: National Aeronautics and Space Administration. 2006. Pp. xi, 659. \$25.00.
- KIRCH, A. ROGER. *At Day's Close: Night in Times Past*. Paperback edition. New York: W. W. Norton. 2006. Pp. xxxii, 447. \$16.95.
- INK, CAROLE, FRANK HADLER, and TOMASZ SCHRAMM, editors. *1956: European and Global Perspectives*. (Global History

- and International Studies.) Leipzig, Germany: Leipziger Universitätsverlag. 2006. Pp. 354. €22.00.
- GLAD, JOHN. *Future Human Evolution: Eugenics in the Twenty-First Century*. Foreword by SEYMOUR W. ITZKOFF. Schuylkill Haven, PA: Hermitage Publishers. 2006. Pp. 136.
- HANNAM, J. *Feminism*. (A Short History of a Big Idea.) London: Pearson Education Limited. 2007. Pp. xvi, 188. £9.99.
- KASSIMERIS, GEORGE, editor. *The Barbarization of Warfare*. New York: New York University Press. 2006. Pp. xii, 321. Cloth \$55.00, paper \$19.00.
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- LAZAR, ALLAN, DAN KARLAN, and JEREMY SALTER. *The 101 Most Influential People Who Never Lived: How Characters of Fiction, Myth, Legends, Television, and Movies Have Shaped Our Society, Changed Our Behavior, and Set the Course of History*. New York: HarperCollins. 2006. Pp. xiii, 317. \$13.95.
- LEBOR, ADAM. *"Complicity with Evil": The United Nations in the Age of Modern Genocide*. New Haven: Yale University Press. 2006. Pp. xx, 326. \$25.00.
- LOVE, RONALD S. *Maritime Exploration in the Age of Discovery, 1415–1800*. (Greenwood Guides to Historic Events, 1500–1900.) Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press. 2006. Pp. xxix, 195. \$45.00.
- MARKS, ROBERT B. *The Origins of the Modern World: A Global and Ecological Narrative from the Fifteenth to the Twenty-First Century*. (World Social Change.) 2d ed. Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield. 2006. Pp. xiv, 221. \$21.95.
- NAU, HENRY R. *Perspectives on International Relations: Power, Institutions, and Ideas*. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press. 2007. Pp. xxix, 401. \$46.95.
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REVIEWS

TO THE EDITORS:

While I am sorry to learn that Stephen Neff did not comprehend my book *The Art of Surrender: Decomposing Sovereignty at Conflict's End* (AHR, October 2006, 1142), I am more sorry that he has misrepresented some of the book's key passages and foci. One hopes that any reviewer will meet, and evaluate, a book on its own terms, rather than, as in this case, deride those terms at the outset. Perhaps the most egregious misrepresentation, and one that is emblematic, is Professor Neff's claim that the book "blithely states that surrender entails the 'unmitigated abjection' of the surrendering party." In fact, the relevant passage reads "An act of power transfer that appears to entail unmitigated abjection for the vanquished and glory for the victor, surrender actually comprises a complex configuration of social and cultural forms" (p. ix)—in other words, just the opposite of what Neff is claiming. This misrepresentation is sustained over the course of the review, a review in which the book's aim to sort through the variations of meaning and consequence of different surrenders is decisively ignored. No mention is made in the review of the book's major focus on the ways that historical surrenders have been represented, in paintings, photographs, memoirs, and maps, among other cultural objects. Clearly, these kinds of analyses are not of in-

terest to Neff, but as they are at the heart of the book's analysis, potential readers should be apprised of them. Finally, a point of fact: The book's analysis of the surrender of Breda correctly identifies the date as 1625 not, as Neff indicates in his review, 1667.

ROBIN WAGNER-PACIFIC

Stephen C. Neff does not wish to respond.

TO THE EDITORS:

Michael A. Barnhart's review of Paul A. C. Koistinen's *Arsenal of World War II: The Political Economy of American Warfare, 1940–1945* (AHR, October 2006, 1210–1211) contains surprising errors. The review opens with the "War Planning Board" meeting in October 1942 to consider the economic feasibility of military requirements. But what Barnhart describes is actually a meeting of the War Production Board, the central agency for directing war production and the focus of more than half of Koistinen's book. There was no such agency as the War Planning Board.

Other inaccuracies follow. President Franklin D. Roosevelt appointed the National Defense Advisory Commission, not "Council," on May 29, 1940 (nineteen days after Germany invaded the Low Countries and two weeks after it invaded France), not "in the summer of 1940." One of the commission's members was Harriet, not "Harriett," Elliott. Contrary to Barnhart's claim, Roosevelt did not select Donald Nelson to chair the commission—it had no chair, and that was one of its major problems. Koistinen spends three chapters on the commission.

None of these errors, which concern facts well known to scholars of the U.S. mobilization for World War II, appears in Koistinen's book. Such an unfortunate handling of the subject's basic facts cannot help but lessen confidence in the evaluative part of the review.

TERRENCE J. GOUGH
Arlington, Virginia

Michael A. Barnhart does not wish to respond.

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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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




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




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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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

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


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
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

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
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

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
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
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
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


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
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
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